R v Macaskill No. Sccrm-00-257 - [2003] SASC 61

R v MACASKILL
[2003] SASC 61
Trial by Judge Alone
Nyland J
The Charge

The accused is charged on information with the crime of manslaughter: s 13 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. The particulars of the charge against her are that on 24 September 1999 at Salisbury Downs or another place, she unlawfully killed Crystal Hayes. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against her. The accused was initially presented for trial by jury and a verdict of guilty was returned against her. The accused appealed against that conviction. On 21 December 2001, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a re-trial. The accused thereafter elected, pursuant to s 7(1) Juries Act 1927 (SA) to be tried by judge alone.
Onus of Proof
In considering the issues which arise for determination, I have at all times borne in mind that the accused does not have to prove her innocence. The accused is to be presumed not guilty of the charge against her unless and until I am satisfied of her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is for the prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty of the charge against her and nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt will do. It is not enough for the prosecution to show a mere suspicion of guilt or to show that the accused is probably guilty. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt also applies to each and every element of the offence charged against the accused.
If, in the course of these reasons, I indicate that I find something proved or I am satisfied about something, that means that I have done so beyond reasonable doubt.
Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence at the trial:
Travis Hayes - partner of the accused and father of Crystal.
Ann French – Mrs French knew both the accused and Hayes. Her son, Will, was a close friend of Hayes and Hayes visited her house several times a week.
Samantha French - daughter of Ann French.
Cheryl Smith - close friend of the accused. At the relevant time Mrs Smith had known the accused for about two years, although for a period she lost contact. She renewed a close association with the accused when Crystal was about three weeks old and regularly assisted the accused in the care of Crystal.
Janet Hasler - neighbour of the accused and nurse. Ms Hasler was summoned to the accused’s house to help when Mrs Smith found Crystal in a seriously ill condition on the evening of 24 September 1999.
Tammy Sims - neighbour of the accused.
Shirley Gower – Family and Youth Services (FAYS) Community Support Worker.
Gareth Kahl – was involved with the Para Districts Men’s Support Group. The group assisted men in dealing with anger and other emotional problems. He took Hayes to the group on a number of occasions.
Craig Winton - ambulance officer. Mr Winton attended at the accused’s home with another ambulance officer, John Graham, on the evening of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Macaskill No. Sccrm-00-257

Details

AGLC: R v Macaskill No. Sccrm-00-257 [2003] SASC 61
Case: [2003] SASC 61
Decision Date: 5 March 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Macaskill involved the accused, the mother of Crystal Hayes, who was charged with causing the death of her infant daughter. The court was tasked with determining the circumstances surrounding Crystal’s death on 24 September 1999, including her health history and the relationship dynamics between the accused and Travis Hayes, the father of the child. The prosecution argued that the accused was responsible for the fatal injury, while the defence contended that there was a reasonable possibility that Travis Hayes inflicted the injury. The court needed to assess the credibility of the witnesses, particularly Travis Hayes, and determine whether the prosecution had proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

The legal issues before the court were whether the accused was guilty of the alleged offence and whether the prosecution had established the necessary elements of the crime. The court had to evaluate the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution and consider whether it was consistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the accused’s guilt. Additionally, the court needed to examine the defence's argument that there was a reasonable possibility that Travis Hayes was responsible for the injury, and whether the prosecution had proven the necessary elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

The court found that while Dr. Keeley's evidence suggested that the injury occurred in the afternoon, other evidence indicated that Crystal was not behaving normally throughout the day. The accused and other witnesses provided accounts that suggested Crystal was unresponsive and ill for most of the day, which contradicted Dr. Keeley's understanding of the events. The court accepted that the accused's understanding of the events, combined with the other evidence, created a reasonable possibility that Travis Hayes was responsible for the injury. As such, the prosecution had not discharged its onus of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, leading to the court acquitting the accused.

The court ordered the accused to be acquitted of the charges brought against her due to the reasonable possibility that Travis Hayes was responsible for the injury to Crystal. The court's decision was based on the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable hypothesis presented by the defence that Travis Hayes inflicted the injury.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Travis Hayes was a critical witness in the prosecution case and it will be necessary to examine his evidence in some detail. I will therefore address his credibility later in these reasons. I indicate, however, that, as far as the remainder of the witnesses were concerned, I thought each of them did the best he/she could to give truthful evidence. Some witnesses had difficulty in recalling details of some of the relevant events but, in my view, that was understandable given the circumstances and lapse of time since Crystal’s death. I have indicated in a discussion of the evidence of the various witnesses those matters upon which I thought a particular witness was mistaken or gave evidence upon which I could not rely.Background: In order to determine what happened to Crystal on 24 September 1999, it is necessary to consider the evidence relating to her health prior to that date and also some of the evidence concerned with the relationship between Hayes and the accused. Unless otherwise indicated, the following history of relevant events represent findings as to facts. The accused was the mother of Crystal Hayes and Travis Hayes (Hayes) was her father. Crystal was born prematurely at the Modbury Hospital on 15 June 1999. She was approximately three months old at the date of her death. Crystal’s feeding problems Crystal was discharged from Modbury Hospital on 6 July 1999. Throughout her short life, Crystal suffered from a number of health problems, most of which related to feeding difficulties. On 12 July 1999, the accused took Crystal to see Dr Baran, a medical practitioner practising at Paralowie. She was presented by the accused for feeding difficulties, which the accused reported had started when she had returned home from hospital. Dr Baran provided a script for Olac which was a lactose free formula. On 15 July 1999, Margaret Heath, a registered nurse in the employ of Child and Youth Health spoke to the accused on the telephone as a result of a referral by the midwife at the Modbury Hospital. Ms Heath asked the accused how she was getting on with the baby. The accused described Crystal continuing to have feeding problems. Ms Heath gave the accused some advice and suggested that she return to see Dr Baran. The accused took Crystal back to see Dr Baran on 27 July 1999. Crystal was on Infasoy at that visit. She had only gained 120 gms in three weeks, which Dr Baran said indicated a failure to thrive. Dr Baran therefore referred the accused to Dr Jaensch, a paediatrician. Dr Jaensch saw Crystal on 27 July 1999. She described her as looking “lean and scrawny”. She said she looked tense and unsettled. She responded to handling and gentle talking quite well. Her skin was a bit dry but she did not have any rashes or bruises. The tone was mildly increased in her arms and legs, which can indicate that the baby is a bit tense. Dr Jaensch decided to admit Crystal to the Modbury Hospital for failure to thrive. There were no indications of trauma, bruising or ill-treatment. Underweight was the only concern. Crystal was admitted to Modbury Hospital on 28 July 1999 where she remained until 3 August. Dr Jaensch said that while Crystal was at Modbury Hospital there was no indication of any metabolic disease that would indicate any reason for failure to thrive or low weight gain.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

If all three elements are proved beyond reasonable doubt, the fact that Crystal’s death was neither contemplated nor desired by the accused would not be an answer to the charge.Circumstantial evidence The prosecution case against the accused is circumstantial as there is no direct evidence of any person having witnessed the alleged offence. Instead the prosecution relies upon evidence of circumstances surrounding the alleged offence from which I am asked to infer beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the person who committed it. It is therefore necessary for me to decide what facts I can accept as established by the evidence and then consider what inference or inferences I am prepared to draw from the facts which I find established. In considering whether I accept that a particular fact has been established I am entitled to take into account the whole of the evidence. In considering the circumstantial evidence, however, I must have regard to the possibility that the evidence does not necessarily point to guilt. I am not able to return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the accused is guilty of the offence. In other words, before I can be satisfied that the accused is guilty, I must be satisfied not only that her guilt is a rational inference, but that it is the only rational inference that the circumstances I find proved enables me to draw.The Defence case The defence case is that there is a reasonable possibility on the evidence that Travis Hayes inflicted the injury to Crystal. There is therefore a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence and the accused should be acquitted. The defence further submitted that even if I found the accused had committed an unlawful act with respect to Crystal, the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that any such act was dangerous.The credibility of the witnesses Travis Hayes was a critical witness in the prosecution case and it will be necessary to examine his evidence in some detail. I will therefore address his credibility later in these reasons. I indicate, however, that, as far as the remainder of the witnesses were concerned, I thought each of them did the best he/she could to give truthful evidence. Some witnesses had difficulty in recalling details of some of the relevant events but, in my view, that was understandable given the circumstances and lapse of time since Crystal’s death. I have indicated in a discussion of the evidence of the various witnesses those matters upon which I thought a particular witness was mistaken or gave evidence upon which I could not rely.Background: In order to determine what happened to Crystal on 24 September 1999, it is necessary to consider the evidence relating to her health prior to that date and also some of the evidence concerned with the relationship between Hayes and the accused. Unless otherwise indicated, the following history of relevant events represent findings as to facts.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, and most significantly, the defence suggested that Dr Keeley’s opinion that the injury had not happened earlier in the day was based on a flawed understanding of Crystal’s history for that day. Dr Keeley’s opinion was based on the premise that Crystal was normal throughout the day. On the defence case, Crystal was far from normal when the accused phoned Mrs Smith at 1.19 pm. The accused had contacted Mrs Smith for help as a result of Hayes having done something to Crystal that morning. The evidence of other medical witnesses left open the possibility of Crystal having been injured in the morning. There was therefore a reasonable possibility that Hayes was the person responsible for the injury to Crystal. On that basis the prosecution had failed to discharge its onus and the accused should be acquitted.Conclusion Dr Keeley was an impressive witness and I accept his evidence as to the rapid onset of symptoms after infliction of injury. His opinion that Crystal suffered the injury in the afternoon was, however, based upon his understanding that Crystal had not exhibited any unusual signs in the course of the morning, apart from the typical feeding difficulties she had displayed since birth. From his discussion with the accused, Dr Keeley understood that Crystal was exhibiting “hungry signs, awake, crying, moving about, looking as if it was hungry” when the accused attempted to feed her on two occasions prior to at least 11.30 am. As he said, he was left with the impression that she was “… irritable but otherwise a normal baby …”. I accept Dr Keeley’s opinion that those matters would be inconsistent with an injury inflicted in the morning. There is, however, other evidence which suggests that Crystal was not behaving normally, apart from her usual feeding problems, in the course of the day. The police asked the accused about Crystal’s demeanour when she tried to feed her and the accused said “… she’s always alert but this no she wasn’t no she wasn’t herself”. She described her as “limp and unresponsive”. Crystal was with the accused at the FAYS office at about 11.30 am. If Crystal had been exhibiting hungry signs and crying and irritable that morning as Dr Keeley understood to be the case, it is surprising that Ms Gower did not hear Crystal making any noise at the office. More significantly, Mr Graham and Mr Winton, the two ambulance officers, recorded in the history they obtained at the house before Crystal was taken to hospital, that Crystal had been “non responsive for most of the day” and that she had been “quite flat all day, quite ill, for most of the day”. Although Mrs Smith did not describe anything out of the ordinary in her telephone conversation with the accused, she recalled that the accused was upset with Hayes and that she had referred to him having done something to Crystal that morning. Nevertheless if Crystal was exhibiting symptoms of being “in deep trouble” as Dr Keeley suggested would have been the case if the injury had been inflicted in the morning, it does seem surprising, as the prosecution suggest, that the accused did not express a greater degree of urgency in the conversation with Mrs Smith or do anything about getting help from someone else. This must, however, be looked at against the background of Crystal’s feeding difficulties, the accused’s obvious limitations as a caregiver, and some of the medical evidence which suggests a difficulty for non‑medical people in immediately recognising symptoms associated with this sort of trauma.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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