R v Lavery
[2017] VSC 587
•28 September 2017
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S CR 2017 0036
| THE QUEEN |
| v |
| CHRISTOPHER JOHN LAVERY |
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JUDGE: | WEINBERG JA |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 24, 26-28 & 31 July, 3, 7-11, 14-17, 21-23 & 25 August 2017 |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 28 September 2017 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | R v Lavery |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2017] VSC 587 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Murder – ‘Cold case’ - Premeditated killing – Victim stabbed in neck and body burned – Motive for killing financial gain – Absence of remorse – Prospects of rehabilitation said to be good – Relative youth of offender at time of offending – Sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 21 years.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Dr N Rogers SC with Mr D Brown | Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr S Johns | Galbally & O’Bryan |
HIS HONOUR:
Christopher John Lavery, after a trial lasting several weeks, you were convicted last month of the murder of James Russouw. It is now my duty to sentence you for that offence.
Circumstances of offending
James Russouw was murdered a few minutes after 11:00 pm, on the night of 7 March 2008. He was stabbed to death, while seated in the driver’s seat of his Jeep Cherokee, which was parked at that time at the East Burwood Reserve. The cause of death was a single stab wound to the neck, inflicted by a Wiltshire Staysharp kitchen knife. The stab wound had been inflicted from behind, with what must have been considerable force, as it penetrated right through the neck from back to front. Thereafter, Mr Russouw’s body was set alight and burnt beyond recognition.
The evidence was that, at about 11:03 pm on that night, Mr Russouw’s car was captured on CCTV arriving at the East Burwood Reserve. There was a passenger in that vehicle. Self-evidently, given the timing of events, the passenger must have been the murderer. The jury, by their verdict, plainly concluded that you were that person.
You and Mr Russouw had been friends for some time. You both attended Whitefriars College, in Donvale. For a considerable time, you had both dealt in cannabis. It seems that Mr Russouw trafficked in greater quantities of that drug than did you. However, the evidence suggests that you too sometimes dealt in substantial quantities. Mr Russouw was sourcing the cannabis primarily from a dealer in Sunshine, and on-sold it to friends and others. You also sold cannabis to friends and others.
It seems that, in the latter part of 2007 and early 2008, there was something of a shortage of cannabis in Melbourne. The Crown case was that Mr Russouw was anxious to obtain a substantial quantity of that drug in order to maintain supply to his regular purchasers.
The Crown alleged that you had made it known to Mr Russouw, on the day in question, or perhaps somewhat earlier, that you could obtain for him a significant amount of cannabis, perhaps of the order of five pounds or so. It was further alleged that you arranged to meet him at the East Burwood Reserve on the night in question, where the sale would take place. The Crown submitted that, based on the evidence as a whole, Mr Russouw must have had on him something like $13,000 in cash that evening in order to pay for that amount of cannabis.
Moments after entering the Reserve at 11:03 pm, Mr Russouw’s Jeep pulled up at a parking bay, a few metres from a score board, adjacent to a sporting oval. The Crown alleged that, suddenly, and without the slightest warning, you stabbed him from behind, as previously described.
Mr Russouw died almost immediately. You then laid his body across the front seat of the vehicle, and somehow manoeuvred his upper half over on to the front passenger side, partly under the handbrake. You then doused his body with petrol. You had brought that petrol with you, contained in a Décor drink bottle.
You left the rear passenger door slightly ajar. You sprayed petrol along a five metre trail, from the rear of the vehicle to the drink bottle, which you then placed on the ground. You set fire to that petrol trail. Plainly, you did so in such a manner as to avoid endangering yourself from the fire.
Perhaps you thought that the Décor bottle, being burnt, would leave no trace of your involvement. That was a misjudgement on your part, as you left your palm print on the bottle. Ultimately, many years later, your carelessness in that regard contributed to your undoing.
In the days immediately following Mr Russouw’s murder, police interviewed many of his known associates. The investigation drew a complete blank. You, having been a friend of Mr Russouw’s, and one with whom he had been in telephone contact on the day of his death, were questioned by police. You denied any involvement in his murder.
You told police that, at the time Mr Russouw was killed, you were at the cinema at Forest Hill Chase, watching the movie Rambo III. The evidence was that the film began a few minutes after 9:00 pm, and finished shortly after 11:00 pm. You said that you had sat through the entire movie. Having regard to the fact that Mr Russouw was murdered between about 11:03 pm and 11:20 pm, it would have been impossible for you to have been his killer. In other words, you relied upon an alibi as a complete defence.
The Crown alleged that you had planned this murder with some care, though it could not say precisely how long it had been in contemplation. You had, earlier that day, arranged with a friend, known in this trial as Witness A, to accompany you that night to Forest Hill Chase, and to see the movie with you. You offered him $150 to do so. You told him, in advance, that you would leave the cinema during the course of the movie. You instructed him to remain behind until the movie was over. You gave detailed instructions as to what route he should take when he eventually left the complex. Once you were in the cinema together you told him to swap clothes with you. That was so that, in the event someone resembling you was seen leaving the cinema, you could attribute the identity of that person to Witness A. Accordingly you would be able to maintain your claim that you had remained in the cinema for the entire duration of the film.
According to Witness A, you left the cinema about half an hour into the movie. He said that shortly thereafter, he fell asleep. When he awoke, the movie was still showing, but you had not returned. He tried to call you on your mobile phone. The records showed that this call took place at 10:59 pm. You did not answer.
Witness A said that he then went home, but met up with you again later that night. He described how the two of you had returned, in your car, to Forest Hill Chase, in order to retrieve your jacket, which he had earlier received from you. It seems that he had left it behind when he departed from the complex.
Afterwards, you threw out Witness A’s clothing, that you had previously worn. Of course, you were no longer wearing those clothes by this stage.
Witness A testified that after the murder, perhaps a day or two later, he visited you at your unit in Blackburn. You admitted to him then that you had killed Mr Russouw. You gave him a large wad of cash which, he assumed, you had taken from Mr Russouw. You threatened Witness A, and his family, saying that you would kill them if he did not support the alibi that you had contrived regarding having been at the movies together, at the time of Mr Russouw’s murder.
Within days, Witness A was questioned by police. Having regard to your earlier threats, he at that stage supported your alibi. As far as the police were concerned that more or less put you in the clear. The investigation continued for a number of years, on a sporadic basis, with many false leads. It was scarcely surprising that it got nowhere.
In 2016, police decided upon a new tack. They offered a sizeable reward, far greater than the amount originally available, to assist in solving what was by now a cold case. They arranged for up to $1 million to be paid to anyone providing information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person or persons responsible for Mr Russouw’s murder. Considerable publicity, including widespread television coverage, was given to this reward in March 2016.
Police were aware from the earliest stages of the investigation that someone, almost certainly the killer, had telephoned Mr Russouw from a public phone box at the Kmart Plaza in Burwood. This was clear from telephone records showing a call from that public phone to Mr Russouw’s mobile phone at precisely 10:54 pm, some nine minutes before his car was seen entering the East Burwood Reserve.
The television coverage of the $1 million reward included CCTV footage of a man approaching the public phone box, and making the 10:54 pm call to Mr Russouw. The Crown alleged that whoever made that call must have arranged with Mr Russouw to meet him shortly afterwards, at or near the Reserve. That was because, the moment he answered the call and spoke to the caller, he changed his plans for the rest of the night, and headed in the opposite direction from where he was supposed to be going. Instead, he drove directly towards the Reserve.
In March 2016, a former close friend of yours happened to see that CCTV footage as part of the television coverage being given to the reward. It struck him, for whatever reason, that the figure shown at the public phone resembled you. He noted, in particular, that the person there depicted wore his clothing in a distinctive style, typical of the way that you were known to have dressed during that particular period. That former friend contacted police, and passed on that information.
It was that former friend’s act that led police, years after the murder, to re-visit the events of the night in question. Naturally enough, they focused upon you, and your alibi. They approached Witness A at his home and questioned him. On this occasion, he resiled from what he had told them back in 2008. He said that the alibi upon which you had relied had been concocted, at your instigation. He also told them that you had admitted to him that you had murdered Mr Russouw.
At this stage, the police had the basis of a solid, but not necessarily overwhelming, case against you. However, that case took on a new light when, having been told by Witness A that you had confessed to the killing, police carried out a further examination of the burnt remains of the Décor drink bottle that had been retained over the years. The police were well aware that there was a palm print on that bottle. However, they had no idea, in 2008, to whom that palm print belonged. It seems that, for whatever reason they had never previously tested your palm print against the palm print on that bottle. They had obviously formed the view that, given your ‘rock solid’ alibi, you did not have anything to do with Mr Russouw’s death.
After your arrest, police obtained your palm print and, for the first time, compared it with the palm print on the burnt remains of the Décor bottle. The palm prints were a match. Your alibi had by this stage largely unravelled.
Over time, the Crown case became increasingly more compelling. For example, CCTV footage that had been taken at the Kmart Plaza in Burwood, at 10:56 pm on the night of 7 March 2008, showed a distinctive and unusual late 1980s white Honda Legend, with a sunroof, being driven out of the car park. This was only two minutes after the 10:54 pm telephone call from the public phone booth at Kmart Plaza to Mr Russouw’s mobile phone.
It just so happened that you were the owner of precisely such a vehicle back in March 2008. You told police, when interviewed at that time, that the car could not be driven. You maintained that story when interviewed again in April 2016, after your arrest. However, police were able to turn up various witnesses who recalled that you were driving that car at about that time. Even worse from your point of view was that there was a photograph, taken in November 2007, that showed you in close proximity with the Honda Legend, in circumstances where it could plainly be inferred that the car could be driven.
In addition, police examined phone records, tracing calls made from Witness A’s mobile phone on the night of 7 March 2008. Your story of having been seated next to him throughout the entire showing of the film was effectively blown out of the water when those records revealed that Witness A had telephoned you at 10:59 pm while the film still had a few minutes to run. You, of course, did not answer that call. The explanation that you proffered to the jury, through your counsel, as to why Witness A would have telephoned you when ostensibly you were seated together in the cinema, namely to help you locate your mobile phone (which you claim to have lost sometime earlier that night) must have struck the jury as entirely implausible.
Clearly, the jury, by their verdict, accepted Witness A as a witness of truth. Equally clearly, they rejected your evidence to the effect that the alibi upon which you relied was truthful. Your counsel suggested that Witness A had perjured himself in order to gain the $1 million reward that was being offered. However, he swore that he knew nothing about any such reward when the police approached him in 2016. He said that the matter of Mr Russouw’s murder had been preying on his mind for a long time, and that he had finally decided to tell the truth. Tellingly, however, he did not go to the police. Rather, they came to him. That gave his evidence something of a ring of truth.
Clearly, the only issue in this trial, so far as the charge of murder was concerned, was whether the Crown had established that you were James Russouw’s killer.
Relevant sentencing principles
Murder is, of course, the most serious crime known to our law. It carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. All murders are grave offences, but some are worse than others. Your crime represents a most serious example of this offence.
The learned prosecutor submitted, on the plea, that Mr Russouw’s murder should be viewed as an ‘execution’. That seems to me to be an apt description of what you did. She also submitted that it was an aggravating feature of your offence that you killed Mr Russouw for financial gain. Your counsel submitted that I should not be so satisfied. I will return to that issue shortly.
The Crown case throughout was that it should be inferred that Mr Russouw intended, on 7 March 2008, to purchase a significant quantity of cannabis. Evidence was called from a number of witnesses, friends of Mr Russouw, to the effect that he had spoken, at about that time, of acquiring a substantial amount of cannabis in the near future.
The evidence suggested that, in 2008, the price of five pounds of cannabis would have been about $13,000. Logically, Mr Russouw would have been expected to have had that amount of cash on him when he met a supplier of that drug at the Reserve that night. There was evidence that Mr Russouw had previously engaged in deals of that kind, at that location, though generally involving lesser quantities of cannabis.
There was also evidence that, after Mr Russouw’s murder, police found some $60,000 in cash in his bedroom. This suggested that he might well have had a significant amount of cash on him on the night he was killed.
The Crown led evidence that you, Mr Lavery, had, over a period of time, incurred significant gambling debts, which you were struggling to repay. It was suggested that you had a powerful motive to kill Mr Russouw in order to rob him of the cash that you fully expected him to have in his possession at the Reserve that night.
The Crown submitted that this was a cold-blooded, premeditated, and carefully planned killing, described, as I have said, as an ‘execution for gain’. In that regard, it was submitted that it should be viewed, in terms of objective gravity, as well above the usual ‘run of the mill’ examples of murder.
The Crown argued that, by approaching Witness A as you did, and arranging to have him support your contrived alibi, you showed yourself to be a particularly callous person, whose offending warrants both denunciation, and severe punishment.
The Crown noted that you were probably not aware, on the night of the murder, that there would be CCTV footage of the public phone box at the Kmart Plaza. You had no idea that, years later, one of your former friends, on seeing that footage, would identify you to police as the person making the call to Mr Russouw. You also had no idea that there would be CCTV footage of a white Honda Legend leaving the car park two minutes after that call had been made.
Not surprisingly, there was little that your counsel could say, on the plea, on your behalf, by way of mitigation. He accepted that this was a particularly serious example of the crime of murder. He recognised that there were a number of aggravating factors present, none of which could be played down. If, as the prosecution submitted, you killed Mr Russouw in order to steal his cash, that had to be a particularly aggravating feature.
Your counsel accepted that other aggravating factors present included the planning that had obviously gone into this murder, as well as the breach of trust involved. You used your long-standing friendship with Mr Russouw to encourage him to let down his guard. In addition, it is well established that the fact that you burnt his body after you stabbed him to death constitutes a significant aggravating factor.[1]
[1]See DPP v England [1999] 2 VR 258 (Brooking JA) discussed below.
The one contentious factual issue that was raised before me on the plea was whether I should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you killed Mr Russouw for financial gain. I am so satisfied, as I believe were the jury. The evidence points strongly in that direction. You fully suspected that Mr Russouw would have, in his possession, at the Reserve, a significant amount of cash. There was no cash ultimately found at the scene. However, you had a large wad of cash with you in the aftermath of the murder. According to Witness A, you handed that cash over to him for safekeeping, and he ultimately gave most of it back to you. I can think of no reasonable explanation for your having set out to kill Mr Russouw, as you did, other than in pursuit of gain.
Accordingly, I find that this killing was carried out for profit.
Your personal background
You are currently 31 years of age. You have no prior convictions, and no subsequent matters of any relevance. You are entitled to call these matters in aid. Although the evidence shows that, as a young man, you sold modest quantities of cannabis to a group of friends, over a significant period, I am prepared to treat you as someone with an otherwise unblemished character, whose conduct in relation to this offence was out of character. Your prospects of rehabilitation seem to me to be good, and I do not think you will reoffend after your eventual release from prison, many years from now.
You were born in Australia in 1986. At the age of two, your family moved to South Africa, your father’s homeland. In 1997, your parents’ marriage ended. You returned to Melbourne with your mother and younger brother. Your father followed some time after that.
Between Years 7 and 10, you attended Whitefriars Catholic College, in Donvale. You then moved on to Box Hill Secondary College. You left there during Year 12, and worked in landscaping. You returned to school in 2006, successfully completing Year 12 at Forest Hill Secondary College. The fact that you were able to complete Year 12 studies was to your credit.
In early 2007, you entered into a relationship with a young woman who gave evidence during the course of this trial. That relationship lasted for a number of years. Up until 2007, you had been living with your father. You moved into a caravan with your girlfriend for a short time, before you both moved into your mother’s house. You then shifted into the unit in Blackburn, where you were living at the time you committed this offence. Your relationship with your girlfriend ended in 2014.
In late 2007 and early 2008, you worked in various casual jobs. Subsequently, in 2009, you studied for a Personal Care Accreditation. From 2010 until 2015, you were employed as a personal carer in various nursing homes. You seem to have had a solid work history throughout that period.
In 2015, after the breakup of your relationship, you moved to Cairns. At the time of your arrest in April 2016, you were working as a sleep technician at night, and a car wash attendant during the day. You seem to have had a good work record in Queensland. Certainly, there is nothing adverse known about you throughout the entire period from 2008 to 2016.
You were only 22 at the time of the commission of this offence. Even at 31, you are a relatively young man. It is well established that youth can be a significant mitigating factor. The fact that you committed this offence at the age that you did entitles you to some consideration in that regard.
In R v Mills,[2] Batt JA set out the principles governing youth as a factor in sentencing. He noted that the youth of an offender, particularly a first offender, should be a primary consideration for a sentencing court. He added that, in such cases, rehabilitation is usually far more important than general deterrence.
[2][1998] 4 VR 235.
The cases say that the reasons for according leniency to young offenders include their reduced culpability, by reason of their immaturity, and less than fully developed capacity to control impulsive behaviour. Of course, age in itself is not conclusive proof of immaturity, and there seems to have been little that could be described as impulsive associated with the commission of this offence.
Importantly, the general propositions stated in Mills are subject to a number of qualifications. As the level of seriousness of the criminality increases, there will generally be a corresponding reduction in the mitigating effects of youth, as such.
I accept, as the authorities state, that it is only in the circumstances of the gravest criminal offending, and where there is no realistic prospect of rehabilitation, that the mitigatory weight to be accorded to youth can be viewed as effectively extinguished.[3] In your case, the objective gravity of your offending is, as I have said, very great indeed. However, as I have also said, I think your prospects of rehabilitation are good. For that reason, specific deterrence is of less significance as a sentencing factor in your case than in many others. Of course, general deterrence remains an important consideration in the sentence that I will shortly impose.
[3]Azzopardi v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 43.
As far as current sentencing practice for murder is concerned, your counsel helpfully provided me with a number of recent examples of sentences for murder that have been imposed at first instance, and that have been considered on appeal, in this State. There are a number of other similar examples that can assist in establishing a reasonable range for offending such as yours. Because of your counsel’s reliance upon these supposedly comparable cases, these will be set out in an annexure to my reasons for sentence. It goes without saying that every case is different, and that the actual sentences imposed in other cases can provide at best only a rough guide to what might be regarded as the appropriate range for this offence.
There is, however, one very recent decision of the Court of Appeal regarding current sentencing practice for murder to which I should specifically refer. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Semaan,[4] delivered on 21 September 2017, the Court upheld a Crown appeal against a sentence for murder of 22 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years. The case concerned an offender who, while high on methamphetamine (‘ice’), shot a friend from close range to the back of the head.
[4][2017] VSCA 261.
Unlike your case, there was no indication in Semaan of any significant degree of premeditation. The crime was a spontaneous, and utterly senseless, killing. The offender had a number of significant prior convictions, including for violence, and was on parole at the time of the offending. He pleaded not guilty, and showed no remorse. He had long standing mental health issues. His prospects of rehabilitation were said to be poor.
The Court of Appeal held that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. It allowed the appeal and increased the sentence to 28 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 24 years. The Court observed that the killing was unprovoked, cold-blooded and carried out in a callous, almost detached manner. It said that, although one might readily conceive of worse cases, the offender’s crime was a serious example of the crime of murder, which might properly be characterised as falling into the upper boundary of ‘mid-range’.
Interestingly, the Court went on to consider whether the offender’s post-offence conduct in inventing a fictitious defence, and taking steps to falsify the crime scene, amounted to an aggravating feature that had an impact on moral culpability. It indicated that the better view was that such conduct did not, on its own, constitute an aggravating factor. It noted, however, that other post-offence conduct, such as the mutilation of a corpse, fell into a different category. It referred in that regard to Director of Public Prosecutions v England,[5] where Brooking JA made it clear that the burning of a corpse, after the murder had taken place, fell into a different category. In his Honour’s view, such conduct would unquestionably constitute an aggravating factor of the kind that could properly be taken into account when assessing the gravity of the offence.
[5][1999] 2 VR 258.
The case of Semaan confirms what I think the various examples of sentences for murder set out in the Annexure also illustrate, namely that sentences for murder have increased somewhat over recent years. Your offence has a number of aggravating factors not present in Semaan. However, you can call in aid some mitigating factors that were not available to the respondent in that case.
I note that the Sentencing Snapshot for murder, produced by the Sentencing Advisory Council for the years 2009 to 2014, indicates that the median length for non-life sentences was something like 20 years’ imprisonment. The most common head sentence was between 20 and 21 years’ imprisonment. Of course, these figures probably distort the length of sentences actually imposed for murder throughout that period. That is because they exclude those cases of life imprisonment for that offence, of which there were 13 out of 129 (10 percent) in that time.
Victim Impact Statements
There were four Victim Impact Statements tendered on the plea. These were from Mr Russouw’s parents, Cecil and Lorna Russouw, his brother, Craig, and his sister, Aimee. They are powerful and moving documents. They all speak, in one way or another, of the heartbreak that the family has suffered as a result of your actions, and the life-changing effect that the loss of a loved son and brother has had on their lives.
Cecil Russouw speaks of the pain and trauma of burying his son, as well as the feelings associated with being unable to have protected him from harm. Lorna Russouw writes of her depression and anxiety that the loss of her son has caused her, the difficulties she has in concentrating, and her ongoing feelings of frustration and anger. Craig writes of the periods of insomnia, depression and anxiety that he has suffered, and speaks poignantly of the promise that his brother showed as a musician. Finally, Aimee writes of the lasting pain that her brother’s murder has caused her, and the irreplaceable bond she had with him.
I trust that you now understand how much pain and suffering you have caused by what you did.
Conclusion
Yours was a cold-blooded, planned and quite brutal killing. It warrants strong condemnation by this Court, as well as the imposition of just and severe punishment. You took the life of your friend who had done nothing to offend you, or warrant, in any way, your actions. You did so for base purposes, namely material gain.
Doing the best I can to weigh appropriately the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case, the Court sentences you to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment. I fix a non-parole period of 21 years.
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Annexure A
Case Sentence on murder charge Plea of guilty/Trial Comments R v Athanasi (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341 Athanasi — 24 years with non-parole period of 19 years. Trial Contract killing. Cavki — 25 years and six months’ imprisonment, with non-parole period of 21 years and six months. Clarke — 28 years and six months’ imprisonment, with non-parole period of 23 years and six months. R v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219 21 years’ imprisonment, with non-parole period of 17 years. Trial Applicant shot and killed wife, concealed remains for a number of years until discovered by a third party. R v Tang [2010] VSC 604 20 years’ imprisonment, with non-parole period of 16 years. Late plea of guilty (third day of trial) Deceased suffered significant blunt force trauma to head and her body was incinerated. Bui v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 93 24 years’ imprisonment Trial Applicant convicted of murder, kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment and conspiracy to murder. R v Borg [2013] VSCA 181 28 years’ imprisonment Trial Respondent shot and killed victim, dismembered body and put in tubs of acid to conceal crime. R v Stoneham [2013] VSC 661 19 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 14 years and six months Plea of guilty Man stabbed former girlfriend, premeditated attack, remorse, no history of violence, mental illness at time of offence. Xypolitos v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 423 27 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 24 years. Trial Applicant was victim's de facto stepfather. Killed victim with hammer in a spontaneous attack. Giles v R [2014] VSCA 183 26 years’ imprisonment Trial Applicant and co-offender choked victim and incinerated body, before stealing items from victim’s house. R v Kerr [2015] VSC 249 21 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 16 years and six months. Guilty plea Assaulted and stabbed victim after fight.
Meade v The Queen [2015] VSCA 171 23 years’ imprisonment, with non-parole 19 years. Trial Premeditated murder of wife by former husband.
DPP appeal against sentence dismissed – sentence said to be ‘low’ but in range.
Spence v The Queen [2016] VSCA 113 27 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole of 22 years. Trial Applicant suspected deceased of informing on him to police about illicit drug activities. Applicant drove deceased, with others, to rural location on pretext and killed him. DPP v Browning [2016] VSCA 153 21 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 16 years Trial Applicant stabbed wife after marriage breakdown. Ryan, Lindholm & Trabert v The Queen [2016] VSCA 255 Ryan — 31 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 26 years Trial Premeditated killing arising out of breakdown of relationship and property dispute. Lindholm — 25 years’ imprisonment with NPP 21 years Guilty plea Trabert — 28 years’ imprisonment with NPP 23 years Trial R v Banek [2017] VSC 11 23 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 18 years Plea of guilty (early) Accused murdered former ex-wife, relative youth and reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. R v Pain [2017] VSC 454 23 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 18 years Trial Accused incorrectly believed wife and son-in-law were having affair, shot son-in-law.
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