R v Langi (No 2)
[2021] ACTSC 239
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
| Case Title: | R v Langi (No 2) |
| Citation: | [2021] ACTSC 239 |
| Hearing Date: | 3 September 2021 |
| Decision Date: | 15 September 2021 |
| Before: | Mossop J |
| Decision: | See [56] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and punishment – sentence – aggravated burglary – upper mid-range of objective seriousness – arson with intent to endanger life – mid-range of objective |
| seriousness – found guilty at trial by jury – where association with | |
| an outlaw motorcycle gang was a motivating factor for the | |
| offending – limited criminal history – guarded prospects of | |
| rehabilitation due to ongoing association with outlaw motorcycle | |
| gang – reparation order – sentences of imprisonment imposed | |
| Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 117 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 7, 11, 33(1)(k) 35, 35A, 36, 37 Crimes (Sentencing) Amendment Bill 2013 (ACT) Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 45A, 312 |
| Cases Cited: | R v CA (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 371; 316 FLR 49 R v Hines (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1273 R v Sharp [2019] ACTSC 175 R v Sidaros (No 6) [2021] ACTSC 24 RP v R [2015] NSWCCA 215; 90 NSWLR 234 |
| Parties: | The Queen (Crown) Aofangatukau Langi (Offender) |
| Representation: | Counsel |
| A Williamson (Crown) T Taylor (Offender) | |
| Solicitors | |
| ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) | |
| Hugo Law Group (Offender) | |
| File Number: | SCC 142 of 2020 |
| MOSSOP J: | |
| Introduction |
1. On 22 April 2021, at the conclusion of a 9-day trial, a jury found the offender, Aofangatukau Langi, guilty of the following counts:
(a) Count 1: aggravated burglary contrary to s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT); and (b) Count 2: arson with intent to endanger life, contrary to s 117(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). 2. Both counts were offences of joint commission with unnamed “others”, by virtue of s 45A
of the Criminal Code.
3. The maximum penalty for aggravated burglary is a fine of $320,000, 20 years’
imprisonment or both. The maximum penalty for arson with intent to endanger life is
25 years’ imprisonment.
4. At the commencement of the joint trial, the offender’s co-accused, Christopher Millington,
pleaded guilty to a joint commission charge of aggravated burglary. At the end of the trial, the jury found him guilty of arson with intent to endanger life and discharging a loaded arm so as to cause reasonable apprehension for safety, as well as a charge of attempting to destroy or conceal evidence.
| Facts | |
| 5. | On 21 November 2019 at approximately 10:45pm three or four intruders, including Mr Langi and Mr Millington approached the house where Alexander Miller lived in Kambah. Both Mr Miller and his partner, Natasha Rayner, were at home at the time and the front door was locked. The intruders kicked in the front door. At least one of them had a handgun. Mr Miller and Ms Rayner went into the bathroom. Ms Rayner lay down in the bathtub. As Mr Miller and Ms Rayner hid in the bathroom, the front door came off |
| its hinges and the intruders entered the house (count 1 – aggravated burglary). | |
| 6. | An audio recording during the home invasion from a covert listening device inside the |
| house recorded one of the intruders saying “come out cunt”, followed shortly after by “fuck it, discharge at him”. The gun was discharged and a 0.32 calibre bullet was | |
| recovered by AFP forensic officers in the doorframe between the bathroom and laundry, at the entrance to the hallway. | |
| 7. | The intruders then poured petrol around the lounge room, near the entertainment unit |
| and in the dining room. The audio records someone saying “light it up”, before the petrol was lit and the intruders left the house (count 2 – arson with intent to endanger life). | |
| Mr Miller and Ms Rayner subsequently exited the bathroom, fled into the backyard through a bedroom and called the ACT Fire Brigade. | |
| 8. | As a result of Mr Millington’s plea of guilty and the jury’s verdict, it is established that Mr Millington and Mr Langi were two of the intruders. The jury’s verdict in relation to |
| count 2 also establishes that in forming the agreement to destroy or damage property by fire, Mr Langi and the other party or parties to the agreement had the intention of endangering the life of another person by fire. Having regard to the background to the offending described next and what can be heard on the audio, the agreement related to endangering Mr Miller and existed at the time the fire was lit. | |
| 9. | This offending occurred in the context of a long running dispute between Mr Miller and members of the Comanchero outlaw motorcycle gang and, specifically, a personal dispute between Mr Millington and Mr Miller. In mid-2017 Mr Miller joined the Comancheros as a patched member. In the course of his membership, Mr Miller met and spent time with Mr Millington and Mr Langi. Mr Miller saw the co-offenders at club events, |
| socialised with them and texted often. At the time Mr Millington had the status of a “hang around” in the Comancheros, which was a precursor to formal membership. Mr Langi | |
| was a patched member of the gang. The evidence is not sufficient to establish beyond | |
| reasonable doubt that he was, at the time of the offending, the “sergeant-at-arms” of the | |
| gang. However, on 7 December 2019, approximately two weeks after the offending, it is established that he held that position. He is to be sentenced on the basis that he was a member of the gang senior enough to occupy the position of sergeant-at-arms very shortly after the offending. | |
| 10. | In April 2019 Mr Miller was effectively kicked out of the Comancheros for “not showing loyalty” when he falsely stated in a bail application that he was no longer a Comanchero. |
| He instead became a patched member of the Nomads outlaw motorcycle gang. After | |
| several months he became the sergeant-at-arms of the Nomads’ ACT Chapter. As a | |
| result of both his bail application and patching over to a rival gang, Mr Miller was subject | |
| to retaliation by Comancheros for having left in “bad standing”. | |
| 11. | On 3 September 2019 Mr Millington sent some messages to a friend of Mr Miller which |
| referred to Mr Miller as a “gronk” and a “dog”. In response, Mr Miller blew up | |
| Mr Millington’s Mercedes-Benz. Mr Miller drove to Mr Millington’s house and poured fuel | |
| over his car, lit it and drove away. Mr Miller then texted Mr Millington photographs of his car on fire. There was some exchange about the two men meeting at Kambah Pool, although this never eventuated. There was some further back and forth between Mr Miller and Mr Millington over text messages throughout September and into October 2019. | |
| 12. | A covert listening device placed in Mr Millington’s Mazda 6 prior to the November 2019 |
| home invasion recorded Mr Millington and Mr Langi discussing Mr Miller and potential | |
| plans to attack him. These plans involved an attack on Mr Miller’s home, including kicking | |
| the door in, the use of a weapon, setting the property on fire and doing so when Mr Miller | |
| was at home. The recordings demonstrate the level of animosity on Mr Millington’s part directed at Mr Miller. A recording from 6 November 2019 records Mr Millington stating “I want to fuck him up so he has to live with it man … cut his fucking fingers off man, cut | |
| do [sic] his two fingers off. He’s not going to pull a gun like this cunt.” Mr Langi does little | |
| talking during these recorded exchanges, but he occasionally joined in. | |
| 13. | There were a number of aspects of the facts relevant to the assessment of objective seriousness which were the subject of competing submissions. |
| 14. | Premeditation: The issue here was whether or not the intercepted conversations on 6 and 7 November 2019 between Mr Millington and Mr Langi were sufficient to demonstrate that the home invasion had been planned for a period of two weeks prior to the incident occurring. It was uncontroversial that the home invasion must have involved some premeditation in that the burglars were equipped with balaclavas, an accelerant, a firearm and approached the house from an adjoining street. The only issue was the extent of the pre-planning. The feature of the intercepted conversations was that Mr Millington did most of the talking. The communications were of ideas or wishes rather than any particular plan. While there was discussion of the possibility of a home invasion at that time, it is not possible to say that it had extended beyond the general idea of a home invasion. There is no evidence of, for example, detailed reconnaissance or other planning in the period between those intercepts and the incident. Thus, while there must have been some pre-planning, it is not a case where the evidence establishes detailed and methodical pre-planning of a criminal enterprise. The features of the home invasion identified above are, however, sufficient to demonstrate some pre-planning and exclude the possibility that it was a spur of the moment decision. |
| 15. | Motivation: So far as motivation to carry out the offending is concerned, the offender |
| submitted that the motive for the offending was not anything to do with the offender’s | |
| membership of the Comancheros motorcycle gang, as opposed to being in retaliation for | |
| the victim having torched Mr Millington’s motor vehicle shortly beforehand. I am satisfied | |
| beyond reasonable doubt that both matters contributed to the motivation for the offending. In light of the fact that the offender was a senior member of the Comancheros at the time of the offending, that the victim had left the Comancheros in bad standing and had joined a rival motorcycle gang and that Mr Millington was also an associate of the | |
| Comancheros, I am satisfied that these were matters which contributed to the offender’s | |
| decision to be involved in the attack. In my view, it would be wrong to characterise the | |
| conduct as divorced from the offender’s association with the Comancheros even if it | |
| cannot be established that the sole or principal motivation was as a Comancheros “hit”. | |
| 16. | Number of weapons: The issue was whether or not there were one or two firearms involved. In the facts that I have set out earlier, I have found only one firearm to have been involved. That is because while there was some competing oral evidence in relation to this issue, the evidence was not sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that that there was more than one firearm involved. |
| 17. | Discharge of the firearm: The issue in relation to the discharge of the firearm was how, if at all, that might be considered to be an aggravating factor in relation to the aggravated burglary, in circumstances where the accused was not convicted on a charge of discharging a loaded arm so as to cause another person reasonable apprehension for his safety. It was uncontroversial that a firearm was discharged. On this issue, I am satisfied that the discharge of the firearm is an aggravating factor but only because it was a possible consequence of the agreement to participate in the aggravated burglary involving the weapon and not because it has been established that Mr Langi agreed to the discharge it in any particular manner or with any particular consequence. |
Objective seriousness
18. The aggravated burglary had the following features. It occurred at night. It was both in company and with an offensive weapon. There were at least three people involved in the actual entry to the building. The entry into the building involved physically breaking through the door. The offensive weapon was a firearm which was loaded. The firearm was discharged during the course of the burglary. The offending involved the aspects of
pre-planning set out at [14] above. The offending was influenced, in part, by Mr Langi’s and Mr Millington’s association with the Comanchero outlaw motorcycle gang and the enforcement of its culture, as well as Mr Millington’s desire for revenge. The offending
was at the upper end of the mid-range of objective seriousness.
19. In relation to the arson, the jury’s verdict necessarily involved a finding that there was an
agreement to endanger the life of a person. The arson involved the spreading of an accelerant within the house. That use was hurried rather than carefully planned and comprehensive. The fire caused very substantial damage to the inside of the house. It is only good fortune that the individuals in the house were not physically harmed. The offending was in the mid-range of objective seriousness.
Subjective circumstances
20. The offender is presently 32 years old. He was 30 years old at the time of the offending. He is of Tongan descent. He was born in Australia. His mother died when he was 13 years old. His father is still alive. He has an older and younger sister and a younger brother. He remains close to his father.
21. He completed year 11 at school in Sydney. After that he worked in the construction industry in Canberra. Prior to his incarceration, he was earning good money in the construction industry as a form-worker.
22. He denied any misuse of alcohol or illicit substances. While in the community he was a churchgoer. He is in good physical and mental health.
23. Unfortunately, he is a member of the Comancheros outlaw motorcycle gang. He was a senior figure within the ACT Chapter at the time of the offending. He is proved beyond reasonable doubt to have been the sergeant-at-arms of that group within two weeks of the offending.
24. He has been incarcerated in the New South Wales (NSW) prison system. There have been restrictions within the prison system as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Those difficulties extended to difficulties that the authors of the pre-sentence report had in contacting him by telephone. The author of the pre-sentence report dated 1 September 2021 had not been able to contact Mr Langi since 17 May 2021.
Criminal history
25. Mr Langi has a limited criminal history that includes four convictions for driving while suspended and a conviction for affray.
Time in custody
26. Mr Langi has been in custody since 19 February 2020. His sentences will be backdated to take that period into account.
Assistance with the administration of justice
27. Counsel for Mr Langi submitted that a lesser penalty should be imposed upon the offender than would otherwise have been imposed because of the degree of assistance provided in the administration of justice. Section 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) gives a discretion to the court to make such a reduction in sentence. Assistance in the administration of justice is defined to include pre-trial disclosure by the defence. It is defined to exclude matters covered by ss 35 and 36 of the Act.
28. The matters said to constitute assistance in the administration of justice were:
(a)
The Agreed Statement of Facts relating to outlaw motorcycle gangs which became exhibit 21.
(b)
The offender agreeing that he was a participant in the covertly recorded conversation in the Mazda, avoiding the need for the police to call evidence from the surveillance officers and adduce CCTV footage.
(c) Agreement that evidence that Mr Millington’s Mercedes was set alight on 3 September 2019 could be led through the informant.
(d) Agreement as to the provenance of CCTV footage from an adjoining street in Kambah. (e) Agreement as to the provenance of the CCTV footage from the house adjacent to the alleyway which captured the intruders as they left and returned to their vehicle. (f) Agreement that the homeowners whose houses captured relevant CCTV footage were not required to be called to establish continuity of the evidence. (g) Agreement that “many witnesses” need not be called in the Crown case. 29. The offender submitted that a discount of 10 per cent of the overall sentence would be appropriate in those circumstances.
30. Leaving aside the Agreed Statement of Facts, the various agreements referred to were not made explicit at the trial and were not the subject of evidence. The precise extent of the utilitarian value of the various matters was not made clear. It was not clear how many witnesses were not required to be called or how long their evidence would have taken if they were required to be called. However, counsel for the Crown did not contest that the various agreements had been reached and accepted that they were matters that did have some utilitarian value.
31. Counsel for Mr Langi referred to the explanatory statement for the Crimes (Sentencing) Amendment Bill 2013 (ACT) which provides as follows:
New section 35A allows a court to impose a lesser penalty, including a shorter non-parole period, on an offender than it would otherwise have imposed having regard to the degree of assistance provided in the administration of justice. The provision is designed to encourage cooperation in ensuring that the trial is focused as efficiently as possible on the real issues in dispute. The provision will extend to allowing a reduced sentence to be imposed where an offender, while maintaining a not guilty plea through to trial, has nevertheless facilitated the administration of justice through pre-trial disclosures, disclosures made during trial or otherwise.
32. The relevant part of the explanatory statement also provides:
An example is provided in the new section of the type of matter that may be considered by the court as assisting in the administration of justice; an admission made by the defence pre-trial or during a trial.
A similar provision exists in New South Wales in section 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The case law that exists on this provision in New South Wales will serve as a guide to the ACT judiciary in applying new section 35A.
33. The amending act also inserted a reference to s 35A in s 37 of Crimes (Sentencing) Act, which requires the court to state the penalty that it would otherwise have imposed and inserted what became s 33(1)(k) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, which requires regard to be had to any assistance by the defence in the administration of justice.
34. The terms of s 35A are not confined. Clear examples of conduct which may fall within it are provided by the example to paragraph (1)(b), an admission and by the definition of assistance in the administration of justice which is defined to include pre-trial disclosure by the defence. It is sufficiently broad to include an agreement that certain issues need not be formally proved as no point will be taken about them.
35. There is no limitation on the operation of the provision that would exclude from its scope actions which in fact assist the administration of justice even though there may be a forensic benefit to the offender which was gained by that assistance: see RP v R [2015] NSWCCA 215; 90 NSWLR 234 at [94]. However, where such a forensic benefit is present there is less need for incentives to be given for such assistance.
36. The statute provides that the penalty cannot be reduced to a degree whereby it is unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence: see s 35A(3) of Crimes (Sentencing) Act. The reduction could not appropriately exceed the lower limits that an offender might receive if he entered a plea of guilty: see R v Hines (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1273. The lower limit of such a reduction is 5 to 10 per cent.
37. In my view, it is appropriate to make a reduction in the sentence to be imposed upon the offender in relation to matters (b)-(g) (set out at [28] above). The reduction should, in my view, be a modest one. So far as (a) is concerned, while it would be open to make a reduction in sentence where there is agreement to facts that would otherwise have to be proved by the Crown, indeed, this is an obvious example where the incentive given by the section is significant, in this case the agreement as to facts must be seen in context. That context includes a pre-trial application brought by the Mr Langi challenging the admissibility of the report of Anthony Macken. This was resolved after written submissions had been prepared and filed by both parties on the basis that there would be an agreement as to certain facts. Although there may have been some utilitarian value in relation to the trial, it is not a matter in relation to which the purpose of the provision compels a reduction in the sentence. Rather, it is one in relation to which Mr Langi has pursued his own self-interest both in making the application and agreeing to the
statement of facts. That Mr Langi’s agreement might have shortened the trial (as
opposed to the pre-trial proceedings) was an incidental consequence and not one which
warrants a discount in sentence.
Comparable cases
38. The Crown provided a table of cases summarising sentences imposed in the ACT, NSW and Victoria for charges involving aggravated burglary, arson and associated charges. They included R v Sharp [2019] ACTSC 175 (Sharp) and R v Sidaros (No 6) [2021] ACTSC 24 (Sidaros). Sharp involved pleas of guilty to an act endangering life, arson and possess a firearm. The offender was a nominee or prospect of the Comancheros. The offender poured and ignited fuel on vehicles in front of a house, the fire damaging the front door. He fired two shot gun rounds from the driveway towards the front window. The starting points for the sentences were act endangering life: four years, arson: three years and six months, possess firearm: 12 months. Because he pleaded guilty, the offender received reductions of approximately 20 per cent on those sentences. The aggregate sentence imposed was six years and eight months.
Sidaros involved a nominee of the Comancheros. In company with others, he attended
the victim’s house. Petrol was poured over a number of vehicles and near the entry to
the house and gunfire was exchanged with the victim resulting in the victim losing a finger. The petrol was ignited. The cars burnt but the house did not catch on fire. The offences were offences of joint commission except for a charge of dishonestly riding in a motor vehicle without consent. He was found guilty after a trial. The sentences imposed were as follows: attempted arson with intent to endanger life, six years; aggravated burglary, three years; intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm, four years; arson, four years; dishonestly riding in a motor vehicle without consent, 18 months. A sentence of 21 days was also imposed for a transfer charge of failing to property store ammunition which the offender pleaded guilty to after the trial. The head sentence was nine years and nine months.
40. I take into account each of the sentences referred to in the table, although the two that I have described in more detail are of particular relevance, having regard to them involving Comanchero-related violence.
Evidence of Dr Andrew Ellis
41. Two reports of Dr Andrew Ellis, a forensic psychiatrist, which were prepared for Legal Aid NSW on 9 April 2020 and 29 August 2021, were tendered by Mr Langi. Those reports describe in general terms the likely impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic upon prisoners in NSW. The more recent report relates to restrictions that arise out of the outbreak of the Delta variant of COVID-19 within the prison system. The restrictions have an effect on the physical conditions in which prisoners are held, access to exercise, access to training and education programs, access to medical care and mental health treatment. These reports provide a factual basis for a conclusion that in general terms prison conditions are likely to have generally adverse consequences for prisoners, at least in the near future. The evidence does not establish that the offender has any specific vulnerability as a result of these conditions, the pre-sentence report describing him as not reporting any mental health issues.
Reparation order
42. The Crown sought a reparation order in favour of the insurer of the owner of the premises that were burnt. The amount sought was $26,084. This figure was arrived at by dividing the total repair cost of the damage occasioned to the premises of $104,336.73 by four, representing the four people who were involved in the incident.
43. The figure of $104,336.73 was arrived at by adding up the four payments made to the owner of the property (which did not include any GST component) and a payment made to the builder who assessed the costs of repairs (from which the GST component was excluded). However, the figure included (precisely where it is not clear) an amount of $1000 which was the excess payable by the owner. Given that the reparation order is sought in favour of the insurer rather than the owner, the excess payable by the owner should not form part of the reparation order calculation. Therefore, the appropriate starting figure is $103,336.73.
44. Counsel for the offender made no submissions against the making of such an order. In
particular, he did not contend that the loss of the insurance company was not a “direct
result” of the commission of the arson offence: cf R v CA (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 371; 316
FLR 49.
45. I have marked for identification the email correspondence between the parties and the court on 6 and 7 September 2021 in relation to the application for a reparation order.
46. I am satisfied that in the circumstances it is appropriate to make a reparation order in favour of the insurer. Allocating responsibility for the damage amongst the number of persons involved is favourable to the offender. I will make an order in the sum of $25,834.18, which is one quarter of $103,336.73.
Consideration
47. At the trial, counsel for the offender announced to the jury:
Let me make no bones about it. Mr Aofangatukau Langi, my client, is now and was then in November 2019 a member of the Comanchero motorcycle club. He was in common
parlance, everyday speech, a bikie. He remains a bikie …
48. As I have indicated earlier in these reasons, the motivation for the attack included both hostility towards Mr Miller as a result of his departure from the Comancheros in bad
standing, as well as revenge for the damage done to Mr Millington’s motor vehicles by
Mr Miller.
49. Both aspects of the motivation for the offending indicate that specific and general deterrence must be prominent considerations in sentencing. Community protection is also a significant sentencing consideration where members or associates of outlaw motorcycle gangs commit serious offences.
50. Notwithstanding the limited criminal history, the association with the Comanchero outlaw motorcycle gang which, so far as the evidence discloses, is ongoing, indicates that Mr Langi is a person of bad character and has, at best, guarded prospects of rehabilitation. They may be assessed as being guarded rather than poor because Mr Langi is still a relatively young man, has not previously been imprisoned and has a supportive family who support him but not his criminal activity. There remains, therefore, the possibility that whatever outward stance he adopts while in custody, there is some prospect that he may not continue his outlaw motorcycle gang association upon his release from custody. The likelihood of that possibility manifesting itself is something that cannot be assessed at this stage.
51. Counsel for the offender submitted that an intensive correction order (ICO) would be an appropriate disposition if the sentence for each offence was four years or less. He submitted that if that was the case then, having regard to the matters set out in s 11(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, an ICO would be an appropriate disposition. He submitted that a condition compelling non-association with members of outlaw
motorcycle gangs would permit some control over the offender’s principal criminogenic
factor, namely, membership of the Comancheros. He submitted that would be a more beneficial outcome than full-time custody having regard to the difficulties of achieving parole, and hence having a period of supervision in the community, if the offender remained a member of the gang.
52. I am not satisfied that this is a case in which an ICO would be appropriate. First, the length of the sentences that I will impose precludes the making of such an order. Second, even if the individual sentences were within the range of sentences permitted to be the subject of an order, the factors in s 11(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act would all tend against the making of an order. Third, the making of an order would not adequately achieve the purposes of sentencing, including those in s 7(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. Fourth, having regard to his ongoing membership of the Comancheros, any condition precluding association with members of an outlaw motorcycle gang would most likely be practically ineffective.
In assessing the length of the offender’s terms of imprisonment, I have taken into account
the reports of Dr Ellis and that there have been and are likely to continue to be some increased restrictions in place in the NSW prison system as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
54. The sentence on the charge of arson will be imprisonment for five years and nine months. On the aggravated burglary charge, it will be four years and nine months. The sentences will be cumulative as to 18 months but otherwise concurrent. This gives a head sentence of seven years and three months.
55. In relation to the non-parole period, it is important to note that the principal criminogenic
risk is the offender’s involvement with the Comanchero outlaw motorcycle gang. Apart
from that, he is still relatively young, has the capacity for stable employment and a supportive family on his side. Any ongoing involvement with the Comancheros is likely to be a significant impediment to release upon parole. In my view, the non-parole period ought to be set in a way which maximises the incentives to cut ties with the gang. It will therefore be at the shorter end of the usual spectrum. Whether the offender is motivated to, or able to, conduct himself in a way which is conducive to being granted release on parole is up to him. The starting point will be 52 months, approximately 60 per cent of the head sentence. It will be reduced by two months under s 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, giving a non-parole period of four years and two months.
Orders
56. The orders of the Court are:
1. On the charge of arson with intent to endanger life (CC2020/2485), the offender is:
(a) Convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for five years and nine months, commencing on 19 February 2020 and ending on 18 November 2025. (b) Required to make reparation to AAI Limited trading as AAMI (AAMI claim number H029819983; Payment Reference Number 5510298199800220) in the sum of $25,834.18. 2. On the charge of aggravated burglary (CC2020/2483), the offender is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for four years and nine months commencing on 19 August 2022 and ending on 18 May 2027.
3. The non-parole period commences on 19 February 2020 and ends on 18 April 2024.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six [56] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Mossop.
Associate:
Date: 19 October 2021
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