R v Lam No. Sccrm-99-106 Judgment No. S288
[1999] SASC 288
•20 July 1999
R v LAM
[1999] SASC 288
Court of Criminal Appeal: Doyle CJ, Bleby and Wicks JJ
DOYLE CJ. This is an application for leave to appeal against sentence.
The applicant sought leave to appeal on 12 different grounds. One of those was abandoned. The applicant then sought to add two further grounds, the grounds then numbering 13 in all.
The judge before whom the matter came referred one ground, ground 5, for consideration by the Court of Criminal Appeal. He refused leave to appeal on all other grounds.
By application dated 28 June 1999 the applicant applied to have determined by the Full Court his application for leave to appeal on grounds 3(i) and (ii), 8, 10 and 13. The other grounds of appeal are now abandoned. The application was considered by the Full Court in private pursuant to Rule 15(7) of the Criminal Appeal Rules.
The application was considered by a court comprising Bleby J, Wicks J and me.
In relation to ground 3(i) and (ii), we consider that the topic of the movement of money in and out of the bank accounts of the applicant was clearly relevant. So were the applicant’s explanations for the movements of that money. We consider that this ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success, and that leave to appeal should not be granted.
As to ground 8, we do not consider that it was necessary for the judge to give directions to the jury about the use to be made of the bank records. In our opinion the bank records were relevant to the movement of money in and out of the bank accounts of the applicant, and that was obvious. There was no need for the judge to assist the jury on the topic. This ground has no reasonable prospect of success, and we would refuse leave to appeal.
As to ground 10, the complaint is that the judge did not give the jury an appropriate direction in relation to identification evidence. But the case was conducted on the basis that there was no challenge to the relevant evidence identifying the applicant as a person who had been to the relevant motel. Under the circumstances there was no requirement to give that direction. This ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success, and we would refuse leave to appeal.
Ground 13 raises a suggested defect in the judge’s direction in relation to the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The judge had earlier adequately directed the jury on the matter. The passage complained of is awkwardly expressed but, in the context of the summing-up as a whole, could not have caused the jury any difficulty. This ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success, and we would refuse leave to appeal.
Accordingly, and for those reasons, we refuse leave to appeal on grounds 3(i) and (ii), 8, 10 and 13.
BLEBY J. I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice.
WICKS J. I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice.
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