R v Kremmer - [2000] NSWCCA 529

NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION: R v Kremmer [2000] NSWCCA 529 revised - 15/12/2000

FILE NUMBER(S):
60490/00

HEARING DATE(S): 28 August 2000

JUDGMENT DATE: 13/12/2000

PARTIES:
Regina v Paul James Kremmer

JUDGMENT OF: Studdert J Simpson J Dowd J

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 00/31/0064

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Coolahan DCJ

COUNSEL:
W. Dawe QC (Crown)
S. Rushton (Appellant)
I.D. Temby QC/P. Singleton (Victims Compensation Tribunal)

SOLICITORS:
S.E. O'Connor (Crown)
D.J. Humphreys (Appellant)

CATCHWORDS:
Criminal law
appellant charged with sexual offence
issues subpoena addressed to Victims Compensation Tribunal for production of documents
production of documents opposed
construction of Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996, s 84(2) considered.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act
Crimes Act
Criminal Appeal Act
Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act
Interpretation Act
Evidence Act
Victims Compensation Act
Criminal Procedure Act
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sentencing) Act

DECISION:
By majority, appeal dismissed; matter to be remitted to the District Court for further consideration by a judge of that Court consistent with the appropriate construction of s84(2).

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

60490/00

STUDDERT J
SIMPSON J
DOWD J
Wednesday 13 December 2000

REGINA v Paul James KREMMER

JUDGMENT

STUDDERT J: I have had the advantage of considering the judgment of Dowd J in draft form. I agree with what his Honour has written as to the second and third counts of appeal addressed in that judgment and I propose to consider only the ground of appeal identified by his Honour as the first ground of appeal. I do so because, regrettably, I have reached a contrary conclusion in relation to it.
Dowd J has fully stated the competing submissions of counsel on the hearing of the appeal and I shall not repeat what his Honour has written in identifying those submissions.
Section 84 of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 provides:
“(1) Despite any rule of law to the contrary:
(a) an application for statutory compensation, and
(b) any documents supporting the application (whether or not furnished when the application is lodged), and
(c) any transcript of evidence given to the Tribunal in a hearing of the application,
are not admissible in evidence against any person in criminal proceedings (other than criminal proceedings in which the applicant is the accused) arising from substantially the same facts as those on which the application is based.
(2) A person cannot be required (whether by subpoena or any other procedure) to produce any application, document or transcript of evidence that is not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings under subsection (1) in, or in connection with, any criminal proceeding.”
The appellant, having been charged with an offence under s 66C of the Crimes Act, issued a subpoena addressed to the Registrar of the Victims’ Compensation Tribunal requiring the production of the following:
“All records held by the Victims’ Compensation Tribunal in respect of:
(a) [DLR], date of birth 7 May 1986;
(b)[NMD], date of birth unknown but aged thirty-six years as at 24 August 1999;
(c)[SJD], date of birth unknown but aged forty-one years as at 24 August 1999.”
The Tribunal declined to produce the subpoenaed documents because of the provisions of s 84(2) set out above, and Coolahan DCJ ruled that the Tribunal was entitled to do so. This appeal concerns the correctness of such ruling, and the matter is before this Court after the District Court judge granted a certificate under s 5(3)(b) of the Criminal Appeal Act.
Hence this appeal concerns the proper construction of s 84(2) of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act. This sub-section was added to s 84 by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act in 1999. Prior thereto, s 84(1) stood alone, and it addressed the admissibility of documents in the following categories:
“(a)an application for statutory compensation;
(b) any documents supporting the application;
(c)any transcript of evidence given to the Tribunal on a hearing of the application.”
Section 84(1) provided that documents in categories (a), (b) and (c) were not admissible in evidence
“against any person in criminal proceedings (other than criminal proceedings in which the applicant is the accused) arising from substantially the same facts as those upon which the application is based.”
The only accused person against whom documents in any of those categories could be used was an accused person who had been the applicant for statutory compensation. Section 84(1) quite clearly prohibited the use of documents of the type identified for a criminal prosecution of any person other than such an applicant. The sub-section would not, however, have prevented access to documents for a legitimate forensic purpose: see as to this R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14, in particular at 22.
Whilst s 84(1) prohibited the evidentiary use of the documents categorised, upon its introduction s 84(2) was directed at the removal of any requirement to produce such documents in the circumstances addressed in the sub-section. A person cannot be required, by way of subpoena or otherwise, “in or in connection with any criminal proceedings” to produce any such documents if they are “not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings under sub-s (1).”
The crux of the appellant’s submission is that s 84(1) only prohibits the admissibility of documents in the defined categories against any person and does not prohibit such admissibility for any person. For example, the sub-section, it was submitted, does not prohibit the admission of such documents into evidence for a relevant purpose such as to challenge the evidence of an alleged victim. It was submitted that s 84(2) does not permit resistance to a subpoena or other procedure for the production of a document of the type identified where the production is called for by the person charged in the criminal proceedings.
Section 84(2) could have been more clearly expressed but I do not consider it ought to be construed in the manner for which the appellant contends. It is not, of course, for this Court to amend the sub-section, but rather to determine what Parliament meant by the language it employed. Spigelman CJ recently reviewed the relevant principles of statutory construction in R v Young (1998-99) 46 NSWLR 681 at paras 5-10. The Chief Justice said at para 6:
“In order to construe the words actually used by Parliament, it is sometimes necessary to give them an effect as if they contained additional words. This is not, however, to introduce words into the Act. This involves the construction of the words actually used…”
The sub-section in my opinion is to be construed as though the words “against any person” appear immediately before the words “in criminal proceedings”. The reference to “criminal proceedings under sub-s (1)”, appearing in s 84(2), is a reference to “proceedings against any person” where those words appear in sub-s (1).
I am fortified in the construction I have placed upon the sub-section by what was said when the relevant Bill was introduced. Because of the uncertainty created by the language which Parliament has used in the sub-section, I consider the operation of s 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 is enlivened and that it is legitimate in ascertaining the meaning of the sub-section to have regard to the Second Reading Speech of the Attorney General concerning the Bill introducing the sub-section. The introduction followed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Young (supra). In that case objection had been taken in the District Court to the production of documents on the ground of sexual assault communications privilege in reliance upon Div 1B of Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act, 1995. The District Court judge determined that Div 1B applied derivatively to the production of documents, but on appeal it was held that that Division did not apply to the production of documents. In the relevant Second Reading Speech, the Attorney General said:
“The Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Bill seeks to amend the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 by re-enacting the provisions of division 1B of part 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995, with modifications, in order to address issues arising out of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Young (1999) NSWCCA 166 and the experiences of those working with the privilege since the Evidence Act provisions were commenced. The principal purpose of the bill is to redress the finding of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Young’s case that the sexual assault communications privilege enacted in division 1B of part 3.10 of the Evidence Act did not apply to the production of documents by subpoena…”
The Attorney General later proceeded:
“It has become apparent that it is relatively common for defence counsel in sexual assault matters to seek access to material used in an application for victims compensation. This material may include information arising from a counselling relationship. A cognate amendment to the Victims Compensation Act seeks to categorically close this avenue of investigation. I commend the bill to the House.”
The construction which I perceive to be the correct construction of the sub-section is thus consistent with a stated object of the statute by means of which it was introduced.
In my opinion, the District Court judge was correct to conclude that the Tribunal was not required to produce documents in the categories addressed in s 84 and the matter should be remitted to the District Court for further consideration by a judge of that Court consistent with the appropriate construction of s 84(2).
It does not follow from what I have said that s 84(2) would relieve the Tribunal of the requirement to produce any documents in respect of the three persons named in the subpoena. The categories of documents identified in s 84 are confined to any application for statutory compensation and any documents supporting such applications and any transcript of evidence given to the Tribunal on hearings of any such applications. There may well be documents outside those categories which should be produced. However, this would be a matter for the primary judge to determine.
I would propose the following orders:
1. Appeal dismissed;
2.Matter to be remitted to the District Court for further consideration by a judge of that Court consistent with the appropriate construction of s 84(2).
SIMPSON J: I agree with the judgment of Studdert J.
DOWD J: This is an appeal by an accused person under s5F(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, concerning the construction of s84 of the Victims Compensation Act 1996, which since 14 July 2000 is called the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (‘the Act’), Coolahan DCJ the trial judge having certified that the judgment was a proper one for determination by this court on the ground that consideration should be given to the proper construction of the s84(2) of the Act. It is in my view, a proper matter for this court to determine.
Section 84 of the Act is in the following terms:
Section 84 Inadmissibility of certain evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings
(1) Despite any rule of law to the contrary:
(a) an application for statutory compensation, and
(b) any documents supporting the application (whether or not furnished when the application is lodged), and
(c) any transcript of evidence given to the Tribunal in a hearing of the application,
are not admissible in evidence against any person in criminal proceedings (other than criminal proceedings in which the applicant is the accused) arising from substantially the same facts as those on which the application is based.
(2) A person cannot be required (whether by subpoena or any other procedure) to produce any application, document or transcript of evidence that is not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings under subsection (1) in, or in connection with, any criminal proceeding.
The appellant in these proceedings had been charged with one count of sexual intercourse with a child between the age of ten and sixteen years, contrary to s66C of the Crimes Act 1900.
On 11 April 2000, the appellant issued a subpoena for production, requiring the Registrar of the Victims Compensation Tribunal to produce documents, being “all records held by the Victims Compensation tribunal in respect of (persons who were children at the time of the offences, whose initials I shall use to describe them, thus);
(a) DLR, date of birth 7 May 1986
(b) NMD, date of birth unknown, but aged thirty-six as at 24 August 1999; and
(c) SJD, date of birth unknown but aged forty-one years as at 24 August 1999.
The Tribunal opposed production of the subpoenaed documents on the basis that s84(2) of the Act provided a blanket prohibition against production.
On 2 June 2000, Coolahan DCJ, sitting at Newcastle, accepted the argument advanced by the Tribunal, and thus did not require production of the documents the subject of the subpoena. The Tribunal had conceded that the appellant had had a legitimate forensic purpose for requiring production.
His Honour, in declining to order production of the documents, said in relation to s84 of the Act, that he found the section “sloppy”, but that he should interpret it to give effect to the intention of the Attorney-General’s Second Reading Speech, introducing the Bill, without His Honour specifying what he perceived that intention to be, other than, that the tribunal was not required to produce the documents.
It was noted by Coolahan DCJ that, in the vast majority of cases of this sort, complaints are late and are uncorroborated, and that the accused’s only means of investigating the veracity of the complaint, is to compare what was said by the complainant on other occasions to other people.
The procedure followed before His Honour was somewhat unusual, in that a blanket non-production order was made without the benefit of an affidavit being filed setting out material which may or may not be claimed to be within the terms of s84(2) of the Act.
His Honour made a number of comments of an uncomplimentary nature about the whole Victim’s Compensation Scheme.
Grounds of Appeal
In the first ground of appeal, the appellant contends that s84(2) of the Act is designed to protect the accused and not the victim of an act of violence, and thus the section does not prevent an accused from issuing a subpoena to the tribunal or any other person, requiring production of documents caught by s84(1) of the Act, in order that access be permitted for valid forensic purposes.
The appellant’s alternative submission is that Schedules 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communication Privilege) Act 1999, insofar as both schedules purport to cover protected confidences, as defined by s148 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, are mutually inconsistent. Section 150 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, would, consequent upon the amending Act, permit production and the adducing of evidence with leave in relation to a protected confidence, s84(2) of the Victims Compensation Act 1996, as introduced by the amending Act, would prohibit the production of such material, and therefore, s84(2) must be read subject to the rights created by s150 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
The third ground of appeal is that the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sentencing) Act 1999, to the Criminal Procedure Act, impliedly repealed s84(2) of the Victims Compensation Act, to the extent that it applies to protected confidences.
First Ground of Appeal
It is submitted by the appellant that s84 does not prohibit evidence of the class referred to, that is; that the application, documentation supporting the application, and the transcript of evidence at the hearing, being made available to an accused person as the section only provides that the documents are not admissible against the perpetrator of an offence although they may be admissible against a claimant victim if, for instance, false evidence is being put forward in a claim by the victim who is thus being charged, or there is a conspiracy to produce and receive a false claim.
It is therefore argued that s84(1) does not prevent the admission into evidence of the material described if it is not to be admitted against an accused, and thus s84(1) does not prohibit the admission of the specified material, as such. It is further argued that s84(1) of the Act does not prevent the use of any material provided to the Tribunal being used for legitimate forensic purposes.
It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the effect of the decision of Coolahan DCJ is that as a consequence alone of being submitted to the Tribunal, that the application, supporting material and transcripts are stamped with immunity from production, even if the material might assist the accused to defend himself or herself.
The appellant contends that His Honour’s construction of the section denies an accused access not only to material which is a “protected confidence” within the meaning of s148 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, in relation to sexual assault offences, but to any material provided to the Victims Compensation Tribunal, in relation to an application for compensation, whether the violence involves sexual assault or otherwise.
It is also argued for the appellant that s84(2) is not limited as suggested by the Preamble to the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act, to preserve the confidentiality of counselling communications in sexual assault offences. A preamble to an Act which also amends a series of cognate Acts, does not assist very much in the interpretation of the specific amendments in the cognate Acts. Section 84(2) of the Act covers applications, documents and transcripts in respect of all offences giving rise to a claim for compensation. The long title to the amending Act clearly does not specifically relate to the cognate amendment to the Act.
It is further submitted that the prohibition in s84(2) of the Act is not absolute. The legislature chose not to do so, thus, it is argued for the appellant that documents may be admissible in evidence at a trial of the accused, provided that the documents are not sought to be admitted “against” the accused. They may provide a basis for cross-examination or other proper forensic purpose.
It is further submitted by the appellant that His Honour’s judgment gives no meaning to the words “….is not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings under ss(1)…”, and it is submitted that all words must prima facie be given some meaning and effect: Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405, at 414. It is thus submitted that it was not open to His Honour to rely on the Attorney-General’s words, as the words in the Act have a clear meaning. The appellant asserts that this is particularly so when the wording of the legislation is consistent with procedural fairness to the accused: Re Bolton; ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, at 518.
It is argued to the contrary, on behalf of the Tribunal, that s84(2) provides a blanket prohibition against production, but only against documents falling within paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s84(1) of the Act. It is noted that the material subject to the prohibition is not all material provided, since the words “in respect of” the Victims Compensation Act application is used, but only “documents supporting the application”. Therefore, documents which come into existence independently, can still be subpoenaed from any other source, even though a copy may be made and sent to the Tribunal.
It is further submitted on behalf of the Tribunal that the words of s84(2) of the Act could not be clearer; that is, that a person cannot be required “whether by subpoena or any other procedure” to produce.

It is submitted on behalf of the Tribunal that the Parliament had intended to block access to the material referred to in ss84(1), and that was done by enacting the same words as used in ss84(1), but has widened the words to insert “not admissible in evidence against any person in criminal proceedings”.
It is also submitted on behalf of the Tribunal that s84(2) of the Act is not about admissibility, but that it is about production and that s84(1) of the Act does not just deal with documents. It imprints documents of a particular category with a stamp of non-admissibility, where those documents would otherwise be sought to be admitted against an accused in criminal proceedings arising out of an injury. That is, s84(1) prevents material supporting the victim’s application for compensation being used against the perpetrator of the injury.
In my view, the difficulty about the framing of s84(2) of the Act is that s84(1) deals with documents not being admissible. Subsection (2) deals with documents at a time of production pursuant to a subpoena or other device which is not a time when adduction of evidence or admissibility of evidence is a relevant issue. Production of documents on subpoena is not an attempt to adduce or admit evidence, it is the making available of material in proceedings for examination by either or both parties. Admissibility is not to the point in issue at that time.
Before its amendment, by the addition of s84(2), the clear intention of s84(1) was that the section only applied to admissibility of evidence, and did not cover other procedures, such as a subpoena or a call to produce. The section also dealt with criminal proceedings only, first, against any accused person arising from substantially the same facts as those on which the application is based, secondly, proceedings of a criminal nature brought against the applicant for compensation. There was no prohibition on the production of documents pursuant to a subpoena or call to produce in any civil proceedings or in any proceedings before a Tribunal or any other body with power to issue subpoenas, or for that matter, in any criminal proceedings brought against the applicant for compensation.
There was no prohibition in s84(1) of the Act on a document being admitted as evidence in favour of an accused or being used for cross examination or providing the accused with information that may lead to other avenues of inquiry, which may disclose information which may be established in some other admissible form: see R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14 at p 22 per Hunt CJ in CL.
It must be noted in terms of the interpretation of the new s84, that s84(2) relies primarily on subsection (1) for its meaning. Subsection (2) is directed towards subpoenas or other procedures and the fact of production, but is limited specifically to material that is not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings under subsection (1) ,that is, it relates to evidence sought to be admitted against an accused. It therefore does not vary in terms of subject matter from subsection (1), nor, does it prevent the use of subpoenas or other procedures to produce material which, in the case of proceedings against a person in criminal proceedings, may be sought to be admitted on behalf of that accused or defendant, and in the case of proceedings against the applicant for compensation, against that applicant.
To give meaning to the words “in, or in connection with, any criminal proceeding”, in s84(2) of the Act, would be to expand the prohibition on subpoenas and other procedures, to related inquiries such as disciplinary inquiries or civil proceedings arising out of or related to the same events, such as a claim for malicious prosecution.
In my view, whatever the expressed intention may be suggested in terms of the speech introducing the legislation, the section has a clearly defined meaning and does not need the assistance, in terms of the Interpretation Act (1987) or any other extrinsic document to assist in its interpretation.
Section 84 of the Victims Compensation Act 1996 covers matter of far wider import than the matters the subject of these proceedings, or s150 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, and applies to all applications for compensation.
The section therefore does not, by the addition of the subsection, lose its original character and clearly there has not been a clear legislative intention expressed to override procedural fairness to an accused.
His Honour’s finding that the section requires external reference to other documents for its interpretation, in any event, misconceives the nature of the assistance provided by the Attorney General’s Second Reading Speech, when introducing the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act 1999.
The Act amended the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, and also amends certain cognate Bills. The Second Reading Speech, related largely to the amendments to the Criminal Procedure (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act 1999 and the specific reference to the cognate bill, being an amendment to the then Victims Compensation Act 1996 at the end of that speech, in a few lines only, states merely that the intention was to seek to categorically close the avenue of investigation for the issue of subpoenas to examine material before the Victims Compensation Tribunal, and says little else.
The balance of the speech relates to the Criminal Procedure Act and the procedures which it sets up as a regime for the examination of confidential, privileged information. The fact that an introductory speech says that a Bill does something does not assist in the interpretation of a bill if the expressed words do not, in the bill itself, do what the introducer of the bill intends.
The very decision, R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR at 681, which led to the introduction of the bill, clearly sets out the very limited circumstances, as held by Spigelman CJ, whose judgment was supported by the majority of the judges in the court, the circumstances in which extrinsic material can be used to interpret a statute, in particular at page 686:
“In order to construe the words actually used by parliament, it is sometimes necessary to give them an effect as if they contained additional words. This is not however, to introduce words into the Act. This involves the construction of the words actually used. Judicial statements which appear to have been prepared to countenance something more than this, should be so understood.
The most frequently cited formulations are:
‘…It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do.’ Thompson v Goold & Co [1910] AC 409 at 420, per Lord Mersey; and
‘…we are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found with in the four corners of the Act itself.’ Vikers, Sons & Maxim Ltd v Evans [1910] AC 444 at 445, per Lord Loreburn LC.
To similar effect is the following formulation:
‘Additional words ought not to be read into a statute unless they are required in order to make provision intelligible.’ Wills v Bowley [1983] 1 AC 57 at 78B.
The process by which words omitted by inadvertence on the part of the draftsperson may be supplied by the court, must remain capable of characterisation as a process of construction of the words actually used.”
And further at p 690:
“The two techniques of construction to which I have referred- reading down general words and giving words an ambulatory construction- are based on the text. In my opinion, there is no warrant for supplying omitted words, unless the result of some such recognised technique of construction can be so described.
It is not, in my opinion, appropriate to take an expression of intention from extrinsic materials to supply the omission by the draftsperson, when the result cannot reasonably be deduced from the words actually used by a recognised technique of construction.”
In my view, the amendment to s84 of the Act does not come within those circumstances.
The words “admissible in evidence” disclose a clear legislative intention to protect the accused charged of an offence, the offence giving rise to a victim’s compensation claim. There is, therefore, no expressly legislative prohibition against the subpoenaed material which may be used by an accused. Clearly, an accused does not seek to admit evidence against his or her own interest.
An accused may therefore use any material, either within the prohibited categories or any other material not within those categories. Section 84(2) of the Act deals with the subpoena or any other means of a requirement to produce documents, and incorporates the following: “any application, document or transcript of evidence”. These three categories are qualified by the adjectival clause “that is not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings under s(1)”. Therefore, the prohibition under the subpoena or a call to produce or other such device is completely qualified by the phrase, and therefore, since an accused can require production of documents for the accused’s own forensic purposes. An accused’s requirement to produce cannot be in the prohibited category referred to in ss84(1), and therefore, an accused may require production of documents under s84(2) of the Act.
In my view, His Honour, the Learned District Judge, erred in interpreting s84(2) of the Act as holding that it prevented production of all documents subpoenaed by the appellant.
Ground of Appeal - Internal Inconsistency
I accept the submission of the respondent to the appeal, there are two regimes created. One deals with criminal procedure in relation to sexual assault counselling communications, the other deals with victims compensation. There is some overlap in terms of material, the subject of each regime, but the two different legislative provisions are directed to differently described classes of documents for different purposes. The Act deals with a wide range of matters outside matters relating to privileged counselling communications, although in a proportion of the applications for compensation, material sought to be examined will relate to this type of offence. But the procedure under the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 as to privileged communications with counsellors sets up a procedure designed to achieve a balance of the interests in matters arising from subpoenas to produce, documents and other such material in relation to sexual assault counselling communications.
It must be remembered that s148 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 gives a very restricted definition to counselling communications, which are the subject of that part of the Act, and in many cases, even though there may be counselling communications with a victim, that still may not result in material which comes within s84 of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996. Most material will be of a medical and other similar expert nature.
In my view, there is no inconsistency between the two provisions. This ground of appeal therefore fails.
Implied Repeal of subsection 84(2) of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996
There is in my view, no inconsistency between the two provisions, and the question of implied repeal does not arise. The Act, the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sentencing) Act 1999, which affected the renumbering from ss57 to 69 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, to ss147 - 159. Express amendments were made to the Act itself.
I accept the submission on behalf of the Tribunal that if Parliament had intended that s84(2) should be repealed or partially repealed, it would have done so expressly. In any event, s84(2) covers all applications for statutory compensation and is, as I have earlier indicated, only likely to cover the specific matters covered by s148 in a number of cases.
In my view, this ground of appeal fails.
I would propose the following orders:
1. That leave to appeal be granted.
2. That the order of Coolahan DCJ be vacated.
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LAST UPDATED: 15/12/2000