R v KITT
[2022] SADC 5
•25 January 2022
DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v KITT
[2022] SADC 5
Reasons for the Orders of his Honour Judge Muscat
25 January 2022
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES - CULPABLE OR DANGEROUS DRIVING CAUSING DEATH OR BODILY HARM
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - INSANITY AND MENTAL IMPAIRMENT - GENERALLY
The defendant was found not guilty of two counts of aggravated causing death by dangerous driving and one count of aggravated causing harm by dangerous driving by reason of mental incompetence. A declaration was made that the defendant be liable for supervision under Part 8A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the Act) and an order was made that the defendant be released on licence pursuant to s 269O(1)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Held:
1. A limiting term of 10 years is fixed pursuant to s 269O(2) of the Act.
2. The defendant is to be released on licence subject to conditions.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) Part 8A, referred to.
R v KITT
[2022] SADC 5Introduction
The defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated causing death by dangerous driving[1] and one count of aggravated causing harm by dangerous driving.[2]
[1] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 19A (1).
[2] Ibid s 19A (3).
The charges relate to a motor vehicle collision at the intersection of Cross Road and Fullarton Road at Highgate at 1:37pm on ANZAC Day 2020. The collision resulted in the deaths of Joanne Shanahan and Tania McNeil and the injury of Joanne’s husband, Peter. The offences are aggravated, as at the time the defendant was exceeding the speed limit by more than 45 kph, contrary to s 45A of the Road Traffic Act1961.
Facts
At 4.14am on ANZAC Day 2020, a traffic camera captured the defendant travelling in his black BMW on Victor Harbor Road in McLaren Vale. The defendant arrived at his parent’s beach house at Encounter Bay sometime after that and while they were asleep. In the weeks leading up to ANZAZ Day, the defendant had been frequently travelling between Adelaide and his parents’ beach house.
After returning from a walk later that day, the defendant’s mother witnessed him heading to his BMW and when she asked him what he was doing he replied that he had to go and help a friend. She took the family dog inside and was going to speak with her son when her husband told her their son was holding the keys to their Volkswagen Amarok.
By the time the defendant’s mother arrived at the Volkswagen he was already sitting in the driver’s seat with the motor running. She tried to speak with him through the window and as he began to reverse out of the street she ran after him banging on the window as he drove off at a normal speed. She tried contacting him on his mobile telephone, but he did not answer or respond.
The defendant’s mental health had deteriorated in the days leading up to the incident and his actions on the day were highly irrational.
While his behaviour was confusing and uncharacteristic that morning, the defendant’s parents were unlikely to have known that he was displaying symptoms of mania associated with a Bipolar Disorder and that he would endure his first manic episode later that day. It is also apparent that they could not have foreseen the possibility of the subsequent tragedy unfolding as it did.
At 12.41pm the defendant was recorded by a traffic device travelling north on Victor Harbor Road at Tatachilla at a speed of 187 kilometres per hour in a 100 kph zone. A witness travelling in the opposite direction observed the defendant’s vehicle pass her at a clearly excessive speed.
A number of witnesses later observed the defendant’s vehicle travelling along the Southern Expressway at extreme speeds, swerving between traffic lanes and overtaking vehicles in the emergency lanes nearly colliding with the concrete barrier separating the north and southbound lanes. Some of those witnesses telephoned the police to report the fast and erratic driving observed, however, the defendant was travelling so fast that the vehicle's registration plate was not clearly visible.
Between 12:30pm and 1:30pm, a vehicle matching the description of the Volkswagen the defendant was in was observed driving erratically. It was seen speeding, swerving and dangerously overtaking cars on various roads after exiting the Southern Expressway, as it travelled along Ayliffes Road, Fiveash Drive and Goodwood Road.
Witnesses also reported hearing the defendant’s tyres screeching and horn blasting. He was seen to take corners without indicating or braking and was observed running red lights at the intersection of Goodwood Road and Daws Road and then Springbank Road before he turned into Grange Road as he made his way home.
The defendant was also observed driving erratically through various streets near his home, including Waite Road, Willowood Drive and Barr-Smith Drive in Urrbrae. He was observed driving through a red light at Kitchener Street, Netherby.
It is indeed incredible that the defendant was not earlier involved in a serious collision given the speed and manner of his driving as witnessed by numerous motorists.
After arriving home, the defendant was observed to be acting strangely by his neighbour, who, concerned for his wellbeing, contacted some of the defendant’s friends. They arrived a short time later and each described observing concerning and bizarre behaviour by the defendant and notified the police and called for an ambulance to attend at the defendant’s home in Urrbrae.
Approximately 30 minutes after returning home, the defendant abruptly left speeding off down the street in the Volkswagen Amarok and before the arrival of police and ambulance services. Like the defendant’s parents, the defendant’s
friends were unaware of the manner of his earlier driving behaviour between Encounter Bay and Urrbrae and could not have foreseen the potential consequences. They did their best to stop the defendant and get some help for him in the circumstances.
Mental illness remains much misunderstood in our society and it is often difficult to detect until a psychotic episode occurs. Even then it is often unknown how an affected person will react during an episode.
Prior to the fatal collision, dashcam footage provided by a witness reveals the defendant driving in a westerly direction down Cross Road crossing back and forth onto the wrong side of the road, as well as driving around a traffic island at great speed. Witnesses reported that when he was driving in the wrong lane he made no effort to slow down or avoid the oncoming traffic.
The defendant’s dangerous driving that day came to a crescendo at 1:37pm, when he was travelling west down Cross Road approaching the intersection with Fullarton Road at extremely high speeds and eventually veered around other vehicles onto the incorrect side of the road in the eastbound lane. Motorists situated behind the defendant’s vehicle did not see the brake lights illuminate as he entered the intersection.
Mrs Tania McNeil was the driver and sole occupant of a silver BMW sedan, stationary at the traffic lights at the intersection and facing north on Fullarton Road at the time. Mrs McNeil entered the intersection as the light turned green when the defendant’s car proceeded through the red light on Cross Road and struck the front driver’s side of her vehicle in the middle of the intersection. The force of the collision was immense, destroying the entire front section of the BMW. The engine of her car was severed from its mounts and launched some distance from the vehicle. Those who observed the collision described an explosion of flames, dust and debris. One witness in a nearby house described the force of the impact as causing the house to shake.
Prior to the collision, Mr Peter Shanahan was driving a black Holden SUV travelling east on Cross Road with his wife Joanne sitting in the passenger seat alongside him. He was slowing down as he approached the red traffic lights ahead of him at the intersection.
Upon the collision with Mrs McNeil’s BMW, the left side of the defendant’s Volkswagen lifted off the ground, becoming airborne and then colliding with the Shanahan’s Holden, travelling through the upper left passenger compartment of their vehicle and entirely peeling off its roof. Investigating Officer Kylie Peters accurately described the damage to the Holden’s roof and passenger side as ‘catastrophic’.
The Volkswagen continued on its trajectory into a brick wall bordering a property on the north-western corner of the intersection on Cross Road and then colliding with and uprooting a large tree on the northern side of Cross Road. Upon hitting the tree, the Volkswagen flipped onto the driver’s side and came to a stop, travelling a total of approximately 55 metres from the initial point of collision with Mrs McNeil’s BMW.
A senior police major crash examiner calculated the speed of the defendant’s vehicle as it entered the intersection of approximately 167 kph.
By the time Emergency Services attended the scene, Mrs McNeil and Mrs Shanahan were both found deceased in the seats of their cars. Brave civilian attempts at CPR to revive Mrs Shanahan were unsuccessful. Two totally innocent and much-loved women lost their lives that afternoon.
Miraculously, Mr Shanahan sustained only minor injuries, including abrasions to his left hand and bruising to his left thumb and fingers.
The defendant was recovered from his vehicle by nearby motorists and later conveyed to the Royal Adelaide Hospital, where he received treatment for various injuries, including a laceration to his head, a fractured rib and fractures to his right femur, tibia and fibula.
Given the wild and dangerous state of the defendant’s driving throughout the day and the narrow near missed collisions, the carnage that eventuated was, tragically, inevitable.
Mental Incompetence Defence
The defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges and raised a defence of mental incompetence under s 269C of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act1935.
The defendant was assessed by two experienced senior forensic psychiatrists, who both expressed the opinion that he was suffering from an episode of mania with psychotic features at the time he committed the offences, and as such had available to him a mental impairment defence to all charges against him.[3]
[3] Preliminary report of Dr Furst dated 1 June 2020 and subsequent detailed report dated 27 June 2021 and report of Dr Nambiar dated 5 May 2021.
On 26 August 2021, the Director of Public Prosecutions conceded the defendant’s mental incompetence to commit the offences charged. That concession was properly made based on the opinions of the forensic psychiatrics, which clearly established that the defendant was experiencing an episode of mania with psychotic features at the time he was driving the vehicle on the afternoon in question.[4] Their diagnosis and opinions were supported by the evidence.[5]
[4] Dr Furst initially diagnosed the defendant as suffering from Bipolar 1 Disorder. However, the defendant continuing to report episodes of grandiose beliefs in the context of relatively normal mood and treatment suggested to Dr Furst that the diagnosis longitudinally may be one of Schizoaffective Disorder; Bipolar Type rather than pure Bipolar 1 Disorder. Irrespective of the exact diagnosis, Dr Furst is of the opinion the defendant was clearly suffering a severe manic episode at the time of the collision as a result of which he was unable to know the wrongfulness of his behaviour.
Dr Nambiar concluded that the defendant’s symptoms were consistent with the onset of a serious mental illness such as Bipolar Disorder with the defendant suffering a clear episode of mania with psychotic features prior to and during the collision and in the weeks following, with the evidence supporting the conclusion that the defendant could not reason that his driving, as perceived by a reasonable person, was wrong.
[5] In the weeks leading up to the collision and following, the defendant’s behavior and thoughts were becoming increasingly paranoid and more manic. He experienced grandiose delusions and thoughts involving religious themes and war, with an elevated mood. He was speaking with himself and at times believed he was the son of God. He reported a decreased need for sleep. Even after the defendant was treated with antipsychotic medication, including mood stabilisers, while at the RAH he was still experiencing flashes of delusional thoughts until the medication took effect.
Indeed, the Court observes that Doctors Onilov and Lawlor, who were the consultant psychiatrists on duty at the RAH when the defendant was admitted to hospital, examined the defendant and considered that he was experiencing symptoms of hypomania, consistent with the subsequent diagnosis of Bipolar 1 Disorder. Dr Lawlor commenced treating the defendant with anti-psychotic medication, including mood stabilisers. Subsequently, the psychiatric registrar, Dr Brown, reviewed the defendant a number of times and he too, considered the defendant had displayed symptoms consistent with a possible Bipolar Disorder, with there being evidence he had experienced a first manic episode of the disorder at the time of the crash. Because of his mental state the defendant was subject to an Inpatient Treatment Order under the Mental Health Act2009 and when he was physically well enough, he was transferred from the Emergency Department to a psychiatric ward at the RAH for further assessment and to establish a treatment plan for his mental illness.
The prosecution and defence both agreed that it was appropriate that the Court terminate the investigation into the defendant’s mental competence to commit the offences and that the Court should record a finding that the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offences.[6] A finding that the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit each offence was recorded.[7] In light of the clear opinions expressed by the psychiatrists, that was an appropriate course to adopt.
[6] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 269FA(5).
[7] Ibid s 269FA(5)(b).
Senior Counsel for the defendant conceded that each of the objective elements of the offences charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence.[8] Despite that concession, the Court independently considered the evidence and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the objective elements of each offence had been established beyond a reasonable doubt and recorded that finding pursuant to s 269FB(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act.
[8] Ibid s 269FB(1).
It followed that the defendant was not guilty of each offence, pursuant to s 269FB(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act.
Supervision Order
The Court declared the defendant liable to supervision under Part 8A Division 4 Subdivision 2 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935.
Pursuant to s269O(1)(b) I considered it appropriate that a supervision order be made, meaning the Court must fix a limiting term equivalent to the period of imprisonment that would have been appropriate if the defendant had been convicted of the offences he was charged with.[9]
[9] Ibid s 269O(2).
I ordered reports be prepared pursuant to ss 269Q, 269R and 269T to assist the Court to determine whether the defendant should be released on licence or committed to detention in relation to the limiting term to be fixed.
Limiting Term
It is well settled by the authorities that in determining a limiting term, the Court must proceed as if it is sentencing for an offence solely constituted by the objective elements.[10] The limiting term is not influenced by the defendant’s mental state, and so much is made clear from the note to s 269O(2).[11] The Court can, however, consider the defendant’s antecedents, previous good character and personal circumstances. [12]
[10] R v Behari (2011) 110 SASR 147.
[11] Ibid at [14].
[12] R v Behari.
A limiting term must also not be regarded as any sort of punishment of the defendant. The purpose of the supervision order is not to penalise but to both protect the community and to secure such supervision and treatment as is available and appropriate.[13]
[13] R v Draoui (2008) 101 SASR 267.
The maximum penalty for the aggravated offence of causing death by dangerous driving is life imprisonment and for the aggravated offence of causing harm by dangerous driving seven years imprisonment.
On a scale of criminality for offences of this kind, the objective elements of the offences sit at the higher end. In setting the limiting term, I must consider the two innocent lives lost and one injured. The risk to the public was self-evidently extremely high.
There were two distinct episodes of dangerous driving by the defendant on ANZAC Day 2020. The first is the defendant’s dangerous driving from Encounter Bay to his home in Urrbrae preceding the second instance of dangerous driving that culminated in the fatal collision. The first instance of dangerous driving is not a matter that can increase the length of the limiting term to be fixed. However, it is, nevertheless, a relevant consideration in that it places the dangerous driving the subject of the offences charged in context and demonstrates that the driving that caused the deaths of Mrs McNeil and Mrs Shanahan and injury suffered by Mr Shanahan was not an isolated act of such outrageous driving by the defendant that afternoon. It is indeed incredibly, extremely fortunate that no one else was killed or injured that day through the defendant’s actions.
At the time of the offences the defendant was a young man, aged 20 years. The defendant’s personal circumstances are comprehensively detailed in various reports before the Court. He has always resided with his parents, who are unwaveringly supportive of their son. He has been raised in a loving household and was fortunate enough to be provided with various recreational, educational and employment opportunities. The defendant continues to study at university and hold part-time work in hospitality. He has an interest in wine making and has undertaken courses in pursuit of that interest. He has good future employment prospects and also maintains a supportive network of friends. He has no criminal antecedents. I have had regard to numerous references attesting to the defendant’s personal qualities and good character.
I have also considered the victim impact statements of the numerous family members and friends of the deceased that were read to the Court, including those of Georgie Steiner, Lisa Scanlon, Nikolaos and Christina Panagiotou, Sue Stringer, Robert and Zena Lambden, Cary McNeil, and Peter, Eleni and Nicholas Shanahan. Their loss, pain and suffering is ongoing.
This case is indeed a tragedy for all concerned.
In consideration of the extreme gravity of the objective elements of the offences, as I have summarised, and the defendant’s favourable personal circumstances, I impose a limiting term of 10 years.
Principles on which the Court is to act and matters which the Court is to have regard
Pursuant to s 269NI of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, the paramount consideration of the Court in determining whether to release a defendant, or the conditions of any licence, after fixing the limiting term, must be to protect the safety of the community, which outweighs the principle that restrictions on the defendant’s freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to a minimum.
Pursuant to s 269T in determining if the defendant should be committed to detention or be released on licence (and the conditions of such a licence), the Court should have regard to the nature of the defendant’s mental impairment; whether the defendant is, or would, if released, be likely to endanger another person or other persons generally; whether there are adequate resources available for the treatment and support of the defendant in the community; whether the defendant is likely to comply with the conditions of a licence and other matters that the Court thinks relevant.
Reports and Submissions
269R Victim/Next of Kin Reports
I received reports pursuant to s 269R from the next of kin of Mrs McNeil and Mrs Shanahan.
Both families expressed their indescribable pain and deep sorrow after losing their loved ones. The ongoing grief and suffering of the next of kin of the victims is readily apparent. Many family members understandably described how they have struggled to come to terms with the senseless circumstances in which their loved ones had passed. Family members expressed feelings of disenfranchisement and frustration towards the criminal justice system. They feel the finding of not guilty by reason of mental incompetence is an unfair outcome and is not justice in their eyes. While the Court sympathises with those views, ultimately the legal outcome is the correct one, based on all of the evidence and expert medical opinions.
I also received a s 269R report from the parents of the defendant who expressed their own sorrow and grief at the loss of their son as they knew him. They explained the ongoing effect that the incident has had on the defendant’s family and spoke to the unimaginable heartache that the families of each deceased must be experiencing. The defendant’s parents made clear their preparedness to continue to support their son.
269Q/269T Psychiatric Reports
Doctors Nambier and Furst, both of whom had reported on the defendant’s mental competence to commit the offences and so were familiar with the defendant, provided the expert reports requested by the Court.
Dr Nambiar’s ultimate opinion is that the defendant can be safely managed in the community with the continuation of the current treatment plan. Dr Furst similarly recommended that the defendant continue to be treated in the community and saw little utility in ordering that he be subject to inpatient treatment or detention.
1.Nature of defendant’s mental impairment
The defendant has a diagnosis of Bipolar 1 Disorder.[14] At the time of the offences, he had experienced a severe manic episode, being his first, with mood congruent psychotic features including grandiose and bizarre delusions. With treatment, the defendant’s mood has since stabilised, and his manic symptoms and grandiose/delusional thoughts have substantially resolved. The defendant has also been experiencing depression, anxiety and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of the incident, with the defendant feeling devastated and guilt ridden over the deaths that occurred as a result of his driving. However, both experts indicate that this is being managed through medication and visiting both his treating psychologist and psychiatrist.
2.Whether the defendant is, or would, if released, be likely to endanger another person or other persons generally
[14] Dr Furst has also suggested the possibility of the defendant having a Schizoaffective Disorder but has stated the distinction between the two psychiatric disorders is relatively academic from a legal point of view. Dr Nambiar was of the same view and reported that treatment will be the same for either condition and that it is only the prognosis that may differ over time due to response to treatment.
The reports indicate that Bipolar 1 Disorder, while a lifelong condition, generally has a good long-term prognosis with the correct professional treatment and support, which the defendant is currently receiving in the community. Risks to community safety would arise if the defendant returned to illicit substance use or stopped taking his medication. This has been made clear to the defendant by those treating him and will continue to be reinforced.
3.Whether there are adequate resources available for the treatment and support of the defendant in the community
Dr Nambiar’s report identifies that these risk factors can be addressed through joint supervision by mental health services with the addition of Community Corrections. Random drug testing could monitor illicit substance misuse and regular health professional visits would ensure detection of early warning signs and subsequent interventions including adjustments to medication or hospitalisation if needed.
The defendant is currently receiving treatment including mood stabilising and antipsychotic medication, psychiatric supervision[15] and psychologist support.[16] He and his family have become more aware of the early warning signs of his condition worsening and are prepared to promptly address it through psychiatric and psychological treatment.
[15] According to Dr Nambiar the defendant is seeing his treating psychiatrist three to four times a week.
[16] The defendant is receiving treatment from his psychologist on a weekly basis.
Dr Furst suggested that the key component of the defendant’s treatment in the community will need to be monitoring for breakthrough episodes of psychosis, being those that persist despite pharmacological intervention. He went on to explain that this is particularly important as antidepressant medications can sometimes precipitate mania.
Despite this, both psychiatrists suggested that the health services necessary to treat the defendant are readily available to him in the community.
4.Whether the defendant is likely to comply with the conditions of a licence
Dr Nambiar suggested that the defendant’s strong support network and compliance with treatment increase the likelihood that he will comply with the conditions of a licence and his success in treatment so far indicates that his risk to the community is low. Dr Furst was of the opinion that the defendant is likely to remain highly compliant with treatment and his risk of reoffending is low.
Clinical Psychologist’s Report
In determining if the defendant should be committed to detention or released on licence, I also have considered a report prepared by the defendant’s clinical psychologist, Dr Chantler.
Dr Chantler is well familiar with the defendant’s mental illness and has been treating him on a weekly basis since June 2020.
In addition to the defendant’s diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder, Dr Chantler has been treating the defendant for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder resulting from the outcome of the collision and associated periods of anxiety and depression.
Dr Chantler maintains a regular dialogue with the defendant’s psychiatric treatment team and general practitioner, reporting any identified concerning changes in his mental health. She stated that this dialogue would ensure dynamic and appropriate systems of care and protocols to monitor the defendant’s mental health if he is released on licence.
She reports that he engages willingly in her treatment even when the tasks cause him some distress. She has reported that he has also persevered with pharmacological treatment despite weight gain and other adverse side effects. Her observations of him over 18 months is that he has taken his antipsychotic medication faithfully and his positive attitude towards treatment as well as a high level of engagement in his psychological and psychiatric treatment suggests he is working to the best of his ability to manage his condition.
She reported that he poses ‘no discernible risk to the community at large or people close to him in general terms’ and continues to enjoy the support of his parents and sense of direction which part-time employment and university studies provide.
Dr Chantler provided the opinion that although the defendant’s mental health conditions will likely persist for life, they can continue to be appropriately managed in the community. Further, the risk of his condition deteriorating can be mitigated by prompt identification and intervention by his treatment team.
Detention or Release on Licence
Pursuant to s 269O(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, after being declared liable to supervision, the defendant may be released unconditionally, committed to detention or released on licence.
I have considered all of the matters in s269T (2) and have had the benefit of comprehensive submissions made by counsel. After considering the expert reports of Doctors Furst and Nambiar, and the report of the defendant’s treating psychologist Dr Chantler, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the safety of the public will not be seriously endangered by the defendant’s release on licence.[17]
[17] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 269T(2).
In all the circumstances it is appropriate to make a supervision order pursuant to s 269O(1)(b)(ii) that the defendant be released on licence. There has been consensus between the parties as to the conditions of the licence.
The defendant will be released on licence and be subject to the following conditions:
1.That the defendant be under the care of the Clinical Director, Forensic Mental Health Service ('the Director'), or a consultant psychiatrist nominated by the Director ('the nominee'), and obey any directions given to him from time to time with regard to medical and psychiatric or psychological treatment, medication, counselling and assessment.
2.That the defendant's case be managed by the Forensic Community Mental Health Team and that the defendant comply with all the lawful directions of that team, particularly with respect to attendances at all appointments nominated by the team.
3.That, at the discretion of the Director or the nominee and at such time when the Director or the nominee sees fit, the defendant's case management be transferred to a local Community Mental Health Team and that the defendant comply with all directions from that team.
4.That the defendant continue to receive his medication current at the date of this order, and further, that any alteration or reduction in such medication not occur without the approval of the Director or the nominee.
5.That the defendant submit to random screening of his blood at the direction of the Director or the nominee, to ensure compliance with medication.
6.That the defendant be under the supervision of the Parole Board of South Australia and comply with the lawful directions of the Parole Board or a Community Corrections Officer appointed by the Parole Board with respect to non-medical matters. To effect initial contact the defendant is to report to the Office of the Department for Correctional Services at Level 1/181 Flinders Street Adelaide (Telephone 8224 2500) within two working days of this order.
7.That the defendant reside with his parents and that he not thereafter change his residence without the permission of the Parole Board or his Community Corrections Officer in consultation with the Parole Board.
8.That the defendant not possess, use or administer any illicit substance, unless medically prescribed by a legally qualified medical practitioner, and further, that any drugs which are prescribed to the defendant by a legally qualified medical practitioner be possessed or administered by the defendant only at prescribed or recommended dosages.
9.That the defendant not consume alcohol.
10.That the defendant submit to breath, blood, oral or urine testing as directed by his Community Corrections Officer, for the purpose of determining whether there is present in his body alcohol or any illicit substance or non-prescribed drug.
11.That the defendant is prohibited from driving, or attempting to drive, any motor vehicle.
12.That the defendant not attend, enter or remain at the following locations:-
(i) 'Burnside Village' Shopping Centre, 447 Portrush Road, Glenside.
(ii) Unley Shopping Centre, 204 Unley Road, Unley.
(iii) Frewville Shopping Centre, 177 Glen Osmond Road, Frewville.
(iv) 'Mitcham Square' Shopping Centre, 119 Belair Road, Torrens Park, except for between the hours of 6 pm and 9 pm on Mondays.
(v) All 'House & Garden' retail stores across South Australia.
(vi) 'Orange Theory Fitness', 202 Belair Rd, Hawthorn.
(vii) 'Apple Store' located in Rundle Mall, Adelaide.
13.That the defendant not leave the State of South Australia, without the prior written permission of the Parole Board.
14.That the defendant not possess a firearm, ammunition, or any part of a firearm.
15.That the defendant submit to tests, including testing without notice, for gunshot residue, as required by the Parole Board or his Community Corrections Officer.
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