R v King
[2017] ACTSC 119
•24 May 2017
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v King |
Citation: | [2017] ACTSC 119 |
Hearing Date: | 16 May 2017 |
DecisionDate: | 24 May 2017 |
Before: | Mossop J |
Decision: | See [65] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and punishment – sentencing – trafficking in a trafficable quantity of cannabis – significant criminal history for similar offences – impact of sentence – effect of a forfeiture order – consideration for assessment for an Intensive Corrections Order – no assessment made for an Intensive Corrections Order – period of imprisonment partially suspended with a Good Behaviour Order – s 34(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) |
Legislation Cited: | Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 2003 (ACT) Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 344 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 603(5) |
Cases Cited: | Bui v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 5 Craft v Diebert [2004] ACTCA 15 R v Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1 |
Texts Cited: | Explanatory Memorandum for the Confiscation of Criminal Assets Bill 2002 |
Parties: | The Queen (Crown) Gregory William King (Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel Ms P Burgoyne-Scutts (Crown) Mr P Edmonds (Defendant) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Canberra Criminal Lawyers (Defendant) | |
File Number: | SCC 86 of 2016 |
MOSSOP J:
Introduction
Gregory William King has pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in cannabis. The maximum penalty for the offence of trafficking in cannabis contrary to s 603(5) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) is 10 years imprisonment and a fine of $150 000.
On 11 December 2015, police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s home in Chisholm, ACT, and on 16 December 2015 at approximately 4:15pm, police executed the search warrant.
During the search police located and seized various quantities of cannabis. The total amount of cannabis located and seized from the Mr King’s home was 8.6725kg. That cannabis was spread throughout the house as follows:
(a)A black garbage bag located under a computer desk in the kitchen/dining area contained four vacuum sealed bags of dried cannabis weighing 1.818kg. Located nearby was a silver and black “Salter” brand set of electronic scales and a number of empty clip sealed bags.
(b)In a tall cupboard in the laundry, a shopping bag with 20.6g of cannabis and another bag containing 453.4g of cannabis heads.
(c)In the walk-in wardrobe of the master bedroom, a rice cooker box contained three vacuum sealed bags of dried cannabis weighing 2.676kg. Further, inside a draw in the walk-in wardrobe was a clip sealed bag containing 24.1g of cannabis.
(d)Inside the garage was a black garbage bag containing a tightly compressed garbage bag wrapped in cling wrap, which contained a number of vacuum sealed bags of dried cannabis weighing 3.642kg. Also in the garage was a suitcase which contained traces of cannabis.
(e)Within the garage there was a separate room created using gyprock partitioning. Inside that room was a chest of drawers and a hydroponic grow tent. There were inside the tent fertiliser bottles, latex gloves, lamps, fans and heaters, pots, hoses, and pH testing strips. These items were consistent with the area being used to grow cannabis. Latex gloves found inside the tent contained the defendant’s DNA. His fingerprints were located on a fertiliser bottle. Dried cannabis weighing 38.4g was located near the tent.
Mr King was arrested that evening.
He spent one day in custody attributable to the offence.
On 15 May 2017 the defendant admitted to the authors of a second
pre-sentence report that he “intended to sell the cannabis and in addition to this plan, had also swapped cannabis in exchange for cocaine.”
The Crown tendered photographs showing the inside of Mr King’s house, including some photographs showing the location of the quantities of cannabis within the house, as well as the location where the cannabis was grown in the house.
Objective seriousness
Submissions
Counsel for the defendant, Mr Edmonds, submitted that having regard to the range of quantities that can give rise to a charge of trafficking namely between 300g and 30kg, the amount in question present case was at the lower end of the range. He referred to the decision in R v Hasani [2015] ACTSC 161 at [16] in which the Chief Justice referred to a quantity of approximately 8kg as being “towards the lower end of the trafficable range”. He also referred to the principles summarised by the Court of Appeal in Bui v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 5 at [41].
He submitted that sentencing should proceed on the basis that some of the cannabis was intended for sale but that it was not possible to determine the significance of sale as opposed to personal use in any more precise way. He submitted by analogy with the categories of heroin user identified in R v Di Bitonto [2016] ACTSC 280 at [24]-[26] that his client was in the user/dealer category of offender.
10. The Crown prosecutor, Ms Burgoyne-Scutts, accepted that it was appropriate to characterise Mr King as a user/dealer. He was certainly not the end of the line. However she pointed to the evidence indicating that he intended to sell the cannabis. She relied upon the evidence in photographs which were tendered.
Conclusion
11. A trafficable quantity of cannabis is between 300g and 30kg. The total amount of cannabis found was less than half of the maximum amount. However the seriousness of an offence should not be assessed solely by reference to amount of cannabis involved. In Bui v The Queen at [41] the Court of Appeal stated:
Some principles that have been identified in the authorities concerning the sentencing of drug traffickers include:
a) The role of the accused is an important consideration, those whose level in the operation is at a higher level of the hierarchy being more culpable: MacDonnell (2002) 128 A Crim R 44 at 50; [33].
b) While, as decided in Wong v The Queen at 609; [67]-[70], the weight of the amount of drug is not of chief importance in determining the appropriate sentence, it remains a relevant factor, particularly in the context of the harm from its distribution effects: R v Bezan (2004) 147 A Crim R 430 at 438; [34].
c) The motivation for the offence is highly relevant, the purpose of profit being a more serious matter: R v Speechly (2002) 133 A Crim R 26 at 30; [20]: R v Day (1998) 100 A Crim R 275 at 277.
12. In the present case the amount in question was neither at the bottom or the top of the range for trafficable quantity. The role of the defendant was as grower and seller, neither the highest or lowest level in the possible drug trafficking hierarchy. However what was occurring was clearly a deliberate and organised activity. The motivation of the defendant was both to provide a medium of exchange to obtain cocaine as well as to sell for profit. The limits on the evidence make it impossible to make any more precise finding beyond reasonable doubt.
13. In those circumstances the offending conduct appears to be in the mid range of objective seriousness for the present offence.
Plea of guilty
14. Mr King was first before the ACT Magistrates Court on 17 December 2015. He pleaded not guilty on that date. He was committed for trial on 28 April 2016. The indictment was filed on 24 May 2016. He pleaded guilty on 8 March 2017, the Wednesday prior to the week of his trial. The plea is late plea of guilty.
Criminal history
15. Mr King is now 47 years old.
16. He has a conviction in 2003 for possessing a trafficable quantity of cannabis. Police found 4.983kg of cannabis in his house. He received a Good Behaviour Order and a fine.
17. In 2004 he was convicted of possessing a trafficable quantity of cannabis, cultivating a prohibited plant for supply and possessing a drug of dependence, namely, amphetamine. This also put him in breach of his earlier Good Behaviour Order. Police found 15.885kg of cannabis, 1.87g of amphetamine, and 188g of the female cannabis plant flowering top. He was given a suspended sentence of nine months imprisonment.
18. In 2006 he was convicted of trafficking in a trafficable quantity of cannabis and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. However that sentence was suspended upon entering into a Good Behaviour Order.
19. In 2009 he was dealt with for a breach of the Good Behaviour Order imposed in 2006 re-sentenced in substantially the same terms. That was because of a further conviction for possessing a drug of dependence for which he was given a Good Behaviour Order with community service.
20. He has a variety of other non-drug related convictions which are not of significance for present purposes. His most recent conviction was for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, an offence which was committed in December 2013.
21. The criminal history indicates that he has on a number of occasions been convicted of offences very similar to the present. It indicates that custodial sentences short of full time imprisonment have been ineffective in deterring him from the commission of further offences relating to cannabis. Mr King’s criminal history indicates that in relation to the offence of trafficking in cannabis, little leniency can be shown to the defendant. It also indicates that specific deterrence is a significant factor in any sentence to be imposed.
Pre-sentence reports
22. Two pre-sentence reports were tendered; the first was dated 11 May 2017, and a second supplementary report dated 15 May 2017.
23. The pre-sentence report dated 11 May 2017 refers to the defendant’s previous contact with ACT Corrective Services as a result of previous sentences imposed.
24. Mr King is an Aboriginal man who reported that he was born in Brisbane and was the eldest of six children. He identified no specific problems in relation to his childhood. Two of his siblings are deceased as is his father. He has a minimal relationship with his remaining siblings but a good relationship with his mother.
25. He has been in his current relationship for 23 years and has six children as a result of that relationship aged between 23 and nine years of age. All reside in the family home.
26. Information in the report was consistent with his house having been confiscated as a result of the present offending conduct and his wife seeking to find accommodation for herself and her four youngest children. Mr King’s wife indicated to the author of the pre-sentence report that she suffered anxiety as a result of the present proceedings and their consequences, particularly in relation to accommodation, financial stress, and the effect of the defendant’s potential imprisonment on the children.
27. The pre-sentence report appears to disclose that the defendant entered the public service after completing Year 11 and has been employed in various positions. He supplemented his income by buying and selling cars. It appears to state that as at the date of the report, he was working as a furniture removalist and was being paid “cash in hand”.
28. His level of alcohol consumption was such that it has caused his wife to give him an ultimatum to reduce his alcohol consumption and this appears to have resulted in some reduction.
29. Mr King reported a history of cannabis use commencing when he was 15 years old. His use of cannabis was a source of conflict with his wife. He was using a significant quantity of cannabis and sometimes hashish prior to his arrest.
30. He found his job as a furniture removalist too physically demanding but is otherwise in good health. The defendant and his wife both considered that he was suffering from depression although he has declined to seek assistance with that.
31. The report also describes that the defendant denied growing cannabis for the purpose of selling to others, instead claiming it was for his own use. He expressed regret that his family was going to lose their home and the stress that his actions have caused his wife.
32. He was assessed as a medium risk of reoffending. The report identified as positive factors the benefit of a supportive wife and mother, and the fact that notwithstanding that the family home has been confiscated, his accommodation has been resolved through “a community agency”. It also identifies as a positive factor that he has employment. It identifies that his primary criminogenic risks appear to be substance abuse issues, mental health issues, financial stress and antisocial values and attitudes. He is assessed as suitable for a community service order.
33. A supplementary pre-sentence report dated 15 May 2017 indicates that the offender had commenced new employment as a delivery driver and was paid “proper wages”. He was relieved that his past criminal history did not prevent him obtaining this employment.
34. He also disclosed to the author previous use of ecstasy, amphetamines and cocaine. He admitted using cocaine at the time of the current offence and that he had exchanged cannabis for cocaine. He denied daily use of cocaine but acknowledged that his use was out of control.
35. He also admitted that his earlier statement that the cannabis was for personal use was not the truth and that he had intended to sell the cannabis as well as swapping it in exchange for cocaine.
Other evidence
36. Mr King tendered a statement signed by his wife which discloses her present circumstances. It states that she is on sickness benefits which she attributes to her anxiety caused by her husband’s court case and a heart condition. Apart from sickness benefits and family tax benefits, she is not in receipt of any other income. The family has been approved to move into a three-bedroom house in Torrens under a four-month occupancy agreement with EveryMan Australia Indigenous Services. That was corroborated by a letter from an employee of that organisation dated 15 May 2017 which indicated that she was the beneficiary of a short-term rental, which included a condition that the organisation must be advised of “the exit point for you and your family” within the four-month period. I take this to mean that the housing is only intended as a short-term transitional measure. The statement of Ms King also discloses her present debts and states the conclusion that she would struggle to pay rent and other living expenses if Mr King was sent to jail. The only other income of the family is an Austudy payment to one of her daughters, part of which is contributed to family living expenses.
37. Also tendered by Mr King was a reference from an officer or employee of Kent Removals and Storage, who attests to the fact that the defendant “has been a valuable asset to our team” and that he “shows great leadership skills and a mature attitude towards all work”. The letter states that he has been employed for “the past 2 years” but as the letter is undated, the period cannot be identified with certainty.
Submissions
The offender’s family and the impact of a sentence
38. Counsel for Mr King pointed to the “pro-social” factors namely that the offender had a wife and family and appears to have had employment over at least the last two years.
39. He submitted that it was appropriate to take into account the effect on the offender’s family. He is the sole breadwinner of the family and the capacity to maintain employment as part of an Intensive Corrections Order was significant.
40. The Crown prosecutor submitted having regard to the decision in the R v Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1 at 3, quoted in Craft v Diebert [2004] ACTCA 15 at [9]-[10], that although the impact of a sentence upon the offender’s family was required to be taken into account the court should not be overwhelmed by that consideration.
The effect of the forfeiture order
41. Counsel for Mr King also submitted that notwithstanding the terms of s 34(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), it was open for the Court to take into account the losses suffered by the offender as a result of that confiscation order in so far as the losses suffered should be taken to reduce what would otherwise be an obvious need for specific deterrence. He submitted, in effect, that having suffered losses as a result of the forfeiture of property there was a lesser need for specific deterrence than would otherwise be the case. He also submitted that it was relevant, because of the loss of the family home, to take into account the increased impact that a sentence of imprisonment would impose upon the offender’s family.
42. The Crown prosecutor submitted that it was permissible under s 34(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act to take account of the reduced circumstances of the offender’s family which has resulted from the loss of the family home but that it was not open to take into account any presumed deterrent effect upon the offender arising from the financial loss imposed by the forfeiture.
43. In the event that the Court proceeded to sentencing, counsel for Mr King submitted that a non parole period should be as short as possible.
Intensive Corrections Order
44. Counsel for Mr King further submitted that it was an appropriate case in which to direct an assessment for an Intensive Corrections Order. He identified the preconditions set out in s 78 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act as being that the Court is satisfied that a term of imprisonment is appropriate and that it will be for a period of less than four years.
45. The Crown prosecutor submitted that an Intensive Corrections Order would not be appropriate because:
(a)The offender had previously had the opportunity to learn his lesson and avoid offending behaviour, this being the fifth time that he was convicted for a similar offence.
(b)There was no evidence as to what if any treatment he had sought in relation to his drug use prior to today and in particular in the period after being charged with the present offences.
(c)Having regard to the inaccurate statements made to the authors of the first pre-sentence report, it was not possible to get a clear understanding which of the drugs he had used in the past he had a particular difficulty with; and
(d)The evidence was sufficient to establish that his motivation was not simply personal use, having regard to the evidence of clip sealed bags, scales, and his admissions to the author of the second pre-sentence report that “he had intended to sell the cannabis and in addition to this plan, had also swapped cannabis in exchange for cocaine”.
46. Counsel for Mr King submitted that the objective seriousness of the offence was not such as to preclude a sentence served by way of an Intensive Corrections Order.
Other submissions
47. Counsel for Mr King submitted that:
(a)The defendant had never been sentenced to full time imprisonment and as a result it could not be said that all options short of full time imprisonment had been tried and failed.
(b)The present offence was 18 months old and there has been no further offending conduct during that period. He pointed to the conditions of bail which precluded the offender from consuming illicit drugs. However in the absence of any condition permitting urinalysis, it is difficult to put any weight on that submission.
(c)The defendant had admitted his use of cocaine when he was not compelled to do so; and
(d)While the plea of guilty was a late one a reduction of 10 to 15 per cent in the sentence that would otherwise be imposed was appropriate having regard to its utilitarian value.
Consideration and Conclusion
48. For reasons which I explain below I consider it appropriate to proceed to sentence Mr King rather than adjourn the proceedings so as to permit an assessment of the defendant’s suitability for an Intensive Corrections Order to be obtained.
49. The purposes of sentencing are set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. General deterrence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation appear in the present case to be the most significant of the matters to be taken into consideration.
50. A very significant matter so far as the appropriate sentence is concerned are the previous sentences imposed for similar offences. Plainly enough, those sentences have been inadequate to deter the offender from committing the present offence.
51. In a number of respects the evidence was less than complete:
(a)There was only limited evidence in the pre-sentence report about the history of drug use. It was only in the second pre-sentence report that Mr King reported use of ecstasy, amphetamines and cocaine. There is no expert evidence suggesting that his use of drugs was the result of an addiction, or that it was a case in which rehabilitation directed to a drug addiction would significantly fulfil the purposes of sentencing.
(b)There was only limited information about his employment history. Piecing together the evidence it appears that he was employed for approximately two years as a removalist up until May 2017. It is not clear whether this was full time although he appears to have been paid “cash in hand”.
(c)There were only limited admissions at a late stage for the purposes of the second pre-sentence report as to his intentions in relation to the sale of the drugs.
52. Clearly there are forensic benefits for an offender in making only limited admissions. However, that makes it more difficult for an offender to persuade the court of a lesser need for specific deterrence or a real desire for rehabilitation. Because of the limitations on the evidence, this is not a case where the Court has a clear picture of an offender who has recognised the error of his ways or the underlying criminogenic drivers of his conduct. Rather, limited admissions have been made and in those circumstances it appears to be that specific deterrence is still a very significant issue. I will address an additional submission made by Mr King in relation to specific deterrence below.
53. Clearly the circumstances of Mr King’s family are significant. The service of a sentence of imprisonment by way of full-time detention will have a significant impact upon his family. It is a “sad but not uncommon experience of sentencing judges and magistrates” that the need for punishment and deterrence leaves little room for leniency based upon the effect upon an offender’s family: see Craft v Diebert at [10]. I have taken into account the financial and health circumstances of the defendant’s wife and fact that he has six dependent children between the age of 9 and 23 years old. The impacts upon his family of a sentence of imprisonment will be within the range of common impacts of such punishment.
54. Section 34(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act provides that “...a court must not reduce the severity of a sentence it would otherwise have imposed because of an automatic forfeiture of property, a forfeiture order, or a penalty order, under the Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 2003”. The submissions of the parties identified the potential ways in which the forfeiture might be taken into account as first, as a factor reducing the need for specific deterrence, and second, by having regard to the difficulties and uncertainties of the defendant’s family’s current housing situation.
55. Section 34(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act was previously s 344 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The prohibition on taking account of the operation of the Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 2003 (ACT) (‘COCA Act’) was inserted by that Act in 2003. The Explanatory Statement provided:
The effect of these amendments is to emphasise that confiscation action is not primarily punitive in nature and to make it clear that the court cannot reduce the severity of the sentence that would otherwise be imposed because confiscation action has been taken against the offender in relation to that offence.
Section 344 of the Crimes Act was moved to the Crimes (Sentencing) Act upon its enactment.
56. The exclusion of the effect of the COCA Act is, in some cases, to introduce a significant legislative fiction into sentencing. Because of the very broad definition of “tainted property” in the COCA Act, there are many cases in which a residential property will be forfeited as a result of drug-related activity undertaken on that property. Where the owner of the property has significant equity in that property, the loss suffered by the owner may easily be many hundreds of thousands of dollars. That is the case whether or not the drug-related activity made any significant contribution to that equity. It will not be unusual for the loss suffered to exceed the maximum fine available in relation to the offence. Thus, in a case where an offender has substantial equity in a residential property, the loss of that property because it was “used” in the commission of the offence and hence “tainted property” for the purposes of the Act, may in reality involve a substantial punishment of the offender. In such a case, the statement of legislative intention that “confiscation action is not primarily punitive in nature” (see the Explanatory Memorandum for the Confiscation of Criminal Assets Bill 2002, p 39), may not accord with the reality.
57. In the present case it is, in my view, open to the Court to take into account the housing situation of the Mr King’s family. That is an existing fact. The consequences for his family of being deprived of his income cannot be ignored. It is not necessary, in order to take that into account, to look at the reasons why the family is now in a tenuous housing position and thereby to link the current circumstances with the making of a forfeiture order.
58. However it is not open to give weight as a mitigatory factor to the consequences of forfeiture of the offender’s home for the need for specific deterrence. Section 34(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act precludes a reduction in sentence “because of” a forfeiture of property. Thus, there must have otherwise been a causal link between the forfeiture and some factor that would require the reduction of the penalty that would otherwise be imposed. The most obvious reason would be that the offender had been punished by the loss of property. However, having regard to the range of purposes of sentencing, the forfeiture of property might be relevant in other ways, most obviously reducing the need for specific deterrence because of the punishment already imposed by way of the forfeiture order. I consider that because of the generality of the exclusion in s 34(2) it is not open to take account of the forfeiture order when having regard to each of the sentencing purposes in s 7. Therefore, in addition to excluding consideration of the forfeiture order when considering the need for punishment (s 7(1)(a)), it also excludes consideration of the order in relation to “deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences” (s 7(1)(b)).
59. Had it been open to consider the effect of a forfeiture order in the present case very limited, if any, weight could be given to it in considering the need for specific deterrence. While it was common ground that there had been or would be a forfeiture of property there was no evidence of the value of the property or the extent of the offenders equity in the property. Mr King did not give evidence about the effect of the forfeiture on his state of mind and therefore any conclusion that the Court would draw in relation to the need for specific deterrence would only be an inference. There was no evidence as to whether any of his previous convictions for drug offences had also involved forfeiture of property and hence it was not possible to say whether previous forfeitures had failed to deter his offending conduct. Having regard to the sketchy evidence about the offender’s attitude to the offending conduct and his history of convictions for prior conduct, I would only place very limited weight on any deterrent effect of the forfeiture of his home if it was open to do so.
60. Because of the previous criminal history of Mr King and the ineffectiveness of custodial sentences short of full time imprisonment to deter him from offending conduct, I am satisfied that there is no appropriate sentence for the present offence other than a sentence of imprisonment.
61. I consider that an appropriate sentence of imprisonment is 20 months. I take into account the plea of guilty. Because of the lateness of the plea I consider that the reduction in the sentence should be a limited one. I will apply a discount of 10 per cent which reduces the appropriate sentence of imprisonment to 18 months.
62. In relation to the manner in which such a sentence of imprisonment must be served:
(a)I consider that a fully suspended sentence of imprisonment would not be appropriate having regard to the previous sentences of that nature which have been imposed and the continuing offending conduct disclosed in the present case.
(b)I do not accept the submission by counsel for Mr King that because an Intensive Corrections Order (or its predecessor, periodic detention) had not previously been imposed, that option should be tried before a sentence of full time imprisonment was imposed. While Intensive Correction Order’s are not limited to circumstances where the offender needs rehabilitation and hence a regime for close supervision is appropriate, the fact that there is no clear evidence of addiction (as opposed to use) or other criminogenic driver which would benefit from a regime of close supervision is a factor tending against the making of an Intensive Corrections Order.
(c)I do not consider that in the present case the service of a sentence of imprisonment by way of an Intensive Corrections Order would involve adequate punishment for the offence or would be adequate deterrence of the defendant and others from committing such offences.
63. I therefore consider that it is not appropriate to make an Intensive Corrections Order. I therefore decided not to further adjourn the proceedings so as to permit an Intensive Corrections Order assessment under s 78 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act to be obtained.
64. I do however consider that it is appropriate to partially suspend the sentence. I make such an order recognising that this will be the first period of imprisonment served by Mr King and the impact of imprisonment upon his family and the potential for a period of full time imprisonment to alter his future conduct. I consider that suspension after a period of nine months and a Good Behaviour Order for 30 months after that will be appropriate to meet the purposes of sentencing. I have taken into account the one day spent in custody but will not backdate the sentence.
65. The orders of the Court are therefore:
I convict Gregory William King of trafficking in cannabis contrary to s 603(5) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).
He is sentenced to 18 months imprisonment commencing on 24 May 2017.
That sentence is to be suspended after nine months on 23 February 2018 upon him entering into an undertaking to comply with his Good Behaviour Obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) subject to the following conditions:
(a) a probation condition that he be subject to the supervision of the Director-General or her delegate for a period of 30 months or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and that he obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him;
(b) that he supply samples of blood, breath, hair, saliva or urine for alcohol or drug testing if required by a corrections officer.
(c) that he attend any treatment, programs or counselling as directed.
| I certify that the preceding sixty-five [65] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Mossop. Associate: Date: 24 May 2017 |
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