R v Keenan - [2008] HCATrans 347

[2008] HCATrans 347

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B23 of 2008

B e t w e e n -
THE QUEEN
Appellant
and
FRANCIS ROBERT KEENAN
Respondent

KIRBY J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 1 OCTOBER 2008, AT 10.16 AM

MR W. SOFRONOFF, QC (Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.G. MARTIN, SC, for the appellant. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld))

MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.J. KIMMINS, for the respondent. (instructed by Price & Roobottom Solicitors)

KIRBY J: Yes, Solicitor.

MR SOFRONOFF: May it please the Court, what I propose to do, if it is convenient to the Court, is to go firstly to some passages in the transcript, appreciating that your Honours are no doubt cognisant of the facts of the case, and then to go to the sections, chapter 2 of the Code and to analyse. After looking at that, I wish to make some submissions about the construction that we advocate of section 8 and the overarching principle that we will submit supports that construction, and then to take your Honours to the cases in an endeavour to demonstrate that the construction that we advocate is consistent with authority in this Court and elsewhere.

KIRBY J: Will you at some stage, particularly for those from non‑Code States, take us, as was suggested in the special leave hearing, to the history of the Code?

MR SOFRONOFF: I will do that, your Honour. The history was covered comprehensively in the decision of this Court in Darkan, and I will take your Honours to the passages in that.

KIRBY J: I am not suggesting that be done now. You do it in your own time and the right space. That is something we will need to have in our minds.

MR SOFRONOFF: Yes, I will deal with that, your Honour. Then finally, your Honours, after going to the authorities I will go to the reasons of the Court of Appeal in this case and take your Honours to the passages that we contend are erroneous. Could I take your Honours to volume 1 of the appeal book firstly. As your Honours are aware, the facts of the case began when a Mr Coffey agreed to deliver a parcel for the respondent, Frank Keenan, whom he had known for some time, and having delivered the parcel he was to receive some money for it and give the money to Keenan. Instead of delivering the money to Keenan he decided to keep the money and he and his partner Vonda Muir then began to live in various places. We can pick up the story, your Honours, with the evidence of Vonda Muir. I am looking at the pages…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Keenan

Details

AGLC: R v Keenan [2008] HCATrans 347
Case: [2008] HCATrans 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of R v Keenan, where the appellant had been convicted of murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during police interviews and the proper application of the exclusionary rule in relation to that evidence.

The High Court was required to determine whether the evidence obtained from the appellant during police interviews, which were conducted after he had been cautioned but before he was formally charged, was admissible. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the evidence was obtained in contravention of the appellant's rights and, if so, whether the exclusionary rule, which permits the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence, should have been applied by the trial judge. The Court also considered the principles governing the exercise of discretion to exclude evidence that, while technically admissible, might be unfairly prejudicial to the accused.

The Court reasoned that the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interviews is governed by both statutory provisions and common law principles. While the police had cautioned the appellant, the Court examined whether the circumstances of the interviews, including the length and nature of questioning, might have rendered the subsequent admissions unreliable or unfairly obtained. The High Court affirmed the principle that courts have a discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, or if the evidence was obtained improperly. The Court analysed the trial judge's exercise of discretion in admitting the evidence, considering whether that discretion had been misapplied.

Ultimately, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial. The Court found that the trial judge had erred in admitting the evidence in question, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and it had been obtained in circumstances that raised concerns about fairness.

Orders