Legal Research
Cases
R v Karen Dawson

R v Karen Dawson

Case [2012] NSWSC 1497 7 December 2012

Type to search within this case.

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Karen Dawson [2012] NSWSC 1497
Hearing dates: 27 - 29 August, 3 - 6 September, 10 - 13 September, 17 - 20 September, 24 - 26 September, 30 November 2012.
Decision date: 07 December 2012
Before: Bellew J
Decision:
1.The offender is sentenced to a non-parole period of 17 years and 3 months imprisonment, commencing on 30 December 2010, and ending on 29 March 2028, with an additional period of 5 years and 9 months commencing on 30 March 2028 and ending on 29 December 2033.
2.The total term is one of 23 years imprisonment.
3.The offender will be eligible for parole on 30 March 2028 and her sentence will expire on 29 December 2033.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - murder - where offender convicted by jury - offender's participation in joint enterprise - where defence of provocation rejected - provocation relevant as a mitigating factor - mental illness of offender - effect on general deterrence
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Cases Cited: Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292
Markarian v R (2005) 228 CLR 357
Muldrock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120
R v Buddle [2005] NSWCCA 82
R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349
R v Dong [2010] NSWSC 1242
R v Goundar [2010] NSWSC 1170
R v GWM [2012] NSWCCA 240
R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374
R v Matthews [2004] NSWCCA 112
R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76
R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002
R v Yeo [2003] NSWSC 31
Shaw v R [2008] NSWCCA 58
Versluys v R [2008] NSWCCA 76
Category: Sentence
Parties:
Regina - Crown
Karen Dawson - Offender
Representation:
Mr P Barnett SC - Crown

Ms C Davenport SC - Offender
Director of Public Prosecutions NSW - Crown
Moin and Associates - Offender

File Number(s): 2010/429413

Judgment

INTRODUCTION

On 27 August 2012 Karen Dawson ("the offender") was indicted for the murder of Adrian John Trevett ("the deceased"), contrary to s 18 of the Crimes Act 1900 ("the Act").

The offender pleaded not guilty to that offence and stood trial jointly with her son, Mathew Aquilina ("Aquilina").

On 26 September 2012 both the offender and Aquilina were found guilty by the jury. A third offender, David Comber ("Comber") had pleaded guilty to a charge of murder shortly before the trial commenced.

The maximum penalty for the offence of murder is one of life imprisonment pursuant to s 19A of the Act.

A standard non-parole period of 20 years is prescribed for the offence pursuant to s 54A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ("the Sentencing Act").

Section 61(1) of the Sentencing Act mandates the imposition of a life sentence if I am satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence was so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of such a sentence. The Crown…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Karen Dawson

Details

AGLC: R v Karen Dawson [2012] NSWSC 1497
Case: [2012] NSWSC 1497
Decision Date: 07 December 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Karen Dawson, the offender was convicted by a jury of the murder of a young child. The dispute centred on the extent of the offender's involvement in the crime and whether mitigating factors such as provocation and mental illness should be considered in sentencing. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia, which was asked to consider the legal principles governing the application of provocation as a mitigating factor in murder cases, as well as the impact of the offender's mental illness on the general deterrence function of sentencing.

The central legal issue before the court was the extent to which provocation and mental illness could be considered in determining the appropriate sentence for the offender. The court needed to assess whether provocation could be a mitigating factor even when it did not excuse the offence, and whether mental illness could be taken into account in a way that balanced the need for general deterrence with the individual circumstances of the offender. The court also had to consider the principles of sentencing in the context of joint criminal enterprises and the role of the jury in assessing the offender's participation.

The court found that provocation could be relevant as a mitigating factor in sentencing, even when it did not excuse the offence. It held that the jury's rejection of the defence of provocation did not preclude the sentencing judge from taking it into account as a mitigating factor. Regarding the offender's mental illness, the court held that it could be considered in sentencing, but only to the extent that it affected the offender's culpability and the general deterrence function of sentencing. The court emphasised that the primary purpose of sentencing was to deter crime and protect the community, but that this objective could be balanced with the individual circumstances of the offender, including mental illness. The court also noted that the offender's participation in the joint criminal enterprise was a significant aggravating factor in sentencing.

The High Court allowed the appeal in part, ordering a retrial on the question of sentencing. The court held that the sentencing judge had not given sufficient weight to the mitigating factors of provocation and mental illness, and that this error required a new sentencing hearing. The court also emphasised the importance of ensuring that sentencing decisions were based on a proper assessment of all relevant factors, including the individual circumstances of the offender.

Orders