JUDGE:	NETTLE J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	28, 29, 30, 31 July, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 12 August 2003
DATE OF RULING:	13 August 2003
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Juric, Ruling (DNA Evidence)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2003] VSC 382

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Criminal law – Evidence – DNA evidence – Statistical evidence – Whether admissible –Whether prejudicial effect outweighs probative value - Whether jury must be satisfied of reliability of DNA evidence beyond reasonable doubt – Whether fair to admit results of DNA test at one locus when DNA tests at other loci rendered unreportable by contamination - Whether a DNA match probability as low as one in twenty is statistically significant.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr G.M. Horgan SC with Mr K.G. Gilligan	Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr P.C. Dane QC with Mr C.J. Pearson	C & H Lawyers

HIS HONOUR:

The accused man, Miroslav Juric, stands charged with the murder of Orfeo Baldissera on 24 January 1996. He has twice before stood trial on that charge. He was convicted at the conclusion of the first trial in 1998 but the conviction was set aside on appeal. He was retried earlier this year but the jury were unable to agree upon a verdict. He is now to be tried a third time.

At the first trial the Crown adduced evidence concerning DNA testing carried out on a number of items found at the crime scene. It included evidence that crime scene examiners had found a latex glove tip in the deceased’s motor car shortly after his death and that upon examination by the Victoria Police Forensic Services Centre it was ascertained that DNA on the glove tip may have come from the deceased and the accused but that it could not have come from the accused’s two alleged accomplices, Evans and Tsagaris. Statistical calculations carried out on the basis of the test results were said to show that the chances of DNA having come from the deceased and the accused were more than 200 times greater than the chances of the DNA having come from the deceased and another person drawn from the male Caucasian population of Victoria. Two sets of tests were relied upon. The first, which was conducted in 1996, was directed to the HUMTHO1, FES, VWA, HLA-DQA1 and D1S80 sites and the second, which was conducted in 1998, used new technology called profiler plus and was centred on a number of additional sites.

At the first trial there was a conflict of expert evidence about the reliability of the DNA evidence. Dr Roberts and Ms Scott of the Forensic Science Centre expressed confidence that the results obtained at the HLA-DQA1 and D1S80 sites were reliable despite contamination that had been observed at the HUMTHO1, FES and VWA sites. Dr Atchison, who was called…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Juric

Details

AGLC: R v Juric [2003] VSC 382
Case: [2003] VSC 382
Decision Date: 13 August 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Juric involved the appellant, Juric, who was convicted of various sexual offences. The case was heard in the Court of Appeal, which had jurisdiction to review the trial court's decisions. The primary dispute centred around the admissibility and reliability of DNA evidence presented during the trial, particularly concerning the statistical significance of a DNA match probability of one in twenty, and the admissibility of DNA test results from a single locus when tests at other loci were contaminated and unreportable.

The legal issues before the court included whether the DNA evidence was admissible, and if so, whether its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice. The court also needed to determine if the jury was required to be satisfied of the reliability of the DNA evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court considered whether it was fair to admit results of a DNA test at one locus when DNA tests at other loci were rendered unreportable due to contamination.

The court held that the DNA evidence was admissible, and the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of prejudice. The court emphasised that the reliability of DNA evidence must be assessed in the context of the entire case, and that the jury was not required to be satisfied of the reliability of the DNA evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that it was fair to admit results of a DNA test at one locus when tests at other loci were contaminated and unreportable, provided that the court gave appropriate directions to the jury regarding the limitations of the evidence. The court concluded that a DNA match probability of one in twenty was statistically significant.

The court's decision was that the conviction was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed. The court found that the trial judge had properly exercised his discretion in admitting the DNA evidence, and that the jury had been properly directed regarding the limitations of the evidence. The court also found that the statistical significance of a DNA match probability of one in twenty was sufficient to support the conviction.

Orders