IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M40 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
THE QUEEN
Applicant
and
JPR
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 14 DECEMBER 2012, AT 11.27 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.J.C. SILBERT, QC: May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.L. SONNET, for the applicant in this matter. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic))
MR D.W. GIBSON: If it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid – Youth Legal Service)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Silbert.
MR SILBERT: If your Honours please. Continuing the theme of gambling, we have considerable weight in our saddlebags. One, we are the Crown; two, we are here on a sentence matter. Having said that, your Honours, it is an important point of principle raised by the judgment of the Court of Appeal here which effectively limits the maximum sentence that can ever be imposed on a child offender in Victoria for a serious indictable offence, effectively, the three years imprisonment, that is to say what is being contended is that the orders of the Court of Appeal are wrong and that by replacing the head sentence of six years with a non‑parole period of four, with three years in youth justice, and decreeing that general deterrence and denunciation can form no part in the sentencing of a child offender, the Court of Appeal has effectively misconstrued the construction of the statute and read in limitations as far as the sentencing of child offenders in Victoria are concerned.
HAYNE J: But there are two distinct steps in that. First, as I understood it, you were saying that this establishes a principle of perfectly general application and the second step is it is founded on a misconstruction of the statute.
MR SILBERT: Precisely so.
HAYNE J: Why is it of general application?
MR SILBERT: Your Honour, because by insisting that ‑ there are two concurrent operations of sentencing law in Victoria for offences such as this. We have the Sentencing Act and we have the Children, Youth and Families Act that I will just refer to as the Children’s Act. Now, they have concurrent operation for the sentencing of a child offender for indictable offences and an order for detention must be made under the Sentencing Act. Now, that comes about by virtue of section 586 of the – I will just refer to it as the Children’s Act. Given that the sentencing judge had rejected all other sentencing options other than detention then only the Sentencing Act could apply by virtue of section 586 of the Children’s Act and it follows that once the Sentencing Act applies, general deterrence and denunciation are applicable by virtue of section 5 of that Act.
Now, it is submitted that it…
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- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 349
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in law by quashing the jury's verdict of guilty and entering an acquittal. Specifically, the High Court was required to determine if the Court of Criminal Appeal had correctly applied the principles governing appeals against jury verdicts, particularly in circumstances where the appeal court considered the verdict to be unsafe or unsatisfactory.
In their joint judgment, Hayne and Heydon JJ found that the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in law. Their Honours explained that an appellate court should not substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the jury unless it is satisfied that the verdict reached by the jury was unsafe or unsatisfactory. The High Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal had failed to demonstrate that the jury's verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory, and had instead engaged in a re-evaluation of the evidence that was not warranted. The principles applied concerned the limited grounds upon which an appellate court can interfere with a jury's verdict, emphasising the deference owed to the primary fact-finder.
The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and remitted the matter to that court to be heard and determined according to law.
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