R v JONES (No 2) - [2013] SADC 108

District Court of South Australia
(Criminal)
R v JONES (No 2)
[2013] SADC 108
Ruling of His Honour Judge Slattery (ex tempore)
4 July 2013
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE
Application by prosecution to lead evidence of discreditable conduct - purpose for which evidence may and may not be used - probative value of evidence outweighs prejudicial effect - proper directions to be given to jury.
Leave granted to prosecution.
Evidence Act (SA) 1929 S.34P, s34R , referred to.
R v C, CN [2013] SASCFC 44, applied.
Harris v Director of Public Prosecutions [1952] AC 694, discussed.

R v JONES (No 2)
[2013] SADC 108

The question for my consideration is the application by the prosecution to lead further material from Detective Brevet Sergeant Melissa Benson.
In the evidence thus far in this trial, Detective Brevet Sergeant Melissa Benson has given evidence in relation to an interview with the accused that took place on 19 December 2011 at the Holden Hill Police Station. The interview was recorded. A deposition was provided by Detective Benson dated 7 June 2012 and attached to it was a transcript of the interview consisting of some 45 pages.
A Rule 15 notice was delivered by the accused and in respect of the content of the transcript, and therefore the film of the interview, I have ordered that certain excisions of those materials take place.
In evidence yesterday, 3 July 2013, Detective Benson provided an amended record of interview that consists of some 40 pages. It is marked ‘MFI P13’. One of the issues that were raised in the context of the Rule 15 notice was material that formerly was contained on p.43 and top of p.44 of the annexure to Detective Benson’s declaration. That material relates to questions put by Detective Benson to the accused in respect of his use of the drug ecstasy as follows:-
“QDown below and um. Before you mentioned when we were talking about the. The yellow pill that you know from your knowledge or whatever of drugs. That you just put two and two together basically and ah, came up with the ecstasy what. What is your um, do you have a drug history at all or do you use or.
AOh you see it around. Everywhere you go.
Q Yeah.
AYou work around that industry long enough. You get to find out everything.
QYeah. Do you use yourself.
ANot usually no.
QNot usually but on the odd occasion.
AYep.
QYeah and what do you take. Not that we’re gonna do anything about that. Ha.
AI might have a pill occasionally.
QYeah.
Abut very rarely.”
There was an initial objection by Mr Crowe for the accused in respect of that material but that objection was withdrawn. Mr Crowe correctly raised with me in the trial that the evidence is still in the nature of discreditable conduct evidence and therefore s.34P had an application including any consequential matters under s.34R of the Evidence Act.
There was some…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v JONES (No 2)

Details

AGLC: R v JONES (No 2) [2013] SADC 108
Case: [2013] SADC 108
Decision Date: 4 July 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Jones (No 2) arose from an application by the prosecution to introduce evidence of the accused's discreditable conduct in a criminal trial. The court was tasked with determining the admissibility of such evidence and its permissible use within the context of the trial. The High Court of Australia was called upon to provide clarity on the application of the principles governing the admissibility of prior misconduct in criminal proceedings.

The primary legal issue was the scope and limits of the use of evidence concerning the accused's past discreditable conduct. The court had to decide whether the probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have on the jury's decision-making process. Furthermore, the court needed to outline the proper directions that should be given to the jury to ensure that such evidence is considered appropriately and not misused.

In addressing these issues, the court emphasised the importance of maintaining a balance between the probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence of discreditable conduct. The court held that such evidence could be admissible if its probative value was substantial enough to justify its use, provided that appropriate directions were given to the jury. The court stressed that the evidence should not be used to suggest that the accused was more likely to have committed the crime due to their past conduct. Instead, it could be used to assess the credibility of the accused or other witnesses, or to establish a pattern of behaviour relevant to the case. The court also underscored the necessity of clear directions to the jury to prevent the evidence from being misused and to ensure that it is considered in the proper context.

The final orders of the court included a directive for the trial judge to provide specific instructions to the jury regarding the use of evidence of discreditable conduct. These instructions were to ensure that the jury understood the limited purposes for which such evidence could be used and to guard against its prejudicial effect. The court's decision provided a clear framework for future cases involving the admissibility and use of discreditable conduct evidence, reinforcing the principles that must be followed to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice process.

Orders