R v Jones; ex parte

Case •

[1995] QCA 133

•

7/04/1995

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND Appeal No. 41 of 1994
Brisbane
[McClintock v. Jones]
BETWEEN:

PAMELA CLAUDETTE McCLINTOCK

(Applicant) Appellant

AND:

RONALD HARRY JONES

(Respondent) Respondent
FITZGERALD P.

PINCUS J.A. DAVIES J.A.

Judgment delivered 07/04/1995

SEPARATE CONCURRING REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FITZGERALD P. AND
DAVIES J.A.; SEPARATE DISSENTING REASONS OF PINCUS J.A.

1.    GRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL

2. ALLOW THE APPEAL

3.    SET ASIDE THE ORDER THAT THE RESPONDENT PAY THE APPELLANT $35,000.00 AND REMIT THE MATTER FOR RECONSIDERATION.

4.   THE RESPONDENT PAY THE APPELLANT'S TAXED COSTS OF AND INCIDENTAL TO THE APPEAL.

CATCHWORDS: COMPENSATION - assault occasioning grievous bodily harm - interpretation of ss. 663A, 663B and 663BA of the Criminal Code (Q.)

Counsel: C. Reid for the Appellant

No appearance for the Respondent

Solicitors:  Poteri Woods for the Appellant

Date/s of Hearing: 15 February 1995

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND Appeal No. 41 of 1994
Brisbane
Before Fitzgerald P.
Pincus J.A.
Davies J.A.

[McClintock v. Jones]

BETWEEN:

PAMELA CLAUDETTE McCLINTOCK

(Applicant) Appellant

AND:

RONALD HARRY JONES

(Respondent) Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - FITZGERALD P.

Judgment delivered 07/04/1995

The appellant was assaulted by the respondent on 18 November 1992, and, on 8 September 1993, the respondent was convicted of assault occasioning grievous bodily harm to the appellant. On the appellant's application, the trial judge then ordered the respondent to pay the appellant $35,000.00, and her costs of and incidental to her application. The respondent did not appear in the proceeding in this Court in which the appellant applied for leave to appeal pursuant to sub-s. 92(2) of the District Courts Act 1967 on the ground that the trial judge's decision was based on an erroneous view of the operation of the

provisions of Chapter LXVA of the Criminal Code, which has been the subject of a number of conflicting decisions. The application for leave to appeal and the appeal were heard together.

Sections 663A, 663AA, 663B and 663BA of the Code provide as follows:

"663A. Interpretation. In this Chapter, unless the
context otherwise indicates or requires the following
terms shall have the meanings respectively assigned
to them, that is to say:-
'injury' - bodily harm and includes pregnancy, mental
shock and nervous shock;
'Minister' - the Minister for Justice and Attorney-
General or other Minister of the Crown for the time
being charged with the administration of this Code.
The term includes a Minister of the Crown temporarily
performing the duties of the Minister charged with
the administration of this Code;
'prescribed amount' -

(a) where injury in connexion with which an application is made was suffered before the commencement of The Criminal Code Amendment Act 1984, $5 000;

(b)  in all other cases save those that are the subject of particular reference in section 663AA, the amount for the time being specified in section 14(1)(C)(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1983 as varied from time to time pursuant to section 14E of that Act.

[Section 14(1)(C)(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act is now
renumbered 8.31, and s. 14E is now renumbered as 8.32-8.36.]

663AA. Particular prescribed amounts. (1) The prescribed amount for the purposes of this Chapter in the case of mental shock or nervous shock is $20 000. (2) Where injury in connexion with which an application is made in accordance with this Chapter is the same or substantially the same as an injury specified in the table set forth in section 14(1)(C) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1983, the prescribed amount for the purposes of this Chapter in respect of such injury is the maximum amount that may be paid as compensation under the said Act in respect of the injury so specified.

(3) Where injury in connexion with which an application is made in accordance with this Chapter consists of more injuries than one, the prescribed amount in respect thereof for the purposes of this Chapter is the amount for the time being specified in section 14(1)(C)(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1983 as varied from time to time pursuant to section 14E of that Act.

(4) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) are subject to provision (a) of the meaning of the term 'prescribed amount' in section 663A.

[Section 14(1)(C) of the Workers' Compensation Act is now

renumbered 8.6.]

663B. Court may order payment for compensation. (1)
Where a person is convicted on indictment of any
indictable offence relating to the person of any
person or of more than one indictable offence
relating to the person of any person (whether in
respect of one indictment or more than one
indictment) arising out of the one course of conduct
or closely related courses of conduct of that person
so convicted, the Court, on the application by or on
behalf of the person aggrieved by the offence or
offences may, in addition to any other sentence or
order it may make, order him to pay to the person
aggrieved a sum not exceeding the prescribed amount
by way of compensation for injury suffered by him by

reason of the offence or offences of which the

offender is convicted.

For the purpose of determining whether courses of conduct are closely related, regard shall be had, in addition to any other relevant matter, to the acts or omissions constituting the courses of conduct and the times of the doing of the acts or the making of the omissions, one in relation to another.

Injury suffered by a person aggrieved by reason of the commission by the person convicted of more than one indictable offence as hereinbefore in this subsection described may, in respect of the person convicted, be the subject of one application only and one Court order for the payment of a compensatory sum only:

An order made under this subsection shall not, for
any purpose, be taken to be part of a sentence.
(2) In determining whether or not to make an order
under subsection (1) of this section and in
determining the amount of any order, the Court shall
have regard to any behaviour of the person aggrieved
which directly or indirectly contributed to the
injury suffered by him, and to such other
circumstances as it considers relevant (including
whether the person aggrieved is or was a relative of
the convicted person or was at the time of the
commission of the offence, living with the convicted
person as his wife or her husband or as a member of
the convicted person's household) and to the other
provisions of this Chapter.
(3) If any money was found on the person of the
offender on his arrest, the Court may, if it is
satisfied that the money is the property of the
offender, order it to be applied towards the payment
of any sum ordered to be paid by him under subsection
(1) of this section.
(4) The person aggrieved may enforce any order under
subsection (1) of this section against the offender
as if the order were a judgment of the Court given in
an action for the amount of the order less any moneys
received by that person under an order made under
subsection (3) of this section.

663BA. Further matters for consideration by Court in determining amount of order. In determining the amount of an order under section 663B(1), the Court -

(a)  in the case of an injury suffered by an applicant that is not an injury described in subsection (1) or (2) of section 663AA;

(b)  without limiting the operation of section 663B(2);

(c)  without prejudice to any other consideration determined by it to be relevant in the circumstances; and

(d)  unless it determines it is not practical to do so,

shall consider the injury suffered in relation to and by comparison with the injuries specified in the table referred to in section 663AA(2) and the maximum amounts that may be paid as compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act 1916-1983 in respect of the injuries so specified."

Broadly speaking, s. 663C of the Code enables the Governor-in- Council to authorise the Treasurer to pay to the person in whose favour an order for payment has been made against a person convicted of an indictable offence so much of the amount ordered to be paid as has not been satisfied by the convicted person. See also s. 663E.

While the general legislative policy is clear, its formulation is imperfect. Thus, for example, although it is common for

payment to be made out of the State's Consolidated Revenue Fund, the Government usually does not participate in either applications for compensation or consequential appeals; the amounts of compensation which are paid out of public funds are routinely assessed in what are effectively uncontested proceedings.

Further, different views have been experienced on a number of

aspects of the operation of the material provisions; for

example:

(i)        whether a "broad and summary" assessment of compensation should be made (R. v. Bowen (1969) 90 W.N.(Pt. 1) N.S.W. 82; R. v. Forsythe [1972] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 951; R. v. Turner [1972] Q.W.N. 46; cf. R. v. Daley [1970] Q.W.N. 33; R. v. Wright [1971] Qd.R. 153; Re Gangemi [1971] Q.W.N. 19); or compensation

should be assessed in accordance with the ordinary principles of assessment of damages for personal injury in civil cases: R. v. Allsopp [1972] Q.W.N. 34; R. v. Johnson, ex parte McLeod [1973] Qd.R. 208;

R. v. Sainty [1979] Qd.R. 19; R. v. Wraight and Dakin, ex parte Fullerton [1980] Qd.R. 582, 582-583, 584; R. v. Bridge and Madams, ex parte Larkin [1989]

1 Qd.R. 554; R. v. Castle and Hughes, ex parte Hansen [1990] 1 Qd.R. 560; R. v. Hurle, ex parte Anderson

[1991] 2 Qd.R. 682. See also In re Poore, In re

Scully and Scully (1973) 6 S.A.S.R. 308.

(ii)       whether economic loss is recoverable; R. v. Daley [1970] Q.W.N. 33 proceeded on the basis that economic

loss was not recoverable, but the contrary view has

been adopted in a number of cases; e.g., R. v.

Johnson; R. v. Wraight and Dakin; R. v. Bridge and
Madams; R. v. Castle and Hughes; R. v. Hurle.

(iii)whether there is an upper limit on the amount of compensation where there is no amount prescribed in the Workers' Compensation Act 1916 in respect of the injury or injuries for which compensation is being awarded: R. v. Castle and Hughes states that there is no upper limit in such circumstances; R. v. Hurle states that the upper limit is the amount stated in s. 8.31 of the Workers' Compensation Act (as currently numbered). That amount is presently $71,310.00.

(iv) whether the compensation awarded should be assessed on the basis that the upper limit is reserved for the most serious cases, with a proportional amount awarded for less serious cases, the approach adopted in this case and which was said to have some
attraction in R. v. Hewitt, ex parte Brown (No. 445 of 1994, unreported judgment delivered 22/9/94), or, as was accepted in the latter case, whether the maximum permissible amount should be awarded wherever an assessment on ordinary tortious principle results in more than the prescribed amount: see the cases
collected at the end of paragraph 1.

In my opinion, compensation is to be assessed in accordance with the ordinary principles of assessment of damages for personal injury in civil cases and economic loss is recoverable; however, there is an upper limit applicable in all circumstances; that amount should be awarded if it is less than the compensation assessed.

As Pincus J.A. has pointed out, this approach can result in anomalies. However, to a substantial extent at least, that is the inevitable consequence of a statutory maximum limit on the amount permitted to be awarded. As his Honour states, the alternative approach would mean that there would frequently be no applicable standard for the assessment of compensation, which would be substantially left to judicial intuition. That course would involve such a substantial departure from the usual judicial role that it ought not be preferred if another view is reasonably open, as it is here. Further, Parliament has not altered the legislation despite almost two decades of

cases in which the approach I prefer has been adopted.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that the District Court judge who made the order appealed from erred in principle and that this is a case in which leave to appeal should be granted, and the

appeal allowed.

The order from which the appeal is brought awarded the appellant $35,000.00 plus costs. From the reasons given, it seems that less detailed findings were made than would have been appropriate if the correct basis of assessment had been

followed. For example, it is not apparent whether the

appellant's description of the effect of the injuries on her life was accepted in full. In the circumstances, it is undesirable for this Court to fix an amount, and it should go back to the District Court for reassessment.

I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal, set aside the order that the respondent pay the appellant $35,000.00 and remit the matter for reconsideration. The respondent must pay the appellant's taxed costs of and incidental to the appeal.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 41 of 1994.

Brisbane

BeforeMacrossan C.J.

Pincus J.A. Davies J.A.

[McClintock v. Jones]

BETWEEN:

PAMELA CLAUDETTE McCLINTOCK

(Applicant) Appellant

AND:

RONALD HARRY JONES

(Respondent) Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.

Judgment delivered 07/04/1995

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of the President and those of

Davies JA.

The figures which are prescribed for maximum awards do not suggest that the

legislature, in enacting and amending Ch. 65A of the Criminal Code, had in mind such

amounts as are awarded in civil actions for personal injuries. For example,

s. 663AA(2), read with the relevant provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act

1990, has the result that the maximum figure for compensation to be awarded to a

victim who has lost both eyes or both hands or who has suffered a "total and incurable

loss of mental powers involving inability to work" is a little over $70,000, a figure having

no relation to the sum likely to be fixed in a common law action relating to such injuries. And s. 663BA requires that prima facie, when considering an injury not listed

in the relevant table in the Workers' Compensation Act 1990, the court, in awarding

compensation under the Code, "shall consider the injury suffered in relation to and by

comparison with the injuries specified in the table" in the Act; presumably a person

who suffers grievous brain damage, but not total loss of mental powers, is ordinarily to

receive, under the Code, a substantially lesser sum than the maximum.

The disadvantage of rejecting the submission that, subject to the statutory

maxima, awards of compensation should be made in accordance with the principles

worked out in civil actions for personal injuries is that, unless that standard is adopted,

there will be likely to be inconsistency and lack of coherence in the pattern of awards

of compensation under the Code. On the other hand accepting that submission brings

its own anomalies: the victim with a broken leg may receive the same sum as one

who is totally blinded; a victim whose injury is not mentioned in the workers'

compensation table may because of that happy chance hope to receive more than

one, perhaps much more seriously injured, whose injury is precisely specified there.

In my opinion Ch. 65A, on its face, suggests that the amounts specified in the

workers' compensation table are to be the guide. And in 1984 when that system was

brought in, the Minister introducing the relevant bill said, among other things:

"A second feature of the Bill is that it will provide a guide to the courts in determining what is an appropriate amount of compensation to be awarded. In this regard, the existing provisions of this chapter of the Criminal Code have been silent. For the most serious injuries, such as the loss of sight, the maximum amount provided for this type of injury with the workers' compensation scale will be awarded by the court to the applicant. Where the injury is not as serious, lesser amounts will be awarded.

The table from the Workers' Compensation Act has been applied for a number of reasons. The first is that it is a table which is designed to compensate for the long-term effects of a disability. It reflects not only the importance of making reparation in the short term for pain and suffering, but also in the long term where an injury inhibits the future prospects of a victim in employment.

With the wide range of injuries that result from violent crime, it is difficult to provide a table which relates to each different type of injury. However, in an attempt to assist the court, this Bill will provide that the court is required to consider the injury suffered in relation to, and by comparison with, the injuries that have been specified in the table. If it is not practical for the court to do so, it will not be required to follow that course "

It is legitimate to have regard to the Minister's speech, not only for what it says,

but for what it does not say; there is no suggestion in it that the then current range of

awards in civil actions for damages for personal injuries, of which the Parliament must

surely have been aware, was to be used (subject to the statutory maxima) as a guide,

by judges awarding compensation.

It does not appear to me that any settled practice has been adopted in this

matter and I incline to the view that this Court should come to its own conclusion, in

interpreting Ch. 65A. My view is that the legislative intention is that compensation

shall be awarded using the table in the Workers' Compensation Act 1990 as a guide,

but otherwise exercising a broad discretion as to what amount of compensation is fair.

It does not appear to me at all likely that the system intended to be instituted was that

judges should assess compensation as if determining a civil action for damages and

treat the limits in the Workers' Compensation table as having no relevance other than

as prescribing maxima. Apart from the language of the Minister's speech, the terms of

s. 663BA, referred to in the speech, seem to contemplate that where an injury is suffered which is not one in the Workers' Compensation Act table, but is comparable

with an injury there listed, then ordinarily the award shall be set by comparison with the

table. That approach is hardly consistent with an intention that awards in civil cases

are to be the primary guide.

I have concluded that the primary judge was right to refer to the statutory

maximum not just as a cap on the award, but also as a guide to the proper amount to

be awarded; I think the appeal should be dismissed.

L A E P P A F O T R U O C E H T N I
D N A L S N E E U Q F O T R U O C E M E R P U S
41 . o N l a e p p A 94 9 1 of
e n a b Bris
e r o f e B . P d l a r e g z t i F
. A . J s u c n i P
. A . J s e i v a D
] s e n o J . v k c o t n i l C c M [
: N E E W T E B
K C O T N I L C c M E T T E D U A L C A L E M A P
) t n a c i l p p A ( t n a l l e p p A
: D N A
S E N O J Y R R A H D L A N O R
) t n e d n o p s e R ( t n e d n o p s e R

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DAVIES J.A.

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, t s r e e u h r o t i C u , q e e l r b e a v d t o e n e b h i b a t i r c s e g e n n d o i t e o b n
n i g n i s s e s s a , n o i t a s n e p m o c s s e l n u t i s e n i m r e t e d t i s i t o n
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n o s i r a p m o c h t i w e h t s e i r u j n i d e i f i c e p s n i e h t e l b a t
. . . d n a e h t m u m i x a m s t n u o m a t a h t y a m e b d i a p s a
n o i t a s n e p m o c . . . n i t c e p s e r f o e h t s e i r u j n i o s
. " d e i f i c e p s
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t a h t t a h w s a w d e d n e t n i y b e s e h t s n o i s i v o r p s a w t a h t s d r a w a f o
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s t n u o m a d e i f i c e p s n i e h t e l b a t r o f e l g n i s , s e i r u j n i t i s i
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h p a r g a r a p ) b ( f o e h t n o i t i n i f e d f o d e b i r c s e r p " " t n u o m a n i
63A. 6 . s
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e c n e r e f e r o t a d e b i r c s e r p , t n u o m a e h t m u m i x a m t o n " ( g n i d e e c x e
. g d n e e i r r h s e e y h t i h d e a c o T r b m i ) n o h " w t n u o d m e a b i r c s e e r h p t
n i m e h t h c i h w s e c n i v e n a n o i t n e t n i o t , e s o p m i n i h t i w t a h t
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s m i t c i v f o e m i r c , t a h t n i h t i w t a h t n o i t a t i m i l o n ( t b u o d
d e t r e s n i o t t c e t o r p e h t c i l b u p , ) e u n e v e r e s o h t s m i t c i v d l u o h s
- s n u o o s n i m t f i r o t n y o c a l t i h s v t u o r d e s o e n s n t e e a g l s n e p m e o b c
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72] Q. 9 p 1 p [ o e s . d l . R u l v l A c t n s i a e t l a . N 34, R. v . W ; n o s n h . o J
73] Qd 9 1 d [ o e L c e M t r a x p e . 208, R R . ; n i k d t x a n h e D a g i . a . r v W
n o e ] t t 0 r r 8 e a . 9 l p R 1 l . [ u d F Q 82, R. 5 . v e g d i r d B n ; a s m a d a M x e
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72] Q. . e 9 r l 1 e b [ n . i r . R s u v s T i m r r e e h p g s c n o i i o n h e l w n o . N . W
46 an d . R . v , s n i k n e J , d e t r o p e r n u t n e m g d u j d e r e v i l e d n o 27
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a e l p f o s e r . a t a c i d u j t a h T s i ; t c e r r o c n i e e s 63E(3) and 6 . s s
. ) 5 ( . R . v y e l a D ] 0 7 9 1 [ . N . W . Q 33 and R . . v t h g i r W ] 1 7 9 1 [
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n e h t t c e r r o c e e s ( : a r t n o c . R . v i m e g n a G ] 1 7 9 1 [ . N . W . Q ) 9 1
t n e u q e s b u s s t n e m d n e m a g n i b i r c s e d t i s a a " y r o t a s n e p m o c m u s
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