R v Jones

[2008] SASC 150

Supreme Court of South Australia

(Criminal)

R v JONES

[2008] SASC 150

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Debelle (ex tempore)

6 June 2008

EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS

Suppression order – application to revoke – respondent sentenced for murder as a juvenile – order made suppressing name of respondent from publication – respondent escaped from prison – respondent now adult – application to revoke suppression order – application pursuant to s 63C(2) of Young Offenders Act 1993 to permit identification of respondent with the offence for which he was convicted – relevant principles – application allowed – suppression order revoked.

Evidence Act 1929 s 69A; Young Offenders Act 1993 s 63C, referred to.

R v JONES
[2008] SASC 150

Criminal

1. DEBELLE J.        On 12 February 1998 Grant Leslie Jones was sentenced by me for the offence of murder. He was then a juvenile. On 14 January 1998 I had made an order suppressing his name from publication. The order did not prevent publication of the circumstances of the offending. The order remains in full force and effect. Mr Jones has been in custody since. More recently, he was in custody at the Cadell Prison. He escaped from that prison. I assume that in due course he will be charged with an offence in relation to that escape.

2. Advertiser Newspapers Pty Ltd learned of that escape. It applied for an order revoking the order I had made on 14 January 1998 suppressing the name of Mr Jones. It asserts that there is a legitimate public interest in publishing news of the escape of Mr Jones and his subsequent apprehension. It is joined in that application by the company which operates the Channel 10 television station.

3. The application came before me on 28 May. On that occasion solicitors appeared for the two applicants seeking the revocation of the previous suppression order. There was no appearance on behalf of either the Director of Public Prosecutions or Mr Jones. As Mr Jones had an order of suppression in his favour, I was not prepared then to deal with the matter unless and until he had an opportunity of being advised and considering his position in the matter. I, therefore, adjourned the application until today.

4. Mr Jones has had a brief opportunity of speaking with the duty solicitor for the Legal Services Commission. She informs me that he does not oppose an order revoking the order of suppressing his name from publication.

5. In one respect there is a tension between the provisions of the Young Offenders Act1993 and s 69A of the Evidence Act1929. The terms of s 69A are grounded on the fact that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interests in open justice and the consequential right of the newsmedia to publish information relating to court proceedings: see s 69A(2). That same provision goes on to provide that a suppression order should only be made if it is satisfied that special circumstances exist. Regard must also be had to the terms of subsection (1) of s 69A which enables the court to make an order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice or to prevent undue hardship to the persons named in that provision. Those provisions do not include an offender.

6. By contrast, what is now s 63C of the Young Offenders Act also invests a court with power to make a suppression order. One obvious factor to which regard must be had is the object of the Young Offenders Act. As expressed in s 3(1), the object is to secure for young people who offend against the criminal law the care, correction and guidance necessary for their development into responsible and useful members of the community and the proper realisation of their potential. One consideration which obviously flows from that provision is that the rehabilitation of a young person who has committed a crime may be assisted by suppression of that person’s name.

7. Mr Jones is now in his late twenties. He is, therefore, no longer a person subject to the provisions of the Young Offenders Act. In addition, he has, as an adult, offended in that he has escaped from custody. I acknowledge that he has not yet been charged with nor yet been convicted of that offence but on the face of the matter he would appear to be guilty.  No suggestion has been made on his behalf to the contrary. In those circumstances, having committed an offence, he has, to some extent, forfeited any entitlement to continue to rely on the suppression order.

8. Apart from those considerations, there is an interesting question whether the Young OffendersAct can have any operation in relation to the escape from custody or, indeed, whether the suppression order can have any further operation. The fact of the matter is that Mr Jones has, as an adult, committed an offence. There is real argument whether, in light of that fact, the suppression order can have no operation and it would be legitimate to publish the fact that he had escaped from custody and to name him.

9. Compliance with the suppression order would, of course, require that there be no reference to the fact that he had been in prison for murder. Compliance with the suppression order would also require that his name not be linked to the publication of the circumstances in which he had offended. Finally, as already noted, Mr Jones does not oppose the application. For all of these reasons, I am prepared to revoke the order made on 14 January 1998. There will be an order accordingly.

10. Mr Campbell, who appears for the company operating Channel 10, seeks an order pursuant to s 63C(2) of the Young Offenders Act permitting the identification of Mr Jones with the offence for which he had been convicted.  Such an order will have as a necessary consequence the publication of the circumstances of the offending. The circumstances of the offending have already been published. I think the appropriate course in this case is to permit the identification of Mr Jones with that offending but the order will permit only publication only of that which is contained in the sentencing remarks I made on 12 February 1998 or the remarks made by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 14 May 1998.

11. It will not be permissible to publish anything more beyond that and, for the purposes of making that entirely clear, I indicate that it will not be permissible to publish any photographs of any person who was in any way associated with that offending.  That restriction extends to photographs of Mr Jones.  

12. The orders will be:

    1Revoke the suppression order made on 14 January 1998 in so far as it relates to Grant Leslie Jones.

    2It shall be lawful to publish particulars identifying Grant Leslie Jones with the circumstances of the offending for which he was sentenced by reference only to the sentencing remarks published on 12 February 1998 and to the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal delivered on 14 May 1998.

    3Notwithstanding the terms of paragraph 2 of this order it shall not be lawful to publish any photograph of the circumstances of the offending or of Grant Leslie Jones.