R v Johnson, Sonnet & Paisley - [2001] VSCA 242

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 311 of 2000
No. 303 of 2000
No. 306 of 2000

THE QUEEN

MATTHEW CHARLES JOHNSON
SEAN JASON SONNET

JASON BRIAN PAISLEY

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JUDGES:	PHILLIPS, C.J., CHARLES and CHERNOV, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	19-20 November 2001
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	20 December 2001
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2001] VSCA 242

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeals Against conviction – Miscarriage of discretion in trial judge refusing application for jury’s discharge – Discretion miscarried in circumstances of the judge being placed under extreme and unacceptable strain – Appeals allowed – s.399.3 Crimes Act 1958 considered.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel

Solicitors

For the Crown

Mr J.D. McArdle, Q.C.

K. Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

For the Applicant Johnson

For the Applicant Sonnet

For the Applicant Paisley

Mr C.F. Thomson

Mr G.F. Meredith

Mr M.P. Taft

Michael P. Coghlan Pty Ltd

Rainier Martini

Stary Myall

PHILLIPS, C.J.:

The applicants, Matthew Charles Johnson, Sean Jason Sonnet and Jason Brian Paisley, (hereinafter referred to as Johnson, Sonnet and Paisley) who are aged 27, 31 and 20 respectively, together with John Wallace Lindrea and Stephen Wenitong were arraigned in the County Court at Melbourne on 4 September 2000 and pleaded “not guilty” to a presentment containing two counts. The first of these charged that at Lara on 1 October 1998 they intentionally and without lawful excuse damaged a glass window belonging to Her Majesty. The second charge was that at Lara on the same date they without lawful excuse intentionally caused serious injury to Gregory John Brazel. The site of the alleged offences was Barwon Prison. On 27 September the jury acquitted Lindrea and Wenitong on all counts and the applicants on the first count. The applicants were convicted on the second count. They were each sentenced to be imprisoned for eight years with a non-parole period of six years.

They subsequently lodged notices of application for leave to appeal against their convictions and sentence. After proceedings before the learned Registrar, the grounds pleaded by them touching conviction came to be as follows:

Johnson
“(a) The convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory.
(b)The Learned Trial Judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in failing to discharge the jury and the failure resulted in a trial whose course constituted a miscarriage of justice.
(c)The Learned Trial Judge did not direct the jury sufficiently in relation to comments made by the alleged victim during the course of the Trial that the defendant and his co-accused would not give evidence.”
Sonnet
“1.The learned trial judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in failing to discharge the jury.
2.The failure of the learned trial judge to discharge the jury resulted in a trial whose course constituted a miscarriage of justice.
3.The learned trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury in accord with Domican v. R.[1] concerning the evidence of the witness Clifford Alan King.
[1](1992) 173 CLR 555
4.The learned trial judge erred in failing to direct…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Johnson, Sonnet & Paisley

Details

AGLC: R v Johnson, Sonnet and Paisley [2001] VSCA 242
Case: [2001] VSCA 242
Decision Date: 20 December 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Johnson, Sonnet & Paisley, the defendants were appealing their convictions. The trial judge had declined an application for the jury's discharge due to alleged juror bias. The defendants argued that the refusal of the application was a miscarriage of discretion, resulting in an unfair trial. The Court of Appeal was tasked with reviewing the trial judge's decision and determining whether there was indeed a miscarriage of discretion that warranted the quashing of the convictions.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge's refusal of the application for the jury's discharge constituted a miscarriage of discretion under section 399.3 of the Crimes Act 1958. The court needed to assess whether the judge had been placed under extreme and unacceptable strain, which could have influenced the decision. The defendants contended that the strain was so significant that it amounted to a miscarriage of discretion. The prosecution argued that the trial judge's decision was sound and there was no miscarriage of discretion.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the strain on the trial judge was indeed extreme and unacceptable, which miscarried the judge's discretion. The court found that the trial judge had been influenced by the stress and strain of the trial, leading to an unfair decision in declining the application for the jury's discharge. As a result, the court allowed the appeals and quashed the convictions. The reasoning was that the trial judge's discretion had been miscarried in a manner that compromised the fairness of the trial, and thus the convictions were set aside.

The court did not impose any new sentences but left it to the trial court to consider the matter afresh, including the possibility of a retrial. The defendants were released on bail pending any new proceedings. This decision highlights the importance of maintaining judicial impartiality and the potential consequences when discretion is miscarried due to undue strain.

Orders