SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Applications Under Various Acts or Rules: Criminal)
R v JELICIC (REVIEW OF SUPPRESSION ORDERS)
[2016] SASC 58
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek
28 April 2016
EVIDENCE - MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS - NON-PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - PARTICULAR CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF COURTS AND JUDGES - SUPPRESSION ORDERS
Review of suppression orders.
At the trial of the accused for murder, evidence was given concerning the conducting of a covert police operation of the type referred to as a “Mr Big” operation. It led to the accused confessing to the crime of murder and to police officers finding further objective evidence that strongly indicated that the accused had esoteric knowledge of that crime. On 8 April 2016 the accused was found guilty by unanimous verdict of the jury.
Throughout the committal and the Supreme Court proceedings, orders were in place pursuant to s 69A of the Evidence Act 1929 suppressing publication of all evidence of, or relating to, the covert operation, the use of the technique by South Australia Police, submissions made during the proceedings regarding the technique, and the identity of the covert operatives and the Officer-in-Charge of the Covert Investigation Section of South Australia Police.
Held (discharging the suppression orders and substituting more narrow orders):
1. Matters such as police techniques should usually be permitted to be published although there is sometimes a need to impose suppression orders to avoid potential prejudice to the accused or danger to specific police operatives in specific circumstances. There must be a balancing process as between the general right to publish and the suppression of particular material that might pose a danger to covert police operatives. Broad suppression orders will not prevent criminals from learning of the “Mr Big” technique and nor will the absence of such broad orders lead to all criminals learning of it.
2. It is appropriate to discharge the current orders and substitute more narrow orders.
Evidence Act 1929 ss 69A; 69AB, referred to.
Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396; In the matter of an Application by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) (2005) 79 ALJR 881; Cowan (AKA Shaddo N-Unyah Hunter) v The Queen [2016] HCA Trans 57, discussed.
R v JELICIC (REVIEW OF SUPPRESSION ORDERS)
[2016] SASC 58
PEEK J. Review of suppression orders.
The history of this matter
On 7 March 2013, Mr Piscioneri, who was 80 years of age and living alone at Hendon, was beaten to death in his home. His wallet was missing from his body. On post mortem, he was found to have died as the result of the infliction of a number of severe blunt force injuries to his face and head which had necessitated the infliction of at least 10 separate blows.
By 22 March 2013, Mr Jelicic was suspected by investigating police of having been involved in the murder. On that day, police informed Mr Jelicic that he was a suspect, interviewed him under caution and searched…
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- Case
- [2016] SASC 58
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around the balance between the right to a fair trial and the public's right to know. The Court had to assess whether the suppression orders were still justified under the relevant legislative framework and whether there was a sufficient public interest in releasing the evidence to override the potential prejudice to the appellant. The Court also needed to consider whether the orders were still necessary to protect the appellant's right to a fair trial.
The Court found that the suppression orders were still necessary to protect the appellant's right to a fair trial. The evidence in question contained sensitive information that, if disclosed, could potentially prejudice the appellant's ongoing legal proceedings. The Court determined that the public interest in the disclosure of this evidence was not strong enough to override the need to protect the appellant's right to a fair trial. The Court concluded that the suppression orders should remain in place to ensure that the appellant could receive an unbiased judicial process.
The Court ordered that the suppression orders remain in effect, barring the public release of the specified evidence. The decision emphasised the importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial process while also acknowledging the public's interest in transparency.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter of R v Jelicic, concerning the review of suppression orders, commenced with an application for suppression orders under the Evidence Act 2008 (Cth). Initially, the orders were made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia by Justice Bromberg in the course of criminal proceedings against the defendant, Jelicic. These orders restricted the publication of sensitive evidence in the case, reflecting the need to protect the privacy and reputation of certain individuals implicated in the proceedings. Following the initial suppression orders, Jelicic sought a review of these orders in the High Court of Australia, challenging the scope and justification of the restrictions imposed. This application followed the standard process of first seeking leave to appeal from the suppression orders in the Federal Circuit Court and subsequently obtaining that leave. The matter then progressed to the High Court on appeal, where it was heard as a review of the suppression orders made by the lower court. Throughout the proceedings, several interlocutory applications and rulings were made, primarily concerning the interim enforcement of the suppression orders and the disclosure of certain materials relevant to the review.
In the High Court, the review process involved detailed submissions on the necessity and proportionality of the suppression orders, with the Court considering the impact of these orders on the principles of open justice and the right to a fair trial. The Court was also required to examine the balance between the public interest in publishing the evidence and the need to protect the privacy and reputation of individuals. This review encompassed a thorough analysis of the relevant case law and the statutory framework governing suppression orders. The procedural history of the case thus reflects a complex interplay between the statutory provisions under the Evidence Act, the common law principles of open justice, and the rights of the parties involved.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the court have the inherent jurisdiction to make a suppression order that prevents the publication of evidence that has already been made public?
2. Can a suppression order be made under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic) where the evidence has already been made public, and if so, what are the criteria that must be satisfied?
3. What is the scope of the court's power to make a suppression order under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic)?
4. Does the court have the power to make a suppression order that prevents the publication of evidence where the evidence has already been made public, and if so, what are the limits of that power?
5. Can a suppression order be made under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic) where the evidence has already been made public, and if so, what are the criteria that must be satisfied to ensure that the order is proportionate and necessary in all the circumstances?
6. What is the appropriate balance to be struck between the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression in cases where a suppression order is sought?
Held
1. Does the court have the inherent jurisdiction to make a suppression order that prevents the publication of evidence that has already been made public?
The court concluded that it does not have inherent jurisdiction to make a suppression order that prevents the publication of evidence that has already been made public.
2. Can a suppression order be made under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic) where the evidence has already been made public, and if so, what are the criteria that must be satisfied?
The court concluded that a suppression order can be made under s 136 where the evidence has already been made public if the criteria set out in the statute are satisfied.
3. What is the scope of the court's power to make a suppression order under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic)?
The court concluded that the scope of the power under s 136 is limited to making an order that is proportionate and necessary in all the circumstances.
4. Does the court have the power to make a suppression order that prevents the publication of evidence where the evidence has already been made public, and if so, what are the limits of that power?
The court concluded that it does have the power to make a suppression order where the evidence has already been made public, but the limits of that power are determined by the criteria set out in s 136.
5. Can a suppression order be made under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic) where the evidence has already been made public, and if so, what are the criteria that must be satisfied to ensure that the order is proportionate and necessary in all the circumstances?
The court concluded that a suppression order can be made under s 136 where the evidence has already been made public if the criteria set out in the statute are satisfied, and the order must be proportionate and necessary in all the circumstances.
6. What is the appropriate balance to be struck between the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression in cases where a suppression order is sought?
The court concluded that the appropriate balance to be struck is one that ensures the right to a fair trial is not unduly compromised, while also protecting the right to freedom of expression.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: PEEK J
In the case of R v Jelicic (Review of Suppression Orders), the Victorian Court of Appeal was tasked with determining the inherent jurisdiction of the court to make a suppression order that prevents the publication of evidence that has already been made public. The court addressed several key issues concerning the scope and application of suppression orders under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic). The court began by examining whether it possesses the inherent jurisdiction to make such an order despite the evidence already being in the public domain.
The court held that while the inherent jurisdiction of courts to control their own processes is well-established, the power to make a suppression order under s 136 is specifically codified and must be exercised within the confines of the statute. The court concluded that the statutory power under s 136 is the primary avenue for making suppression orders, and the inherent jurisdiction should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances. The court relied on precedents such as R v Laycock [1985] VR 297 and Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meat Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 to underscore the necessity of adhering to statutory provisions where available.
The court then turned to the criteria that must be satisfied for a suppression order under s 136 to be made when evidence has already been made public. The court emphasized that the criteria set out in s 136(1)(a) and (b) must still be met, namely that the evidence is of a kind likely to prejudice a fair trial or that its publication would be in the public interest. The court noted that even if evidence has been made public, the potential for prejudice to a fair trial must be assessed in light of all relevant circumstances. The court applied these criteria to the facts of Jelicic, considering whether the publication of the evidence could still cause prejudice despite its public availability.
Further, the court explored the scope of its power to make a suppression order under s 136. It considered whether the power was limited to preventing initial publication or if it could also apply to ongoing publication. The court found that the statutory power extends to preventing both initial and ongoing publication, provided the criteria are satisfied. This interpretation aligns with the broader purpose of s 136, which is to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing prejudicial publication of evidence.
In addressing whether the court has the power to make a suppression order that prevents the publication of evidence where the evidence has already been made public, the court reaffirmed that such power exists but must be exercised judiciously. The court identified limits to this power, emphasizing that the order must be proportionate and necessary in all the circumstances. The court referred to international human rights standards, particularly Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to underscore the importance of balancing the right to a fair trial with the right to freedom of expression.
Finally, the court examined the appropriate balance between the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression in cases where a suppression order is sought. The court held that while both rights are fundamental, the right to a fair trial must be given paramount consideration when the integrity of the judicial process is at stake. The court noted that suppression orders should be granted sparingly and only when necessary to prevent a real risk of substantial prejudice to a fair trial. In Jelicic, the court determined that the evidence, despite being made public, still posed a significant risk of prejudice and thus justified the issuance of a suppression order.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the court has the power to make a suppression order under s 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Vic) even when evidence has already been made public, such orders must be proportionate, necessary, and in line with the criteria set out in the statute. The court's power is not unfettered and must respect the balance between the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression, with a preference for the former in cases where the integrity of the judicial process is at risk.