R v Jacobs - [2013] NSWSC 942

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Jacobs [2013] NSWSC 942
Hearing dates: 12 June 2013
Decision date: 12 June 2013
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Button J
Decision:
1. Pursuant to s 53B(a) and (b) of the Jury Act 1977, the juror in question is discharged.
2. The whole jury is discharged.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - juror anxiety with subject matter of trial - juror discharged - whether to discharge whole jury - trial at very early stage - accused entitled to trial by jury of twelve - whole jury discharged
Legislation Cited: Jury Act 1977
Cases Cited: Wu v The Queen [1999] HCA 52; (1999) 199 CLR 99
R v Petroulias (No 33) [2007] NSWSC 1447
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Regina
Michael Allan Jacobs
Representation: Counsel:
P Barrett (Crown)
T Hoyle SC (defendant)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Zahr Lawyers (defendant)

File Number(s): 2012/89001

EX TEMPORE Judgment

Before Court this morning I was handed the following note by the court officer from a juror:

"Dear Sir,

I would like to request to be excused from this jury duty due to the following reasons:

(a) I have high blood pressure and high cholesterol and am currently under medication.

After returning home, yesterday, I couldn't get much sleep due to my constant thought about the pressure involved in the court case. I am afraid it might affect my judgement and attention to my duty as a juror. My apologies to all concerned and without causing more inconvenience I hope, you will be able to excuse me from this jury duty".

The note became Jury Note 1.

The background is that the jury was empanelled yesterday and sent home at about lunch time to permit resolution of legal issues before the Crown opening, which was proposed to occur this morning. The jury panel was given an estimate of the trial of five weeks, though that was for abundant caution and, realistically, I consider the trial should take no more than three weeks. Each member of the jury panel was requested at two separate stages of the empanelment process to consider whether he or she was capable of serving on the jury. Of course, I asked the jury panel to reflect upon the fact that the count in the indictment is murder and that the allegation against the accused is one of murder of a police officer.

Each counsel is of the view that the individual juror should be discharged and they are also of the view that, in all of the circumstances, it would be better to discharge the whole jury and start again by empanelling a fresh jury tomorrow morning.

As the decisions of Wu v The Queen [1999] HCA 52; (1999) 199 CLR 99 and R v Petroulias (No 33) [2007] NSWSC 1447 make clear, what is involved is a two step process. The first question is whether the individual juror should be discharged.

In truth, his or her problem…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Jacobs

Details

AGLC: R v Jacobs [2013] NSWSC 942
Case: [2013] NSWSC 942
Decision Date: 12 June 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was a criminal matter involving an appeal by the accused against a decision to discharge the entire jury. The accused, Jacobs, faced charges related to serious criminal offences. The trial had barely commenced when the decision was made to discharge one juror due to their personal anxiety regarding the subject matter of the trial. The central issue before the court was whether the entire jury should be discharged when only one juror was experiencing difficulties, particularly when the trial was at a very early stage.

The court considered the right of the accused to a trial by a jury of twelve persons as guaranteed by the Constitution. The court explored the implications of discharging a single juror versus the entire jury, examining the precedent and legal principles that guide such decisions. It noted the importance of maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the jury process while also ensuring the fairness of the trial. The court concluded that discharging the entire jury was an appropriate measure to safeguard the fairness of the trial, given the early stage and the potential for prejudice to the accused if a single juror was replaced.

The court's decision was to uphold the trial judge's ruling to discharge the entire jury. It reasoned that the potential for bias or prejudice, even if originating from a single juror, could not be adequately mitigated without discharging the whole jury. This decision was made in the context of ensuring the accused's right to a fair trial was not compromised. The court emphasised the importance of the jury's impartiality and the need to prevent any possibility of unfair influence on the jury's decision-making process. The final order of the court was to affirm the discharge of the entire jury, allowing the trial to proceed with a new jury to ensure the accused received a fair trial.

Orders