R v Iwanczenko - [2013] SASC 63

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v IWANCZENKO
[2013] SASC 63
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue
29 April 2013
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - RELEASE ON LICENCE
The Attorney-General applies for an order that Mr Iwanczenko be detained in custody until further order under section 23 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) ("the Act").
Mr Iwanczenko applies, if such an order is made, for an order authorising his release on licence under section 24 of the Act.
Held:
1. Mr Iwanczenko is incapable of controlling and unwilling to control his sexual instincts within the meaning of section 23 of the Act (at [46]-[47]).
2. An order should be made that Mr Iwanczenko be detained in custody until further order (at [48]-[51]).
3. An order should be made authorising Mr Iwanczenko’s release on licence under section 24 of the Act (at [54]).
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 56, 77a, 158, 170; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) ss 18A, 23, 24; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 7, 17, 23, referred to.
R v Ainsworth [2008] SASC 67; (2008) 100 SASR 238; R v Kiltie (1986) 41 SASR 52; R v O'Shea (1997) 94 A Crim R 560; R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56, discussed.
R v Armfield [2005] SASC 108; (2008) 155 A Crim 299; R v Wichen [2005] SASC 323; (2005) 92 SASR 528, considered.

R v IWANCZENKO
[2013] SASC 63
Criminal:
Blue J:

The Attorney-General applies for an order that Mr Iwanczenko be detained in custody until further order under section 23 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) (“the Act”).
Mr Iwanczenko applies, if such an order is made, for an order authorising his release on licence under section 24 of the Act. With the consent of all parties, I heard Mr Iwanczenko’s conditional application concurrently with the Attorney-General’s application.
The applications give rise to the following issues:
1.   Is Mr Iwanzcenko incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual instincts?
2.   If so, am I satisfied that I should make an order that Mr Iwanczenko be detained in custody until further order?
3.   If so, should an order be made authorising Mr Iwanzcenko’s release on licence?
I first address the question whether an order can and should be made that Mr Iwanczenko be detained in custody until further order under section 23. Unless and until such an order is made, the question cannot arise as to Mr Iwanzenko’s release on licence under section 24. I put aside for the time being any considerations relating to release on licence.
Pre-conditions for application by Attorney-General
Section 23(2a) of the Act provides:
If a person has been convicted of a relevant offence, the Attorney-General may, while the person remains in prison serving a sentence of imprisonment, apply to the Supreme Court to have the person dealt with under this section.
Section 23(1) defines a relevant offence to include, inter alia, an offence under section 23 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) (“indecent behaviour”).
On 11 November 2010, Mr Iwanczenko was convicted of 10 counts of indecent behaviour in contravention of section 23(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA). He was convicted at the same time of 15 other offences. The Magistrate imposed a single sentence for all 25 offences of a term of imprisonment of 3 years deemed to have commenced on 4 May 2010.[1] He is presently serving that sentence of imprisonment.
[1] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 18A.
On 10 October 2011, the Attorney-General applied for an order of detention in custody until further order under section 23(2a) of the Act.
The conditions precedent for the Attorney-General to apply under section 23(2a) have been satisfied.
Relevant principles
Upon the making of an application under section 23, the Court is to direct at least two legally qualified medical practitioners to inquire into the mental condition of the person the subject of the application and report to the Court on whether the person is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his or her sexual instincts.[2]
[2] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 23(3).
Section 23(5)(a) provides:
The Court may order that a person to whom this section applies be detained in custody until further order if –
(a) the Court, after considering the medical practitioners’ reports and any relevant evidence or representations that the person may desire to put to the Court, is satisfied that the order is appropriate …
It is an implicit pre-requisite for the making of an order under section 23(5) that the Court be satisfied that the person is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his or her sexual instincts.[3]
[3] R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56 at [10] per White J; R v Ainsworth [2008] SASC 67; (2008) 100 SASR 238 at [24] per White J (Doyle CJ agreeing) and [101] per Layton J.
It is not a pre-requisite to making an order under section 23 that two legally qualified medical practitioners have expressed the opinion that the person is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his or her sexual instincts.[4]
[4] R v Ainsworth (2008) 100 SASR 238 at [35]-[41] per White J (Doyle CJ agreeing).
Section 23(3) formerly (before August 2005) referred only to a person being incapable of controlling his or her sexual instincts. The Full Court in R v Kiltie[5] considered the meaning of that expression in the predecessor of section 23 of the Act.[6] King CJ said:
It is to be remembered, of course, that what is in question is not unwillingness to exercise self-control, nor a high degree of sexual drive, nor a high degree of temptation resulting from innate characteristics or external circumstances, nor special susceptibility to such temptation; what is in question is true incapacity to exercise the necessary degree of self-control over the sexual instincts.
…
The incapacity referred to in the section is an incapacity to exercise control resulting from innate mental characteristics. It is not that temporary incapacity to exercise self-control which results from the paralysis of will power caused by the ingestion of alcoholic liquor or drugs. Nor is it a strong inclination towards sexual offending resulting from deprivation of the means of satisfying sexual desire unless there is, in addition, an innate incapacity to control that inclination.[7]
[5] (1986) 41 SASR 52.
[6] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 77a.
[7] R v Kiltie (1986) 41 SASR 52 at 62. See also at 64-65 per Legoe J and 72 per Johnston J.
In August 2005, Parliament amended section 23 to incorporate reference to willingness to control sexual instincts. While the observations of King CJ concerning the concept of incapacity remain apposite, the Court is now required to consider a composite question of both incapacity and willingness to control sexual instincts. Section 23(1) defines “unwilling” to mean:
… there is a significant risk that the person would, given an opportunity to commit a relevant offence, fail to exercise appropriate control of his or her sexual instincts.
In R v Whyte,[8] White J said:
[8] [2006] SASC 56.

The decision concerning the offender’s present state of mind is to be made by an assessment of the chance that he or she may in the future, in certain circumstances, behave in a certain way. It is the risk that the offender may fail to exercise appropriate control of his or her sexual instincts which is to be assessed. In most cases, the commission of one or other of the offences listed in the definition of "relevant offence" will comprise a failure to exercise the requisite control. Where the conduct in question involves a breach of the criminal law, it could hardly be said that the control of sexual instincts was appropriate. But it may not be every commission of a relevant offence which indicates a failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts.

…

The assessment is not, however, to be confined to the risk that a relevant offence may be committed. The risk to be assessed is the risk that the offender will fail to exercise appropriate control of his or her sexual instincts, not that he or she will commit a relevant offence.

…

The offender’s actual present state of mind may be a factor which bears on the risk that an offender may, at some time in the future, fail to exercise appropriate control of his or her sexual instincts, but in many cases, it will not be the only factor. The definition itself recognises one other factor, namely an opportunity. The risk that a person may fail to exercise appropriate control of his or her sexual instincts is likely to vary according to the nature and extent of the circumstances in which the opportunity to do so arises. The definition seems to require a variety of possible circumstances in which such an opportunity might arise to be considered.

…

In my opinion, the definition is to be applied in the following way: the Court must assess the risk that the offender would, given the opportunity to commit a relevant offence, fail to exercise appropriate control of his or her sexual instincts. That assessment is to take account of all factors bearing on that risk. The Court’s assessment of the person’s state of mind will usually be very relevant to the assessment of the risk, but it is not the only matter to be considered. The opinions of the medical practitioners who have examined the offender and reported to the Court on the offender’s mental condition will be relevant to the assessment of the offender’s state of mind, but the opinions which those practitioners are able to express based on their field of expertise will not ordinarily encompass all the matters relevant to the Court’s assessment. That is to say, it will be necessary in some cases for the court to consider a range of factors which are not particularly within the field of expertise of, say, a forensic psychiatrist.

Before a Court concludes that a person is unwilling in the defined sense, it must be satisfied that the risk of failure to exercise appropriate control is "significant". In context, the word "significant" has the meaning of "substantial". Put more colloquially, the Court must be satisfied that there is a "good chance" that the risk will eventuate. The mere possibility of a failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts will not be sufficient. But on the other hand the Court does not have to predict that the offender will fail to exercise appropriate control, or even consider it probable that he will fail to exercise such control. [9]

[Footnotes omitted.]

[9] R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56 at [24], [25], [26] and [29]-[30].

If the Court makes a finding that the person is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his or her sexual instincts, the Court is then to consider the further question whether it is satisfied that an order for detention in custody until further order is appropriate within the meaning of section 23(5).[10]
[10] R v Ainsworth (2008) 100 SASR 238 at [77] per White J (Doyle CJ agreeing) and [103] per Layton J.
In determining whether the Court is satisfied that an order is appropriate, the Court engages in a balancing exercise. A primary factor to be taken into account in favour of making an order is the interest of the community in being protected against continuing danger.[11] A secondary factor in favour of making an order is to ensure that the person receives appropriate care, supervision and control.[12] A primary factor to be taken into account against making an order is the deprivation of liberty by indeterminate detention of the person.[13]
[11] R v Kiltie (1986) 41 SASR 52 at 61 per King CJ; R v Ainsworth (2008) 100 SASR 238 at [81] per White J (Doyle CJ agreeing). See also at [142] and [150]-[152] per Layton J.
[12] Ibid.
[13] R v Armfield [2005] SASC 108; (2005) 155 A Crim R 299 at [42] per Gray J; R v Wichen [2005] SASC 323; (2005) 92 SASR 528 at [34]-[41] per Gray J; R v Ainsworth (2008) 100 SASR 238 at [56] per White J (Doyle CJ agreeing).
The power to make an order is exceptional and should only be exercised with caution and upon cogent evidence.[14]
[14] R v Ainsworth (2008) 100 SASR 238 at [56] per White J (Doyle CJ agreeing).
Background facts
Mr Iwanczenko was born in 1969. After leaving school, he completed a four year apprenticeship in painting. His employment since then has been primarily as a painter and a labourer.
In March and October 1991, Mr Iwanczenko committed three grossly indecent acts.[15] They involved exhibitionistic behaviour similar to that committed between August 2009 and March 2010 described at [35] below. In April 1991 he was fined for the two March offences and in June 1994 he was sentenced for the October offence to 3 months imprisonment suspended upon his entering into a bond.
[15] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 23(2).
In or before 1993, Mr Iwanczenko commenced a relationship with a woman with whom he commenced living in late 1993. They married in 2000.
In December 1993 and January 1994, Mr Iwanczenko committed offences of housebreaking and larceny[16] and robbery with violence[17] respectively. He broke into two separate houses to steal women's underwear. On the second occasion, he was disturbed by the occupant. He grabbed her, pushed her to the ground and asked for money.
[16] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 170.
[17] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 158.
As a result of these matters, Mr Iwanczenko was referred by his general practitioner to Dr O'Brien in February 1994. Dr O'Brien provided a psychiatric report for consideration by the Court when sentencing for these offences.
In May 1994, Mr Iwanczenko was sentenced in the District Court for those two offences to 3 years imprisonment commencing in April 1994 with a non-parole period of 12 months. He was released on parole in January 1995.
Mr Iwanczenko saw Dr O’Brien monthly while in prison between May 1994 and January 1995. Thereafter he saw him from time to time until September 1999.
In April 1996, Mr Iwanczenko committed a grossly indecent act.[18] In October 1996, he was sentenced to 2 months imprisonment suspended upon entry into a bond.
[18] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 23(2).
Between 1997 and May 2001, Mr Iwanzcenko was working as a labourer and living in Adelaide with his wife.
In May 2001, Mr Iwanczenko committed aggravated serious criminal trespass[19], assault with intent to rob whilst armed[20] and indecent assault.[21] He entered the victim’s home wearing a balaclava and armed with a knife. He pointed the knife towards her neck and demanded money. He dragged her into the bedroom onto the bed and then held her to the floor by grabbing her around the neck. He subsequently touched her on the breast and groin when she escaped to the kitchen.
[19] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 170.
[20] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 158(a).
[21] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 56.
In May 2001, Mr Iwanczenko was arrested for those offences and remained in custody until sentenced in the District Court in March 2002. He was sentenced to 7½ years imprisonment commencing in May 2001, with a non-parole period of 5 years.
Mr Iwanczenko’s relationship with his wife ended in 2002 while he was in prison and they subsequently divorced.
In August 2008, Mr Iwanczenko was released on parole. He resided at Offenders Aid and Rehabilitation Services (“OARS”) accommodation. With one short exception, he was unemployed for about a year after his release from prison.
Between 10 September and 18 November 2008, while on parole, Mr Iwanczenko attended ten individual sessions of psychological intervention with Dr Doueal at the Adelaide Community Correctional Centre. He ceased attending on the expiration of his parole on 23 November 2008 when attending became no longer mandatory.
In January 2009, Mr Iwanczenko presented to the Adelaide Community Correctional Centre, disclosing that he had masturbated in public on two occasions and was concerned that he was going to be arrested. He undertook nine further individual psychological sessions on a voluntary basis with Dr Doueal between 7 January and 13 May 2009.
In about August 2009, Mr Iwanczenko commenced working as a painter on a subcontract basis. He continued to reside at an OARS flat (living alone).
Between August 2009 and March 2010, Mr Iwanczenko committed 22 offences comprising 10 acts of indecent behaviour,[22] five acts of offensive behaviour[23] and seven acts of being unlawfully on premises for the purpose of committing the offence of indecent behaviour.[24] The acts of offensive behaviour involved Mr Iwancenko being naked in a public place in close proximity to a stranger. The acts of indecent behaviour involved Mr Iwanczenko being naked and either masturbating or simulating sex in close proximity to a female stranger. Having been arrested on earlier occasions, he remained in custody from 4 May 2010 until sentenced.
[22] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 23(1).
[23] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 7(1).
[24] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 17(1).
In September 2010, Dr Raeside provided a psychiatric report for consideration by the Court when sentencing for those offences. In November 2010, Mr Iwanczenko was sentenced in the Magistrates Court to 3 years imprisonment with a commencement date of 4 May 2010 and a non-parole period of 18 months.
Between September 2011 and November 2012, Mr Iwanczenko participated in the Sexual Behaviour Clinic program conducted at Mt Gambier prison.
Mr Iwanczenko did not apply for parole, and is due for release on 3 May 2013.
Mr Iwanczenko has committed a number of non-sexual offences, including larceny, wilful damage, assault and resist police.
Psychiatric evidence
Dr O'Brien provided to the Court psychiatric reports dated February 2012 and February 2013. He also gave oral evidence. He interviewed Mr Iwanczenko in January 2012 and February 2013. Dr O'Brien had treated Mr Iwanczenko between February 1994 and September 1999 and had provided reports for sentencing or parole purposes in 1994, 1997 and 2006.
Dr O'Brien expressed the opinion that Mr Iwanczenko suffers from paraphilia, namely exhibitionism. He expressed the opinion that, if Mr Iwanczenko were simply released from prison, there would be a high risk that he would commit further sexual offences, particularly when experiencing anxiety or stress. He expressed the opinion that Mr Iwanczenko is presently incapable of controlling and unwilling to control his sexual instincts. He expressed the opinion that Mr Iwanczenko has made progress in undertaking the Sexual Behaviour Clinic program, but “he is not there yet”. He expressed the opinion that it is desirable in his own interests that he be returned to the community under strict supervisory conditions, including regular mandatory therapy and participation in the Owenia House program.
Dr Raeside provided to the Court reports dated January 2012 and February 2013. He also gave oral evidence. He interviewed Mr Iwanczenko in January 2012 and January 2013. He had previously interviewed Mr Iwanczenko and provided to the Magistrates Court a report in September 2010.
Dr Raeside expressed the opinion that Mr Iwanczenko suffers from paraphilia, particularly exhibitionism. He meets the criteria for diagnosis of Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. He expressed the opinion that, if Mr Iwanczenko were simply released from prison, there would be a high risk that he would commit further sexual offences, particularly when experiencing anxiety or stress. He expressed the opinion that Mr Iwanczenko is incapable of controlling and unwilling to control his sexual instincts. He expressed a similar opinion to that expressed by Dr O'Brien concerning the desirability in Mr Iwenczenko’s own interests of his being released into the community under strict supervisory conditions.

Dr Begg provided to the Court psychiatric reports dated January 2012 and February 2013. He also gave oral evidence. He interviewed Mr Iwanczenko in January 2012 and February 2013. Dr Begg expressed the opinion that Mr Iwanczenko suffers from paraphilia and specifically exhibitionism. He expressed the opinion that, if Mr Iwanczenko were simply released from prison, there would be a significant likelihood that he would commit further sexual offences, particularly when experiencing anxiety or stress.
Dr Begg recommended that Mr Iwanczenko be released under strict supervisory conditions, including mandatory individual and group therapy, abstaining from alcohol and illicit drugs, and being assisted in the development of a social network. On that basis and for those reasons, Dr Begg said that he did not support Mr Iwanczenko’s continued detention under section 23 powers and believed that he does have a capacity and willingness to control his sexual impulses.
Capacity and willingness
Both Dr O'Brien and Dr Raeside expressed the opinion that Mr Iwanczenko does not presently have the capacity to control his sexual instincts. Dr O'Brien has extensive experience with Mr Iwanczenko, having treated him between 1994 and 1998 and provided reports from time to time since then. Dr Raeside previously saw Mr Iwanczenko and provided a report in September 2010. My assessment of Dr Begg’s evidence as a whole is that he does not hold the opinion that, if Mr Iwanczenko were simply to be released from prison, he is presently capable of controlling and willing to control his sexual instincts within the meaning of section 23(3) of the Act and that he was using the words “capacity” and “willingness” in the passage referred to at [45] above in the sense of his potential capacity and desire to control his sexual instincts. If I had considered that there were a significant difference between the opinions of Doctors O'Brien and Raeside on the one hand, and Dr Begg on the other, I would have preferred the opinions expressed by Dr O’Brien and Dr Raeside.
Taking into account the psychiatric evidence and all of the other evidence adduced on the application, I am satisfied that Mr Iwanczenko is incapable of controlling and unwilling to control his sexual instincts within the meaning of section 23. If he were simply released from prison, opportunities would be likely to arise in which he could commit sexual offences in circumstances in which he would be unable and unwilling to control his sexual instincts.
Is a detention order appropriate?
In light of the psychiatric evidence given by each of Doctors O'Brien, Raeside and Begg, and Mr Iwanczenko’s history and present circumstances, I find that it is likely that, if he were simply released from prison, Mr Iwanczenko would commit further sexual offences. Factors tending to increase the risk would include his suffering anxiety, stress or anger; his not being in a personal relationship; his not being employed; his not being within a social network and his not undergoing regular and intensive therapy.
Mr Iwanczenko contends that the circumstances are not exceptional so as to justify the making of an order. He also contends that, with two exceptions, his sexual offending has been at a lower level on a relative scale because it has not involved physical contact.
In relation to the level of sexual offending, many of the offences have involved Mr Iwanczenko being naked and either masturbating or simulating sex in front of a female stranger. While contact has not been involved in those cases, nevertheless it is both confronting and disturbing for the witness to his behaviour. Dr Raeside explained that the gratification to Mr Iwanczenko is proportional to the degree of reaction by the witness to his behaviour. While most of Mr Iwanczenko’s sexual offending has been at this level, it has extended over approximately two decades and was particularly prominent over the six months before his arrest in April 2010. In addition, in January 1994 and May 2001, Mr Iwanczenko’s conduct in a woman’s home escalated to assault and indecent assault respectively. I have taken into account the fact that the power to make an order under section 23 is exceptional and should only be exercised with caution and upon cogent evidence.
Weighing the public interest in the protection of the community and the desirability of ensuring that Mr Iwanczenko’s mental condition is regularly reviewed and treated against the deprivation of liberty which would be occasioned by an order under section 23 in the manner summarised at [17]-[18] above, I am satisfied that an order should be made that Mr Iwanczenko be detained in custody until further order. I will make an order to that effect.
Release on licence
Mr Iwanczenko applies for an order under section 24 of the Act authorising his release on licence. The Director of Public Prosecutions does not oppose such an order.
The question whether a person should be released on licence under section 24(1) gives rise to different considerations to those pertaining to whether an order for indefinite detention should be made in the first place under section 23(5) or whether such an order should be discharged under section 23(11).[25] In R v O’Shea,[26] Doyle CJ (Matheson J and Nyland agreeing) said:
I have come to the conclusion that the requirement for the discharge of an order for detention is simply that specified in subs (12). That is, that the court is satisfied that the order should be discharged, after taking into account the interests of the person and of the community. Clearly enough, the court would consider the risk of further offending by the person. The greater the risk, the less likely the court would be to discharge the order. If the court is in fact satisfied that the person is capable of controlling his or her sexual instincts, one would expect the order to be discharged as of course. But, in my opinion, it is not essential that the court be so satisfied before it can discharge the order.
…
It follows, in my opinion, that s 23(12) does not mean that the order can be discharged only if the court is satisfied that there is no risk of the person offending.
…
To begin with, as the judge noted, s 24(1) specifies no criteria at all for a release on licence. A release on licence is quite different from the discharge of an order for detention. Of its nature, a release on licence is a temporary measure which can be terminated by the Parole Board or automatically upon the person being sentenced to imprisonment for an offence. A release on licence will be subject to conditions that will enable the Parole Board to exercise significant control over the activities of the person released, and enable the Parole Board to provide for supervision of the person. … All in all, a release on licence can be regarded as a means to test the suitability of a person for release, whereas the discharge of an order puts the person in question beyond the control of the Parole Board. It sets the person free unconditionally.
That being so, release on licence may be appropriate although an order for discharge is not appropriate. Release on licence will be considered much more readily. I agree, with respect, with his Honour's view that under s 24(1) one must consider the interests of the community and the risk of the person offending. The matters that are relevant under s 23(12) are equally relevant under s 24(1). But the weight given to the risk of offending will, in my opinion, be significantly less. In addition, the ability to impose conditions, to exercise controls and to enforce supervision, must significantly affect the exercise of the relevant discretion.
It is again the case that the breadth of the discretion under s 24(1) is such that there is no point in trying to identify the grounds upon which an order might properly be made. I consider that all one can usefully say is that it will be necessary to consider, among other things, the risk of the person concerned offending. But in my opinion there is scope for much more weight to be given to the desirability of testing the person's fitness for, and preparing the person for, a return to the community, by allowing a period of controlled and supervised freedom.[27]
[25] R v O’Shea (1997) 94 A Crim R 560 at 563-565 per Doyle CJ (Matheson J and Nyland J agreeing).
[26] (1997) 94 A Crim R 560.
[27] (1997) 94 A Crim R 560 at 564-565.
The evidence of each of Dr O'Brien, Dr Raeside and Dr Begg is that, if Mr Iwanczenko is released under strict supervisory conditions including mandatory therapy and treatment, there is a reasonable prospect that he will learn to control his sexual instincts. The Parole Board is empowered under section 24 to impose conditions upon Mr Iwanczenko's release on licence and can be expected to do so having regard to interests of the protection of the community, the interests of Mr Iwanczenko and the interests of the community that Mr Iwanczenko learn to control his sexual instincts. While those conditions cannot guarantee in an absolute sense the protection of the community, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make an order authorising Mr Iwanczenko's release on licence under section 24.
Conclusion
On the Attorney-General’s application under section 23 of the Act, I order that Mr Iwanczenko be detained until further order.
On Mr Iwanczenko’s application under section 24 of the Act, I authorise Mr Iwanczenko’s release on licence. I will hear the parties as to the date of release.