R v Hunter
[2015] SASCFC 84
•12 June 2015
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v HUNTER
[2015] SASCFC 84
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
12 June 2015
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - POWERS OF COURT ON APPEAL - TO CONSIDER FRESH EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - FRESH EVIDENCE AND EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - HARDSHIP - TO OTHERS
Appeal against sentence. The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated theft by force (robbery). On two separate occasions on 14 January 2014 the appellant unsuccessfully attempted to "carjack" a member of the public’s vehicle by using a machete. On 3 September 2014 the appellant was sentenced in the District Court to seven years imprisonment with a non-parole period fixed at five years. Both the head sentence and non-parole period were backdated to commence 14 January 2014, being the date the appellant was first taken into custody.
The matter was first heard by this Court on 20 March 2015. At that time it became apparent that various lower court documents had erroneously recorded the appellant as having been charged with two completed offences of aggravated theft by force (robbery) as opposed to attempted offences. The appeal was adjourned to enable counsel to take instructions. When the appeal resumed on 18 May 2015, counsel indicated that it was common ground that the errors were merely administrative and that the appellant had been properly convicted of, and sentenced for, two attempt offences. The appeal proceeded on that basis.
The appellant seeks to appeal against the non-parole period imposed. The appeal is brought on the basis of evidence now available and said to be fresh, concerning the effect of the sentence on the appellant’s two youngest children and their grandfather who is their full-time carer. The appellant contends that the circumstances are now such that had they been known or better understood by the sentencing Judge, a lower non-parole period would have been imposed.
Held by Nicholson J (Gray and Peek JJ agreeing), dismissing the appeal:
1. Whilst hardship to the dependants of an offender is a factor relevant to sentence, it is not generally taken into account other than in extreme or exceptional circumstances. Whilst the problems confronting the appellant’s children and their grandfather as a result of their father’s incarceration are such as to engender substantial sympathy, the situation is not one that suggests extreme or exceptional circumstances.
2. The appeal is only as to the length of the non-parole period. Even if it were to be reduced, the appellant, given the seriousness of his offending and his criminal record, could still expect to be subject to a lengthy period of imprisonment before being entitled to apply for release on parole. Even then, his release on parole would not necessarily be a foregone conclusion. Any reduction of the non-parole period would achieve little by way of addressing the concerns raised on appeal.
3. For these reasons, the proposed fresh evidence would not have led to a materially significant reduction of the non-parole period. Permission to adduce the proposed fresh evidence is refused.
4. The Magistrates Court is directed to correct its file endorsements and the committal for sentence notice so as to accurately record the relevant offences.
5. The District Court is directed to correct its report as to prisoner tried so as to accurately record the relevant offences.
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 s10, s10C, s18A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s137, s270, referred to.
R v Lepore [2013] SASCFC 13; R v Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291; R v Moffa (No 2) (1977) 16 SASR 155; Markovic v R (2010) 30 VR 589; R v Penno (2004) 236 LSJS 457, [2004] SASC 354; R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199; Neill v Police [1999] SASC 270, considered.
R v HUNTER
[2015] SASCFC 84Court of Criminal Appeal: Gray, Peek and Nicholson JJ
GRAY J.
I would dismiss the appeal. I agree with the further orders proposed by Nicholson J. I do not wish to add to his Honour’s reasons.
PEEK J.
I agree with the orders proposed by Nicholson J and with his reasons.
NICHOLSON J.
Introduction
The appellant has appealed against a sentence imposed on 3 September 2014, in the District Court, following his plea of guilty to two offences of attempted aggravated theft by force (robbery).[1] The maximum penalty for each offence is imprisonment for 12 years. In each case, the element of aggravation was that the appellant used or threatened to use an offensive weapon, namely, a machete, when committing the offence.
[1] Sections 137(1) and 270A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935.
The Judge, upon exercising the discretion under section 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, imposed just the one penalty for both offences; imprisonment for seven years with a non-parole period of five years. His Honour allowed a discount of 30 per cent for the pleas, being the maximum available under statute,[2] given the timing of the pleas. Both the head sentence and the non-parole period were backdated to commence on the day the appellant was taken into custody, 14 January 2014.
[2] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, s10C.
The appeal is based on evidence that was not before the sentencing Judge. The appellant maintains that the evidence in question satisfies the test for fresh evidence and is of a nature that had it been available to the sentencing Judge most likely would have resulted in a lower non-parole period being set.
When the appeal first came before this Court on 20 March 2015, the attention of counsel was drawn to a series of inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the manner by which the appellant’s offending had been recorded as the matter passed through the committal stage in the Magistrates Court and the arraignment and sentencing stage in the District Court before reaching this Court on appeal.
By the information dated 15 January 2014 and presented in the Magistrates Court, the appellant was charged, correctly as it turns out, with two attempts. However, the typed endorsement for the appellant’s first appearance in the Magistrates Court on 15 January 2014 and the typed endorsements thereafter refer to two completed offences of “commit theft using force (aggravated)”. The endorsement for 2 May 2014 records the appellant as having pleaded guilty to two completed offences of “commit theft using force (aggravated offence)” and to the appellant having being committed, with respect to the two completed offences, for sentence in the District Court. Further, the committal for sentence notice, received in the District Court on 15 May 2014, also records the appellant as having been committed for sentence with respect to two completed offences of “commit theft using force (aggravated offence).”
On 2 June 2014, the appellant appeared during an arraignment list in the District Court. Counsel advised the court that the appellant adhered to his previous pleas following which the allocutus was administered. The form of the allocutus as, in fact, administered is not clear from the transcript. At the commencement of the sentencing remarks, reference was made by the Judge to “two offences of aggravated theft using force”. However, the maximum penalty for each offence was noted, by the Judge, as 12 years imprisonment. This is the correct maximum for the attempt offence. The aggravated completed offence carries a maximum of life imprisonment. The noting of the correct maximum and the balance of the sentencing remarks make it plain that the appellant was sentenced only with respect to offences of attempt.
Unfortunately, the report as to prisoner tried completed in the District Court at the conclusion of the sentencing process perpetuated previous errors. It records the appellant as: having been charged with the two completed offences; as having pleaded guilty and been convicted of those two offences; and, as having been sentenced for those two offences.
Various persons were involved in one or more of the processes referred to in the documentary record just identified. Some were involved in the creation of parts of the record and others would or should have reviewed it and would or should have had the opportunity to identify any errors. Those involved included counsel for each party who appeared in the Magistrates Court, the Magistrate, the Magistrate’s clerk (or clerks), counsel for each party who appeared in the District Court, the District Court Judge, the District Court Judge’s associate (or associates) and counsel for each party who appeared in this Court.[3] It would appear to have been a comedy of administrative errors; it is unfortunate that the defects in the record were not identified until the matter reached this Court on appeal.
[3] Three different counsel appeared for the appellant in the Magistrates Court, the District Court and this Court respectively and different counsel appeared at various stages for the prosecution.
At the hearing in this Court, on 20 March 2015, the matter of the record was raised with counsel. The appeal was adjourned to enable both parties time to investigate whether there had been a series of administrative recording errors only, with the appellant, at all times, having been dealt with for the two attempt offences or whether the appellant had been arraigned in the Magistrates Court incorrectly on completed offences and wrongly committed for sentence with respect to completed offences.
The matter came back before this Court on 18 May 2015. The Court was informed that it was common ground that the appellant had pleaded to and been committed and sentenced with respect to attempt offences only. There had been administrative errors only. The appeal was to proceed as a sentence appeal on the basis that the appellant had been properly convicted of and sentenced for two attempt offences.
In the circumstances, the Court accepted the parties’ assurances in this respect and proceeded to hear the appeal against sentence. Whatever the outcome of the appeal, it will, in due course, be necessary to make an order directing that certain court records, in particular, the endorsements in the Magistrates Court, the Magistrates Court committal notice as filed in the District Court and the District Court report as to prisoner tried, be amended to reflect the correct position.
The appeal
Prior to and during the hearing, the appellant abandoned grounds of appeal directed at contentions that the head sentence of seven years was manifestly excessive, that the Judge should have exercised the discretion available to suspend the prison sentence and that the Judge gave no or no adequate consideration to the appellant’s personal circumstances, in particular, the effect a term of imprisonment would have on the appellant’s family.
Ultimately, counsel for the appellant restricted the appeal to an orally amended version of the substituted grounds of appeal filed in this Court on 9 January 2015. As a consequence, the sole ground of appeal pressed was in the following form.
The Court should allow fresh evidence to be received in relation to circumstances which were not known or anticipated at the time of sentence.
Particulars
a.Subsequent to sentence the positions of the appellant’s children and carer/grandfather have altered.
b.The capacity of the children’s mother to care for them is less than was apparent at time of sentence and in any event has worsened since sentence.
c.The children are in the care of their grandfather, whose mental and physical health has declined partly as a result of his role as carer.
d.These changes have increased the impact of the appellant’s sentence on his children.
e.Had the current position of the appellant’s children and grandfather been known at the time of sentence, it would have justified a more merciful non-parole period than that which was imposed on the appellant by the learned sentencing Judge.
In all the circumstances the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
The Judge’s sentencing remarks
The nature and circumstances of the offending were explained by the Judge in some detail.
Each of the offences with which I must deal was an attempt to steal a car from the owner using a machete. They were what have come to be known as carjackings or at least in this case attempted carjackings. They were committed in quick succession, when the first was unsuccessful and as it transpired both were unsuccessful. You were arrested soon after the offending.
The first victim was driving his car south on Marion Road and came up to the intersection with Anzac Highway. In doing so he drove around a car which I assume was the one you had been driving, that appeared to have broken down a short distance from the lights. There did not appear to be anyone in or associated with that car. As he waited at the lights he heard a car sound its horn and a figure approach from the rear. That person was you holding a large machete in your right hand. You shoved the machete through the open window and held it at a short distance from the victim’s face and throat. You yelled at him demanding that he get out of the car. The victim wanted to know what he’d done wrong. The victim started to wind up the window and then accelerated rapidly without warning. He got away from you but you managed to smash the machete down on the driver’s side window.
As for the second victim he was in his car in a street that leads onto the Anzac Highway and as I infer not far from the Highway Hotel. This victim had the motor turned off but the keys were still in the ignition and he was talking on the phone. All of a sudden you appeared, put the machete through the window, menaced him with it and held it against his neck and throat. You demanded that he give you the keys and for him to get out of the car. This seemed to go on for minutes but perhaps it was not that long. You threatened to knock his head off and kept moving the blade about. The victim started the motor and you changed hands holding the machete. You tried to open the car door and at that moment the victim then took off. Again you hit the car with the machete as it took off.
As mentioned, this offending is very serious in itself. Twice you threatened people who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. These were two men, which was bad enough, but your victims could easily have been the more vulnerable, perhaps women or the elderly. The use of a machete must have been very frightening and terrifying. Members of the public must feel safe when simply going about their business when driving on the roads.
The Judge, correctly, with respect, described the offending as very serious. His Honour identified both general and personal deterrence as being important considerations. In the latter respect, the Judge was mindful of the appellant’s prior criminal record which included suspended prison sentences, ordered in 2007 and 2010, for offences of violence and threatening violence.
The Judge also paid careful attention to the appellant’s personal circumstances. His Honour acknowledged the appellant’s seriously dysfunctional childhood, marked with exposure to violence, the appellant’s excellent work record, and the fact that the appellant was the father of four children including A, a boy aged three, and B, a girl aged six, from whose mother, NM, the appellant had recently separated. The Judge noted that the appellant’s problems became apparent at about Christmas 2013 when NM took up with another man, neglected the care of A and B and became seriously involved with drugs.
During sentencing submissions, the Judge heard from DM, the father of NM and who, as at the time of sentencing, was responsible for the care of the two children. DM spoke highly of the appellant as a parent and acknowledged that his daughter has had a number of issues that had been the cause of conflict between her and the appellant. There is no doubt that DM was and remains very supportive of the appellant whom he regards as hard working and always available for the family.
As earlier indicated, no complaint is now made about the approach taken by the sentencing Judge. The appeal will turn on the nature of new evidence that the appellant seeks to put before the Court; whether it is properly to be characterised and admissible as fresh evidence and, if so, whether it is of such a nature that to ignore it would result in an unjust sentence having been imposed.
Legal principles relevant to the reception of fresh evidence on a sentence appeal
This Court, on hearing an appeal against sentence, has a discretion to receive fresh evidence, that is, evidence that either was not available or could not, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained for use at the initial hearing. The proper approach to the exercise of the discretion is well understood. The Full Court in R v Lepore,[4] by reference to other authorities, explained the position in this way.
[4] [2013] SASCFC 13 at [23]-[26] (Sulan, Peek and Blue JJ).
Determining where the interests of justice lie in fresh evidence applications requires the weighing up of two broad considerations. The first is the public interest in the finality of litigation, which requires that all reasonable steps be taken to put all material evidence before the sentencing court. Weighed against this is the probability that the fresh material would have an important influence on the result of the case.[5]
[5] See R v Kikidis (2012) 112 SASR 148, [25], citing R v Dorning (1981) 27 SASR 481, 485.
In R v Dorning,[6] the Court provided guidance on the exercise of the discretion.[7] The following matters should be considered:[8]
[6] (1981) 27 SASR 481.
[7] See also R v Gilby [2012] SASCFC 94.
[8] (1981) 27 SASR 481, 485-486.
• the Court should be satisfied that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;
• the evidence should be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and
• the evidence should appear credible.
In R v Smith, King CJ said:[9]
The proper purpose of fresh evidence on an appeal against sentence is to bring before the court facts which were in existence at the time of the imposition of sentence but were not known to the sentencing judge or to explain facts which were before the sentencing judge so as to put them in a new light. It is not open to the Court of Criminal Appeal to intervene upon the basis of events which have occurred since the imposition of sentence and fresh evidence is therefore not receivable to establish the occurrence of such events. A clear distinction is necessary between fresh evidence as to events occurring before sentence and evidence as to events occurring after sentence.
In R v McIntee,[10] King CJ observed:
The rules relating to fresh evidence, like all rules of law, should be applied so as to serve and not to frustrate the interests of justice. I have no doubt that appellate courts will always receive fresh evidence if it can be clearly shown that failure to receive such evidence might have the result that an unjust conviction or an unjust sentence is permitted to stand…
[9] (1987) 44 SASR 587, 588.
[10] (1985) 38 SASR 432, 435.
The evidence sought to be relied on by the appellant as fresh is, in part, evidence of developments, concerning DM’s care of and responsibility for the appellant’s two youngest children, which have come about after the date of sentencing. The evidence also canvasses in more detail the circumstances of the children known to the Judge as at the time of sentencing. I am satisfied that at least the former aspects of the evidence, now relied upon, could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use before the Judge. I am also satisfied that the evidence appears credible. As such, the question of whether or not it should be admitted as fresh evidence on the appeal is to be determined by a consideration of whether or not it probably would have an important influence on the sentence, although it need not necessarily be decisive in that respect.
A brief summary of the evidence said to be fresh
The appellant relies on two affidavits sworn by DM,[11] an affidavit of his partner, TB[12] and a statutory declaration of AR.[13]
[11] Sworn 26 November 2014 and 11 March 2015 respectively.
[12] Sworn 13 December 2014.
[13] Declared on 25 November 2014.
AR is the mother of the appellant’s two older children, two daughters aged nine and eight. In her declaration she describes the extent to which the appellant was paying child support payments before he was taken into custody. AR also describes, in some detail, the financial difficulties that she is experiencing, as a single parent of two daughters, and the depravations in both a material sense and an emotional sense experienced by the older daughters as a consequence of the appellant’s incarceration. AR also states that she is not in a position to care for her daughter’s half siblings, A and B, who are presently in the care of their grandfather, DM.
DM is 46 years of age and is employed as a youth worker and kinship worker with Families SA. He has known the appellant for over eight years. His affidavit evidence traverses, in some detail, his personal circumstances, the abject failure of his daughter, NM, as a mother, the impact of the appellant’s incarceration on his life now that he is the full time carer for A and B and its impact on the lives of A and B.
DM has described the difficult and tumultuous relationships that existed between himself and his former wife (LM, the maternal grandmother of A and B), between himself and his daughter (NM, the mother of A and B) and between NM and LM. The effect of DM’s evidence, unchallenged by the prosecution, is that LM and NM are not capable of providing any assistance whatsoever with respect to the care of A and B.
DM has provided a detailed description of the breakdown of the relationship between the appellant and DM’s daughter, her descent into a life of drug addiction and anti-social behaviour, her constant failure to care for her children, A and B, the threatening and aggressive behaviour directed by NM and her friends towards the appellant and the disputes between them concerning the children.
DM has explained how, following the arrest of the appellant on 14 January 2014, his former wife, LM, assumed care of the children. However, Families SA immediately commenced an investigation into the care of the children the outcome of which was that they were removed from the care of LM and NM and placed in the care of DM.
According to DM, the present situation, as far as the children are concerned, is that they are in his care pursuant to some form of court order which, according to DM, is to expire in or about July 2015. DM would appear to be the only stable parental figure within the family.
The children have been orphaned by the system. It is an extremely unfortunate situation. Their mum is on drugs and has no interest in them. She has a one-hour weekly access to the children but has not shown up for the last 12 weeks and their dad has been locked away for at least five years with an intervention order on him banning contact with the children.
DM’s evidence is to the effect that the children have been significantly emotionally and psychologically affected as a consequence of the incarceration of their father and are very distressed by the whole situation.
DM has also described, in detail, the significant impact that caring for the two children has had on his lifestyle. It has been a major shock and adjustment for him, after ten years of living on his own, to have to look after two very young children.
I come home from my job, which is caring for children and I when I come home it feels like I am working. I can’t take a holiday, I have no freedom anymore. The stress from that is overwhelming. I have had two days off in the last nine months. This has had huge impact on my relationship with my partner, TB, and my social life. We can’t do things that we used to. Like go out for dinner, go on holidays. There’s no spontaneity in our lives anymore as we are constantly caring for the children.
DM does not live with his partner, TB, but they work together in caring for and looking after A and B.
DM has also explained the extent to which his financial circumstances have been affected and the extent to which his mental and physical health has been affected now that he has the constant care of and responsibility for the two children.
According to DM, the situation as far as he, TB and the children are concerned, has progressively deteriorated from the time that the appellant was sentenced.
I am concerned that I will not be able to care for the children for the full time that [the appellant] is incarcerated. I am unsure of whether Families SA plan to seek a longer term order for me in relation to the children. The children would go into public foster care if we cannot continue to care for them. The daily stress of caring for two young children is taking a huge toll on my financial situation, my relationship and my health. I am concerned we may not be able to sustain this level of care long-term.
TB, in her affidavit, has provided information that, in general terms, corroborates DM’s evidence as to the difficulties he and the children are experiencing. In her view, the appellant created a healthy environment for his children and an environment in which they felt safe and protected from the most unfortunate influence that their mother, NM, and their grandmother, LM, had on their lives. TB, who works as a carer at a university childcare centre, is strongly of the view that the two children are in need of professional mental health assistance. However, the cost of obtaining this privately is beyond the means of her and DM. As at the date of her affidavit (13 December 2014) she was helping DM with the full time care of the children.
Legal principles concerning the effect of a prison sentence on dependents
Subsection 10(1)(n) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 provides that in determining the sentence for an offence, one of the factors to which a court must have regard is the probable effect any sentence under consideration would have on dependents of the defendant. The authorities in this area are to the effect that hardship to the dependents of an accused person is not generally to be taken into account in an accused’s favour other than in extreme or exceptional circumstances.[14] The probable effect on dependants has been said to be a limited aspect of the power to exercise mercy[15] and the hardship must be of such a serious character as to call for a merciful approach to sentencing.[16] It must be a matter that goes beyond the hardship which inevitably results from a bread winner being sent to prison; there must be something that demands the exercise of mercy.[17]
[14] See for example R v Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291; R v Moffa (No 2) (1977) 16 SASR 155.
[15] Markovic v R (2010) 30 VR 589.
[16] R v Penno (2004) 236 LSJS 457; [2004] SASC 354.
[17] R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199; Neill v Police [1999] SASC 270.
Consideration
There is no doubt that the problems confronting A and B as a result of their mother’s drug addiction and her rejection of them and their father’s lengthy term of imprisonment are significant. They will continue to suffer emotionally, psychologically and financially. There is also no doubt that DM and TB, by having agreed to assume responsibility for the two children, have had their lives significantly disrupted and that as a result DM, at least, is experiencing financial difficulty, anxiety and other ill health.
It is a very sad story and one that inevitably engenders substantial sympathy for the children, for their grandfather, DM, and for TB.
Nevertheless, the children are the responsibility of and, at least, formally, in the care of the State. If DM finds that he is unable or unwilling to continue to care for the children over the long term other arrangements will have to be made by the State. This is a very sad but, unfortunately, not an unusual situation. The question is whether, as events have transpired since sentence, the circumstances of the children and the circumstances of DM and TB, as described in the affidavit evidence, are so exceptional as to demand mercy and a sentence different from that ordered by the Judge.
In my view, there are two reasons why this appeal should fail. The first is that the situation of the two children, whilst a tragic one, is not one that suggests extreme or exceptional circumstances. It is inevitable that when a parent is imprisoned there will be substantial, and at times irremediable, repercussions for that person’s family, including for their children. This will be all the more so where that parent is at the time of being incarcerated the sole functioning parent.
In this case, proper steps have been taken to care for the children. They are in State care and, at least for the foreseeable future, they are in the capable and loving care of their grandfather. I appreciate that this has come at some great cost to DM and to his partner, TB. However, they are not dependents of the appellant. Whilst their circumstances are not to be ignored, I do not place as much weight on the difficulties caused to DM and TB as is to be placed on the circumstances of the two children themselves. If DM and TB were not available to care for the children, the children would be in State care and likely placed in some form of foster care.
At the moment, the children are, by all accounts, being well looked after given the circumstances. If they were to go into foster care they would be no worse off than many children whose parent or parents have died or have failed them in one way or another, including the not uncommon situation of a parent being imprisoned. As unfortunate as the circumstances are they are not, to my mind, to be characterised as extreme or exceptional in the sense recognised in the authorities.
The second consideration is that even if the appeal were to succeed it would not improve the situation for the foreseeable future. The appellant has not argued that his sentence should have been or should now be suspended so as to enable him to return to the community and to parent his children. Given the seriousness of the offending, the need for general deterrence and the very real need for personal deterrence in this case, the refusal of the Judge to suspend was well within the available discretion and even when regard is had to the new evidence on which the appellant now relies.
The appellant has challenged only the non-parole period as being manifestly excessive once all the circumstances are taken into account. Even if the non-parole period, presently set at five years, were to be reduced on appeal, the appellant still would be required to serve a substantial period of time in custody before being entitled to apply for release on parole. Whether or not release on parole would be granted is, itself, not a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, even once the appellant were to be released on parole, this Court cannot assume that he necessarily would have custody of his children restored to him immediately on his release, given his quite significant record of violent offending.
For these reasons, any reduction of the non-parole period may do little to alleviate the concerns raised on behalf of the children, DM and TB.
Conclusion
The difficult circumstances confronting the children, the absence of their mother and the fact that they most likely would have to be in the care of their grandfather or in State care for, at least, the period of any non-parole period set was squarely before the sentencing Judge. In my view, the proposed fresh evidence is not such as to have an important influence in the sense of leading to a materially significant modification of the non-parole period set by the Judge. I would refuse to admit, on the appeal, the materials sought to be adduced as fresh evidence and I would dismiss the appeal. I would make the following orders.
(1)Appeal dismissed.
(2)The Magistrates Court is directed to correct its file endorsements and the committal for sentence notice so as to accurately record the relevant offences.
(3)The District Court is directed to correct its report as to prisoner tried so as to accurately record the relevant offences.
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