R v Howe

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal: Criminal)
R v HOWE
[2016] SASCFC 56
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Kelly, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
13 May 2016
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - FACTUAL BASIS FOR SENTENCE - ROLE OF GUILTY PLEA OR DEPOSITIONS
Appeal by defendant against sentence.
The appellant was a one third owner of a ski boat and trailer, kept in a shed near shacks at Younghusband. The boat had been purchased four years earlier for $45,000. The appellant was engaged in litigation against his co-owners in relation to companies of which they were directors and shareholders. The appellant decided to take the boat and trailer, sell them in Adelaide and appropriate the proceeds to himself in light of his claims against his business partners.
In the early hours of 14 June 2014, the appellant, accompanied by a friend, broke into a shed, connected a boat and trailer to their vehicle, and drove towards Adelaide. They were observed by police in Murray Bridge and arrested. The appellant was charged with theft of the boat and trailer. Unbeknown to the appellant, the boat and trailer he took were not the ones of which he was a co-owner. They belonged to another person and were valued at approximately $100,000.
The defendant was initially charged with theft and serious criminal trespass. Negotiations resulted in a new information being laid in the District Court charging theft and being unlawfully on premises, to which the appellant pleaded guilty. As a result, the appellant was eligible for a discount of up to 10 per cent in respect of the theft charge and up to 40 per cent in respect of the unlawfully on premises charge.
The appellant was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment for eight months, reduced from a starting point of 10 months on account of the guilty pleas, which was suspended on his entering into a bond to be of good behaviour.
The appellant appeals against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive because it was not necessary to impose imprisonment or alternatively the starting point was manifestly excessive and on the further ground that the Judge erred by failing to explain how the single sentence was arrived at after application of the differential discounts.
Held per Blue J (Kelly and Nicholson JJ agreeing):
1.      The gravity and circumstances of the crime were such that any sentence other than of imprisonment would have been inappropriate (at [50]).
2.      The starting point of imprisonment for 10 months was not manifestly excessive (at [52]).
3. The Judge erred in utilising section 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 without identifying separate starting points and separate discounts (at [55]-[59]).
4.      Notwithstanding the error, on resentencing, a term of imprisonment of at least eight months would be imposed and the appeal should be dismissed (at [59]).
5.      Appeal dismissed (at [60]).
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 134, s 169, s 353; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 11, s 18A, s 10C, s 39; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 17; Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Dangerous Offenders) Amendment Act 2007 (SA); Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Guilty Pleas) Amendment Act 2012 (SA); Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Sentencing Principles) Amendment Act 1999 (SA); Statutes Amendment (Serious Firearm Offences) Act 2012 (SA), referred to.
R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17; R v Wakefield (2015) 121 SASR 569, discussed.

R v HOWE
[2016] SASCFC 56
Court of Criminal Appeal: Kelly, Blue and Nicholson JJ
KELLY J:

I agree with Blue J.
BLUE J:
This is an appeal against sentence.
In the early hours of 14 June 2014, the appellant, Matthew Edward Howe, in company with a friend, entered a shed at Younghusband, connected a Malibu ski boat and trailer belonging to a Mr Cockrell to their vehicle and drove the vehicle to Murray Bridge, where they left the boat and trailer at the side of the road. The following morning, the appellant, in company with another friend, returned to Murray Bridge with a different vehicle and connected the boat and trailer to their vehicle with the intention of towing them to Adelaide and the appellant selling them. The appellant acted under the mistaken belief that he was taking a different boat and trailer of which he was a one third owner and which were also kept at Younghusband.
The appellant pleaded guilty in the District Court to one count of theft[1] and one count of being unlawfully on premises.[2] A Judge imposed a single sentence[3] of imprisonment for eight months, suspended on the appellant entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for 18 months.
[1]    Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 134.
[2]    Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 17(1).
[3]    Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 18A.
The appellant was eligible for a discount of up to 10 per cent for pleading guilty to the theft charge[4] and up to 40 per cent for pleading guilty to the unlawfully on premises charge.[5] The Judge reduced the sentence from a starting point of 10 months to the sentence imposed of eight months, but did not indicate how the discount was arrived at.
[4] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10C(2)(f).
[5] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10C(2)(a).
The appellant appeals against the sentence on two grounds:
1.The sentence was manifestly excessive because it was not necessary to impose a sentence of imprisonment or alternatively the starting point of imprisonment for 10 months was manifestly excessive.
2.The Judge erred by failing to explain how the single sentence was arrived at after application of the differential discounts.
Factual circumstances
In about 1996, the appellant and Colin Miller incorporated a company. In 1999, Brett Laing joined the appellant and Mr Miller as equal shareholders and directors of the company. In 2000, the appellant, Mr Miller and Mr Laing incorporated a second company as equal shareholders and directors.
In 2008, the appellant, Mr Miller and Mr Laing purchased land at Younghusband, on which was built a shack and shed in which was situated a Camero ski boat which they also purchased. The appellant saw the shack and shed when they purchased the land but did not return until June 2014 when he committed the offences.
In 2010, the appellant, Mr Miller and Mr Laing purchased a 2007 model Centurion ski boat for $45,000. Mr Miller arranged the purchase. The boat was assessed by Mr Miller as having a value of $70,000 at the time. The boat was kept on a trailer. The old Camero boat was sold. The appellant did not see the Centurion boat at Younghusband but did see it on one occasion in Adelaide and also saw electronic photographs of it.
In about 2012, disputes arose between the appellant and Messrs Miller and Laing concerning the businesses conducted by their companies. At that time, their companies carried on a road sweeper sales business and a road sweeping business. The disputes lead to litigation between the appellant and Messrs Miller and Laing. The appellant incurred large legal costs in the litigation.
In June 2014, the appellant decided to take the Centurion boat and trailer from the site at Younghusband, sell them and use the proceeds to pay for living expenses and legal costs.
On the evening of 13 June 2014, the appellant met up with a friend, A, and they travelled to Younghusband, arriving at about 11.00 pm. The appellant took with him a balaclava and gloves. They saw a ski boat on a trailer in a shed. The shed in fact belonged to John Murphy. The appellant mistakenly believed that the ski boat was the Centurion boat of which he was a one third owner. In fact, the ski boat was a Malibu boat owned by Stephen Cockrell. The Malibu boat was worth approximately $100,000.
The appellant and A broke the padlock and a metal pole attached to a truss in the roof of the shed in order to open the two main doors. They connected the boat and trailer to the appellant’s utility and at about 2.30am started towing the boat and trailer towards the appellant’s house in Adelaide. In the course of the taking, the boat suffered minor damage.
The utility was not powerful enough to pull the boat and trailer properly and, when they got to Murray Bridge, they left them by the side of the road and drove back to Adelaide. The following morning, the appellant and another friend, B, drove to Murray Bridge in a friend of B’s Jeep to tow the boat and trailer to Adelaide. At 8.30am, they were observed by police and questioned.
The appellant told the police some of the events described in the previous three paragraphs. The appellant was arrested for theft. The appellant was formally interviewed and gave to police more details of the events described in the previous three paragraphs. The appellant accepted that he had taken a different boat to that intended.
Mr Murphy and Mr Cockrell repaired the damage to Mr Cockrell’s shed at a cost of $600. Mr Cockrell had the damage to his boat repaired and met the insurance excess of $500.
The appellant was born in 1970. He completed year 11 at high school and then worked for nine years for the James Hardie group. He completed an apprenticeship and qualified as an electrical mechanic and electrician. He worked as an air-conditioning technician for two years. He then commenced his own business, Dial a Bobcat, undertaking contract work with a bobcat and tipper.
In 1996, the appellant and Mr Miller incorporated the first company to clean waterways for catchment boards and councils. In 1999, Mr Laing joined them and in 2000 they incorporated the second company to undertake contract road sweeping. They subsequently expanded to sell road sweepers.
In 2001, the appellant commenced a relationship with a woman who he married in 2009. Their daughter was born in 2013 but they separated shortly thereafter. In September 2013, the appellant suffered substantial injuries as a result of a motor cycle collision in which he was not at fault. He was in a wheelchair for the next six months.
The litigation between the appellant and Messrs Miller and Laing was settled in May 2015. The appellant entered into a restraint of trade agreement as part of that settlement. The appellant intended to establish a new business outside the scope of that restraint.
The appellant had appeared once previously in the District Court in 1999 when he was fined on a charge of producing cannabis.
In March 2013, the appellant entered the premises of a former girlfriend without her consent, as a result of which he was charged with being unlawfully on premises. In April 2013, he was fined $300 in the Magistrates Court, without a conviction being recorded.
In July 2013, the appellant kicked Mr Miller at their work premises, as a result of which he was charged with assault. In October 2014, he was placed on a bond to be of good behaviour for 12 months without conviction in the Magistrates Court. The assault pre-dated the June 2014 offences but had not been dealt with by the Magistrates Court when the appellant committed the June 2014 offences.
The proceedings
On 15 June 2014, the appellant and B were charged on information in the Magistrates Court with one count of aggravated non-residential serious criminal trespass,[6] one count of theft[7] and five other counts relating to matters ultimately not pursued in the District Court.
[6] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 169(1).
[7] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 134.
On 22 September 2014, the appellant was committed for trial to the District Court.
On 4 November 2014, the appellant was arraigned in the District Court on an information charging one count of aggravated non-residential serious criminal trespass[8] and one count of theft[9].
[8] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 169(1).
[9] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 134.
On 2 December 2014, the matter was listed for trial on 24 August 2015 and referred to a special directions hearing. In early May 2015, the appellant offered to plead guilty to the theft count on withdrawal of the serious criminal trespass count.
On 28 August 2015, it was agreed that the appellant would plead guilty to theft and to unlawfully on premises and the charge of serious criminal trespass would be withdrawn. A new information charging theft and being unlawfully on premises was filed.
On 31 August 2015, the appellant was arraigned on the new information and pleaded guilty to both counts. Because he pleaded guilty at his first appearance in court on the unlawfully on premises charge, he was eligible for a discount of up to 40 per cent.[10] However, he was eligible for a discount of only up to 10 per cent on the theft charge.[11]
[10] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10C(2)(a).
[11] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10C(2)(f).
In September 2015, the Judge heard sentencing submissions. The Judge foreshadowed an intention to order that the appellant pay compensation to Mr Murphy of $600 and Mr Cockrell of $500. The appellant agreed to pay the compensation forthwith.
The sentencing remarks
The Judge identified the maximum penalty for theft as being imprisonment for 10 years and the maximum penalty for being unlawfully on premises as being imprisonment for two years.
The Judge summarised the circumstances of the offending. The Judge added:
The background to the offending is significant. At the time you were engaged in a dispute with your former business partners. You believed that you had a share in a boat with one or both of them and it was your intention to take the boat in which you believed you had an interest. Regrettably the boat that you stole was not that boat. In other words, you believed you had a claim to take the boat, although you knew that others also claimed ownership, and you intended to take that boat using such things as gloves, a black beanie, disposable overalls and black tape. This was not an open, above board retrieval of the property, it was a theft in circumstances where you said you had a claim, however, in fact you did not have a claim at all over this boat or trailer.
The Judge summarised the appellant’s personal circumstances. The Judge identified the different maximum discounts for the guilty pleas of 10 per cent and 40 per cent for the theft and unlawfully on premises offences. The Judge then said:
I have decided to approach the sentence by imposing one penalty pursuant to s. 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act. I indicate that I have had regard to each of those discounts in arriving at the sentence.
I note the submission to the effect that I should not impose a term of imprisonment. I do not agree. The value of the property stolen was very significant. Whilst the reason for the offences is important, it cannot justify the theft of a valuable and portable asset like a boat. All boat owners have understandable concerns about the security of these valuable items because they are portable. Most significant is the need to deter you and others from taking the law into your own hands. I accept you had a genuine belief about your entitlement to a boat, not the boat that you actually took. But the law must do, and the courts must do what they can to deter people from taking the law into one’s own hands.
Having regard to those matters and your background I am of the view that it is appropriate to fix a term of imprisonment. However, having regard to your good prospects for the future, I find that there is good reason to suspend that term of imprisonment.
Were it not for your guilty pleas I would have imposed a sentence of 10 months imprisonment. In light of your pleas I reduce that to eight months imprisonment. That sentence will be suspended upon you entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of 18 months.
Manifest excess
The appellant’s principal contention is that the Judge erred in determining that it was necessary to impose a sentence of imprisonment and the Judge ought instead to have imposed a fine and/or community service under section 18 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (the Sentencing Act) or discharged the appellant without imposing a penalty on the condition that he enter into a bond to be of good behaviour and appear for sentence if he failed to comply with a condition of the bond under section 39 of the Sentencing Act.
Subsection 11(1) of the Sentencing Act provides:
11—Imprisonment not to be imposed except in certain circumstances
(1)     A sentence of imprisonment may only be imposed—
        (a)     if, in the opinion of the court—
(i)the defendant has shown a tendency to violence towards other persons; or
(ii)the defendant is likely to commit a serious offence if allowed to go at large; or
(iii)the defendant has previously been convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment; or
(iv)any other sentence would be inappropriate, having regard to the gravity or circumstances of the offence; or
(b)     if a sentence of imprisonment is necessary to give proper effect to the policies of the criminal law stated in section 10.
The Director does not suggest that subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of paragraph (a) apply in the present case and the Judge did not rely on them. The appellant contends that it was not open to the Judge to conclude under subparagraph (iv) that a sentence other than of imprisonment would be inappropriate having regard to the gravity and circumstances of the offences. The Director contends that any other sentence would have been inappropriate.
Before addressing the party’s contentions, it is desirable to first consider paragraph (b) of subsection 11(1). When the Sentencing Act was enacted in 1988, subsection 11(1) contained no equivalent of paragraph (b). In 1999, section 10 was amended to insert a new subsection (2) providing that “a primary policy of the criminal law is to protect the security of occupants of the home from intruders” and subsection 11(1) was amended to insert new paragraph (b) to provide that a sentence of imprisonment may also be imposed “if it is necessary to give proper effect to the primary policy stated in section 10(2)”.[12]
[12] Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Sentencing Principles) Amendment Act 1999 (SA).
In 2007, section 10 was amended to add a new subsection (1b) that “a primary policy of the criminal law is to protect the safety of the community” and section 11(1)(b) was consequently amended to refer to the “policies of the criminal law stated in section 10” rather than to the policy stated in subsection 10(2).[13]
[13] Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Dangerous Offenders) Amendment Act 2007 (SA).
In 2012, section 10 was amended to add a new subsection (3a) that “a primary policy of the criminal law in relation to offences involving firearms is to emphasise public safety by ensuring that, in any sentence for such an offence, paramount consideration is given to the need for deterrence”.[14] It is evident that the purpose of section 11(1)(b) at that point was to provide for imprisonment when it was necessary to give proper effect to the policies stated in subsections 10(1b), (2) or (3a).
[14] Statutes Amendment (Serious Firearm Offences) Act 2012 (SA).
Later in 2012, a new section 10 was substituted in which the provisions formerly contained in subsections 10(1b), (2) and (3a) were consolidated into a single new subsection (2).[15] New subsection 10(2) provided:
[15] Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Guilty Pleas) Amendment Act 2012 (SA).
(2)     In determining the sentence for an offence, a court must give proper effect to the following:
        (a)     the need to protect the safety of the community;
(b)     the need to protect the security of the lawful occupants of their home from intruders;
(c)     in the case of an offence involving the sexual exploitation of a child—the need to protect children by ensuring that paramount consideration is given to the need for general and personal deterrence;
(d)     in the case of an offence involving arson or causing a bushfire—
(i)the need to protect the community from offending of such extreme gravity by ensuring that paramount consideration is given to the need for general and personal deterrence; and
(ii)the fact that the offender should, to the maximum extent possible, make reparation for the harm done to the community by his or her offending

Finally, in 2013 subsection 10(2) was amended to add an additional paragraph (e).[16] Paragraph (e) provides:
(e)in the case of an offence involving a firearm—the need to protect the safety of the community by ensuring that paramount consideration is given to the need for general and personal deterrence.
[16] Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2013 (SA).
It is evident that the “policies of the criminal law stated in section 10” referred to in section 11(1)(b) are those policies embodied in subsection 10(2). Paragraphs (b) to (e) of subsection 10(2) refer to specific types of offences and have no application in the present case. Paragraph (a) refers more generally to “the need to protect the safety of the community”. The reference to “safety” suggests that this is intended to apply to crimes involving danger to the person, such as crimes involving violence or violation or the threat or risk of violence or violation or injury or the threat or risk of injury to the person. The reference to “safety” appears to be less apposite to a crime of theft involving no danger to the person. In any event, if it does encompass a crime of theft, section 11(1)(b) has no additional effect to that achieved by section 11(1)(a)(iv).
Under section 11(1)(a)(iv), the question is whether any sentence other than of imprisonment would be inappropriate having regard to the gravity and circumstances of the offences committed by the appellant. In R v Manunta,[17] this Court said that:
the Court in determining pursuant to paragraph (d) whether any sentence other than imprisonment would be inappropriate having regard to the gravity or circumstances of the offence, is required, in my opinion, to give the usual weight to the traditional purposes of sentencing, namely observation of a just proportion between the seriousness of the offending and the punishment, general deterrence, personal deterrence and rehabilitation.[18]
[17] (1989) 54 SASR 17.
[18] At 24 per King CJ (with whom the Legoe and Bollen JJ relevantly agreed).
The offence of theft was made out because the appellant intended permanently to deprive the owner or owners of their property in that boat. Nevertheless, the parties made submissions on the basis that the gravity and circumstances of the offences should be considered primarily on the premise of the appellant’s mistaken belief that it was the Centurion boat that he was taking and intending to sell. However, even on that basis, that is, with that motive and notwithstanding that the appellant was a one third owner of the Centurion boat he believed he was taking, the theft was a serious one. Had the appellant’s belief been correct, he still would have had no lawful right to sell the boat without the consent of his co-owners Mr Miller and Mr Laing, nor any lawful right to appropriate the proceeds of such a sale to his own use. He intended to deprive his co-owners permanently of their property in the boat. The fact that he was prosecuting a claim against them in the litigation gave him no justification for taking the boat with the intention of selling it and appropriating the proceeds.
The appellant planned the taking and selling of the boat and enlisted the assistance of his friends A and B in the endeavour. He undertook the endeavour over the course of the weekend beginning on the Friday night and extending to the Sunday morning. It was a calculated and premeditated crime as opposed to an opportunistic spur of the moment theft. The appellant deliberately took the boat clandestinely under the cover of darkness. He knew that the Centurion boat that he intended to steal had cost $45,000.
The theft involved an offence of substantial gravity committed in circumstances involving a deliberate disregard of the lawful interests of the owners of the boat albeit being, in the appellant’s mind, his co-owners, Messrs Miller and Laing.
The appellant was not entitled to the leniency that might have been afforded to him if this had been his first offence. He had previously been fined for being unlawfully on premises. As the Judge observed, he had previously taken the law into his own hands in dealing with his former girlfriend and with Mr Miller.
The appellant contends that, given his belief that he was taking a boat in which he held a one third interest, personal and general deterrence are less important than if he had intended to take a boat that he believed was owned by a stranger. However, as the Judge observed, it remains important that persons in general are deterred from stealing property in which they share ownership with others.
Finally, in assessing the gravity of the crime, it is appropriate to take into account to some degree the reality that the boat stolen in fact belonged to a stranger in circumstances in which the appellant took no steps to verify that it was in fact the boat of which he was a co-owner.
The gravity and circumstances of the crime are such that any sentence other than one of imprisonment would have been inappropriate.
The appellant contends in the alternative that a starting point of imprisonment for 10 months for the offences of theft and being unlawfully on premises was manifestly excessive. It is common ground on appeal that the major offence was the theft and, while the Judge did not disclose the relative contributions of the two offences to the aggregate starting point, the major contribution to the aggregate sentence must have been in respect of the theft.
Given the gravity and circumstances of the theft, a starting point of imprisonment for 10 months was not manifestly excessive.
The first ground of appeal is not established.
Sentencing discount
The appellant contends that, because the maximum available discount in respect of the theft offence was 10 per cent and in respect of the unlawfully on premises offence was 40 per cent, it was incumbent on the Judge when utilising section 18A to identify separate starting points and separate discounts in respect of each offence and disclose them in the sentencing remarks.
In R v Wakefield,[19] this Court said:
When there are different maxima applicable or the prescribed criteria have a differential operation in respect of individual offences, such that the application of s 10C would result in different discounts for the individual offences, the sentencing court is required to apply the prescribed criteria by reference to the respective maximum discounts and arrive at individual discounts for those individual offences. There is no reason why the sentencing court cannot impose a single penalty utilising s 18A, but it must do so by proceeding in the manner prescribed by section 10C.
When a sentencing court utilises section 18A to impose a single penalty and application of section 10C requires differential discounts in respect of the individual offences, the sentencing court is obliged to explain how it has arrived at the single sentence imposed after application of the differential discounts. This, in turn, requires identification of the notional starting head sentences for the individual offences and the notional discounts applied.[20]
[19] [2015] SASCFC 10, (2015) 121 SASR 569.
[20] At [38]-[39] per Blue J (with whom Kourakis CJ and Peek J agreed).
The Director accepts that, if the Judge notionally accumulated or partially accumulated separate notional sentences for the theft and unlawfully on premises offences, the Judge was obliged to identify and disclose the separate notional starting points and discounts. However, the Director contends that, if the appellant had been sentenced separately for the theft and unlawfully on premises offences, it would have been appropriate to order that the sentences be served concurrently.
It is apparent from the Judge’s sentencing remarks that the Judge did not treat the notional sentence in respect of the unlawfully on premises offence as being concurrent with the theft offence. If the Judge had done so, the Judge must have identified a starting point for the theft offence of imprisonment for 10 months and, in that event, the Judge would have been precluded by section 10(2)(f) of the Sentencing Act from allowing a discount in excess of 10 per cent, such that the Judge would have been obliged to impose a sentence of imprisonment for nine months. In fact, the Judge imposed a sentence of imprisonment for eight months.
The fact that the Judge allowed an average discount of 20 per cent (being twice as close to 10 per cent as to 40 per cent) suggests that the notional sentence in respect of the theft offence might have been twice the notional sentence in respect of the unlawfully on premises offence. However, this seems unlikely as the unlawfully on premises offence should have attracted a much lower sentence than the theft sentence. Given the fact that the Judge did not disclose notional starting points or separate discounts, it is not possible to be confident how the Judge proceeded. It may be that the Judge proceeded in a different manner altogether.
It follows that the Judge did not give adequate reasons for the calculation of the discounts allowed under section 10C of the Sentencing Act. However, given the gravity and circumstances of the theft offence, if this Court were to resentence the appellant, it would be appropriate to adopt a starting point of at least imprisonment for not less than nine months. Applying a 10 per cent discount to that starting point would give a sentence for the theft offence alone of imprisonment for just over eight months. Accordingly, without taking into account what would be an appropriate sentence for the unlawfully on premises offence, this Court is obliged in any event to dismiss the appeal pursuant to section 353(4)(b) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
Conclusion
I would dismiss the appeal.
NICHOLSON J:
I agree with Blue J.

[2016] SASCFC 56

13 May 2016

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Criminal Law

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Sentencing

Appeal

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