R v Hornby - [1996] QCA 446

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1996] QCA 446
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 348 of 1996

Brisbane

[R v. Hornby]

THE QUEEN

JEFFREY JOHN HORNBY

(Applicant)
Pincus J.A.
Derrington J.
Ambrose J.

Judgment delivered 15 November 1996

Judgment of the Court

APPLICATION REFUSED

CATCHWORDS:	RAPE - life sentences - whether manifestly excessive.
Counsel:	Mr M Griffin for the applicant. Mr D Bullock for the respondent.
Solicitors:	Legal Aid Office for the applicant. Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions.
Hearing Date:	25 October 1996.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT

Judgment delivered 15 November 1996

The applicant was sentenced in the District Court on 22 February 1996 in relation to a number of attacks on females. There were three offences of abduction, five of assault occasioning bodily harm, one of indecent assault with a circumstance of aggravation, one of common assault, one of administering a stupefying drug, two of robbery, one of indecent treatment of a child under 16 years, one of indecent assault and one of stealing; but the principal counts were seven offences of rape, in relation to each of which the learned primary judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. As to the rest, sentences of varying lengths were imposed, the longest period of imprisonment imposed for them being 5 years.

The application challenges only the sentences of life imprisonment; the submission put forward by Mr M Griffin, for the applicant, was that some of these sentences should be reduced to sentences for a fixed number of years, as was done in the case of Killen (C.A. No. 129 of 1991, unreported, 20 September 1991). The following account of the offences deals not only with the seven offences of rape, but with all the lesser offences. There were three complainants.

Complainant 1

This complainant was 18 years of age at the time of the offences, which took place in February 1995. The complainant got to know the applicant, who is 44 years of age, through her grandmother. On 9 February 1995 the applicant asked the complainant if she would like to go to Russell Island to see the applicant’s defacto wife, with whom the complainant got on well. The complainant was told that she would be taken out to a restaurant. On arrival at the island in the applicant’s vehicle, the complainant was driven to a secluded area and told to get out of the car. The applicant punched her in the chest and pushed her to the ground, then directed her to lie on her stomach while he tied her hands behind her back; he briefly placed a hood over her head. The applicant then drove the complainant to a house on Russell Island and in the course of the journey unbuttoned part of her dress and inserted two fingers into her vagina; he also further assaulted her by hitting her on the face. When the two arrived at the house, the applicant cut the rope binding the complainant’s hands and threatened her with a knife,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Hornby

Details

AGLC: R v Hornby [1996] QCA 446
Case: [1996] QCA 446
Decision Date: 15/11/1996

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Hornby, the appellant, Hornby, sought judicial review of his life sentences for multiple counts of rape. The appellant argued that the cumulative effect of the sentences imposed was manifestly excessive and disproportionate. The matter was heard and determined by the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia. The primary focus was on the proportionality of the aggregate sentence, considering the individual and collective gravity of the crimes committed.

The court examined the legal principles governing the severity of sentences in cases involving multiple convictions of serious offences. It was necessary to assess whether the cumulative sentence imposed was unjust or manifestly excessive, taking into account the appellant's culpability, the nature and impact of the crimes, and the need for general and specific deterrence. The court also considered the sentencing principles established in previous cases and the overarching requirement for proportionality in sentencing.

In its reasoning, the court held that the sentences were not manifestly excessive. It determined that the sentences reflected the gravity of the crimes and the appellant's culpability. The court emphasised the need to consider the cumulative effect of the sentences and found that the total sentence was proportionate to the crimes committed. The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentences were upheld as just and appropriate under the circumstances.

Orders