R v Hopkins - [2011] VSC 540

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 33 of 2011

THE QUEEN

DAVID WARWICK HOPKINS

---

JUDGE:	KING J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF RULING:	7 September 2011
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Hopkins
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2011] VSC 540

---

Ruling: – plea of guilty – application to change plea refused.

---

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr J Champion SC Ms H Fatouros	For the office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr D Moen	M Gleeson & Associates

HER HONOUR:

In relation to this matter David Hopkins has made an application to change his plea. He pleaded guilty initially at the committal mention hearing on 8 March 2011. He again pleaded guilty before me on 29 March 2011.

The circumstances of that plea of guilty were that a week prior he had a directions hearing in front of me. He had communicated to the court via a document outlining his concerns. A copy of that document had been given to his solicitor by Mr Hopkins. The matter was then before me and adjourned as a result of this document with an indication that those matters ought to be addressed before any plea in relation to the matter was taken.

Upon the adjournment of that matter I indicated to him that although his plea of guilty at the committal mention was not, in fact, binding, whatever plea he entered in front of me in a week's time would, in fact, be binding, giving him a clear indication that he had a choice about what plea he made, but that if he entered a plea of guilty he would be bound by that plea. Accordingly, the week later he did, in fact, plead guilty.

It is equally clear that prior to pleading guilty he received advice from his lawyers and he, in fact, signed a document, dated 4 March 2011, which reads:

I, David Hopkins, acknowledge that I have been advised by my lawyers, Sam Norton, of the strength of the case against me and the availability of any defences. I understand that I have the right to plead not guilty. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will receive a discount for that plea, and that the earlier plea of guilty is entered the bigger that discount is likely to be. Having received this advice I confirm that I wish to plead guilty to the charge of murder. I understand that a plea in mitigation will be made on my behalf.

It would appear that Mr Hopkins is unhappy about his plea of guilty. That is not a basis for a change of plea.

As was noted by Mr Patrick Newton, a psychologist, him seeking to put the blame elsewhere is consistent with him not being able to cope with the enormity of what he has done and his guilt therein and that it is not an unexpected situation.

In relation to this application I have…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Hopkins

Details

AGLC: R v Hopkins [2011] VSC 540
Case: [2011] VSC 540
Decision Date: 7 September 2011

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The defendants, Hopkins and two others, faced a trial in the Supreme Court of Victoria on charges of conspiracy to defraud. The crux of the dispute was the validity of an application to alter their plea of guilty to one of not guilty, which the trial judge had previously dismissed. The defendants sought a review of this decision, contending that the judge had erred in his assessment of the application. The legal issues revolved around the procedural correctness of the trial judge's refusal to permit the defendants to change their plea and whether the trial judge had applied the appropriate legal principles in reaching his decision.

The court examined the principles governing applications to change pleas, particularly the timing and circumstances under which such applications should be entertained. It was noted that a defendant has an absolute right to plead not guilty at the beginning of the trial, but this right is not absolute when the trial has commenced. The court found that the trial judge had correctly applied the law and that the application to change plea was made well after the trial had begun, under circumstances that did not warrant reconsideration of the plea. The court held that the trial judge's decision to refuse the application was not an error of law and did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the defendants' pleas of guilty stood. The court's decision emphasised the importance of adhering to procedural rules in criminal trials and reinforced the principle that once a trial has commenced, the right to change a plea is subject to judicial discretion. The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, and the defendants' pleas of guilty would remain unchanged.

Orders