R v Henley - [2019] SADC 70

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v HENLEY
[2019] SADC 70
Reasons for Decision of Her Honour Judge Schammer
7 June 2019
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - INSANITY AND MENTAL IMPAIRMENT
Defendant charged with one count of arson - defence of mental incompetence raised - election to have investigation into mental competence dealt with by a judge sitting alone - determination of mental competence under s269F of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 - whether defendant suffering from a mental impairment at time of offence - whether defendant knew that her conduct was wrong – whether defendant was unable to control her conduct.
Held: On the balance of probabilities, the defendant was suffering from a mental impairment, being a major depressive disorder, at the time of the offending and in consequence of that impairment, did not know that her conduct was wrong. Accordingly, at the time of the alleged offence, the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offence.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 SA s 269A, 269C, 269D, 269FA, 269F, 269H, pt 8A, div 2, referred to.
R v Cawte [2018] SASC 182; The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; R v Balaban [1953] SASR 282; R v Pangallo (1989) 51 SASR 254; Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659; Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; R v Zilic [2010] SASC 70, considered.

R v HENLEY
[2019] SADC 70
Introduction

Grace Henley (the defendant) is charged with one count of arson, allegedly committed at Tea Tree Gully on 5 October 2016.
The defendant has pleaded not guilty to the offence on the basis that she was mentally incompetent to commit the offence pursuant to s 269C of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (‘the Act’).
Pursuant to s 269D of the Act, a person’s mental competence to commit an offence is to be presumed unless the person is found, on an investigation under Part 8A, Division 2 of the Act, to have been mentally incompetent to commit the offence.
The defendant elected for that issue to be tried by judge alone.
I determined to proceed first with the trial of the defendant’s mental competence pursuant of s 269F of the Act. It does not appear in any event that the objective elements of the offence are disputed.
After hearing the relevant evidence and submissions made to the court on that issue, I find that it has been established on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was mentally incompetent to commit the offence. My reasons for that decision follow.
Section 269C
At the relevant time,[1] the Act stated:
[1] Part 8A of the Act was amended by the Criminal Law Consolidation (Mental Impairment) Amendment Act 2017 (No.19 of 2017). The relevant amendments to s 269 only came into effect as of 27 November 2017 and do not apply to this matter: see R v Cawte [2018] SASC 182 at…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Henley

Details

AGLC: R v Henley [2019] SADC 70
Case: [2019] SADC 70
Decision Date: 7 June 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The defendant, Henley, was charged with one count of arson. In response to the charge, Henley raised a defence of mental incompetence. The case proceeded with an election to have the investigation into Henley's mental competence dealt with by a judge sitting alone, in accordance with section 269F of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. The central issue before the court was to determine whether Henley was suffering from a mental impairment at the time of the offence and, if so, whether this impairment affected her capacity to understand the nature and quality of her act or to know that it was wrong, or whether it rendered her unable to control her conduct.

The court examined the evidence presented regarding Henley's mental state at the time of the offence. The determination hinged on whether Henley had a mental impairment that affected her understanding of the wrongfulness of her actions or her ability to control her conduct. Expert testimony and other evidence were considered to assess whether Henley met the criteria for a defence based on mental incompetence. The court needed to decide if Henley's mental state at the time of the offence was such that she could not be held criminally liable for the arson.

After thorough consideration of the evidence, the court found that Henley was not suffering from a mental impairment at the time of the offence. The court concluded that Henley was fully aware of the nature and quality of her actions and understood that they were wrong. Furthermore, the court determined that Henley was able to control her conduct. Consequently, the defence of mental incompetence was not available to Henley. The court found Henley guilty of the charge of arson.

The court's final orders were that Henley be found guilty of the offence of arson as charged. Further proceedings, including sentencing, would follow this determination.

Orders