SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v HEALEY
[2008] SASC 83
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Anderson
2 April 2008
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - OTHER OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - SENTENCING
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT - SENTENCE - MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS - SEX OFFENDERS INCAPABLE OF CONTROLLING SEXUAL INSTINCTS
Application by the Director of Public Prosecutions for respondent to be detained in custody until further order pursuant to s 23 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) - whether respondent is capable of controlling or is unwilling to control his sexual instincts - whether such an order is appropriate - consideration of the utility of such an order to enhance the protection of public - factors relevant to the exercise of discretion.
Held: Respondent is capable of controlling his sexual instincts - respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts as per the definition contained in s 23 - not reasonable on evidence to order indefinite detention, having regard to long sentence of imprisonment imposed cumulatively upon previous long sentence and because treatment may be successful and further because of power of intervention by the Attorney-General - application refused.
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 23; Prisoners (Interstate Transfer) Act 1982 (SA), referred to.
R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56; R v Ainsworth [2008] SASC 67, applied.
R v England (2004) 87 SASR 411; Buckley v The Queen (2006) 80 ALJR 605, considered.
R v HEALEY
[2008] SASC 83Criminal
ANDERSON J.
Introduction
This is an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP) for Mr Healey to be detained in custody until further order pursuant to s 23 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) (the Sentencing Act). It is claimed that Mr Healey is incapable of controlling, or is unwilling to control, his sexual instincts. At the time the relevant offences were committed Mr Healey was aged 18 years.
Mr Healey has pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence, one count of attempted abduction of a child under 16 years, one count of abduction, one count of indecent assault, three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under 12 and one count of gross indecency. All of these offences formed part of a series of events that occurred in a suburb of Adelaide on 23 December 2002. I have today sentenced Mr Healey for these offences.
Mr Healey became a person of interest to the investigation shortly after committing these offences, but avoided being apprehended by police in the days and months following the commission of these offences. He eventually absconded interstate. The South Australian police, after discovering that Mr Healey had been imprisoned in New South Wales on similar offences, interviewed him in Parramatta police station on 14 September 2004.
The New South Wales offences consisted of taking a…
Continue reading R v Healey
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Healey [2008] SASC 83
- Case
- [2008] SASC 83
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence provided by two psychiatrists, Dr Nambiar and Dr Begg, who concluded that Mr Healey was capable of controlling his sexual instincts but was unwilling to do so. The court also considered the submissions from both sides regarding the utility of an indefinite detention order. The court found that Mr Healey was manipulative and had a tendency to disrupt proceedings, which led to doubts about his willingness to control his sexual instincts. However, the court noted that the long prison sentence imposed, combined with the possibility of successful treatment and the power of intervention by the Attorney-General, made it unreasonable to order indefinite detention. Consequently, the application was refused.
The court's decision was based on the evidence presented, the nature of the offences, and the potential for treatment and intervention. The court exercised its discretion and concluded that an indefinite detention order was not warranted in this case. The final orders reflected the court's decision not to impose an indefinite detention order on Mr Healey.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: ANDERSON J
Finally, Mr Mancini submitted that even if I find that Mr Healey is unwilling to control his sexual instincts, I should not make an order in the exercise of my discretion. He submitted that unless and until the treatment is undergone, it is premature to determine the s 23 question, as it would be unfair to Mr Healey.Consideration of s 23 Section 23 of the Act gives the court the power to detain a prisoner for an indefinite period of time for preventative purposes to protect the public: see R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56 at par [13] per White J. The power to detain someone for an indefinite period of time results in the deprivation of that person’s liberty. Such power should not be taken lightly and must be thoroughly considered by the court before making the order. In relation to the specific power to detain found in s 23, in R v Whyte, White J referred to the judgment of Bleby J in R v England (2004) 87 SASR 411 at 423 and 424 where His Honour said:... satisfaction as to the inability of a person to control their sexual instincts is a matter of assessing the opinions to that effect, their strengths and their weaknesses, to a point where the court can be satisfied that the incapacity is present. In doing so, the court will need to take account of the seriousness of the declaration it is asked to make and the gravity of the consequences of giving the direction. To borrow the words of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, the necessary degree of satisfaction cannot be produced “by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences”. It will require cogent and acceptable evidence in order to justify the making of the declaration and the giving of the direction. But even then, there is a residual discretion conferred by the use of the word “may” in the subsection. In that respect it may also be appropriate to consider, as in the case of R v Fahey and R v Riley whether, if a sentence is also imposed, the defendant is likely, at the end of the custodial period, to resume similar sexual activities. This will, in turn, require consideration, among other things, of the defendant’s access to and the likely effect of various regimes of treatment, and whether they can be effected in the prison setting or in some other institution contemplated by the section. Once an application has been made under s 23(2)(b) then s 23(3) requires that the court direct at least two medically trained practitioners to “inquire into the mental condition” of the person and report to the court on whether that person is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his or her sexual instincts. There is considerable authority dealing with the concept of whether someone is incapable of controlling their sexual instincts. However, in the case of Mr Healey this is not in my view an issue. Dr Nambiar in his report touched on the issue of incapacity, but did not make a definitive statement in this respect. Both Dr Begg and Dr Westmore found that Mr Healey was capable of controlling his sexual instincts. It is my view that there is insufficient evidence to allow me to make a finding that Mr Healey is incapable of controlling his sexual instincts, and Ms Griffith did not urge that course.