R v Hasapis (Sentence)

[2025] NSWSC 771

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Hasapis (Sentence) [2025] NSWSC 771

Hearing dates:

10 July 2025

Date of orders:

17 July 2025

Decision date:

17 July 2025

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

N Adams J

Decision:

(1) For the offence of murder, Mr Hasapis is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 26 years commencing on 28 January 2023 and expiring on 27 January 2049. I fix a non-parole period of 18 years. Mr Hasapis will be first eligible for release to parole on 27 January 2041.

(2) In compliance with s 25C of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), I note that the provisions of that Act have potential application to Mr Hasapis. I direct that his legal representatives advise him of the existence of the Act and its application to this offence.

Catchwords:

CRIME – SENTENCE – murder – guilty verdict after Judge alone trial – where the deceased was assaulted by the offender and died from head injuries – where the deceased suffered 71 injuries to his body – where motive for assault was to elicit information – mid range objective seriousness – moral culpability – criminal history – facilitation of administration of justice – aggregate sentence

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 18(1)(a), 59

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 25C

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 30E(1)(3), 21A(3)(i), 22A(1)(2), 25E, 44(2B), 53A, Table behind s 54B

Criminal Procedure Act1986 (NSW), ss 166, 168(3)

Cases Cited:

Apps v R [2006] NSWCCA 290

Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37

Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1

Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28

Droudis v R [2020] NSWCCA 322

Dungay v R [2020] NSWCCA 209

Haddara v R [2016] VSCA 168; (2016) 260 A Crim R 306

Harris v R [2021] NSWCCA 322

Hasapis v R [2014] NSWCCA 216

Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25

Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39

Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38

NK v R [2025] NSWCCA 73

Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273

R v Fuller (No 5) [2025] NSWSC 76

R v Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705

R v Hasapis [2025] NSWSC 121

R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346

R v Hillsley [2006] NSWCCA 312; (2006) 164 A Crim R 252

R v Homann [2018] NSWSC 757

R v Kilby(No 2) [2025] NSWSC 748

R v MAK; R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381; (2006) 167 A Crim R 159

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
Daniel Paul Hasapis (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
Mr L Carr SC (Crown)
Ms M Avenell SC (Offender)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Legal Aid Commission NSW (Offender)

File Number(s):

2023/29485

Publication restriction:

Nil.

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

Background

1. On 28 January 2023, Sean Froggatt was residing in an apartment block in Wyong. He was in receipt of support through the National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) for medical conditions including schizophrenia and epilepsy. The offender, Daniel Hasapis, was a neighbour in the same apartment block. In the early hours of 28 January 2023, the offender assaulted Mr Froggatt by punching, kicking and whipping him during an interrogation that lasted at least a half an hour. Mr Froggatt died of blunt force head injuries shortly afterwards. During the prolonged assault on the deceased, the offender also punched and whipped two other women present at the scene: his estranged partner, Bonnie Cullen, and her friend, Mariana Taitoko.

2. The offender was arrested and charged with Mr Froggatt’s murder on 28 January 2023. He was refused bail and has remained in custody since that date.

3. On 17 February 2025, the offender’s murder trial commenced before me, sitting as a judge alone. He had previously offered to plead guilty to manslaughter, but that plea was not accepted by the Crown. On that day, he also pleaded guilty to one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (“AOABH”) on Mariana Taitoko on or about 26 January 2023 contrary to s 59 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). That offence carries a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment.

4. The offender’s trial for Mr Froggatt’s murder proceeded before me until Friday, 21 February 2025 at which time I retired to consider my verdict. The issue at trial was whether the Crown could prove beyond reasonable doubt that at the time of the fatal assault the offender intended to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased. The offender did not deny that he had assaulted the deceased; his defence to the murder charge was that he did not intend to inflict really serious harm on Mr Froggatt.

5. On 27 February 2025, I found the offender guilty of murder: R v Hasapis [2025] NSWSC 121 (the verdict judgment).

6. At the proceedings on sentence before me on 10 July 2025, the offender asked to be sentenced in relation to three offences. In addition to the murder of Mr Froggatt and the AOABH on Ms Taitoko he also asked to be dealt with for the “related offence” of one count of AOABH on Bonnie Cullen on 27-28 February 2023. [1] Evidence of that assault was adduced during the murder trial. The offender pleaded guilty to that charge at his proceedings on sentence and asked to be sentenced on the facts adduced at the trial. I am satisfied that this offence arose from substantially the same circumstances as those from which the murder arose. Given that charge is not being dealt with on indictment, the maximum penalty I can impose for that offence is 2 years’ imprisonment. [2]

   1. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 166.

   2. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 168(3).

7. It is now my role to sentence the offender in relation to these three offences. I am required to identify and consider all factors relevant to the sentence and ultimately make a value judgment as to what the appropriate sentence is given all the factors in the case. [3] In doing so, I must have regard to the purposes of sentencing. The sentence imposed must adequately punish the offender, denounce his conduct, make him accountable for his actions, protect the community, act as both a general and specific deterrent and recognise the harm done to the family of the deceased and the community. On the other hand, the sentence to be imposed must also promote the offender’s rehabilitation. [4] The extent to which more or less emphasis is to be placed on these purposes of sentencing turns on the findings I make based on the material that was before me.

   3. Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 at [51] per McHugh J; confirmed by the Court in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [26].

   4. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Sentencing Act”), s 3A.

8. The maximum penalty for the offence of murder is life imprisonment. [5] The standard non-parole period (“SNPP”) for murder is 20 years’ imprisonment. [6] The Crown did not contend that this is a matter in which I would impose the maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

   5. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 18(1)(a).

   6. Sentencing Act, Table behind s 54B.

Agreed Facts on Sentence

9. I have already considered the circumstances of the fatal assault on the deceased in some detail in order to make the findings I did in reaching my verdict. At the proceedings on sentence, senior counsel for the Crown and the offender agreed that there was no need for me to repeat all of those matters for the purposes of sentencing the offender and reference can be made to those findings in these reasons. In light of that approach, I will endeavour to distil the facts as much as possible whilst still noting those aspects of the offender’s conduct which are relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence of murder. Agreed Facts were tendered in relation to the assault on Ms Taitoko and I have included them in the following summary of the events which occurred on the Australia Day long weekend from 26-28 January 2023.

10. As at 25 January 2023, the deceased resided in Unit 8 of the apartment block in Wyong with a flatmate Rodney Dickinson who received a regular payment from Centrelink as Mr Froggatt’s nominated carer. Mr Froggatt was 52 years old, and the offender was 30 years old.

11. Bonnie Cullen resided in Unit 1. She had been in an intimate relationship with the offender but by 26 January 2023 the relationship had broken down and the offender was in the process of moving out.

12. Ms Cullen had a friend, Mariana Taitoko, who was staying a few blocks away in Howarth Street. The distance between these premises was a five to ten minute walk.

13. On 25 January 2023, the offender sent a number of abusive text messages to Ms Cullen. They mostly related to their relationship ending, the logistics of him moving out of the unit and his desire to collect his belongings. These texts reflect a concern on the offender’s part that Ms Cullen might allow people to visit the unit, that she would perform sex work at the unit and that visitors might steal his possessions before he was able to move them out.

26 January 2023

14. On the morning of Thursday, 26 January 2023, Ms Taitoko visited Ms Cullen at Unit 1. During the course of that day, the offender discovered that some of his property was missing, including a pink-coloured handbag, a set of keys to Unit 1 and a watch. He believed that the property had been stolen from the unit by Ms Taitoko. This belief was based on the fact that Ms Taitoko had left Unit 1 for a period of time that day to return to the Howarth Street address and then returned to Unit 1.

15. Upon discovering that the property was missing, the offender became angry. He demanded that the property be returned to him. Ms Cullen left Unit 1 and went to the Howarth Street address in search of the missing items and did not return for a few hours.

AOABH - Ms Taitoko

16. While Ms Cullen was absent from Unit 1, the offender violently assaulted Ms Taitoko in the second bedroom of the unit. The assault lasted a few hours and included the offender pulling the victim by the hair, punching her to the face and head, striking her to the body with punches and kicks, burning her skin with a jet lighter, and striking her to the head with the jet lighter. Photographs were tendered at the proceedings on sentence depicting her injuries and I will return to them in more detail when assessing the objective seriousness of that offence.

17. During the course of the assault, the offender demanded that Ms Taitoko reveal the location of the missing property. Ms Taitoko felt like she “blacked out” on a number of occasions, although she appeared to the offender to be awake at all times.

18. While the offender was assaulting Ms Taitoko, Ms Cullen was at the Howarth Street premises trying to locate the missing property. She was unsuccessful and left. Sometime after that, an occupant of those premises found the missing property and returned them to Unit 1. Once this occurred, the offender stopped assaulting Ms Taitoko. The assault had commenced when it was still daylight and ceased sometime after dark. Ms Taitoko fell asleep in the spare bedroom at Unit 1 and slept through the night.

19. As a result of the offender’s assault, Ms Taitoko received the following injuries:

1. Numerous subdural haematomas including: overlying her left parietal and frontal lobes, measuring up to 3mm in depth; overlying her right frontal lobe, measuring up to 3mm in depth and on her scalp at the back of the head measuring up to 3cm in depth;

2. Extensive bruising and swelling around both eyes, especially the left eyelid, bruising to the left side of the jaw and front of the neck on the left side; to the back of the neck on the left side, behind the left ear and to the left shoulder;

3. A superficial laceration to her forehead measuring about 2cm in length and superficial grazing to the chin; and,

4. Seventeen (17) superficial dermal burns of various sizes to the neck, left breast, stomach, forearms, upper left arm, upper left back behind the shoulder, left torso, middle of the back, and thighs.

27 January 2023

20. Ms Taitoko awoke the following morning. She was in pain and felt tired from her injuries. Ms Cullen gave her with some breakfast. Both women remained at Unit 1.

21. At about 4:30pm that day, the offender left Unit 1 and travelled to Wentworthville in Sydney to purchase methylamphetamine. It was an agreed fact that at that time he had been supplying methylamphetamine out of Unit 1. He was driven to Wentworthville by a neighbour named Darren Thornthwaite, who resided in Unit 7, directly above the offender and Ms Cullen. At 4:45pm, the offender sent Ms Cullen a text message demanding that she not let any “random cunts” in the house until he had picked up his property.

22. Whilst the offender was away, Ms Cullen arranged for the deceased to attend Unit 1 to supply her and Ms Taitoko with cannabis. The deceased visited Unit 1 and remained there for a period of time smoking cannabis with Ms Cullen and Ms Taitoko in the loungeroom. During this time, another unknown male came to Unit 1 for a short time. He wanted to speak to the offender but left when advised that the offender was not there. The deceased left Unit 1 and returned to his own unit after smoking the cannabis with Ms Cullen and Ms Taitoko.

23. There were some missed calls between Ms Cullen and the offender that afternoon. The offender sent a text to Ms Cullen at 6:25 pm in which he said, “Stupid hooker you think your (sic) on the phone being a fuckwit”. They later spoke by telephone at 8:11pm.

24. The offender and Mr Thornthwaite returned to Unit 1 at around 8:00pm to 8:30pm. The four of them all smoked some “ice” and Mr Thornthwaite then left. The offender became angry. He believed that some further property had been removed from the unit in his absence. He yelled at Ms Cullen and Ms Taitoko, demanding to know who had been at the unit when he was out. He accused them of performing sex work from the unit in his absence. Whilst he was yelling at them both, he slapped Ms Cullen to the face and punched Ms Taitoko to the head. Ms Taitoko eventually told the offender that both the deceased and an unknown male had attended Unit 1 when the offender had been out that day.

25. After hearing this, the offender became enraged and attempted to get the deceased to come to the unit. There was further shouting which was heard by a neighbour. Call charge records show that the offender placed a few calls to the deceased’s carer, Mr Dickinson, who told the offender that the deceased was asleep. At 11:25pm, there was a text exchange in which the offender asked Mr Dickinson to tell the deceased to pop down to Unit 1 when he woke up. The deceased woke up about ten minutes later and went downstairs to see the offender at Unit 1.

The murder of Mr Froggatt

26. At around this time, a neighbour (Mr Thornthwaite’s son) in the unit above Unit 1 heard a loud bang in Unit 1, followed by the deceased’s voice. The deceased said, “oh fucking hell”. The neighbour then heard a few more bangs, followed by the offender’s voice. The offender was yelling at somebody. The neighbour heard the offender yell, “shut the fuck up”. For the next 30 minutes, multiple bangs and multiple voices yelling could be heard. The loud noises were not constant but were happening every now and again. The neighbour fell asleep after hearing noises for that 30 minute period.

27. Both Ms Taitoko and Ms Cullen witnessed the fatal assault on the deceased. As I have explained in my verdict judgment, although there were some inconsistencies between their evidence, having regard to the forensic evidence, I accept much of their evidence as to what occurred despite the fact that they were drug affected and had other difficulties which may have adversely impacted on their ability to remember clearly what happened.

28. When Mr Froggatt arrived, the offender began yelling at him and told the three of them to go into the second bedroom. Once in the spare room, the offender punched the deceased in the head. He was angry. Ms Cullen tried to stop him, but the offender then assaulted her and Ms Taitoko. This went on for some time. Mr Froggatt was crying and telling the offender to stop. The offender also punched Mr Froggatt in the stomach about four times and “just kept hitting him” in the head and in the stomach. Ms Cullen described the offender hitting Mr Froggatt to his head with a closed fist. She told the offender, “It wasn’t him, it wasn’t him”, but the offender continued to hit Mr Froggatt “very forcefully” to his head and he fell to the floor. Mr Froggatt kept saying “I don’t know what you’re talking about”. When Mr Froggatt fell to the floor, he put his arms up to cover his face. He was kicked about five times to the abdomen and upper body (his chest and torso) and struck with a chain. He had swelling on his face and his breathing was heavy. The offender also whipped the two women with the gold chain about five to ten times. Ms Cullen was struck on the upper arm and “a couple of other places”. A photograph tendered at the trial shows a mark on Ms Cullen’s arm as a result of the whipping with the chain. This is the basis for the AOABH charge in relation to Ms Cullen.

29. Each time that Mr Froggatt failed to answer one of the offender’s questions, the offender punched and/or kicked him. Ms Cullen described the punches and kicks as “ongoing” in that the offender kept asking questions and then punching Mr Froggatt, who did not throw any blows in return. She agreed that they were “big punches” and that they were all “big kicks”. The offender also kicked Mr Froggatt to the head as well.

30. The offender only stopped hitting Mr Froggatt when he finally said to him, “the Yugoslavian set you up”. It is not clear what was meant by this but when he said this the offender left the room with Ms Cullen. He turned the light out and closed the door. He and Ms Cullen kept arguing outside the door.

31. Ms Taitoko was left alone in the room with Mr Froggatt. She could not see him, but she could hear him on the ground trying to breathe. His breathing was “raspy”, and he was gasping for air. This went for about 10 minutes. Mr Froggatt tried to crawl towards her, but she was scared and could not move. She was sitting on the floor trying not to cry. Mr Froggatt was moving on the ground a bit and then stopped and was just lying there.

32. Sometime later, the offender and Ms Cullen came into the room. Ms Cullen thought they were out of the room for about half an hour to an hour. When they re-entered the room, they used the light from the mobile phone and saw that Ms Taitoko was at the end of the bed and the deceased was on the floor.

33. The offender told Ms Taitoko to bring the deceased back to life. She tried mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and chest compressions. It did not work. The offender told her to put “ice” in his “bum” and breath it into his mouth. She did this but it did not work either. Ms Taitoko told him that there was no pulse. She tried to resuscitate the deceased for 35 to 40 minutes. The body was then covered with a sheet.

34. As for the number of punches, Ms Cullen said there were a bit more than ten whereas Ms Taitoko described about eight closed fist punches to the deceased’s face and four punches to his stomach. Ms Taitoko described that the offender “just kept hitting him, just kept punching him”, although she also explained that there was questioning in between those strikes.

35. Ms Cullen’s evidence was that there was an impression of more than ten punches to the head and that the deceased was kicked to the abdomen and upper body about five times. Ms Cullen’s impression was that the punches were very forceful. [7]

    7. Tcpt, 18 February 2025, pp. 96, 126.

Post death events

36. After the deceased died, the offender used the torch from his phone and wrapped up Mr Froggatt’s body in a sheet. Ms Taitoko was asleep at this time. Ms Cullen described how the body was dragged to the laundry by the offender and subsequently moved to the bathtub in the bathroom and covered with a doona.

37. When Ms Taitoko woke up the next day, she used Spray n’ Wipe to clean up the bedroom as did Ms Cullen. There was blood up the walls, on the curtains and on the floor, but primarily on the deceased. The offender had told them to clean the bedroom. They used “Chux” and Windex.

36. That morning, Mr Dickinson sent messages to the offender inquiring about Mr Froggatt’s whereabouts, but the offender did not respond.

37. Ms Taitoko returned to the Howarth Street premises that afternoon. Upon seeing her injuries, the occupants of that address contacted Police immediately. The call to emergency services was made at 4:28pm on Saturday, 28 January 2023. Ms Taitoko was conveyed by ambulance to Gosford Hospital. She was admitted to the Emergency Department overnight and moved to general inpatient hospital accommodation on 29 January 2023. She remained an inpatient at Gosford Hospital until 1 February 2023, when she discharged herself against medical advice.

38. At 5:29pm on 28 January 2023, Mr Dickinson placed a call to the offender’s mobile phone. The offender did not answer. At 5:30pm, Mr Dickinson sent the offender a text message: “Cops are here”.

39. Ms Cullen described the offender as being “psycho” until police arrived. He was quite erratic and uncontrollable prior to this, over the two-day period, to the point that Ms Cullen felt she could not reason with him.

40. The police attended Unit 1 in relation to the assault on Ms Taitoko. They arrived at 5:30pm that day. The offender was arrested. Whilst they were doing a sweep of the unit, they found the deceased’s body located in the bath. This is where Ms Taitoko had told them it would be. A blue fitted sheet was covering Mr Froggatt’s head and neck area and he was wrapped in a blue and white doona cover. Photos of the deceased were tendered during the trial depicting his injuries at that time.

41. A crime scene was established. Cleaning products were found in the second bedroom, the kitchen area and the laundry, and blood and blood stains were found at numerous places around the flat. I do not propose to summarise the crime scene evidence. It is consistent with the body being moved to the laundry and then dragged again to the bathtub where it was found by police. Luminol testing confirmed this as well.

42. A gold and a silver chain was found in the laundry sink which had the same link pattern as the injuries to the deceased’s arms from when he was whipped by the offender during the fatal assault.

43. Police also seized items that were located inside rubbish bags on the rear balcony of Unit 1. One such bag contained, amongst other things, a blood-stained pillow and a blood-stained bra.

44. When the offender was spoken to, he exercised his right to silence. The deceased’s blood was located on the offender’s socks and shoe on arrest.

The injuries to the deceased

47. Dr Lea Murray was the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on the deceased and gave evidence at the trial. Dr Murray identified a total of 71 external injuries on the body of the deceased. The cause of death was recorded as “Blunt Force Head Injuries”. She stated:

“This man suffered multiple repeated blunt force impacts to his head, face, body and limbs. He had extensive bruising and swelling to his scalp and face, fractured facial bones, and bleeding and swelling on his brain. This has likely resulted in profound unconsciousness and death.”

48. She opined that the deceased would not have died immediately from the injury.

49. A post-mortem CT scan identified, inter alia, bleeding on the external surface of the brain, bleeding in the ventricles within the brain, marked swelling and bleeding within the scalp tissues, fractures of the left sided facial bones with associated gas in soft tissues of the face and neck, and multiple rib fractures.

50. Dr Murray noted that in relation to the bruising on the deceased’s face, it was difficult to define individual impact points or individual blows because there were so many bruises that they had merged together. There were also “blowout fractures” to the left eye socket, the bruising of which likely would have been pronounced quite early on after the incident. She explained that the orbit bone is thin and had shattered after being subjected to significant force on the left side which had caused that pattern of fracturing. There were no fractures of the skull, only fractures to the orbital wall and the maxilla.

51. The overall pattern of some of the injuries on Mr Froggatt’s forearms and upper arms were suggestive of “defensive” type injuries consistent with the deceased tried to defend himself and instinctively putting up his hands in front of his body to protect himself.

52. As for the 71 injuries, I have set them out in detail in the verdict judgment. [8]

    8. R v Hasapis [2025] NSWSC 121 at [179]-[183].

Objective seriousness

53. It is necessary for me to assess the objective seriousness of the murder. Both senior counsel for the Crown and the offender accepted that there was no obligation to place the objective seriousness of the murder on any particular range. Despite this, it was accepted that it can be useful to do so, and I propose to adopt that course.

54. The Crown submitted that I would make a finding that this was in the mid-range of objective seriousness whereas the offender submitted that I would make a finding of below mid-range objective seriousness.

55. In support of their respective submissions, both senior counsel for the Crown and the offender identified various aspects of the offending as being relevant to the assessment. I have considered those matters carefully and consider the following circumstances to be relevant to the assessment of objective seriousness.

56. First, as to the degree of planning, I accept the submission made on behalf of the offender that this was not an offence that had been planned for some time. There was nothing sophisticated nor ordered about the circumstances leading to the assault nor its execution. The offender’s focus upon Mr Froggatt was unjustified and irrational. On the other hand, it cannot be described as “spontaneous”. After learning from Ms Taitoko and Ms Cullen that the deceased had been inside Unit 1 that day, the offender became angry and arranged for the deceased to come down to visit him, which he subsequently did. The assault commenced shortly after the deceased arrived at his premises. It was not a situation where the offender first sought explanations from the deceased before he commenced the assault and then “snapped”.

57. I accept that the deceased was not constantly struck during the period of the assault; the offender took time out from the assault on the deceased to assault Ms Cullen and Ms Taitoko as well. But the fact that the blows were not continuous throughout the entire assault has to be considered in the context that there was intermittent questioning as well. I accept the Crown submission that this was a form of gratuitous cruelty.

58. Secondly, the fatal assault lasted for at least 30 minutes. The neighbour did not describe it stopping after half an hour, he simply fell asleep after hearing it for half an hour. That is a lengthy period of time over which to sustain injuries. I have had regard to this fact on a number of bases. The repeated blows increase the dangerousness of the offender’s actions. The prolonged nature of the assault provided the offender with opportunities to reconsider his actions at any time during the deceased’s final moments. He did not do so. The offender was determined to continue the violent assault, even when the deceased’s increasing vulnerability to further blows must have been apparent to him and when it would otherwise have been obvious to the offender that the deceased was struggling significantly.

59. Thirdly, the offender was aware that the deceased was a slighter person than him, weighing only 63 kg. He was also aware that he had repeatedly assaulted the deceased for at least half an hour. Although Mr Froggatt was vulnerable given that he was on the NDIS scheme, there was no evidence before the court that the offender was aware of that fact, and I have not had regard to it. As the defensive injuries found at post-mortem revealed, the deceased did not fight back. He was described as crying and asking the offender to stop.

60. Fourthly, the motive for the attack was somewhat unclear but it was accepted that the offender was angry and trying to get answers from the deceased. The offender also submitted during the trial that the motive included getting some psychological satisfaction from assaulting, torturing or interrogating the deceased in order to get information.

61. Fifthly, there were 71 external injuries occasioned across all parts of the body of the deceased including repeated and focused blows to the deceased’s head and the blowout fracture to the deceased’s left orbital wall and floor. I have had regard to the number of injuries. I have discounted some of them which were relatively superficial and I accept the possibility that some of them may have been caused by either the deceased falling to the floor or the resuscitation attempts made by Ms Taitoko. The deceased must have been on the ground prior to the final fall to the ground to explain the numerous injuries to his lower body which were consistent with kicks and being assaulted when he was down.

62. The expert evidence, which I accepted, was that it would have taken at least an hour for the deceased to die. During that time, he would have been in a state of profound unconsciousness. He was subjected to “the indignity of drug-related resuscitation attempts” at a time when he was close to death. At no time did the offender call for any medical or other assistance.

63. Sixthly, although there is no evidence that the violent whipping of the deceased with the gold chain could have led to his death, it did involve gratuitous cruelty. The photos show 16 injuries to the deceased caused by being whipped with the gold chain. These injuries broke the skin and would have bled. The chain marks on the back of the door in the second bedroom are consistent with the accused bringing his arm back to whip him with great force.

64. Finally, the offender is to be sentenced on the basis that he intended to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased rather than kill him. That was the Crown case at trial. Although an intention to kill is a consideration generally tending to greater objective seriousness than an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, that is not always necessarily so. [9] As I indicated in my verdict judgment, although I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender commenced the assault with the intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, I am satisfied that he formed this intention as the assault progressed when he was unable to get the answers he wanted from the deceased.

    9. Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28 at [180]-[181], citing Apps v R [2006] NSWCCA 290 at [5], [49], and R v Hillsley [2006] NSWCCA 312; (2006) 164 A Crim R 252 at [16].

65. Overall, the fatal assault was severe, prolonged, involved gratuitous cruelty, and was carried out against a defenceless man. The degree of mitigation that would ordinarily flow from a finding of the lesser intent for murder needs to be moderated in this case. The deceased’s final moments must have been terrifying, painful and accompanied by a feeling of hopelessness.

66. Having considered all of these matters, I am satisfied that the objective seriousness falls in the mid-range.

Objective seriousness - AOABH Ms Taitoko

67. The Crown submitted that the objective seriousness of the assault on Ms Taitoko is above the middle of the range. Reliance was placed on the fact that the offender committed various acts of violence on her including pulling her by the hair, punching her face and head, kicking her body, burning her skin with a jet lighter and striking her head with the jet lighter. The photographs tendered on this appeal reflect the extent of these injuries.

68. The offence was of a prolonged nature, lasting at least two hours, and resulted in Ms Taitoko feeling as if she had lost consciousness. The assault also involved an element of gratuitous cruelty, demonstrated by the offender occasioning 17 superficial burns with the jet lighter to Ms Taitoko’s body.

69. I am satisfied that this is a serious example of AOABH and above the mid-range of objective seriousness.

Objective seriousness - AOABH Ms Cullen

70. The Crown submitted, and I accept, that the objective seriousness of the assault on Ms Cullen was much less serious than that on Ms Taitoko. She was whipped with the gold chain a number of times. The chain made contact with her upper arm, which she was holding in front of her face, and “a couple of other places”. Exhibit H in the trial proceedings depicted an injury to Ms Cullen’s upper arm, occasioned by the offender’s whipping with the chain.

71. The Crown accepted that the degree of injury inflicted to Ms Cullen’s upper arm was relatively minor in nature. On the other hand, reliance was placed on the fact that the assault was interspersed with the contemporaneous fatal assault during an interrogation. The offender told them, “[y]ou’re all going to die if you don’t tell me who’s been in the apartment”. Ms Cullen was the offender’s intimate domestic partner at the time.

72. In the case of Ms Cullen, the Crown submitted that the offence falls in the middle of the range of objective seriousness whereas on behalf of the offender it was submitted that it was low.

73. I am satisfied that this offence falls below mid-range of objective seriousness.

Victim Impact Statement

74. The Crown tendered a victim impact statement on behalf of the family from Mr Froggatt’s sister, Kylie Jordan, dated 7 July 2025. Ms Jordan read that statement to the court at the proceedings on sentence.

75. Ms Jordan described the “profound and enduring” impact the death of Mr Froggatt had on their family as a “void that cannot be filled”. She described the “unfathomable” stress and trauma Mr Froggatt’s death had on their father who was the first one to speak to police. Her father had to deliver the news of the death to the family, repeatedly recount the events and manage Mr Froggatt’s affairs. This has left a visible emotional toll on him and “robbed him of the peace he deserved in his retirement years”. Ms Jordan described how her father “carries the pain of Sean’s loss with him every day”.

76. Ms Jordan also described how the initial shock she experienced gave way to “overwhelming fear and anxiety” and “shattered [her] sense of safety”. Although her mother is deceased, her mother’s twin, her aunt has seen a deterioration in her mental health and life “with grief that will never leave her”. The tragedy has left “a permanent scar” on their family, cast “a shadow” over “every celebration” and changed the way they “move through the world” and trust others.

77. Section 30E(1) of the Sentencing Act provides that I must consider this statement and may make any comment on it that I consider appropriate. Further, the Crown made an application under s 30E(3) of the Sentencing Act that the victim impact statement be taken into account in connection with the determination of the punishment for the murder on the basis that the harmful impact of Mr Froggatt’s death on family victims is an aspect of harm done to the community. I may only do so if the Crown applies for this to occur, and I consider it to be appropriate.

78. The Sentencing Act does not explain how the court is to determine when it is “appropriate” to take such statements into account in this way. As McCallum J (as her Honour then was) observed in R v Halloun [10] the provision cannot be taken to suggest that some lives are more valuable than others. All human lives are of equal value. Every unlawful death causes harm to the community and to the family of the person killed. As her Honour did in that case, I have had regard to the statement of Ms Jordan to give texture to the “undoubted proposition” that every unlawful taking of a human life harms the community in some way. In that way, the provision serves the purposes of sentencing stated in s 3A of the Sentencing Act, one of which is to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.

    10. [2014] NSWSC 1705 at [46].

79. It is clear that the deceased’s senseless death has had a significant impact on those who loved him. No sentence that the court might impose could adequately reflect that loss and no sentence could possibly ease the grief of those who were close to him. On behalf of the Court and the community it serves, I extend my sincere condolences to the family and friends of Sean Froggatt.

Subjective case

80. The offender did not give evidence at his sentence proceedings. His subjective case was placed before the court in a psychological report prepared by Dr Mamta Sidhu dated 19 June 2025. I have taken the following background from that report as told to Dr Sidhu by the offender.

81. The offender was born in 1992 in Sydney to young parents, a 15-year-old mother and a 20-year-old father. Due to his mother’s young age and her reported heroin addiction the offender was placed in the care of his paternal grandparents, who were of Greek origin, when he was 4 years old.

82. The offender reported that his grandparents’ home was a safe and loving environment and denied any violence or exposure to substance use or abuse in the home environment. Even though his grandparents provided a safe and stable environment, there were communication barriers that prevented the offender from forming a meaningful attachment to them. He was unable to speak Greek, and their command of English was limited. He described that being the only child in his grandparents’ home made him often feel isolated and lonely.

83. The offender’s experience at school was poor. He was not able to integrate into the school environment. He had learning difficulties and was racially bullied. He fought with those that bullied him, and this resulted in his suspension on a number of occasions.

84. The offender did not have strong feelings of connection with his parents. He had regular contact with his mother but irregular contact with his father, who was “working a lot”. He has four half siblings on his mother’s side with whom he had regular contact and enjoyed spending time with. He only had irregular contact with his two half siblings on his father’s side.

85. As he grew older, he became more integrated with his peers for social connection. This had a negative influence on him, exposing him to drug and alcohol use from an early age and contributing to his anti-social behaviours. The offender’s issues with learning, peer integration and behaviour continued in high school, and he was expelled in Year 9. He reported that lack of boundaries at home resulted in him “doing what [he] wanted” in his teenage years.

86. The offender’s work history started with working in landscaping with his father. He remained in that role for 12 months and then commenced working as a delivery driver on a casual basis. Regrettably, his anti-social lifestyle choices impacted his work history, and he was not able to hold down steady employment for many years. This made him reliant on anti-social strategies to survive financially. He was able to later complete a Certification Level II in Hospitality at a TAFE course as well as a Barista course.

87. As an adult, the offender now has a better relationship with his father than his mother. He has been estranged from his mother for the past 13 years but described his relationship with his father as close. He described him as “his most consistent support”. His grandparents have since died.

Criminal history

88. The offender has a criminal history which includes previous offences of violence. The offender committed his first offence, a robbery in company, in July 2011 when he was 18 years old. He received an 18-month suspended sentence. His appeal against conviction was dismissed. [11]

    11. Hasapis v R [2014] NSWCCA 216.

89. The following year, and whilst on bail for the robbery in company offence, the offender committed further offences of common assault and larceny in January 2012, and recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company and recklessly wounding in company in May 2012. The offender was sentenced in relation to these latter offences to concurrent terms of 2 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months. He was released from custody in January 2015.

88. The offender did not commit any further offences until March 2019 by which time he was 26 years old. He punched an acquaintance to the face a number of times, causing bruising to the victim’s eye. He was dealt with for AOABH by way of an Intensive Correction Order (“ICO”), imposed for 15-months. That ICO expired in January 2021.

89. During the currency of the ICO the offender committed offences of drug supply, which were dealt with by way of Community Corrections Orders which expired on 28 September 2022, four months before the commission of the present offences.

90. It is of some significance that there was a break in his offending from 2012 to 2019.

91. The Crown accepted that the offender’s criminal history was not an aggravating factor in this case, but it deprived him of the leniency that would otherwise be afforded to a person of prior good character. I accept that submission.

92. Since entering custody, the offender has not received any custodial penalties.

Drug history

95. The offender reported to Dr Sidhu that he was exposed to alcohol and cannabis use from the age of nine years old through his older peer group. He started using cannabis daily and had a dependency by the time he was 13. From the age of 15, he started to use “speed” and “ice” and quickly became addicted. The offender also reported cocaine use commencing from the age of 21. Dr Sidhu concluded that the offender has been suffering from chronic drug addiction through most of his adult life. Specifically, the offender reported that the seven months prior to the offending was the worst period of substance abuse in his history.

96. The offender was under the influence of methylamphetamine (“ice”) at the time of the commission of these offences. As McCallum J (as her Honour then was) observed in R v Homann, [12] “[i]ce is a scourge. It is freely accessible and highly addictive. The experience of the courts is that it not infrequently makes ordinary people violent and irrational”. I would further endorse the following comments of the Victorian Court of Appeal as to the scourge of ice: [13]

“It is the experience of judges that ice potentially is extremely harmful to the individuals who use it. Almost daily, judges in criminal courts are told that serious crimes were committed by offenders who, as a result of the use of ice, suffered severe mood swings, paranoia and psychosis, reflected in extreme aggression and violence. It is also well-known to judges who sit in criminal courts that the violent, dangerous and reckless behaviour that the drug often provokes in those who use it causes immeasurable harm to the community, which suffers as a result of such behaviour.”

12. [2018] NSWSC 757 at [46].

13. Haddara v R [2016] VSCA 168; (2016) 260 A Crim R 306 at [49] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA).

97. It is well established that drug addiction is not a mitigating factor on sentence. [14]

    14. R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 at [273], [206], [273].

Mental health

98. The psychometric assessment performed by Dr Sidhu with respect to the offender’s general cognitive capacity and functioning (IQ test) comprised assessment of his verbal comprehension skills and his perceptual reasoning skills. His verbal comprehension skills were assessed to be within borderline range and his perceptual reasoning skills in the average range which indicated that the offender performs better with visual rather than verbal information.

99. Dr Sidhu noted that the offender’s school reports and assessments highlight his verbal difficulties from an early age and that it “appears that his verbal difficulties have been a persistent feature of his life since childhood, continuing into adulthood and has perhaps impacted his communication skills, social skills and confidence in these areas of functioning.”

100. The offender’s psychometric assessment did not indicate any intellectual disability in relation to his general cognitive capacity or functioning.

101. The only mental health diagnosis Dr Sidhu made was of Substance Use Disorder. On behalf of the offender, it was submitted that his Substance Use Disorder is a factor to be taken into account in the mix of factors relevant to the court’s instinctive synthesis but does not reduce the offender’s moral culpability for his offending. I accept that submission.

Moral culpability

102. I have considered the material placed before me regarding the offender’s personal circumstances. It was submitted on behalf of the offender that his dysfunctional childhood should allow for some diminution of his moral culpability. [15] An assessment of an offender’s moral culpability extends to a consideration of their personal circumstances which may affect their capacity to reason, appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions or control their conduct. [16] A sentencing judge is required to assess whether an offender’s background operates to reduce his or her moral blameworthiness for the offending because: [17]

“… exposure to domestic and family violence or alcohol and drug use, during an offender’s formative years, may operate to normalise that conduct such as to have an impact upon their capacity to reason, appreciate the full wrongfulness of their actions, control their conduct, understand the consequences of their offending, and may impair their capacity for emotional regulation, and increase immaturity and impulsivity.”

15. Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37.

16. Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273 at [31].

17. NK v R [2025] NSWCCA 73 at [101].

103. On behalf of the offender, it was accepted that his background was not one of deprivation, but it was one of disfunction in that he did not have a relationship with his parents, had only a limited ability to communicate with his primary carers and has low verbal skills. It was submitted that these factors affected his development of a strong moral code. The Crown on the other hand submitted that the offender was not exposed to domestic violence, nor substance use or abuse in the home environment in his formative years. He was generally raised in a safe and loving home environment with his grandparents, albeit his childhood was a lonely and isolated one. The offender’s exposure to alcohol and substance use was from outside of the home environment, by an older peer group.

104. Having carefully considered Dr Sidhu’s report, there is nothing identified in the offender’s childhood or upbringing that might explain why the offender would have had a reduced capacity to reason or appreciate the full wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the fatal assault. It seems to me that it was his consumption of ice, rather than his upbringing by his grandparents, which may have impaired his capacity for emotional regulation. In fact, Dr Sidhu opined that the impact of the offender’s heavy drug use from an early age likely impacted his brain development in that it resulted in deficits in his thinking skills, such as judgement, planning and consequential thinking, and coping ability and affected his decision making.

105. An assessment of whether the Bugmy principles are applicable in any case to some extent involves an evaluative assessment upon which judicial minds may differ. I accept that the offender reported a sad and lonely childhood. He had no close relationship with his biological parents and an inability to communicate freely with his primary caregivers, his grandparents, due to language difficulties. His poor verbal skills may have contributed to that. He sought solace with an anti-social peer group which led to usage of illicit drugs from a very early age. His grandparents are now deceased and there is no material before me to explain whether they were aware of his descent into heavy drug use at a very early age and were unable to control the offender or whether they were even aware of it at all.

106. Although I consider the matter to be finely balanced, I am satisfied that the offender’s childhood is such that I would make a moderate reduction in his moral culpability on account of it. Such a finding does not automatically translate to a reduced sentence. [18] I have also considered whether there are any countervailing sentencing factors. [19] I am satisfied that the small reduction I would make in moral culpability is largely but not entirely offset by the weight to be afforded in this matter to general deterrence and the need for the sentence to vindicate the dignity of the victim and reflect the community’s disapproval of the offending. [20]

     18. Harris v R [2021] NSWCCA 322 at [89].

     19. Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 at [54].

     20. Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 at [54].

107. Despite the fact that I am satisfied that the small reduction in moral culpability is offset in this way, his background of disadvantage must be given “full weight” and I propose to do so as part of the process of instinctive synthesis. [21]

     21. Dungay v R [2020] NSWCCA 209 at [153].

Remorse

108. An expression of genuine remorse can be a mitigating factor on sentence but only if an offender has provided evidence that he has accepted responsibility for his actions, and has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage. [22]

     22. Sentencing Act, s 21A(3)(i).

109. The only evidence of remorse on behalf of the offender was in Dr Sidhu’s report. [23] She described the offender clearly struggling to discuss the offence. He often provided limited responses or shrugged. He told her that he “bashed someone I knew” as he believed that the victim had robbed him which left him “feeling angry”. He told Dr Sidhu that due to his drug affected state and feelings of anger he “bashed him just to get my stuff back”. He told Dr Sidhu that he was not intending “to hurt him badly or for him to be killed”. Although he admitted using the chain as a weapon, when Dr Sidhu asked him about that she described him as expressing “seemingly genuine remorse”. He told her that he regrets “all of it” and recognises that the victim was likely scared in his final moments of life. Dr Sidhu went on to report this:

“Mr Hasapis expressed that he feels ‘not good about what I’ve done, I feel like shit’. He recognised the impact on the victim’s family and expressed that they likely felt both anger and sadness about the loss of their loved one.”

23. At [32].

110. The offender relied on this as evidence of some remorse whereas the Crown submitted that it was insufficient to discharge the offender's onus on this issue.

111. I have had regard to the fact that the offender told Dr Sidhu, on a date after the verdict of guilty to murder, that he did not intend to hurt the deceased “badly”. This is inconsistent with the evidence adduced at the trial, and the verdict. In this respect it cannot be said that the offender has established that he truly accepts responsibility for his actions. Despite this, I am satisfied that he has shown some remorse short of the statutory requirement and that this is a relevant factor in relation to his prospects of reoffending and rehabilitation.

112. Although he pleaded guilty to the assaults of Ms Cullen and Ms Taitoko, Dr Sidhu’s report does not otherwise contain any expressions of remorse in relation to those victims and I am unable to make any finding in relation to them beyond acknowledging those pleas.

Prospects for rehabilitation/Risk of reoffending

113. The offender submitted that his substance use disorder is relevant as a general factor and has some relevance to assessing his risk of reoffending and prospect of rehabilitation. Clearly his risk would be reduced and his prospects enhanced if he could refrain from drug use. It was submitted that although it is early into his sentence, it is positive that he recognises his need to refrain from drug use and engage in treatment in custody.

114. It is inevitable that the offender will be receiving a lengthy sentence of imprisonment. To some extent this makes it difficult to assess his prospects on release in the distant future. Despite this, given his recent positive conduct in custody, I am satisfied that that is some cause for optimism upon his release. Although any finding must be guarded, I am prepared to find that the offender has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, especially if he is able to remain drug free.

Commencement date and totality

115. The offender has been in continuous custody since his arrest in respect of these matters on 28 January 2023 and the aggregate sentence will be backdated to that date.

116. On behalf of the offender, it was submitted that he may not have received a custodial sentence for the assault on Ms Cullen if considered on its own and that its criminality could be wholly reflected within the sentence imposed for the murder. In the event that a separate custodial sentence is imposed, it was submitted that it should be wholly concurrent with the murder sentence. The offender accepted that there may be some accumulation for the assault upon Ms Taitoko but that given the proximity in time, and the fact that the offender will inevitably receive a significant sentence for the murder, any accumulation should be very modest.

117. The offender stands to be sentenced on three offences of violence of different seriousness. The aggregate sentence to be imposed must recognise this so as to avoid any suggestion that the offender has received some kind of a discount for multiple offending. [24] I will allow for significant notional concurrence as between the two assault charges but there will be some notional accumulation as between those offences and the murder to reflect the serious assault on Ms Taitoko and to a lesser extent on the offender’s domestic partner, Ms Cullen. The sentence imposed for the murder cannot entirely reflect the criminality for the other two offences. [25]

     24. R v MAK; R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381; (2006) 167 A Crim R 159 at [18].

     25. Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1 at [27].

Facilitation of the administration of justice

118. The Crown accepts that it is open to the court to impose a lesser penalty on the offender than would have otherwise been imposed, having regard to the degree to which the defence facilitated the administration of justice at the offender’s trial. [26] As reflected in the verdict judgment, much of the evidence at trial was adduced by way of agreed facts. The only two civilian witnesses who were called were the eyewitnesses to the fatal assault. The offender narrowed the sole issue in the proceedings to the question of murderous intent.

     26. Sentencing Act, s 22A(1).

119. The degree to which an offender’s sentence can be reduced on this basis is subject to the restraint that any reduction must not result in a sentence that is “unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence”. [27]

     27. Sentencing Act, s 22A(2).

120. Although quantifying the discount is not necessary, it has been held to be desirable to do so if it makes a significant difference in the penalty ultimately imposed. Further, doing so has the benefit of providing transparency to the sentencing process and encouraging accused people and their legal representatives to conduct criminal trials efficiently and expeditiously. [28]

     28. Droudis v R [2020] NSWCCA 322 at [105].

121. I propose to quantify the degree to which the offender’s indicative sentence for the murder will be reduced as a result of his facilitation of the administration of justice. It is important that accused persons and their legal representatives be encouraged to conduct criminal trials efficiently and expeditiously. As to the degree of reduction, I have considered the approach in R v Fuller (No 5) [29] where the indicated reduction can be ascertained to be by a factor of 5%. I consider the narrowing of the issues and approach taken in the offender’s case to be such as to warrant a slightly higher reduction than that which will translate to about 7%.

     29. [2025] NSWSC 76 at [103], [106] per Ierace J.

Comparable cases

122. No comparable cases were provided on sentence. That is not surprising. The offence of murder can be established in numerous ways. Many cases involve an intention to kill whereas others, such as this case, involve an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm. Many cases involve a weapon such as a firearm or a knife. Many offenders have findings of reduced moral culpability made, including on the basis of youth or mental illness. Other offenders are sentenced on principles of complicity where their role in the murder did not involve physically causing the death. Other cases involve contract killings or arise in a domestic violence context. Others still involve murders committed whilst the offender was on conditional liberty such as parole.

123. The recent decision of R v Kilby [30] has been of some assistance. It involved a violent assault in which the offender intended to cause grievous bodily harm as well. It can be distinguished from the present case on a number of bases. The offender in that case killed the deceased by punching him multiple times and stomping on him at least once causing extensive bruising, abrasions and lacerations. That assault was shorter, spontaneous, and did not involve gratuitous cruelty. It was assessed as below the middle of the range but not at the lower end of the range. There was an early plea of guilty leading to a 25% discount and the offender was found to be genuinely remorseful. His moral culpability was found to be reduced. The starting point for the murder was 24 years’ imprisonment which after the 25% discount, resulted in a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 years and 6 months.

     30. (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 748.

Special circumstances

124. Clearly, the purposes of sentencing in s 3A of the Sentencing Act can only be reflected in a sentence of full-time imprisonment. I have addressed the significance of the purposes of sentencing throughout these reasons.

125. The offender sought a finding of special circumstances and a variation to the statutory ratio [31] in order to enhance his prospect of successful reintegration into the community.

     31. Sentencing Act, s 44(2B).

126. The Crown submitted that a finding of special circumstances should not be made, because the statutory formulation will provide the necessary post release supervision to meet the respective needs of the offender and the community.

127. It is often said that there is no need to make a finding of special circumstances in murder cases given that the parole period will already be lengthy. Despite this, I am persuaded that the relevant matters identified on behalf of the offender militate in favour of such a variation in this case.

Discount for pleas

128. Although the offender indicated a willingness to plead guilty to manslaughter, that was not ultimately the verdict I reached. Despite this, as I have already indicated, he is entitled to a reduction based on his willingness to facilitate the course of justice.

129. As for the plea of guilty to AOABH on Ms Taitoko, although the Crown initially took issue with the offender’s entitlement to a 25% discount, it was ultimately submitted that in this case the issue was uncertain [32] such that the Crown accepted that he could receive a discount of 25%. I propose to apply that discount. The offender pleaded guilty to the AOABH on Ms Cullen at the proceedings on sentence. Again, although he is not entitled to a specified discount for that late plea, his approach to that matter will also be taken into account in relation to his facilitation of the course of justice.

     32. See s 25E of the Sentencing Act.

Indicative sentences

130. I propose to proceed by way of an aggregate sentence pursuant to s 53A of the Sentencing Act.

131. I would propose the following indicative sentences:

AOABH (Ms Taitoko)   - 2 years and 7 months imprisonment (after the 25% discount) (rounded down)

AOABH (Ms Cullen)     - (s 166 Certificate) 5 months imprisonment

Murder   - 24 years and 2 months imprisonment (reduced from 26 years), NPP of 17 years

SENTENCE

132. The offender is sentenced as follows:

1. For the offence of murder, Mr Hasapis I sentence you to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 26 years commencing on 28 January 2023 and expiring on 27 January 2049. I fix a non-parole period of 18 years to expire on 27 January 2041. You will be first eligible for release to parole on 27 January 2041.

2. In compliance with s 25C of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), I note that the provisions of that Act have potential application to Mr Hasapis. I direct that his legal representatives advise him of the existence of the Act and its application to this offence.

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Endnotes

Decision last updated: 18 July 2025