R v Green
[2019] ACTSC 87
•13 February 2019
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v Green |
Citation: | [2019] ACTSC 87 |
Hearing Date: | 6 February 2019 |
DecisionDate: | 13 February 2019 |
Before: | Mossop J |
Decision: | See [72] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and punishment – sentencing – causing grievous bodily harm – offender rides unregistered and uninsured electric bicycle along shared path and strikes child riding on path – child suffers serious injuries including brain injury – offender found guilty at trial – limited criminal history but criminal history does not fully reflect the history of offending behaviour – polysubstance abuse – history of sexual abuse – custodial sentence and fines |
Legislation Cited: | Australian Road Rules, rr 288(1), 288(6) Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 25 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), ss 68D(2), 68E(2) |
Cases Cited: | R v Leskinen (1978) 36 FLR 414 |
Parties: | The Queen (Crown) Matthew James Green (Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel T Hickey (Crown) J Sabharwal (Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid ACT (Offender) | |
File Numbers: | SCC 119 of 2018 SCC 120 of 2018 |
MOSSOP J:
Introduction
On 23 November 2018, following a trial, Matthew James Green was found guilty of one count of causing grievous bodily harm contrary to s 25 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The maximum penalty for causing grievous bodily harm is imprisonment for five years.
Mr Green is also charged with a number of offences which have been transferred to this Court. It is in the interests of justice that they be dealt with in this court: Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 68D(2). The charges are:
a) one count of driving on a path contrary to r 288(1) of the Australian Road Rules (Road Rules) on 11 May 2017, the maximum penalty being 20 penalty units;
b) one count of driving while disqualified contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) on 11 May 2017, the maximum penalty for a first offender being 50 penalty units, imprisonment for six months or both;
c) using an unregistered vehicle contrary to s 18(1) of the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act 1999 (ACT) on 11 May 2017, the maximum penalty being 20 penalty units; and
d) using an uninsured vehicle contrary to s 17(1) of the Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Act 2008 (ACT) on 11 May 2017, the maximum penalty being 50 penalty units.
Causing grievous bodily harm
The jury found the offender guilty of a contravention of s 25 of the Crimes Act. That section provides:
A person who, by any unlawful or negligent act or omission, causes grievous bodily harm to another person is guilty of an offence punishable, on conviction, by imprisonment for 5 years.
On 11 May 2017, the offender was riding his Stealth B-52 electric bicycle at about 40 to 50km/h on a path near Fadden Primary School. The Stealth B-52 electric bicycle has pedals as well as an electric motor. It weighed 52kg. It was about 8:45am. At that time a 10-year-old school student, BI, was riding a BMX bicycle along the path. Along with his school friends, he had been entertaining himself before school by riding the bike around a circuit from the playground of the school onto the path and then back up to the playground. Whilst he was performing one of these circuits, the offender, who was travelling downhill along the path, collided with him. The impact of the collision buckled the front wheel of BI’s bicycle. The offender’s dirt bike helmet collided with BI’s head. BI was not wearing a helmet. BI was thrown from his bicycle unconscious and landed on the ground several metres away. He was lying face down on the ground and bleeding around the face and nose.
Several students were present when the collision occurred. An ambulance took the child to the Canberra Hospital and provided initial resuscitation. He was initially unstable and required intubation to assist his breathing. A series of CT scans were done at the hospital which showed several haemorrhages in the frontal and temporal lobes, and extensive basal skull and facial bone fractures. He was immediately taken by air ambulance to the Children's Hospital at Westmead, Sydney where repeat CT and MRI scans were done. He was unconscious for four or five days. Medical staff monitored his brain injury and assessed him daily. He did not require surgery. He was considered to be out of post traumatic amnesia 24 days after the collision. This indicated that his brain injury was in the very severe category.
BI did not return to school until Term 4 (which was about five months after the collision) and then returned gradually a few days per week. His mother noticed changes in her son following the collision including fatigue, regressed behaviour and difficulties with short‑term memory. He now needs a full-time teacher’s aide to assist him in class to help him with tasks involving his short-term memory. Doctors are unable to determine the overall prognosis for his cognitive function until he is 18 to 25 years old because his brain is still developing.
The jury’s verdict necessarily involves a finding that the conduct of the offender fell so far short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances and involved such a high risk of grievous bodily harm that the conduct merited criminal punishment: see R v Leskinen (1978) 36 FLR 414.
At the relevant time BI was travelling up the pathway towards the offender. A police video of a drive-through along the path towards the scene of the accident showed that the path was mostly straight with good sightlines. As the offender was travelling down the path towards BI, the offender had an unobstructed view for about 160m to BI. At 40km/h he would have had about 15 seconds to react, somewhat less if he was going faster.
The jury’s verdict must have involved negligence in the form of one or more of the following:
(a)riding the Stealth B-52 bike on the pathway;
(b)riding at a speed which was inappropriate past a school where students were likely to be and in fact were;
(c)failing to keep a proper lookout; and
(d)failing to manoeuvre the bike in order to avoid a collision.
During the course of the execution of a search warrant at the offender’s house, he gave a version of events which involved BI going across in front of him, doing a U-turn and then coming straight back into his path. The verdict of the jury is inconsistent with this eliminating negligence of the required character but does not rule out the factual matters referred to in the interview by the offender.
The exact mechanism of the collision cannot be determined beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence. The evidence of the other boys who were present but did not observe the actual collision is consistent with BI doing a circuit which involved riding up the path in the opposite direction to the offender’s path of travel. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that each of the aspects of negligence identified above existed in the present case. Insofar as the offender sought to establish some unpredictable behaviour on the part of BI as a mitigating factor, I am not satisfied of that on the balance of probabilities. The uncorroborated statement made to police is not, in my view, sufficient to establish the facts there stated on the balance of probabilities.
Therefore, the offender is to be sentenced on the basis that the exact mechanism of the collision cannot be determined, each of the components of negligence set out above were present and, whilst the existence of that negligence can accommodate some level of unpredictable behaviour by BI on the bicycle, it does not encompass the type of unpredictability described by the offender during the search as a mitigating factor.
Transferred charges
There were also number of charges transferred to the Supreme Court as related charges. The prosecution tendered further evidence in order to establish the offences: Supreme Court Act, s 68E(2).
Driving on a path
Rule 288 of the Road Rules provides:
288 Driving on a path
(1) A driver (except the rider of a bicycle) must not drive on a path unless subrule (2) or (3) applies to the driver.
…
Subrules (2) or (3) were not relevant in the present circumstances.
“Path” is defined in r 288(6) as “a bicycle path, footpath or shared path”. The definition of “footpath” is as follows:
footpath … means an area open to the public that is designated for, or has as one of its main uses, use by pedestrians.
The definition of a “shared path” is, in part:
shared path is an area open to the public (except a separated footpath) that is designated for, or has as one of its main uses, use by both the riders of bicycles and pedestrians …
Because both of these definitions may be met by reference to the main uses that the path has, it is not essential to establish any designation or signage in order to establish that an area is a footpath or a shared path. In the present case, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that one of the main purposes of the path in question was use by both the riders of bicycles and pedestrians. Therefore, I am satisfied that the path was a shared path. Further, had that not been the case, I am also satisfied that one of the main uses is use by pedestrians and hence the path would have been a footpath.
The evidence establishes that the accused was the driver of the Stealth B-52 bicycle on the path. The evidence also establishes that the Stealth B-52 bicycle had a maximum power output of 1961W. Because of that power output it was not a “bicycle” within the meaning of the Road Rules. That is because bicycle was defined in a manner which limited the power output of an auxiliary motor to 250W.
I am satisfied that the offender was the driver of a motor vehicle which was not a bicycle on a path within the meaning of the relevant rule and find him guilty of this offence.
Driving while disqualified
In order to establish this offence the prosecution must prove that the offender was disqualified by a court from holding a driver licence and that he drove a motor vehicle on a road or road related area during the period of disqualification: see Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act, s 32(1).
An evidentiary certificate under s 72(1)(a) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) establishes that on 11 May 2017 the offender was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence as a result of an order of the ACT Magistrates Court made on 22 November 2016.
The Stealth B-52 bike was a motor vehicle as it was “a vehicle built to be propelled by a motor that forms part of the vehicle”: see Road Transport (General) Act, Dictionary. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to determine whether or how a bicycle fitted with a motor of less than 250W is treated by s 32 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act.
A road related area is defined in the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act in a manner which includes:
…any other area that is open to or used by the public so far as a declaration under the Road Transport (General) Act 1999, section 12 (Power to include or exclude areas in road transport legislation) declares that this Act applies to the area;
but does not include an area that would otherwise be a road related area so far as a declaration under that section declares that this Act does not apply to that area: see Dictionary, Road Transport (General) Act.
The path on which the offender drove the Stealth B-52 bike is a road related area because a declaration under s 12 of the Road Transport (General) Act includes as road related areas “any part of a park, reserve, recreational or sporting ground, racecourse, or any other open place, to which the public has access whether with or without payment for admission”: Road Transport (General) Declaration of Areas to be Defined as Road Related Areas (NI2000-44). It is beyond doubt that the relevant area was, if nothing else, an open place to which the public had access.
Therefore, this offence is made out and I find offender guilty of it.
Unregistered vehicle
Section 18(1) of the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act provides that a person must not use an unregistered registrable vehicle, or a vehicle with suspended registration, on a road or road related area.
To make out this charge it must be established that that the offender used an unregistered registrable vehicle on a road or road related area.
For the reasons given earlier, the area in question was a road related area.
The vehicle was a registrable because it was “any motor vehicle”: see definition of “registrable vehicle” in the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act. A “motor vehicle” included, relevantly, “a vehicle built to be propelled by a motor that forms part of the vehicle…”: see Road Transport (General) Act, Dictionary. A bicycle (which includes a bicycle with a motor of up to 250W) would not have been a registrable vehicle: Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2000 (ACT), s 20.
A certificate under s 72(1)(b) of the Road Transport (General) Act shows that no “Black Stealth B-52 electric motorised bicycles” had been recorded on the registrable vehicles register. That is the register kept under the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act. The offender made no submission that the evidentiary value of the evidentiary certificate was undermined by the description of the vehicle in the certificate in the manner that it was.
Therefore, the offender is guilty of this charge.
Uninsured vehicle
In order to make out this charge it must be established that the offender used a motor vehicle on a road or road related area that was not insured.
For the reasons given above, the Stealth B-52 bike was a motor vehicle and it was used on a road related area.
Section 31 of the Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Act provides:
If the road transport authority registers, or renews the registration of, a motor vehicle, a CTP policy comes into force for the motor vehicle when the registration, or renewal of registration, takes effect.
Because the vehicle was unregistered no CTP policy came into effect and hence it was uninsured. Therefore, the offender is guilty of this offence.
Victim impact statement
Two victim impact statements were read by the victim’s mother. The victim, BI, also prepared two victim impact statements which were tendered. I have taken into account each of these in determining the appropriate sentence. These statements illustrate the significant consequences of the offender’s negligence not only upon the immediate victim of the offending conduct, but also the long-term physical and emotional toll taken on the members of the victim’s family.
Although still young, BI recognises that his injuries differentiate his position in life from those of his peers. He is clearly concerned about the future. He demonstrates considerable insight in recognising that his injuries have also had an impact upon his sister because his parents, of necessity, devote more time to him. Whilst he recognises that his life has changed as a result of the injury, it is apparent that as a result of his age and stage of maturity, he has a limited understanding of the full extent of the consequences his injuries.
The victim impact statements read by his mother address the immediate consequences of the accident as well as the longer term consequences for BI, herself and the other members of her family. She describes the dramatic circumstances for a mother of finding her son, who she had recently dropped at school, in hospital, wondering whether he was going to live. There was the significant period which he spent in the Children’s Hospital in Sydney when she was away from her daughters. There are the longer term consequences of having to manage the restrictions on her son’s conduct so as to keep him safe from further significant injury. She and her husband have had the extra pressure associated with the financial stress arising from the need to ensure that he receives proper rehabilitation. There is the emotional impact upon her and her husband as well as her daughters of coping with the long-term change in their son and brother.
The second victim impact statement read by BI’s mother attests to the change in her son’s friendships and capacity to engage with his friends as a result of his injuries. She continues to be burdened by the ongoing requirements for rehabilitation. The need to deal on a continuing basis with his injuries has clearly taken an emotional toll on her and she recognises that the effects of the accident upon the members of her family will continue for the rest of their lives.
Objective seriousness
In assessing the objective seriousness of an offence against s 25 of the Crimes Act it is necessary to have regard to the nature of the negligent act and the causal relationship between the negligent act and the grievous bodily harm. So far as the nature of the negligent act is concerned, that involved a number of components: the use of the vehicle on a footpath, the speed at which it was travelling, and the failure to pay proper attention or manoeuvre the bike so as to avoid any collision. The starting point is that a reasonable person would not have unlawfully ridden the Stealth B-52 bike on a shared path. Next, a reasonable person would not have ridden past the school and the children playing near it at the speed of 40 to 50 km/h. Finally, while in the present case it is not possible to make a finding about precisely what was going on in the offender’s mind immediately prior to the accident, even having regard to that excessive speed he had excellent sightlines and plenty of opportunity to manoeuvre so as to give children on or near the path a wide berth. Therefore, this component of his negligence involved either or both of failing to pay proper attention to the path in front of him or failing to manoeuvre so as to avoid the risk of a collision.
It is also necessary in assessing the objective seriousness to have regard to the potential for harm arising from the negligent act. The Stealth B-52 bicycle weighed 52kg. Clearly, the riding of the Stealth B-52 bicycle at speed had the capacity to cause death or very serious injury to another person in much the same way that a motorbike might.
Because of the number of different components of the offender’s negligence, the causal potency of his negligence was not lessened by the possibility that BI’s riding immediately prior to the accident was not entirely predictable.
The conduct in the present case is above the mid range of objective seriousness for an offence against s 25.
Each of the transferred charges is in the mid range of objective seriousness for the respective offences.
Subjective circumstances
The personal circumstances of the offender are disclosed in a pre-sentence report dated 30 January 2019. They are also described in the reports of a psychiatrist and a psychologist which were tendered on behalf of the offender. Those reports were prepared for the purposes of personal injury proceedings against a school in a Bathurst at which the offender alleged that had been sexually abused by a teacher. Significantly, the offender saw the psychiatrist less than three weeks after the present offending occurred and the psychologist over the period between November 2016 and July 2017. Therefore, they provide an assessment of the circumstances of the offender which is contemporaneous with the present offending conduct. The Crown did not object to the tender of the psychiatrist’s report. The report records admissions of significant criminal conduct on the part of the offender which was not otherwise disclosed in the criminal history. The psychologist’s report was tendered by consent with some redactions.
The offender is 47 years old. He currently resides with his elderly parents, having moved in with them a few years ago following a relationship breakdown. He has a good relationship with his sister. He has limited contact with his brother. He has two adult children live who in Queensland and has a close relationship with them. He also maintains regular contact with the mother of his children and her partner.
He attended school until Year 11. He was a victim of child sexual abuse at the hands of his former housemaster at the boarding school that he attended from Year 7 until Year 9. The sexual abuse was very serious and was associated with his introduction to alcohol, tobacco and illicit drugs. The sexual abuse is described in more detail in the psychiatrist report. Notwithstanding that he left the relevant school in Year 9, the sexual abuse escalated and continued until he was about 18 years old.
The sexual abuse was causally related to his involvement in illicit drug use. He had begun a pre-apprenticeship in fitting and machining and electrical work which he was unable to complete because he had drug-related problems and because of his poor attendance. He initially smoked amphetamines and then progressed to self‑injecting. He smoked cannabis. The means of financing this drug use is described later in these reasons.
From the age of 17 he spent at least nine or 10 years addicted to heroin until he was exposed to a rapid detoxification program in Israel funded by his father. The pre‑sentence report indicates heroin use over a four-year period but I consider it more likely that the psychiatrist’s report is accurate and that is consistent with heroin use over a substantially longer period. At its peak his heroin use was costing $1000 per day. Whilst the detoxification program in Israel was successful in relation to heroin, he has continued to abuse and remain dependent upon a number of other drugs.
As at the time of the offending his drug use involved smoking many cones (up to 40) of cannabis per day and regularly injecting methamphetamine. He used ecstasy and cocaine on occasion.
Police only investigated the sexual abuse that he had suffered as a child in 2012. The offender’s contact with police led to a significant mental health breakdown and he lapsed at that stage into illicit substance use. His abuser was charged, pleaded guilty and jailed.
Although he had used amphetamine from the age of 16 until his 20s, he reported being abstinent until approximately 2012. He then spent approximately $80,000 on methamphetamine between 2012 and 2013. He managed to reduce his use to once a fortnight in the last 12 months (that is from approximately January 2018) and reported being abstinent in the three months prior to the preparation of the report (that is, from approximately November 2018). He continues to use up to 2g of cannabis on a daily basis. He has a problematic history of alcohol use. In the past he has had a gambling problem, but he has not gambled for approximately 15 years.
He is a carpenter by trade and has run his own business for approximately three years. At the time of the offending that operated at a modest level averaging about 15 hours per week. Prior to that he has had work as a subcontractor in the building industry doing various jobs which he was able to maintain despite his long-term drug use. From about 2010 until 2015 he successfully ran a business with his then partner doing building work.
The offender received a substantial payout from the Presbyterian Church of Australia which ran the school at which he was abused. These funds have been invested and permitted him to live comfortably when supplemented by additional income from his business.
He has some ongoing back issues as a result of a spinal injury in 2006. That includes suffering from osteomyelitis in his spine which required extensive treatment at the Canberra Hospital. He also suffers from arthritis. He suffered some unspecified injuries in the accident giving rise to the present charges and took some time off work.
A friend of the offender told the author of the pre-sentence report that he had taken the circumstances surrounding the offence very badly, expressed grief about what happened to the victim and that for weeks and months after the offence he was constantly worrying about the victim’s well-being and blaming himself.
He is assessed by the author of the pre-sentence report as being at a medium to low risk of general reoffending.
The report of the psychiatrist paints a grim picture of him at about the time of the accident:
He appeared as chronically dysphoric and as a shell of a man without articulating his subjective state of impairment and dysfunction.
…
His cognitive functioning appeared to me to be affected by his chronic drug use and also the use of substances on the day. I suspect this reflects his habitual functioning at this stage. His concentration was impaired.
The report also records the statement of his sister to the psychiatrist which was summarised as:
She confirmed a picture of her brother as a sad man living an empty life who was emotional[ly] wrecked and lost. This was clearly consistent with the presentation and assessment on the day.
The report of the psychologist records him as having an abiding distrust of authorities, a tendency to retaliate first, hating being told what to do and a tendency to black-and-white thinking. It describes him as having a thin veneer of self-confidence and bravado but being vulnerable and full of self-doubt. It describes these symptoms and signs as being related to having been sexually abused. The report of the psychologist summarises his position as follows:
Mr Green is very seriously psychologically unwell. His abuse at school has been documented elsewhere. The experience has made him into a very volatile, unhappy and reckless person.
Criminal history
The offender has a limited criminal history. That includes the offence of driving with a prescribed drug in his oral fluid or blood, namely THC and methamphetamine, from 2016 which led to him being disqualified at the time of the offending. There are also the offences committed just two days prior to the present offences when he was caught riding the Stealth B-52 bike on the Kings Highway heading up the hill out of Queanbeyan in the direction of Bungendore. It is remarkable that notwithstanding being pulled up for this offending he then went on and committed the offences for which he is now being sentenced.
However, his criminal history does not fully reflect the history of offending behaviour. As pointed out above, he spent many years addicted to illicit substances, in particular amphetamines and heroin. The report of the psychiatrist describes the offender’s admission of offending conduct as follows:
Mr Green said financing his drug use came from stealing. Mr Green relied upon criminal activity to support his drug dependence. He said there were 32 motels in Dubbo. We would break into these premises and into cars. With a small group they stole items that they could sell. He was not convicted of any offences. He progressed to stealing from shops and then did break and enters into houses. He was involved in car theft. Vehicles were sold on to “chop shops”. Criminal activity escalated over the years to trading firearms that were unregistered. Mr Green became an accomplished regular criminal. He was often approached by police but never charged.
Time in custody
The offender has spent no time in custody for these offences.
Consideration
The extent of negligence on the part of the offender was significant. For the reasons set out above, the offender’s responsibility and moral culpability is also high. Tragically, the injuries inflicted upon BI were significant and long lasting. He has suffered a very severe brain injury requiring initial resuscitation and hospitalisation. His behaviour has regressed and he has difficulties with short-term memory which requires a full-time teacher’s aide to assist him in class. His prognosis is uncertain but there will be long-term consequences because of his brain injury.
The offender is not a young man. The evidence of remorse is patchy. There are some indications of remorse but other indications of a lack of remorse. This is probably consistent with the limitations on the offender’s cognitive functioning described in the psychiatrist’s report.
Whilst he has limited criminal history, he does have a significant history of offending associated with his illicit substance use. That illicit substance use commenced when he was a child and is associated with the sexual abuse that he suffered as a child. His polysubstance abuse has affected his cognitive functioning. There is a causal link between his use of illicit substances and the history of sexual abuse. It is not possible to say either on the balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the accident. Given that the precise reasons why he failed to take appropriate care immediately prior to the accident are not possible to discern, it is not possible to say whether or not the impairment of cognitive functioning described in the psychiatrist report was causally related to the accident. Having regard to the fact that he was pulled over by police in the days prior to the accident, it is possible to say, on the balance of probabilities, that his decision to ride on the path was affected by his impaired cognitive functioning. However, that alone is not of great significance in terms of the appropriate sentence.
Each of the matters in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing Act) 2005 (ACT) is relevant to the sentencing of the offender. Because of his unfortunate history of sexual abuse leading to long-term drug addiction he is less suitable as a vehicle for general deterrence, although general deterrence must play a role in the sentence. Specific deterrence is of significance having regard to his history of criminal conduct and the fact that he was not deterred from committing the present offences by being pulled over in the days immediately prior to the accident. Clearly, it is necessary to denounce the conduct and to recognise the harm that has been done to the victim and his family which is significant, long-lasting and tragic for BI and in particular for his parents who are more able to perceive the changes in their son. Rehabilitation of the offender must be considered. There are limits on the capacity for rehabilitation given his age and the long-term effects of his polysubstance abuse. Nevertheless, it is a factor which must be given some weight.
In my view, the seriousness of the crime and circumstances of the offender mean that no other penalty other than a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate.
In my view, the appropriate penalty is a custodial sentence of 20 months. Counsel for the offender submitted that any custodial sentence should be suspended or that the offender should be assessed for suitability for an intensive correction order. I do not consider that this is an appropriate case in which to order the preparation of an intensive correction assessment. Whilst the custodial sentence is within the relevant range for an intensive correction order and the offender does have ongoing drug use problems, the case is not one in which the intensive intervention associated with an intensive correction order is particularly suited having regard to the age and history of the offender, and I do not consider that an intensive correction order would adequately reflect the need for deterrence and denunciation of the offending conduct. Rather, I consider that the potential for rehabilitation as part of the sentence will be appropriately accommodated by a sentence of full-time imprisonment and a period of supervision on parole. The period on parole is more suitable than a suspended sentence as it will permit the parole decision to be made in the light of the offender’s progress in custody. The non‑parole period will be 10 months which corresponds to 50% of the head sentence. This permits a significant portion of the sentence to be served on parole subject to supervision.
So far as the transferred charges are concerned, they may be dealt with by fine and a period of disqualification where appropriate. Having regard to the custodial sentence imposed, the issue of totality requires that there be considerable leniency in relation to these offences. The offence of driving was disqualified carries with it an automatic period of disqualification of 12 months or longer if the court orders: see Road Transport (Driver Licensing)Act, s 32(5). I will make no order that affects the automatic period of disqualification.
Orders
The orders of the Court are:
1. On the charge of causing grievous bodily harm (XO2018/31375), the offender is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 20 months from 13 February 2019 until 12 October 2020.
2. The non-parole period starts on 13 February 2019 and ends on 12 December 2019.
3. On the charge of driving on a path (CC2017/6206), the offender is convicted and fined $200 and allowed one month to pay.
4. On the charge of driving while disqualified (CC2017/6207), the offender is convicted and fined $200 and allowed one month to pay.
5. On the charge of using an unregistered vehicle (CC2017/6208), the offender is convicted and fined $200 and allowed one month to pay.
6. On the charge of using an uninsured vehicle (CC2017/6209), the offender is convicted and fined $200 and allowed one month pay.
| I certify that the preceding seventy-two [72] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Mossop. Associate: Date: 2 May 2019 |
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