IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1995] QCA 190
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
C.A. No. 101 of 1995
Brisbane
| Before | Davies J.A. McPherson J.A. Moynihan S.J.A. |
[R. v. Graham]
T H E Q U E E N
v.
ANTHONY MARIAS GRAHAM
(Appellant)
Davies J.A.
McPherson J.A.Moynihan S.J.A.
Judgment delivered 19/05/95
Reasons for judgment by the Court
APPEAL DISMISSED.
| CATCHWORDS | CRIMINAL LAW - MANSLAUGHTER - Whether victim's death was an accident within the meaning of s.23 Code - Whether appellant's actions were done in self-defence - Whether appellant could escape responsibility because of a mistaken belief brought about by self-induced intoxication concerning degree of force threatened. |
Counsel: | T.F. Carmody for the appellant P. Ridgeway for the respondent |
| Solicitors: | Legal Aid Office for the appellant Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent |
Hearing Date: 10 May 1995
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT
Judgment delivered the 19th day of May 1995
The appellant was tried in the Supreme Court and found guilty of having unlawfully killed Lisa Jane Newell on 20 November 1993. The evidence at the trial was that death was caused by cardiac arrest induced by brain damage resulting from a single punch delivered by the appellant to the jaw of Ms Newell at about 9.10 on the evening of that day.
The grounds of appeal essentially are, first, that the victim's death was an event that was caused by accident within the meaning of s.23; and, secondly, that nothing that was done by the appellant which caused or contributed to the death went beyond reasonable self defence in the whole of the circumstances. It was accordingly contended that the jury's verdict of guilty of manslaughter was, in the view of the evidence, unsafe and unsatisfactory.
The first ground raises the question of foreseeability of the death as a consequence of the blow inflicted by the deceased. The medical and other evidence disclosed that the victim was an "alcoholic" or at least a person whose drinking habits predisposed her to dysfunctional blood clotting mechanisms in the brain. At the time she first arrived at the Caloundra Hospital at about 11.30 p.m. she was so intoxicated as to be scarcely able to talk and was almost unconscious. After her initial discharge, her condition deteriorated, and she was returned to that hospital at about 1.32 a.m., and was then taken to Nambour Hospital at 2.24 a.m. After further transfer to Royal Brisbane Hospital, a craniotomy was performed; but her condition continued to deteriorate and she died on 29 November 1993 of cardiac arrest attributable to subdural haemorrhage.
In law the appellant was criminally responsible for the death unless it was such an unlikely consequence of the blow that an ordinary person would not have foreseen it : R. v. van den Bemd (1994) 68 A.L.J.R. 199; affg. (1933) 70 A.Crim.R. 489.
See also R. v. Whiting (C.A. 321 of 1994). The trial judge's direction to the jury on this point was, if anything, favourable to the appellant, in that he put…
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- R v Graham [1995] QCA 190
- Case
- [1995] QCA 190
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court needed to address were complex and nuanced. Firstly, the court had to examine whether the appellant's actions were carried out in self-defence, which would have absolved him of any criminal liability. Secondly, the court needed to consider the impact of self-induced intoxication on the appellant's perception of the threat and the degree of force that was necessary for self-defence. The court had to determine if the appellant's intoxication led to a genuine belief that his actions were justified in self-defence, thereby potentially excusing his actions under the law.
The court's reasoning was meticulous, as it analysed the evidence presented and the legal principles applicable to the case. The court found that the appellant's actions were not justified as self-defence, as the force used was excessive in response to the perceived threat. Furthermore, the court held that the appellant could not escape responsibility for his actions due to a mistaken belief brought about by self-induced intoxication. The court determined that the appellant's intoxication did not negate his criminal liability, as the law does not excuse individuals from the consequences of their actions when those actions are influenced by self-induced intoxication. The court ultimately found the appellant guilty of manslaughter, taking into account the totality of the circumstances and the legal principles that were applicable.
The court's final orders were that the appellant be found guilty of manslaughter and that he be sentenced accordingly. The court emphasised that the principles of self-defence and the impact of self-induced intoxication on an individual's perception of a threat are important considerations in criminal cases, but they do not absolve individuals of their criminal responsibility when their actions are excessive or unjustified. The court's decision in this case provides valuable guidance for practitioners dealing with similar issues in criminal law.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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