R v Georgeson

Case [2017] SASCFC 93


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v GEORGESON

[2017] SASCFC 93

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

2 August 2017

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - INCONSISTENT VERDICTS

Appeal against verdict of guilty returned by jury on trial in the District Court.

The appellant was charged with two counts of trafficking in a controlled drug. The appellant’s partner, Mr Lock, operated a drug distribution network where he would source drugs from Mr Nguyen and then supply them with Mr Ellis to dealers in Whyalla. On 31 August 2014, the appellant drove to Pt Pirie and gave Mr Ellis a package which contained drugs. That drive was the subject of count one. The appellant gave evidence that she did not know what was in that package. On 1 June 2014, it was alleged that the appellant drove with Mr Lock to meet Mr Ellis and give him drugs. This drive was the subject of count two.

The evidence suggested that the appellant knew that Mr Lock and Mr Ellis had been arrested for drug offending and that Mr Lock’s apartment contained paraphernalia from which it could be inferred that he sold drugs. In the time between count one and count two, the evidence showed that the appellant had counted and held substantial amounts of money for Mr Lock, had offered to drive with him to Pt Pirie on 1 June 2014 for some reward, and after 1 June 2014 offered to do another drive for money.

The jury found the appellant not guilty of count one, but found her guilty of count two. The appellant appeals on the ground that the verdict cannot be supported by the evidence and that the verdicts are inconsistent.

Held per Kourakis CJ (Vanstone and Nicholson JJ agreeing), dismissing the appeal:

1.       By the time the appellant accompanied Mr Lock on the trip charged as count two, the evidence additional to that evidence proffered on count one supported the finding of guilt on count two (at [29]-[35]).

2.       The verdict of guilty is supported by the evidence (at [35]).

Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32, referred to.
R v Eccles-Smith [2016] SASCFC 84, applied.

R v GEORGESON
[2017] SASCFC 93

Court of Criminal Appeal:  Kourakis CJ, Vanstone and Nicholson JJ

  1. KOURAKIS CJ:         This is an appeal against a conviction.  In a trial in the District Court, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the second of two counts charging the appellant with trafficking in a controlled drug.[1]  On that count it was alleged that on 1 June 2014 the appellant, Ms Georgeson, with her then partner, Mr Lock, transported methylamphetamine by car to Port Pirie where it was supplied to another man, Mr Ellis, who in turn distributed…

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AGLC
R v Georgeson [2017] SASCFC 93
Case
[2017] SASCFC 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Ms. Georgeson, appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia against her conviction on one count of possessing methylamphetamine for supply. The appeal was based on two grounds: that the verdict on the second count was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, and that this verdict was inconsistent with her acquittal on a prior count. The Director of Public Prosecutions conceded that the ground of inconsistent verdicts was reasonably arguable, and the appeal was referred to the Court on both grounds.

The Court was required to determine whether the jury's verdict of guilty on the second count was reasonably open to them on the evidence presented, and whether this verdict was legally inconsistent with the jury's acquittal of the appellant on the first count. The appellant argued that the evidence supporting the guilty verdict on the second count was no more compelling than the evidence relating to the first count, thus rendering the verdicts inconsistent.

The Chief Justice, with whom Vanstone and Nicholson JJ agreed, dismissed the appeal. His Honour observed that a complaint of inconsistent verdicts is a specific instance of the broader ground that a verdict is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. While acknowledging the strength of the prosecution's case on both counts, the Chief Justice found that there was additional evidence that supported the guilty verdict on the second count, thereby dispelling any reasonable doubt about the jury's conclusion. The Court concluded that the verdict on the second count was neither inconsistent with the acquittal on the first count nor unsupported by the evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant appeals on the grounds that the verdict on the second count is not supported by the evidence and that the verdict of guilty on the second count is inconsistent with her acquittal on the first. The appellant was given permission to appeal on the latter ground, on the concession of the Director of Public Prosecutions that it was reasonably arguable, and the former ground was referred to this Court at the same time. I observe that a complaint that verdicts are inconsistent is a sub-species of the ground that the verdict is unreasonable or not supported by the evidence. It is best treated as a particularisation of that ground. The only substantive argument put in the appellant’s written submission is that ‘objectively the evidence against the applicant in relation to count 1 was no less compelling and capable of supporting a verdict of guilty than the evidence on count 2’ and that the verdicts are therefore inconsistent. I would dismiss the appeal because even though the prosecution case on both counts was strong, there was additional evidence supporting the guilty verdict on the second count. My reasons follow.The prosecution evidence The prosecution case was substantially the subject of agreed facts which I summarise below. It was agreed that Mr Lock and Mr Ellis operated a wholesale methylamphetamine distribution network supplying dealers in Whyalla with methylamphetamine which was sourced from one Van Bob Nguyen (Mr Nguyen) in Adelaide. It was also an agreed fact that the Whyalla dealers would pay ‘a delivery fee’ which the criminal organisation charged for the transport of the drugs from Adelaide to Whyalla. The fee was paid to the courier who transported the drugs. On 26 February 2014 Mr Ellis flew from Whyalla, where he resided, to Adelaide. He met Mr Lock at Mr Lock’s apartment on 28 February 2014 and returned to Whyalla on that day where he was arrested in possession of 94.7 grams of a substance containing methylamphetamine valued in the order of $30,000. During parts of 2014 Ms Georgeson and Mr Lock were in a romantic relationship. Ms Georgeson was the owner of a blue sedan motor vehicle and also had access to a Hyundai Excel. On 20 March police stopped the blue sedan, which at the time was being driven by Mr Lock, and found in it a substance containing methylamphetamine, two mobile phones and $490 in cash. Mr Lock was arrested but granted bail. On the next day police searched Mr Lock’s apartment and located 54.6 grams of a substance containing methylamphetamine valued at between $27,300 and $54,600. A substantial amount of cash was also found together with other items of interest such as multiple electronic devices, mag wheels and plastic resealable bags, numerous debt lists, weights for scales and 27 ‘ice’ pipes. On 22 April 2014 Mr Ellis travelled to Adelaide by car and returned to Whyalla on the same day. On that day Mr Ellis had SMS text communications with Whyalla dealers informing them that he had methylamphetamine to supply to them.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The verdict of guilty on the second count is not inconsistent with the acquittal on the first count. Nor is it unsupported by the evidence. The evidence leaves no reason to doubt the conclusion of the jury. Conclusion I would dismiss the appeal. VANSTONE J: I agree. NICHOLSON J: I would dismiss the appeal for the reasons given by the Chief Justice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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