R v George
[2021] ACTSC 361
•1 December 2021
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title:
R v George
Citation:
[2021] ACTSC 361
Hearing Date(s):
26 November 2021
Decision Date:
1 December 2021
Before:
Refshauge AJ
Decision:
1. George George be convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment to commence on 25 September 2020 and end on 24 March 2022.
2. George George be convicted of burglary and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment, to commence on 25 December 2021 and end on 24 October 2022.
3. George George be convicted of damaging property and sentenced to six months imprisonment, to commence on 25 June 2022 and end on 24 December 2022.
4. George George be convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and sentenced to four months imprisonment, to commence on 25 October 2022 and end on 24 February 2023.
5. George George be convicted of possession of a thing with intent to cause damage and sentenced to six months imprisonment to commence on 25 October 2022 and end on 24 March 2023.
6. George George be convicted of possession of a weapon with intent and sentenced to two months imprisonment to commence on 25 March 2023 and end on 24 May 2023.
7. George George be convicted of possession of stolen property and sentenced to three months imprisonment to commence on 24 February 2023 and end on 24 May 2023.
8. George George be convicted of assault of a frontline worker and are required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender's Good Behaviour Obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for six months, to commence today and end on 31 May 2022.
9. George George be convicted of trespass and without passing sentence be released on recognisance of $500 security without surety to be of good behaviour under s 20 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for four months to commence today and end on 31 March 2022.
10. The sentence is suspended today for two years. George George be required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender's Good Behaviour Obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 for two years from today, from 1 December 2021 until 30 November 2023, with the following conditions:
a) A probation condition that he accept the supervision of the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services, or his delegate, and obey all reasonable directions of the person delegated to supervise him for two years from 1 December 2021, or for such lesser period as the person supervising him deems appropriate, and to obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him, including as to urinalysis;
b) That he reside at 67 Werriwa Crescent, Isabella Plains, ACT, or as directed by the person supervising him;
c) That within 48 hours, namely no later than Friday this week, 3 December, he contact Canberra Recovery Hub of the Salvation Army and arrange to be assessed for admission to its Alcohol and Other Drug Program, and if assessed as suitable, enter into that program and complete it;
d) That he admit himself to the Justice Services Counselling Program at Karralika within seven days, that is, on or before 7 December 2021, and complete that program;
e) That he discuss with the person supervising his programs to address his mental health issues, and obey all reasonable directions that that person may give him as to admission to and completion of any programs or any counselling;
f) That he give consent to Canberra Recovery Hub and Karralika Programs to provide any information about his admission to, attendance at and progress in the programs conducted by them for the person supervising him, as that person may reasonably require;
g) That he report to the Court on progress of his rehabilitation on 18 February 2022 at 2:30 pm and at any other time as the Court may direct from time to time.
11. The Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services be requested to provide a report to the Court by 18 February 2022 on the progress George George has made under the Good Behaviour Order.
Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – Subjective Considerations on Sentence – Drug Addiction – Childhood Disadvantage – Mental Illness – Suspended Sentence – Good Behaviour Order
Legislation Cited:
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 24, 26A
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 311, 312, 324, 403, 408
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 7, 10, 12A, 33, 46J, 63
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) s 85
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 90A, 90BPublic Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth) s 11
Cases Cited:
Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; 253 CLR 58
Bell (1981) 5 A Crim R 347
Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571
Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433
Duncan v The Queen (1983) 47 ALR 746Elias v The Queen; Issa v The Queen [2013] HCA 31; 248 CLR 483
Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506
Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357R v Ardler [2004] ACTCA 4; 144 A Crim R 552
R v Bloomfield (1998) 44 NSWLR 734
R v Carmody [2016] ACTSC 382
R v Ciccone (1974) 7 SASR 110
R v Cuthbert [1967] 2 NSWR 329
R v Dowling (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 200
R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9
R v F [1998] TASSC 74
R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83
R v Horne [2017] ACTSC 36
R v John [2017] ACTSC 144
R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256
R v Mathews [2020] ACTSC 364
R v McHughes (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 344
R v Molina (1984) 2 FCR 508
R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152
R v Slattery [2020] ACTSC 154
R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103
R v Valentini (1989) 46 A Crim R 23
R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269
Ross v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 161Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584
Parties:
The Queen ( Crown)
George George ( Offender)
Representation:
Counsel
E Wren ( Crown)
A Zhang ( Offender)
Solicitors
ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ( Crown)
Legal Aid ACT ( Offender)
File Number(s):
SCC 115 of 2021
SCC 116 of 2021
REFSHAUGE AJ:
Introduction
1. On 4 April and 12 September 2020, George George committed a series of three offences, then six offences, to each of which he has pleaded guilty. He is now to be sentenced. It is clear, as is explained below, that Mr George has a severe dependency on illicit drugs and faces serious mental health challenges. While, as is also explored below, the offences are serious, though not the most serious, the sentencing task is a complicated one because of the interplay of the various factors.
2. In R v Cuthbert [1967] 2 NSWR 329 at 330, Herron CJ pointed out:
The function of the criminal law and the purposes of punishment cannot be found in any single explanation, for it depends both upon the nature and type of offence and the offender. But all purposes may be reduced under the single heading of the protection of society, the protection of the community from crime. The sentence should be such as, having regard to all the proved circumstances, seems at the same time to accord with the general moral sense of the community and to be likely to be a sufficient deterrent both to the prisoner and others. Courts have not infrequently attempted further analysis of the several aspects of punishment, where retribution, deterrence and reformation are said to be its threefold purposes. In reality they are but the means employed by the courts for the attainment of the single purpose of the protection of society. (citations omitted)
3. This has more recent resonance in the approach that the High Court has mandated, which was expressed in Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; 253 CLR 58 at 72; [34] in the following way:
A sentencing judge must reach a single sentence for each offence and must do so by balancing many different and conflicting features. The sentence cannot, and should not, be broken down into some set of component parts. (citation omitted)
4. Reference was made to the High Court's earlier decision in Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584 at 611. In that case, the plurality said:
The task of the sentencer is to take account of all of the relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all. That is what is meant by saying that the task is to arrive at an “instinctive synthesis”. This expression is used, not as might be supposed, to cloak the task of the sentencer in some mystery, but to make plain that the sentencer is called on to reach a single sentence which, in the case of an offence like the one now under discussion, balances many different and conflicting features.
[…]
So long as a sentencing judge must, or may, take into account of all of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, to single out some of those considerations and attribute specific numerical or proportionate value to some features, distorts the already difficult balancing exercise which the judge must perform. (citations omitted)
5. The difficulty of that task is reinforced by the comment of the majority in Elias v The Queen; Issa v The Queen [2013] HCA 31; 248 CLR 483 at 494; [27] that “[a]s this Court has explained on more than one occasion, the factors bearing on the determination of sentence will frequently pull in different directions.”
6. See the earlier comments to the same effect of Brennan J in Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 436–7.
7. It is now clearly recognised that the rehabilitation of the offender is a significant part of the protection of the society and a means of achieving it: Channon v The Queen at 437–8. In R v Ciccone (1974) 7 SASR 110 at 113, the Court explained:
The criminal law is intended for the protection of the public against criminals, for the punishment of those who commit offences, and the deterrence of others who might be minded to offend in like manner. One of the matters which a judge always considers is whether an accused person will respond to leniency and to supervision. If he does so respond, there is one less member of the criminal class, the public are to that extent protected, and the accused and others are encouraged to lead honest lives. However, as has been many times pointed out there are four general aspects of punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention and reformation; and it is for the sentencing judge addressing himself to the accused, and having considered the matters put in mitigation and other matters including the prevalence of the offence, the accused's past conduct, his age, and the likelihood of his responding to reformative process, to decide in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion what ought to be done in the case of that particular accused. It is to be hoped that the deterrent effect of a term of imprisonment will itself be a step towards the reformation and rehabilitation of the prisoner. Imprisonment is not necessarily to be regarded as the antithesis of rehabilitation.
8. Thus, in the Federal Court of Australia, on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, it was said in R v Molina (1984) 2 FCR 508 at 510, which took the matter further, that:
It must be remembered that the ultimate purpose of all punishment is the protection of society. It will often be in the best interests of society if emphasis is put on rehabilitation, particularly in cases where the offender can genuinely be said to be at the crossroads between a useless, drug-ridden and probably criminal existence and a relatively normal life in society, supported by a caring family.
9. Echoing that same approach, French CJ pointed out in Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at 537; [32] “[r]ehabilitation, if it can be achieved, is likely to be the most durable guarantor of community protection and is clearly in the public interest.”
10. In R v Bell (1981) 5 A Crim R 347 at 351, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Queensland held that a lack of precedent for the imposition of a non-custodial sentence should not mean that the sentencing judge's discretion to impose such a sentence, if it was appropriate in the circumstances, be fettered.
11. As the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal explained in Duncan v The Queen (1983) 47 ALR 746 at 749, cited with approval more recently by the Supreme Court of Tasmania in R v F (1998) 8 Tas R 88 at 96:
In Bell's case the court decided that the learned sentencing judge unduly fettered his sentencing discretion by believing that only custodial punishment could be imposed. The case is authority for the proposition that where, prior to sentence, there has been a lengthy process of rehabilitation and the evidence does not indicate a need to protect society from the applicant, the punitive and deterrent aspects of the sentencing process should not be allowed to prevail so as to possibly destroy the results of that rehabilitation.
12. In this context, Mr George must now be sentenced. The Court must now turn to the particular circumstances of the offences and of the offender, which will provide the matters from which the relevant factors must be balanced to produce a single just and adequate sentence individualised to meet the situation in this case.
13. On sentencing, the Crown, ably represented by Ms E Wren, tendered, without objection, its Sentencing Tender Bundle. It included the relevant documents for committal and transfer of the offences under ss 90A and 90B of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), a Statement of Facts and Mr George's Criminal History. It included CCTV footage of the incident on 4 April 2020 and some photographs of the weapons and the damages both to the property and the victim in the incident of 12 September 2020.
14. As Mr George had initially sought that a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (Treatment Order) be made under s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), it included Drug and Alcohol Sentencing Assessments (Suitability Assessments) under s 46J of the Sentencing Act, prepared by ACT Corrective Services dated 26 August 2021 and by Canberra Health Services dated 24 August 2021 and 7 October 2021. None of the contents of these documents was challenged. The CCTV was played in part to the Court.
15. In very helpfully assisting the Court, Ms A Zhang, counsel for Mr George, also tendered a bundle of documents. These included four psychological reports, a letter from ACT Corrective Services Justice Housing Program dated 3 September 2021, a letter from Karralika Programs dated 18 October 2021 and a letter from Canberra Recovery Hub dated 25 October 2021. No objection was raised to the tender of these documents and no challenge was made to the contents of them.
16. Subsequently, two emails were tendered, also without objection, showing that the lessee of premises in Isabella Plains had offered Mr George accommodation. No challenge was made to the contents of them. I have read all this material. Accordingly, the following findings are made from this material, much assisted by the valuable submissions, both written and oral, of both counsel.
The facts
17. At about 12:35 pm on 4 April 2020, Mr George went to a residence in Kambah and banged on the front door. He had a tennis racket with him. When the occupant answered the door, he saw that Mr George had raised the racket in a threatening manner which alarmed the occupant, who did not know Mr George.
18. Mr George demanded to see his sister, apparently believing that she was in the residence. The occupant explained that he did not know Mr George's sister and she was not there. It was apparent from the CCTV footage that Mr George became increasingly agitated during this conversation.
19. Then Mr George struck the pane of glass beside the front door with the tennis racket, causing the racket to break. These facts form the basis of the charge of possession of a thing with intention to cause damage to property.
20. Mr George then kicked the pane of glass, causing it to break. He forced the right side of his body to fall into the residence, causing injuries to his right calf and wrist. These facts were the basis for the offence of intentionally damaging property.
21. Mr George bound up his wounds and the occupant of the premises called the police. After some time going through his possessions in front of the property, Mr George then took a chrome-coloured pole, spiked at the end, and used it to smash the remainder of the glass. This was also relied on as the facts for the offence of possession of a thing with intention to cause damage to property. Mr George left the property and police arrived a little later.
22. Mr George was later located in Kambah by police who searched his backpack. They located the chrome-coloured pole, a black wallet with his identification, but also a driver licence in another name, a white mobile phone and a watch. The latter three items were later determined to have been stolen and caused the preferring of the charge of unlawful possession of stolen property.
23. He was later summoned for these offences.
24. At about 1:30 pm on 12 September 2020, Mr George was in a carpark in Wanniassa, throwing golf balls at fixed objects, making a lot of noise, when one of the balls landed in the courtyard of a nearby unit.
25. Mr George went to the staircase leading to the unit and produced a metal knife-like object, similar to a pick. The occupant of the unit approached him and, when they were about a metre apart, Mr George asked whether his sister was in the unit, and then, swearing, threatened the occupant while brandishing the object towards the occupant, who felt threatened and feared for his safety. These facts founded the charge of possessing an offensive weapon with intent.
26. Mr George then walked away to another unit, ripping the flyscreen door off that unit, which woke the occupant who went to her balcony and noticed Mr George below. Mr George appears to have walked back downstairs, but returned to the front door of the unit where the occupant was standing, having noticed the damage to the flyscreen door of the unit.
27. Mr George then confronted the occupant, saying to him “you better not have my sister inside or I'll fucking stab you” and forced open the flyscreen door, causing it to strike the occupant above his right eye and causing him considerable pain. These facts formed the basis of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
28. Mr George then entered the unit, repeatedly threatening the occupant that, if he had his sister, he would stab him. He walked around the unit, continuing to threaten the occupant despite being told a number of times to leave. Finally, Mr George did leave. These facts are the basis of the charge of aggravated burglary, the circumstance of aggravation being that he had a weapon with him.
29. Mr George then walked downstairs to a nearby garage and struck it, causing significant damage to it, and causing scratches to a motor vehicle inside. He then entered the garage and started opening the cupboard doors. These were the facts providing the basis for the charge of burglary with intent to cause damage.
30. Later that day, another occupant of the unit saw Mr George striking the door of a storage compartment with a hammer, calling out “door, door, door” or similar. When he saw the occupant watching him, Mr George took a golf club and walked towards the occupant saying something and threatening him with the golf club. The possession of these items made the occupant concerned for his safety. It was these facts that led to the charge of possession of an offensive weapon.
31. Police arrived shortly after and approached the unit where they had been told Mr George was. They saw him in the unit and asked him to open the door, which he did. He refused their request, however, to come out of the unit. Police blocked him from closing the door and Mr George pushed one of the police officers in the chest, stopping him from arresting Mr George for a few minutes. From these facts, the police laid the charge of assaulting a frontline community service provider.
32. Mr George was, however, arrested and during the arrest stated that he had been using drugs. Later conversation by police with the occupant of the unit ascertained that Mr George had no permission to be in the unit and he was charged with trespass.
The proceedings
33. As noted above at [23], Mr George was summonsed to appear in the Magistrates Court for the offences of damaging property, possessing a thing with intention to cause damage and unlawful possession of stolen property alleged to have been committed on 4 April 2020.
34. He was summonsed to appear on 11 August 2020. He appeared then and the proceedings were adjourned. After several further adjournments, Mr George appeared in the Magistrates Court and entered pleas of not guilty by virtue of mental impairment to each of the charges that had been laid. The proceedings were again adjourned.
35. On 2 December 2020, the charge of possessing a thing (the tennis racket and chrome pole) with an intention of causing damage was preferred and he entered a plea of not guilty by virtue of mental impairment to that charge also.
36. By this time, he had, as also noted above (at [32]), been arrested for the offences committed on 12 September 2020. He appeared in the Magistrates Court on 14 September 2020 and bail was refused. In the Crown's Sentencing Tender Bundle, it shows that he was in custody as a sentenced prisoner from 11 to 25 September 2020, though the first date is, of course, prior to the date 12 September 2020, when he is alleged to have committed the first offences.
37. An explanation subsequently and very helpfully provided was that there was another offence of damaging property for which Mr George was sentenced on 3 September 2021.
38. The offence was not shown on the Criminal History provided in the Crown Sentencing Tender Bundle, which history was dated 14 September 2020, thus predating the imposition of that sentence. No other details of the offence have been provided to the Court and they are probably not needed as there is no allegation, for example, that Mr George was on bail when he committed any of the offences which he is to be sentenced, so it is not necessary to do so. The Court is grateful to the Crown counsel for clarifying the matter.
39. When the sentence was imposed in the Magistrates Court, it was backdated to commence on 11 September 2020 for 14 days. No point was taken about this, and the Court will, accordingly, presume that the pre-sentence custody for Mr George for these sentences commenced on 25 September 2020. Until today, that is a total of 433 days.
40. The proceedings for all the offences then progressed together and, on 12 May 2021, Mr George pleaded guilty to each of them and was committed to this Court for sentence with the summary charges being transferred.
41. On 23 July 2021, he was found eligible to be subject to a Suitability Assessment and the Assessments were ordered. He remained in custody.
42. Sentencing was set for 26 November 2021. The Suitability Assessments, however, found him unsuitable for a Treatment Order, principally on the ground that he had no stable accommodation. That has since been resolved in that, after the Court adjourned for sentence, a series of emails were received and admitted into evidence at the hearing of the sentence, providing a location in ACT Housing. There is no independent corroboration that the lessee consents to Mr George's occupation or for how long she is prepared to have Mr George reside there.
The offences
43. As noted above (at [12]), it is important for the purposes of sentencing to consider the circumstances of the offences, which must be taken into account in order to construct a just and adequate sentence.
44. There are two parts to this. As noted in many decisions of the High Court, the maximum penalty is a critical part. As said in Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at 372; [31]:
It follows that careful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick. That having been said, in our opinion, it will rarely be, and was not appropriate for Hulme J here to look first to a maximum penalty, and to proceed by making a proportional deduction from it. That was to use a prescribed maximum erroneously, as neither a yardstick, nor as a basis for comparison of this case with the worst possible case. (citations omitted)
45. The second part comes from a consideration of particular circumstances of each offence that might make it more or less serious, so as to determine where the offending, in conjunction with Mr George’s personal circumstances lies on a “spectrum” of offending: R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 at 266; [19]. There, the High Court referred to that “spectrum” as extending from the least serious instances of the offence to the worst category “properly so-called”.
46. The way in which this is preferably described was set out by the Court of Appeal in R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 at 108; [24] where it observed
that references to low-range, mid-range and high-range objective seriousness are unlikely to be helpful in this jurisdiction. It is preferable for a sentencing judge to confine themselves to identifying the particular features of the case that inform the objective seriousness of that case.
47. The particular features referred to by their Honours are those matters that sentencing judges and Courts of Appeal have identified as aggravating or mitigating the seriousness of the offence.
48. Aggravated burglary is an offence contrary to s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) and attracts a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment or a fine of $320,000 or both.
49. Burglary is prohibited by s 311 of the Criminal Code which provides for a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment or a fine of $224,000 or both.
50. By these maximum penalties, the offences must be regarded as serious. They are both, of course, burglaries, though the aggravated burglary is more serious by virtue of the fact that, at the time of the trespass, Mr George had a weapon with him. This is obviously an aggravating factor. Other than that, however, the relevant factors of aggravation or mitigation are generally the same. These factors were recently considered following a review of various decisions in R v McHughes (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 344 at [28]. It is not necessary to set out there what was found, but reference will be made to the matters of relevance.
51. Both properties were, or were related to, residential premises. In the case of the aggravated burglary, it was a unit and the occupant was present. These are aggravating features. In the case of the burglary, the premises were a garage associated with a unit, but not a home and so not quite so serious. While a car was in the garage, no occupant was there. This is serious, but not so serious.
52. Mr George damaged both properties to gain entry and this, too, is aggravating. Unfortunately, no evidence of the cost occasioned by such damage was in evidence. In addition, Mr George did damage the motor vehicle parked in the garage but, it appears, when he damaged the garage door to gain entry. He is, however, said to have “pushed a table up against [the occupant's] vehicle”, but there was no allegation of specific damage.
53. There was also an aggravating matter, a confrontation with the occupant of the premises, the subject of the aggravated burglary, both on the way in, though subject of a separate charge, which will require a degree of concurrency in sentence, and also while inside.
54. While there was some preparation in that Mr George had a knife and the tennis racket with him, this was very limited and there was no evidence of premeditation. Further, the motivation for the offences is unclear. Mr George seems to have been under some illusion about his sister, a concern that is reasonable, except without, in this case, any basis for believing that she was there.
55. Unfortunately, no Victim Impact Statement was provided to the Court, so it is not possible to determine what, if any, trauma was experienced by any of the victims, save that the occupant of the premises subject to the aggravated robbery did suffer an assault, though, as noted, that was separately charged. Mr George's behaviour did make the occupant fearful, but not so much that he was unable to ask Mr George to leave the premises. The damage to the door would also have been of concern.
56. While the owner of the garage was not present, the intrusion would have been of concern, as would the damage, including to the parked vehicle.
57. Damaging property is made an offence by s 403 of the Criminal Code, which prescribes a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment or a fine of $160,000 or both. It is, thus, a serious crime, but not as serious as the burglary offences.
58. The way in which such an offence can be committed is, however, of a very wide variety. As made clear in R v Carmody [2016] ACTSC 382 at [69], the circumstances under which the damage was inflicted and the amount of damage caused are critical elements. In this case, there is a degree of wantonness in the damage to the window beside the front door of the premises, caused when the occupant, quite reasonably, said that he did not know Mr George's sister who was not there. There was, unfortunately, no evidence of the cost of the damage caused, but the Court can accept that the replacement of the window is not a minimal cost and, as is evident from the photographs in the Crown Sentencing Tender Bundle, the damage to the garage was quite considerable.
59. Assault occasioning actual bodily harm is an offence against s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) for which the Act prescribes a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. In assessing such an offence, clearly the nature of any injuries is very important: R v Bloomfield (1998) 44 NSWLR 734 at 739–40. Here, the injuries were not very clearly identified. Ms Zhang submitted that it was “a small cut” which appeared in two of the photographs in the Crown's Sentencing Tender Bundle and appears to be a reasonably accurate description, though it did cause the victim “immediate pain”. The circumstances of the infliction of the injury are also important: Ross v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 161 at [20]. In this case, the Court accepts that the injury was caused recklessly and not intentionally, and so is not quite as serious.
60. Possession of a thing with intent to cause damage is criminalised by s 408 of the Criminal Code for which the maximum penalty of three years imprisonment or a fine of $48,000 or both is legislated.
61. No authorities have been cited by the parties or identified by the Court that have considered this offence. It is an offence that would be aggravated by the nature and number of the weapons. In this case, the weapons were not all possessed at the same time. The use of weapons, unless separately charged, would also be relevant. Here, Mr George used the tennis racket to smash the window, which damage was separately charged, requiring a degree of concurrency. The pole was also used to smash the remainder of the glass.
62. This charge was also a “rolled-up” charge. That is, possession of each weapon would have justified a charge in itself, but, in the circumstances, the two occasions were encompassed in the one charge. Such charges were discussed by the Court in R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83 at [164].
63. In brief, the charge is one charge and the maximum is that for the one offence. The criminality is nevertheless greater than were there to have been only one weapon, but would not necessarily justify the sum of the sentences that would have been imposed for each of the offences if not aggravated. The facts of such a charge may have a bearing on accumulation and concurrency. See R v John [2017] ACTSC 144 at [107].
64. In this case, some greater severity would be justified, given the two weapons and their use.
65. Assaulting a frontline community service provider is an offence contrary to s 26A of the Crimes Act and attracts a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. It is a relatively new offence introduced on 10 June 2020, with others directed towards violent offences against police and other frontline workers. Some of the offences were discussed in R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152 at [27]–[30], though that case involved a more serious offence.
66. The offence encompasses not only police officers, but members of fire and rescue services and ambulance officers. The offender must know or be reckless as to whether the person was such a worker, as was the case here, and clearly the police officer was engaged in exercising one of his functions, though the offender need not know this element: s 26A(4)(a) of the Crimes Act.
67. Again, no authorities were cited by the parties or identified by the Court, but it seems that the factors relevant to assault offences would apply, especially the harm done and the circumstances. As to the former, it was a single push with no consequences of harm to the police officer and no real interference with his functions as such, given that Mr George was apparently arrested shortly after, though it did temporarily stop the police officer from arresting him at this stage. There were no relevant special circumstances. It was not a very serious version of the offence.
68. Unlawful possession of stolen property is made an offence by s 324 of the Criminal Code which provides for a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment or a fine of $8,000 or both. As was pointed out in R v Dowling (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 200 at [50], that is not a trivial offence, being akin to receiving, which, of course, encourages offences of theft, but it is not as serious as theft.
69. There was no indication in the evidence of the value of the property. The loss of a phone and driver licence, however, can cause a significant inconvenience to the owner, though there was no direct evidence of this.
70. Finally, s 11 of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth) makes trespass an offence and specifies a maximum penalty of a fine of $2,220. It is, thus, comparatively, the least serious of the offences.
Subjective circumstances
71. Mr George has given some different versions of his family history, especially over time, and especially in the earliest psychological report, prepared when he was 13 years old.
72. Mr George was born 30 years ago in Sydney, the third of his parents' six children. He is of Polynesian extraction and of Scottish, Italian and Cook Island heritage.
73. From an early age, he was raised in Sydney by his maternal grandmother who appears to have lived a transient lifestyle and, it appears, suffered from schizophrenia. He was considered neglected by the welfare system at some stage. He lived there for some time before being returned to his mother in New Zealand, with whom he had had limited contact.
74. He experienced violence and sexual abuse as a child, reporting feelings of rejection. His mother's partner was an alcoholic and the family suffered from domestic violence. He was assessed as needing care and protection, however, and was later taken into foster care where he was placed in a number of homes, often running away. He reports to have lived in 20 different boys’ homes.
75. He exhibited behavioural issues and learning difficulties and is reported to have sustained some head injuries with some evidence of impaired frontal lobe functioning. At age 13, he attempted significant self-harm. He was “in and out of Youth Justice” and had a disrupted schooling. His current reading ability and numeracy skills are, as a result, assessed as being in a very low range, at the level of a Year 4 student. He left school at Year 10.
76. He had difficulties with the New Zealand Family Court, that Court having kept his passport until he was 20 years old, so that the lack of identification had led to his ineligibility to apply for benefits, resulting in him resorting to crime to contribute to the family.
77. A number of difficult and damaging experiences are reported in the various reports available of his personal history.
78. Though the evidence was conflicting and not very clear, it appears that he relocated to Australia at between 20 and 25 years of age.
79. He had a number of relationships and appears to have fathered three children to three different partners. He does not have access to his youngest son, though he has some “off and on” communication with his most recent partner.
80. Mr George commenced work at about age 13 when he “helped out” a caregiver from the boys’ home. The caregiver was a plumber and Mr George worked with him for about a year. He then worked with a butcher until he ran away from the home that he was in at the time and engaged in labouring and then fruit picking.
81. At about 20 years of age, he gained employment in a recycling centre for about two years when he lost the job through a difficulty not of his own making. He then worked in a milk bar and completed an “army course” before moving to Australia.
82. He initially returned to work as a butcher, then gaining work with a company which made trusses and frames for a while before being incarcerated in New South Wales.
83. He had some physical injuries over time, but describes his physical health as not presenting any current concern. He has had cataract surgery.
84. The most recent psychological report states that testing indicates that he meets the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, complex, as a result of his experiences of violence and the destruction of his attachment systems.
85. Mr George has also a history of substance abuse. He first drank alcohol at age 13, drinking regularly by age 14. He has recently moderated his alcohol consumption. He began smoking tobacco at an early age, too, and continues to smoke up to about 10 cigarettes a day.
86. He was introduced to cannabis at the early age of 12 years old and has been smoking regularly since then, often daily smoking between a quarter and a half of an ounce, but more recently reducing to about 3 grams.
87. His main drug of choice is methylamphetamine, which he began using when he was aged 15 or 16. He stopped after a cousin's partner's death from its use, but recommenced when he was 25 years old. His partner at the time was a user and reactivated his dependency. Has smoked about “eight balls” (seven grams) each time and continued using after he and his partner separated. He had used methylamphetamine immediately prior to committing each of the series of current offences.
88. He has used a range of other drugs, MDMA/Ecstasy, cocaine, psilocybin, heroin, GHB and steroids, but only once or twice in each case.
89. Mr George has not engaged in any treatment for drug use. He did complete a Violent Offender's Treatment Program in 2019 while in prison in New South Wales and substance misuse was addressed in the program. Despite being in custody at the Alexander Maconochie Centre for over a year, he did not participate in the Solaris Therapeutic Program. His reason was that he thought it would be similar to the Violent Offender Treatment Program and he “cannot see the point”.
90. Mr George has a long and depressing criminal record. [Redacted for legal reasons].
91. His offending as an adult includes 14 offences in New Zealand, though the majority are failures to comply with court orders — failing to answer bail and breaching conditions of intensive supervision or of community work requirements. Three of the offences were burglary offences.
92. In New South Wales he has 12 offences on his record. Most significantly, he was sentenced to prison from 24 July 2015 to 23 July 2019 with a parole period from 24 January 2016 to 23 January 2018. The offences included six firearms offences and drug possession. Since then, he has been fined on three occasions for drug possession and custody of a knife.
93. He has, as noted above, one offence in the ACT on his record.
94. Though it is a worrying record, it has, until these offences, abated quite significantly. He has not been incarcerated since January 2018 until he was arrested and refused bail on 12 September 2020. They are, however, worrying offences of violence to property, though clearly he was affected by drugs in their commission which had an unspecified relationship with his mental health difficulties which seem, given the circumstances of the offending, to have been relevant.
95. Mr George has been homeless and this was a reason, as was indicated above (at [42]), for the Suitability Assessments’ finding that he was unsuitable for a Treatment Order.
96. He did apply for the Justice Housing Program and was found suitable and has been placed on the waiting list. He has not been advised of availability and remains on the waiting list.
97. Clearly, homelessness would be a significant impediment to his rehabilitation and it does appear that there is a considerable value to the community in an investment in such housing to allow the effective rehabilitation of those convicted of offences who are ready to be rehabilitated, but whose reform is at greater risk if they remain homeless. The protection of the community is thereby put at risk and the ongoing cost of incarceration increases.
98. Mr George has already also been offered an assessment for an Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation Program at Canberra Recovery Hub, a day program conducted by the Salvation Army and has been described as likely to be accepted into the program. He has also been accepted into the Justice Services Counselling Program at Karralika Programs on his release from custody.
Childhood disadvantage
99. There is no doubt that Mr George has suffered childhood disadvantage and this was accepted by both counsel. The disruption to his living arrangements would have brought not merely attachment issues, but also failed to give him grounding and certainty that could have led to the foundations of a healthy adulthood. His uncompleted and inadequate education have inevitably profoundly increased that problem.
100. This disadvantage will have affected his development and, as the courts have accepted, reduces his moral culpability: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571. This disadvantage can also explain the criminal behaviour with his lack of developed sense of standards and behavioural norms, as well as the important sense of self-worth, which he was unable to develop because, in part, of the lack of balance and safety in his childhood. It is important to give full weight to his background in the sentence to be imposed.
Mental health
101. Mr George has been diagnosed as suffering from Post‑Traumatic Stress Disorder, complex, as noted above (at [84]).
102. In her psychological report, Ms Leesa Morris, in the latest report available to the Court, explains:
Mr George has reported that his motivation for his series of offending related to perceived threats to his loved ones, activating an abandonment vulnerability. While in this state, Mr George would have experienced reduced ability to make rational behaviour choices or to control his irrational behaviours or thoughts. This is separate to the reduction of inhibition due to Mr George's intoxicated state at the time.
103. This was clearly evident in the footage from the CCTV recording played to the Court of the first incident. It was also evident in the completely unexplained way he sought out his sister in circumstances where there appeared no rational basis for doing so in the places he did.
104. Similarly, the earlier report of Dr Bornstein, prepared in relation to the firearms offences in New South Wales, refers to Mr George as “sensitised to rejection, loss and abandonment”.
105. This requires consideration of the principles for addressing the complex area of sentencing offenders with mental health challenges. That has been helpfully set out in R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 at 276; [32] where the Court identified the various ways that the mental health of an offender should be taken into account.
106. This includes the reduction of moral culpability. The Crown properly pointed out that Mr George was also clearly affected by drugs at the time. This, of course, is not mitigatory, though it may be explanatory (R v Valentini (1989) 46 A Crim R 23 at 25) and moderates to some extent the allowance to be made for his moral culpability, arising from his mental health situation.
107. Mental health will also have a bearing on whether general deterrence should be moderated because an affected offender is not a suitable vehicle for it. In this case, this is relevant, but must not be allowed to outweigh the serious nature of the offences.
108. It may also moderate the relevance of specific deterrence, which has a reduced capacity to be effective where the underlying health issues are not addressed.
109. Ms Zhang, in her perceptive and comprehensive submissions, pointed out that even despite the drug use, Mr George's “complex PTSD activated an abandonment vulnerability which impacted his ability to rationally and appropriately make decisions”. The Court accepts that this was so and affects the effect of general and specific deterrence on the sentence that is to be imposed and reduces Mr George's moral culpability, though not completely, given the influence of the offending drugs.
Current sentencing practice
110. As well as providing the relevant features to assess the objective seriousness of an offence, current sentencing practice, required by s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act to be considered by a court sentencing an offender, involves an identification of the current sentences imposed, not as a limit or prescribed boundaries, but as a range to allow for consistency and fairness.
111. This is best done by reference to comparable cases so that the principles of reasoning can be understood. There are, of course, rarely precisely or truly comparable cases for a whole range of reasons.
112. Though with limitations (see R v Mathews [2020] ACTSC 364 at [45]; R v Horne [2017] ACTSC 36 at [49]–[53]), sentencing statistics from the ACT Sentencing Database can be of value. Sometimes, but regrettably quite infrequently now, the sentencing details can give a link to the sentencing remarks which assist to understand how the sentence is imposed, given that the Database has a limited number of factors identified.
113. In the case of burglary, the Database shows, as set out in R v Slattery [2021] ACTSC 154 at [70], that 72% of sentences for the offence are of full-time custody, of which 21% were of seven to 12 months duration and 35% of 13 to 18 months duration.
114. In R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9 at [154], it was noted that “the offence of aggravated burglary usually results in a sentence of between 18 months and three years and six months imprisonment”.
115. None of these figures are, of course, outer limits.
Consideration
116. The task of the sentencing court is to impose a sentence that is just and adequate. To achieve this, it is necessary to have regard to the purposes for which a sentence is to be imposed. In this jurisdiction, those purposes are helpfully set out in s 7 of the Sentencing Act and the Court must have regard to them.
117. The offences committed by Mr George are serious, especially the burglaries, not least because of the maximum penalties. They are significant breaches of the norms required to be observed for a peaceable society that permits all of its residents to develop their potential and live harmonious lives.
118. In order to reinforce these norms, punishment is inevitable and to make it clear to others that such behaviour is unacceptable, there is a need for some element of general deterrence in the sentence. These factors, however, must be moderated by the reduced moral culpability of Mr George, for the reasons already articulated above (at [107]).
119. These matters do, to some extent, protect the community, but that protection is also to be gained by the rehabilitation of Mr George, if it can be achieved. That he now has a residence means that there is some scope for this being effective. He has made the enquiries necessary to identify rehabilitation and he initially sought a Treatment Order, which indicates some commitment to rehabilitation, though, of course, he has not engaged in any significant rehabilitation at this stage other than the Violent Offenders Treatment Program.
120. Given the unaddressed mental health issues, specific deterrence is unlikely to be required as a major factor in sentence. There still needs to be consequences for his actions to reinforce the need for civilised and pro‑social behaviour by him.
121. At the same time, the harm done to the victims must be acknowledged. This does not always require a severe penalty, as reform is often how victims may see the appropriate recognition of their experiences. See, for example, R v McHughes (No 3) at [70]. That there was no Victim Impact Statement is regrettable, but does leave the Court only with assessing the harm in a general and limited way.
122. Mr George initially pleaded not guilty through mental impairment. While this did put the Crown to proof to a degree, it did, by the plea, not challenge the facts that constituted the offence, though these must still be made out: R v Ardler [2004] ACTCA 4; 144 A Crim R 552 at 567; [90]. It does, however, reduce to a degree the preparation required of the Crown for trial, though not avoided without a full plea of guilty.
123. Nevertheless, before these charges were committed for trial or a trial date was set, though the prosecution brief of evidence had been prepared, Mr George did enter pleas of guilty. They had significant utilitarian value and do justify a sentencing discount.
124. Mr George has committed burglary offences before, but they were of a different character as they were clearly offences of dishonesty, whereas there was apparently no dishonesty involved in the aggravated burglary in this case. That is not quite so clear in the case of the burglary where he looked through the cupboards in the garage. This is unlikely to be where he would find his sister and is consistent with an intent to steal.
125. The matter of his accommodation is concerning, but it appears that, as noted above, he remains on the Justice Housing Program list to which he might transition were the present arrangements unsatisfactory.
126. It is a risk and it is to be hoped that Mr George appreciates that the consequences in failing to make this accommodation work is that he will likely be returned to a lengthy period of custody.
127. As well as these matters, the Court will take into account the nature and circumstances of the offences as they have already been described and also the personal circumstances of Mr George as they have been set out by the Court and as set out in the evidence before the Court, especially as to his mental health and drug use. The Court takes into account the harm done to the victims as it can be assessed, though in a limited way, and the effect of the offences on them. These offences, of course, affect the community as well.
128. Mr George is, of course, solely responsible for the offences and he accepts that in describing that they arose “through the choices [he] made”. He has pleaded guilty and the Court is asked to take that into account as part of his remorse for the offences. That appears to be justified by the insight he expressed in reporting to Ms Morris, the author of the most recent psychological report, that he would like to say sorry to the victims of his crimes.
129. Taking all these matters into account, however, it is clear that no other sentence than a sentence of imprisonment is just and appropriate for these offences: s 10 of the Sentencing Act. There is, however, a real question as to how it should be served.
130. In this case, Mr George has committed multiple offences. The Court must impose a separate sentence on each and the length of each sentence has been carefully considered to ensure it is just and adequate, and to ensure that Mr George is not punished twice.
131. The Court must also consider whether the sentences should be partly or wholly concurrent because, for example, they are part of the same course of conduct, or contain common elements. This is relevant in a number of instances here, some of which have already been mentioned. The Court has then considered the length of the total term of the sentence arrived at to ensure that the principle of totality is respected and that the total sentence adequately reflects the criminality of the offences committed, but no more than that, and that the total sentence is not excessive, but will leave open the realistic prospects of reform and maintain the hope required for Mr George to take an effective part in the community and realise his aims when he is released.
132. This may result in what is seen as some leniency, in that some sentences are made concurrent, but while the total criminality of Mr George is an important factor, though moderated by Mr George's reduced moral culpability and mental health, his growing awareness for the need for rehabilitation is also important, as are the circumstances of his early introduction to drug use. Thus, it requires a sentence proportionate to his culpability for the crimes, the effect on the community, but also Mr George's subjective circumstances and the value of reform to both the community and to himself.
133. Mr George has been in custody now for 433 days. That should be taken into account by backdating to the start of the sentence under s 63(2) of the Sentencing Act. Mr George does not pursue a Treatment Order at this stage. The period of his pre-sentence custody also raises questions of how the Court should proceed to consider release. Ordinarily, a non-parole period would be set. There are advantages to this over a release on a Good Behaviour Order with a suspended sentence.
134. The making of a parole order is often desirable because release will not occur until sometime in the future, and an offender's readiness cannot always be properly assessed by a court considering it so far in advance, as opposed to the Sentence Administration Board doing so at the time. This also means that it is not possible to make further enquiries about the proposed address at which Mr George will reside, although the Sentence Administration Board would be able to undertake some enquiries about that.
135. In this case, there was an attractiveness to this initially because Mr George was likely to be released immediately to homelessness, and this would likely set him up to fail, even where rehabilitation programs were available and mandated. The Board could assure that a residence was available and suitable at the time of release.
136. On the other hand, this might mean that, if no place became available, Mr George would serve the whole of his sentence in custody. While that is the sentence that is found to be just and adequate, it means that there is no ongoing support or supervision for him on his release, and he will have to be released whether he has engaged in rehabilitation or not. Such rehabilitation can only be mandated by conditions to a parole order, or to a Good Behaviour Order, and release prior to the expiry of the sentence.
137. The Crown helpfully pointed out that, while administration of either would be under the same regime, namely ACT Corrective Services, the Board could be more agile and prompt in monitoring and supervising it, given the cumbersome nature of reporting breaches of a Good Behaviour Order to the Court.
138. While this may be accepted, there are advantages to the Good Behaviour Order. Thus, the Board can give some directions to parole and impose some conditions, but it cannot change or vary the order such as re-sentencing, as a Court can in certain circumstances. The Board, while able to vary conditions, can ultimately only cancel the parole order and return the parolee to custody without benefit of achieved rehabilitation.
139. Further, and perhaps more importantly in this case, the parole order is only for the balance of the sentence after release, whereas a Good Behaviour Order can extend beyond the term of the sentence. In this case, conscious though the Court is of the value and contribution of the Sentence Administration Board, Mr George has now served a very substantial amount of his sentence, and has a residence, so further delay is not really desirable. He will need, however, an intensive and extended period of rehabilitation beyond that which would be encompassed by a just and adequate prison sentence.
140. Accordingly, to the Court will release him, suspending the sentence and making a Good Behaviour Order.
[His Honour then spoke directly to the offender]
141. Mr George, please stand.
142. The orders of the Court are as follows:
1. You are convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment to commence on 25 September 2020 and end on 24 March 2022.
2. You are convicted of burglary and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment to commence on 25 December 2021 and end on 24 October 2022, and that is to be cumulative as to seven months on the sentence for the offence of aggravated burglary.
3. You are convicted of damaging property and sentenced to six months imprisonment to commence on 25 June 2022 and end on 24 December 2022. That is to be cumulative as to two months on the sentence for burglary.
4. You are convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and sentenced to four months imprisonment to commence on 25 October 2022 and end on 24 February 2023. That is to be cumulative as to two months on the sentence for damaging property.
5. You are convicted of possession of a thing with intent to cause damage and sentenced to six months imprisonment to commence on 25 October 2022 and end on 24 March 2023. That is to be cumulative as to two months on the sentence for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
6. You are convicted of possession of a weapon with intent and sentenced to two months imprisonment to commence on 25 March 2023 and end on 24 May 2023.
7. You are convicted of possession of stolen property and sentenced to three months imprisonment to commence on 24 February 2023 and end on 24 May 2023.
8. You are convicted of assault of a frontline worker and are required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender's Good Behaviour Obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for six months, to commence today and end on 31 May 2022.
9. You are convicted of trespass and without passing sentence you are released on recognisance of $500 security without surety to be of good behaviour under s 20 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for four months to commence today and end on 31 March 2022.
10. That is a total sentence from 25 September 2020 to 24 May 2023 which is a two years and six months sentence.
11. The sentence is suspended today for two years. You are required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender's Good Behaviour Obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 for two years from today, from 1 December 2021 until 30 November 2023, with the following conditions:
(a) A probation condition that you accept supervision of the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services, or his delegate, and obey all reasonable directions of the person delegated to supervise you for two years from 1 December 2021, or for such lesser period as the person supervising you deems appropriate, and to obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising you, including as to urinalysis;
(b) That you reside at 67 Werriwa Crescent, Isabella Plains, ACT, or as directed by the person supervising you;
(c) That within 48 hours, namely no later than Friday this week, 3 December, you contact Canberra Recovery Hub of the Salvation Army and arrange to be assessed for admission to its Alcohol and Other Drug Program, and if assessed as suitable, enter into that program and complete it;
(d) That you admit yourself to the Justice Services Counselling Program at Karralika within seven days, that is, on or before 7 December 2021, and complete that program;
(e) That you discuss with the person supervising you programs to address your mental health issues, and obey all reasonable directions that that person may give you as to admission to and completion of any programs or any counselling;
(f) That you give consent to Canberra Recovery Hub and Karralika Programs to provide any information about your admission to, attendance at and progress in the programs conducted by them to the person supervising you, as that person may reasonably require;
(g) That you report to the Court on the progress of your rehabilitation on 18 February 2022 at 2:30 pm and at any other time as the Court may direct from time to time.
12. The Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services be requested to provide a report to the Court by 18 February 2022 on the progress you have made under the Good Behaviour Order.
Mr George, that is a lot of words and a lot of explanations about you, so I hope you understand it. You have been around the courts before. You probably understand it. Basically, I have said that these are very serious offences and would ordinarily justify at least two years and six months in prison, moderated because of your mental health issues and your childhood disadvantage, but these are matters that you need to address and you need to confront.
144. I have made complicated conditions, and your counsel, who is very able, will explain them to you, but it requires you, in effect, to undergo an extensive period of rehabilitation. You must come back and report to me in February about how that is going, and at that time, if you are not complying with these conditions, I can cancel the Order and send you back to prison. If there is a need for it and the circumstances arise, it may be possible to reconfigure those conditions, but that will depend on how it is going.
145. This is an opportunity. You were doing better outside prison in New South Wales, and there was nothing until this damage property (and I do not know what that was about), but it justified 14 days imprisonment, until this, when everything fell apart, and that let your mental health get control of you. It let your drug and alcohol use run away with you. You have got to address these, or it will be a revolving door in and out of prison. I am hopeful, I am ever said to be optimistic. I hope I am right, but you will have to step up. You will have to do the hard yards. Only you can do it, but there is professional help available. Corrective Services will help you.
146. The Salvation Army and Karralika are good agencies that will help you, and you need to consider what you need to do to manage your mental health so that these things of great seriousness and of great criminality do not continue. This is an opportunity. I hope you can take it with both hands and run with it, and kick a few goals. It is up to you. I will see you on 18 February and I hope the report card is really first-class, but it will be tough. You have got to put your shoulder to the wheel and work really hard. Good luck.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-six [146] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Acting Justice Refshauge
Associate:
Date: 29 November 2022
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