SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v GBL [2023] QCA 104
PARTIES:
R
v
GBL
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 225 of 2022
DC No 45 of 2022
DC No 52 of 2022
DC No 56 of 2022DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Childrens Court at Townsville – Date of Sentence: 30 September 2022 (Clare SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
19 May 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
11 May 2023
JUDGES:
Mullins P and Flanagan and Boddice JJA
ORDER:
Leave to appeal be refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant youth was convicted on his own pleas of guilty to some 27 violence, property and driving offences – where the most serious offending comprised of armed robbery, in company, of a taxi driver (count 7) and assault occasioning bodily harm, while armed in company, of an 80-year-old female complainant at her residence (count 21) – where the applicant was sentenced to an effective head sentence of 20 months detention, to be released after serving 50 per cent – where convictions were recorded on counts 7 and 21 – where the applicant was aged 17 years at the time of the commission of the offences – where much of the offending occurred in the context of substance misuse – where the applicant’s childhood had been marked by significant deprivation well beyond the disadvantage typically seen in the Childrens Court – where the applicant had a lengthy juvenile history for which no convictions had been recorded to date – whether the sentencing judge’s reference to “exceptional circumstances” in the sentencing remarks was the erroneous imposition of a threshold of exceptional circumstances as being the test for recording convictions under s 184(1) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) – whether the recording of convictions on counts 7 and 21 rendered the sentence manifestly excessive
Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 184
R v DBU (2021) 7 QR 453; [2021] QCA 51, cited
COUNSEL:
C J Tessmann for the applicant
S L Dennis for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with Boddice JA.
FLANAGAN JA: I agree with Boddice JA.
BODDICE JA: On 2 September 2022, the applicant pleaded guilty, in the Childrens Court at Townsville, to: one count of entering premises with intent to commit an indictable offence (count 1); one count of entering premises and stealing (count 2); one count of attempted burglary, in the night, while armed, in company (count 3); one count of burglary and stealing, in the night, while armed, in company (count 4); one count of unlawfully using a motor vehicle (count 5); one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle with a circumstance of aggravation (count 6); one count of armed robbery, in company (count 7); two counts of receiving stolen property (counts 8, 11);…
Continue reading R v GBL
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v GBL [2023] QCA 104
- Case
- [2023] QCA 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the sentencing judge correctly exercised the discretion to record convictions and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court examined the sentencing judge's remarks and found that the term "exceptional circumstances" was not used as a threshold but rather as part of a balanced consideration of all relevant factors, including the nature of the offences, the applicant's age, his previous convictions, and the potential impact on his rehabilitation and employment prospects. The court held that the sentencing judge did not err in exercising the discretion to record convictions for the most serious offences. The court also concluded that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, given the applicant's extensive criminal history and the seriousness of the offences.
The court refused leave to appeal and noted that the sentencing judge had carefully considered the applicant's background and circumstances in imposing the sentence. The court highlighted that the recording of convictions was warranted due to the serious nature of the offences, particularly the assault on the elderly woman, and the risk to public safety. The court found that the sentence, which allowed for early release, was appropriate and balanced the need for punishment and rehabilitation.
LEAVE TO APPEAL BE REFUSED.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave to appeal be refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent further submits that should error be established, a resentencing would result in a recording of convictions for those counts. The applicant’s lengthy and unrelenting criminal conduct since the age of 13, notwithstanding the imposition of multiple detention orders, conditional release orders, community service orders and probation orders, together with the commission of the most serious offending whilst on bail, and at a time when the applicant was approaching 18 years of age, with mixed contents in the pre-sentence report, supported an exercise of the discretion to record convictions in respect of those most serious offences.Consideration A review of the sentencing remarks evidences the sentencing judge’s careful consideration of the applicant’s pleas of guilty, his tragic upbringing and learning and other difficulties when structuring a sentence which afforded the applicant the significant benefit of release after serving 50 per cent of the detention period, thereby avoiding serving any time in an adult prison. However, the recording of any conviction was a matter to be considered separately, after giving specific regard to the nature of the offence, the applicant’s age, his previous convictions and the impact the recording of a conviction would have on his chances of rehabilitation generally, and of finding and retaining employment. Section 184 of the Act lists those mandatory requirements for consideration when exercising such a discretion, without any of those requirements being given paramountcy. The sentencing judge must have regard to all of the circumstances of the case, including those specific matters. There is good reason why the Act does not place paramountcy on any particular factor. In the case of a youthful offender, the recording of a conviction is a potential oppression, which may stand in the way of rehabilitation of that youthful offender. The purpose of recording a conviction in respect of a youthful offender is that it serves as a warning “to those dealing with a young person that they must be warned about the risk of serious, physical, moral or economic loss despite the fact that such a warning will affect a young offender’s rehabilitation and employment prospects”.[1][1]R v DBU [2021] QCA 51 at [32] per Lyons SJA (with whom Morrison and McMurdo JJA agreed). The sentencing judge specifically recorded that a conviction may bring “some adverse consequences” and that ordinarily convictions were not to be recorded for juvenile offenders, before finding that there were “exceptional circumstances here”, noting in particular a risk to the safety of other people, and that the applicant’s recent progress, whilst promising, did not remove that danger, especially considering the level of violence inflicted on the 80-year-old female complainant. The applicant’s offending against the 80-year-old female complainant was particularly serious. It was conduct warranting consideration of the need for a warning to others, by the recording of a conviction in respect of those offences. However, the sentencing judge was required to have regard to not only the serious nature of that offending and the applicant’s considerable criminal history. The sentencing judge was also required to have regard to the applicant’s tragic background, the learning and other difficulties, which were relevant to his behaviour to date, and the good behaviour shown by the applicant in his most recent period of detention, which was in the order of six months.