SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v GBJ [2022] QCA 52
PARTIES:
R
v
GBJ
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 95 of 2021
DC No 3 of 2020DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Childrens Court at Rockhampton – Date of Sentence: 1 September 2020 (Clare SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
14 April 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
26 November 2021
JUDGES:
Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J
ORDERS:
1. Leave to appeal against sentence granted.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. The sentence below be set aside, to the extent that it be ordered that no conviction be recorded, but not otherwise.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCING ORDERS – DISCRETION TO RECORD CONVICTION – RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS – where the applicant pleaded guilty in the Childrens Court to one count of armed robbery, in company, with personal violence – where the applicant was sentenced to 12 months’ detention and a restorative justice order in respect of that offence – where the applicant was ordered to be released after serving 70 per cent of that sentence, with a conviction recorded – where on the same date the applicant was sentenced in respect of 42 unrelated offences – where for these offences the applicant was sentenced to probation for a period of two years, with convictions not being recorded – where the applicant had only recently turned 14 years of age and, whilst he had reoffended while subject to Court orders, the applicant had not previously had a conviction recorded against him – whether the nature of the offence, while serious, did not of itself warrant the recording of a conviction – whether the recording of a conviction would have a general impact on the applicant’s chances of finding or retaining employment – whether the applicant had poor prospects of rehabilitation – whether the recording of the conviction rendered the sentence manifestly excessive
Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 184
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited
R v FAY[2020] QCA 154, cited
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550; [2015] HCA 39, citedCOUNSEL:
C J Lovel for the applicant
S L Dennis for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
FRASER JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Boddice J and the orders proposed by his Honour.
McMURDO JA: I agree with Boddice J.
BODDICE J: On 26 February 2020, the applicant pleaded guilty, in the Childrens Court at Rockhampton, to one count of armed robbery, in company, with personal violence.
On 1 September 2020, the applicant was sentenced to 12 months’ detention and a restorative justice order in respect of that offence. The applicant was ordered to be released after serving 70 per cent of that sentence. A conviction was recorded. 285 days pre-sentence detention were declared as time served in respect of the sentence.
On the same date, the applicant was sentenced…
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- R v GBJ [2022] QCA 52
- Case
- [2022] QCA 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the nature of the offence warranted the recording of a conviction, whether the recording of a conviction would impact the applicant's employment prospects, whether the applicant had poor prospects of rehabilitation, and whether the recording of the conviction rendered the sentence manifestly excessive. The court considered the relevant sentencing factors, including the applicant's age, previous convictions, and the impact of recording a conviction on the applicant's chances of rehabilitation or employment. The court also noted that the applicant's co-offenders, who had more serious involvement in the offence, did not have convictions recorded. The court concluded that the recording of a conviction, in the circumstances, rendered the applicant's sentence manifestly excessive.
The court granted leave to appeal against the sentence and allowed the appeal. The sentence was set aside to the extent that it ordered that no conviction be recorded, but not otherwise. The court emphasised that, under the Youth Justice Act 1992, the starting point is that no conviction is recorded against a juvenile. In exercising the discretion to record a conviction, regard must be had to all of the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence, the applicant's age, and any previous convictions. The court found that the recording of a conviction in respect of the applicant's offending involved a misapplication of sentencing principles. The applicant had only recently turned 14, had not previously had a conviction recorded, and the nature of the offence, while serious, did not warrant the recording of a conviction. Additionally, recording a conviction would have a general impact on the applicant's chances of finding or retaining employment, although there was no evidence of a specific impact due to the applicant's age and poor engagement educationally. Finally, while the applicant had engaged poorly in respect of programs and other efforts of rehabilitation, there was no finding that the applicant had poor prospects of rehabilitation.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal against sentence granted.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. The sentence below be set aside, to the extent that it be ordered that no conviction be recorded, but not otherwise.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, the respondent submits that no issue of parity arises as there were matters of distinction in the personal circumstances of the co-offenders, including a lack of persistence in reoffending.Consideration Absent specific error, a sentence will only be set aside on the ground of manifest excess if circumstances as a whole support a conclusion that the sentence imposed is “unreasonable or plainly unjust” thereby evidencing that there must have been some unidentifiable failure to properly exercise the sentencing discretion.[1][1]House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505. Such a conclusion arises only if “having regard to all of the relevant sentencing factors, including the degree to which the impugned sentence differs from sentences that have been imposed in comparable cases, the appellate court is driven to conclude that there must have been some misapplication of principle”.[2][2]R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550 at [28]. The starting point under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) is that no conviction is recorded against a juvenile.[3] In exercising a discretion to record a conviction, regard must be had to all of the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence, the applicant’s age and any previous convictions and the impact of the recording of a conviction on the applicant’s chances of rehabilitation generally or of finding or retaining employment.[4][3]R v FAY [2020] QCA 154 at [12].[4]Youth Justice Act 1992, s 184(i). Those factors, having regard to all of the circumstances, support a conclusion that the recording of a conviction in respect of the applicant’s offending involved a misapplication of sentencing principles. First, the applicant had only recently turned 14 years of age and, whilst he had reoffended while subject to Court orders, the applicant had not previously had a conviction recorded against him. Second, the nature of the offence, while serious, did not of itself warrant the recording of a conviction. None of the co-offenders had a conviction recorded for the offence. Third, recording of a conviction would have a general impact on the applicant’s chances of finding or retaining employment. That there was no evidence of a specific impact was unsurprising. The applicant was only 15 years of age at sentence and was poorly engaged educationally. Finally, whilst the applicant had engaged poorly in respect of programs and other efforts of rehabilitation, there was no finding that the applicant had poor prospects of rehabilitation.Conclusions The recording of a conviction, in the circumstances, rendered the applicant’s sentence manifestly excessive. I would order:1.Leave to appeal against sentence be granted.2.The appeal be allowed.3.The sentence below be set aside, to the extent that it be ordered that no conviction be recorded, but not otherwise.