R v Gassy (No 4) - [2010] SASC 124

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v GASSY (No 4)
[2010] SASC 124
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Nyland and The Honourable Justice Layton)
7 May 2010
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - OBJECTIONS OR POINTS NOT RAISED IN COURT BELOW - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION - PARTICULAR CASES
Appeal against conviction - appellant convicted of murder - prosecution case circumstantial - trial judge admitted evidence that appellant suffered from a delusional disorder - trial judge directed jury that they could infer that statements made by the appellant to various witnesses constituted "delusional thinking" - trial judge directed that evidence of delusional disorder could support prosecution case - whether evidence relevant - whether evidence should have been excluded in the exercise of discretion as being more prejudicial than probative - whether direction as to use of evidence appropriate.
Held: Evidence was relevant and admissible - evidence not more prejudicial than probative - evidence was properly admitted - trial judge's directions appropriate - appeal dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - WARRANTS - SEARCH WARRANTS - GENERALLY, ISSUE AND VALIDITY
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE - GENERALLY
Search warrant issued to police to enter and search appellant's home in New South Wales - items seized included important pieces of circumstantial evidence - appellant alleged a number of defects with warrant and argued that individually or collectively they invalidated the warrant - whether warrant was valid - whether warrant properly executed - whether items located pursuant to warrant ought to have been excluded pursuant to public policy discretion.
Held: Search warrant was valid - evidence properly admitted - permission to appeal refused.

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - PROPENSITY, TENDENCY AND CO-INCIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY AND RELEVANCY - PROPENSITY EVIDENCE - OTHER CASES
Appeal against trial judge's decision to admit certain items of evidence - whether items evidence of propensity - whether evidence more prejudicial than probative - whether evidence relevant.
Held: Evidence relevant to motive and not propensity evidence - any prejudicial effect of evidence outweighed by probative value - permission to appeal refused.
Search Warrants Act 1985 (NSW) s 11, s 11(2), s 12A, s 15, s 15(3) and s 23; Search Warrants Regulations 1999 (NSW) r 9; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 45C, referred to.
R v Christie [1914] AC 545; R v Gassy (No 2) [2005] SASC 491; R v Gassy (No 3) (2005) 93 SASR 454; Gassy v The Queen [2007] HCA Trans 426 (9 August 2007), considered.

R v GASSY (No 4)
[2010] SASC 124
Court of Criminal Appeal: Doyle CJ, Nyland and Layton JJ

DOYLE CJ: I would refuse permission to appeal on ground 1 and ground 2. I would dismiss…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Gassy (No 4)

Details

AGLC: R v Gassy (No 4) [2010] SASC 124
Case: [2010] SASC 124
Decision Date: 7 May 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Gassy (No 4), the appellant sought to appeal against his conviction on the basis of several grounds, including the trial judge's handling of evidence related to his mental health and the judge's directions to the jury concerning this evidence. The appeal centred on the admissibility and impact of psychiatric testimony regarding the appellant's alleged delusional disorder.

The court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's mental health diagnosis and in directing the jury on how to consider this evidence. Specifically, the court needed to assess whether the trial judge's directions to the jury were sufficient and whether the evidence of the appellant's mental health was more prejudicial than probative, potentially warranting exclusion under the Christie discretion.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in admitting evidence of the appellant's mental health, nor did the judge misdirect the jury in their consideration of this evidence. The court held that the judge provided adequate directions, allowing the jury to consider the appellant's mental state as one factor among many in assessing his state of mind at the time of the alleged offence. The court further found that the evidence was probative and not overly prejudicial, and therefore did not warrant exclusion.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant further submitted that the absence of any evidence of delusions about Dr Tobin made the diagnosis irrelevant. He argued that to ask a psychiatrist whether something was consistent did not mean anything. He submitted that the evidence should be excluded pursuant to the Christie discretion[2] as being more prejudicial than probative. It was submitted that the diagnosis lacked probative force, because it was a deliberate false diagnosis based on a small amount of material and a short psychiatric assessment. He also submitted that the evidence was highly prejudicial, given community attitudes about mental illness. [2] R v Christie [1914] AC 545.The Judge’s direction to the jury as to the evidence of delusional disorder As mentioned earlier, at the conclusion of the voir dire, the Judge ruled that the prosecution would be permitted to lead evidence from Dr Woodforde as to his diagnosis, as well as opinions expressed by other medical practitioners relating to this matter. In the course of his summing up, the trial Judge referred to the evidence of Dr Woodforde and the other medical witnesses about the appellant’s delusional disorder. He made it clear that those psychiatrists who examined the appellant were not of one view as to whether the appellant suffered from such a condition. The Judge said:Dr Woodforde is at the forefront of the view that he did. Dr Phillips was not of the view originally but came around to the view that the accused may have been suffering from a paranoid disturbance of mind and possibly a delusional disorder.Dr Floyd and Dr Ali expressed strong views against a finding of delusional disorder. What then is the position?The proof of a delusional disorder is not a necessary part of the prosecution case. However, the prosecution argues, and although this word is not used, I think it is an accurate description, the prosecution argues that it sharpens their case to an extent if the accused was suffering from a delusional disorder and that it had the consequence which is referred to in the evidence of Dr Woodforde and to Dr Phillips.When I say ‘the consequence’, I mean the anger and resentment that can arise out of the delusion against the people the person perceives to be acting against their interests. That is the extra, so to speak, which the prosecution seeks to obtain from this evidence and of course, this is related by the prosecution to the resentment and anger allegedly held by the accused against Dr Tobin. Of course resentment and anger in the ordinary sense can occur without a disorder.The accused strongly denied that he suffered from a delusional disorder at any time. He criticised strongly the approach of Dr Woodforde who he said reached a diagnosis after an interview which lasted 40 minutes. He said the main basis relied upon by Dr Woodforde for his opinion involved the Mauritius Ambassador incident and the incident involving the sign ‘The Rapist’. The accused put to you that these matters were quite irrelevant to such a diagnosis and insufficient to support it.He said he was under great pressure at the hospital because of the difficulties to which reference has been made and he decided to go and see Dr Ali. The accused said his symptoms were indicative of burnout and that is not a formal medical diagnosis. The accused referred to his academic and other achievements and the fact that he had represented himself at this trial. He said these factors pointed away from a diagnosis of delusional disorder. The accused addressed you on Dr Floyd’s qualifications which he said well qualified her to express an opinion on his condition.He said that psychiatrists other than Dr Woodforde examined him on several occasions. Dr Woodforde examined him on two occasions and I think they were of 40-minute duration.So ladies and gentlemen, whether you accept that the accused had a delusional disorder and whether it had the consequence which the Crown argues for it on the basis of the evidence of Dr Woodforde in particular, and to a lesser extent Dr Phillips, is a matter for you. But, even if you were of the view that the accused did not suffer from delusional disorder, you would still have to consider whether he did develop feelings of anger and resentment towards Dr Tobin, and if so, to what degree and to consider your conclusion in that respect in relation to all other evidence in the case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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