JUDGE:	INCERTI J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	12 March 2020
DATE OF SENTENCE:	2 April 2020
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Garrard
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2020] VSC 154

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Manslaughter – Guilty plea – Single stab wound – Remorse – Diagnosis of personality disorder – Verdins principle five – Youth of offender – R v Azzopardi (2011) 35 VR 43 – Social disadvantage during formative years – Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 – Relevance of offender’s drug addiction – R v McKee [2003] VSCA 16 – Prospects of rehabilitation guarded – Sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 5 years – Sentencing Act 1991.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Prosecution	Mr M Rochford QC with Ms L Dawson	Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr J Williams	Victoria Legal Aid

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

Ricky Garrard, you have pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of Sadiq Husseini on 19 July 2018. It now falls to me to sentence you according to law.

The maximum penalty for manslaughter is 20 years imprisonment.

Summary of offending

I will briefly summarise the circumstances of your offending. On 19 July 2018, at approximately 6:20pm, you put on a jacket which you found hanging on the back of a chair at your residence in Doveton, and rode your bicycle to a milk bar.

You arrived at the milk bar roughly ten minutes later. The owner of the milk bar was known to sell cannabis over the counter. You spoke to him, and purchased some cannabis.

At approximately 7:00pm, your friend Jason entered the milk bar. You both left shortly after, and returned to your residence.

Later that evening, at around 8:30pm, Mr Husseini entered that same milk bar with some friends.

At around the same time, you returned to the milk bar on your bicycle. As you walked inside, you placed your left hand inside the jacket pocket, where you cut yourself on a knife. The knife was approximately 30cm in length.

When you entered the milk bar, Mr Husseini asked you whether you were a drug dealer, and you responded that you were. You were, at this time, funding your own drug use by selling small quantities to others.[1] You offered to sell drugs to him. You shook hands and left shortly after, at around 8:35pm.
[1]Transcript of Proceedings, DPP v Garrard (Supreme Court of Victoria, Incerti J, 12 March 2020) 28.24–28 (‘T’).

You returned to the Doveton address and spoke to Jason. You told him that you had a sale of drugs for him at the milk bar.

You then went back to the milk bar, arriving at 8:54pm, where you spoke to Mr Husseini. Both of you were standing and chatting in a group of people who had come…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Garrard

Details

AGLC: R v Garrard [2020] VSC 154
Case: [2020] VSC 154
Decision Date: 2 April 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Garrard involved the defendant, Garrard, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter following the death of a single stab wound to the victim. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The central issue before the court was the appropriate sentence for Garrard, considering his guilty plea, his remorse, his diagnosis of a personality disorder, and his disadvantaged social background during his formative years. Additionally, the court had to assess the relevance of his drug addiction and prospects of rehabilitation.

The court examined several factors in determining the appropriate sentence. It considered the principles set out in Verdins, particularly principle five, which focuses on the circumstances of the offence and the offender. The youth of the offender and his social disadvantage were also taken into account, as was his remorse. The court noted that while Garrard had shown some remorse, it was not deemed sufficient to warrant a significantly reduced sentence. The court also considered the relevance of the offender’s drug addiction, as per R v McKee, and concluded that it was a factor that contributed to the offence but did not warrant a more lenient sentence. The prospects of rehabilitation were deemed guarded. Ultimately, the court sentenced Garrard to seven years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years, in accordance with the Sentencing Act 1991.

The final orders of the court reflected the comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors in sentencing. Garrard was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years. This sentence took into account the mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and the offender’s remorse, balanced against the severity of the offence and the offender’s personal circumstances.

Orders