R v Gall

[2025] NSWDC 232

District Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Gall [2025] NSWDC 232

Hearing dates:

14 February 2025

Date of orders:

14 February 2025

Decision date:

14 February 2025

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

Anderson SC DCJ

Decision:

[58]-[59]

Catchwords:

SENTENCING - aggravated dangerous driving causing death – application of Whyte guideline - fulltime custody – history of alcohol abuse – no remorse or insight. Tension between a reduction of moral culpability for cognitive impairment and mental health issues and s 21A(5AA) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 for intoxication.

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194

Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Burton [2020] NSWCCA 54

Fisher v R; R v Fisher [2021] NSWCCA 91

Pender v Rex [2023] NSWCCA 291

R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209

R v Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR 252; [2002] NSWCCA 343

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
David Gall (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
Mr J Sfinas of Counsel (Crown, ODPP)
Mr N Broadbent SC (Offender, Public Defender)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Dubbo (Crown)
Aboriginal Legal Service, Dubbo (Offender)

File Number(s):

2023/00161384

Publication restriction:

Nil

JUDGMENT

1. I have just heard the sentence submissions for David Francis Gall who was born on 15 October 1959. He has committed the offence of dangerous driving – aggravated - causing death.

2. There has undeniably been a devastating loss for which this Court now bears the responsibility for passing sentence on Mr Gall, the offender. In doing so, the focus will turn to the application of the law in what may be a clinical if not insensitive way, particularly from the perspective of the families of the deceased Mr Kelly, who are present in Court today. That is not my intention.

3. I acknowledge the nature of these proceedings and the impact upon Mr Kelly’s family and friends who have travelled a very long way to be here. Those watching must understand that no life can ever be equated with a period of imprisonment. No gaol term can return a loved one, and a life should never be measured simply by the punishment meted out to the offender. I am required to sentence the offender based on a range of factors, many of which you have heard discussed today.

4. I must consider the maximum sentence available for this offence, the seriousness of the conduct in comparison to other offenders who have committed this offence, the offender’s personal circumstances and a range of matters that I am, as a matter of law, required to consider, including the fact that he pleaded guilty to this offence.

5. As I say, the offender appears for sentence on one count of aggravated dangerous driving occasioning death, an offence at s 52A(2) of the Crimes Act. A person convicted of this offence faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 14 years. There is no standard non-parole period. The maximum penalty operates as a legislative guidepost representing the legislature’s assessment of the seriousness of an offence of this nature. The offender pleaded guilty at an early opportunity, and for that reason is entitled to a 25% discount on the sentence which I would have otherwise imposed.

FACTS

6. On 19 May 2023, the deceased, Mr Paul Kelly was aged 52. He left his home at Bourbah, western New South Wales, at about 3pm to go and secure cattle which had escaped from his farm. He was driving along Gulargambone Road in a four-wheel drive quad bike which was not fitted with a seatbelt. I note that quad bikes do not have seatbelts, and he was not required to wear one.

7. The offender was driving a Holden ute, also along Gulargambone Road towards Quambone. He had started his journey that day in Warren. The most direct route from Warren to the Collie Hotel is just shy of 50 kilometres. At about 2.22pm, the offender had stopped at the Collie Hotel on the Oxley Highway where he had a schooner of beer.

8. At 3.40pm, the offender was travelling near the West Point Road intersection, the distance between the Collie Hotel and the West Point Road and the intersection with the Gulargambone Road is 52 kilometres. Both the offender and Mr Kelly were driving west on the unsealed road which had a speed limit of 100 kilometres per hour. At 3.45pm, the offender collided with the rear of Mr Kelly’s quad bike in the middle of the road. In that area, there is a very slight right-hand bend in the leading towards the crash site.

9. Mr Kelly was thrown from his quad bike and landed almost 25 metres away from the point of impact. The offender continued driving for another 59 metres before he ultimately stopped his vehicle. He approached the deceased, observed him, and then returned to his vehicle and continued driving to raise the alarm at the nearest farmhouse that he came across. That farmhouse was occupied by the Raes. The first person he saw was Jarrod Rae. He told Jarrod that he had just hit a man on a bike.

10. Jarrod immediately left to drive to the crash site while his father Steven stayed with the offender. Steven Rae observed the offender to be unstable on his feet, with slurred speech and unsteady eyes. The offender made admissions about hitting somebody on a motorbike who was lying on the road and not moving. Steven Rae took the offender to his house. While on the way there, the offender took a can of XXXX Gold beer from the tray in his car. Mr Rae told him he should not drink anything, but the offender replied that he did and proceeded to drink the can of beer.

11. Steven Rae left to go to the crash site himself while his wife Tracey stayed with the offender. She offered him a cup of coffee. She observed him to be swaying while walking and unable to keep a straight line. He was slurring his words. He returned to his ute and collected another XXXX Gold and drank that. After drinking that second beer, he went to go and pick up a third but Mrs Rae stopped him and told him in no uncertain terms that he did not need to drink another and not to drink anything else until the police arrived. The offender became agitated and repeatedly told her he wanted to go home, but she told him that that was not going to happen.

12. At about 4.25pm emergency services were contacted and told what had happened. At 5.01pm paramedics arrived on the scene where Mr Kelly was confirmed to have passed away, having suffered numerous blunt force injuries to his head and torso, and a subarachnoid haemorrhage.

13. At 5.45pm police attended the property to arrest the offender. Mrs Rae told police that the offender had consumed two XXXX Gold cans since he had been there. By this time, the offender was asleep in his ute. The police woke him up and they observed a strong smell of alcohol coming from him and his car, and noticed that his eyes were glassy and slightly bloodshot. He was asked how much he had been drinking and he responded “Heaps”. He was arrested and underwent a mandatory blood and urine sample.

14. At 4am the following morning, the offender participated in an electronically recorded interview with police. The offender informed police that he was not driving for any particular reason that afternoon and had simply gone for “a lap down the back roads” and that he had probably been driving for an hour or two leaving around 12 or 1 o'clock. The offender also told police that the incident happened when he was looking down to get a cigarette, and that he had simply looked up and heard a bang. He told police “I don't know where they come from. He wasn’t there, you know, because it was a straight road. I gave him a bit of a shake and nothing happened.”

15. A crash investigation was undertaken by police. At the time of the collision the weather was fine and the road was dry. A subsequent blood alcohol concentration was taken from the offender, and the report concluded that he had at the time of the collision a blood alcohol concentration of between 0.220 and 0.283 grams per 100 millilitres of blood, with the most likely level being 0.241 grams. He was on a provisional drivers licence at that time for reasons I will come to and his blood alcohol concentration should have been zero.

16. This offence requires an offender to have more than 0.150 blood alcohol concentration. The effect of having alcohol at this level would be a gross impairment of his ability to drive, including an impairment of perception, divided attention, visual scanning, and peripheral vision, mood and reaction times. All of those facts are important.

OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS

17. An essential part of the sentencing process is the assessment of the objective gravity of the offence for which the offender is to be sentenced. The objective seriousness of the conduct sets the parameters of the appropriate sentence and ensures the sentence imposed is proportionate to the offence committed. It is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders. It is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending itself.

18. Most adults, particularly in the regions, drive a motor vehicle every day, and the fact that they are potentially lethal weapons is often forgotten. People can convince themselves that they are safe to drive when they are tired, under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and the consequences as we see here can be tragic. The holding of a drivers licence conferring the right to drive a motor vehicle is a privilege which carries heavy responsibilities. When responsibility is not exercised, terrible consequences can result.

19. The law requires the imposition of a significant punishment which includes lengthy periods of imprisonment, both as a way of denouncing the abhorrent conduct and in deterring other people who may be tempted to drink and drive, and in doing so act in an unacceptable, irresponsible, and antisocial manner.

20. The need for general deterrence and denunciation in such cases is of critical importance and will generally significantly outweigh the subjective case of an offender. Cases of this kind are a tragedy, especially for the family of the wholly innocent deceased whose lives have been irretrievably affected by the reckless and irresponsible conduct of this offender. The message must be sent in unequivocal terms that if you drive irresponsibly, particularly under the effect of alcohol or illicit substances, you not only risk your own life but the life of many others.

21. In sentencing the offender, I have had regard to the 2002 guideline judgments of R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209 and R v Whyte (2022) 55 NSWLR 252. In Whyte, the Court identified what it identified as a typical case involving an offence of dangerous driving occasioning death or grievous bodily harm, contrary to ss 52A(1) and (3) of the Crimes Act 1900, along with frequently recurring aggravating factors and a general range of sentencing. Although they are different offences, the principles apply to this aggravated version.

22. The guideline judgment is neither a starting point nor is it prescriptive, there may be matters of aggravation not specifically referred to in the guideline, and in that event it is appropriate for such matters to be taken into account. It is not to be regarded as some type of judicial straitjacket. The factors identified in Whyte as both frequently occurring and aggravating are not exhaustive.

23. Each case will depend upon its own facts and individual justice requires that the penalty imposed reflects the objective seriousness of the offending, the subjective circumstances of the offender, and the need to recognise the purposes of sentencing as contained in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The guideline judgment provides that a frequently recurring case of an offence of this nature under s 52A has the following characteristics:

1. A young offender.

2. A person of good character with no or limited prior convictions.

3. Death or permanent injury to a single person.

4. The victim is a stranger.

5. No or limited injury to the driver.

6. Genuine remorse.

7. A plea of guilty of limited utilitarian value.

24. These typical case characteristics do not all apply here. The offender was not young, but rather aged 63 years and 9 months of age. He had a prior criminal history and a shocking driving history which the Crown accurately describes as “disgraceful”. Mr Kelly was a stranger who died as a result of the offender’s conduct, while the offender was uninjured. The presence or absence of these characteristics necessarily impacts the final disposition of the case and assists in determining the appropriate sentence.

25. In respect of the plea of guilty, I note in Whyte a 10% discount was allowed to reflect the utilitarian value of the plea. But here, this offender is entitled to 25%. The guideline judgment identified a series of aggravating factors for offences, specifically the extent and nature of the injuries. Here, they are catastrophic causing Mr Kelly’s death. Secondly, the number of people who may have been put at risk is unknown, so that factor is neutral. The speed of the offender’s vehicle was unknown, and that factor is neutral.

26. There was, however, a high degree of intoxication. There is no evidence of erratic or aggressive driving or that he was showing off. That factor is therefore neutral. The length of the journey is somewhere in the vicinity of perhaps two to three hours and around 115 kilometres. The offender in this case stopped and approached the deceased after the collision and went to immediately raise the alarm. Other considerations raised by Whyte do not arise in this case.

27. The offender’s conduct demonstrates, on any view, a serious disregard for public safety and a conscious decision to drive while affected by alcohol. I am satisfied, given the amount of alcohol the offender had drunk and the length of his journey, that the offender has almost demonstrated a complete abandonment of responsibility. In making this finding, I acknowledge the term “abandonment of responsibility” covers a wide range of driver behaviour, and that is certainly open to conceive or more serious examples of driver misconduct which would satisfy that description of “abandonment of responsibility”. The reason I fall short of reaching that conclusion in this case is that there is no evidence of speeding or driving erratically. While the distance travelled was long, it was in a sparsely populated area.

28. I have considered the offender’s moral culpability in the circumstances of this case, and I have found that it falls in two different directions. It is reduced, to a limited degree, because of his childhood depravation, and that is not contentious. But there is the more relevant issue of his cognitive decline and its effect. The Crown’s submissions is that it as a result of that cognitive decline – and for the reasons put forward in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 – that his mental condition poses a greater risk to the community. I will discuss this further shortly. For the present purposes I will say that the matter is finely balanced.

29. Both parties made submissions about where these offences fell on a continuum of objective seriousness. I understand why such a submission is made. It makes things easier to compare to one another and it’s a convenient summary. There is no requirement for a sentencing judge to utilise the concept of where a case falls on a scale of seriousness. But in the circumstances of this matter I will set out my conclusion, which is that the offender’s conduct falls well above the midrange of objective seriousness.

ANTECEDENTS

30. The offender is now 64 years of age. He has an enormous number of entries on his criminal and traffic history dating back to 1978. Some of the offences are so old that the sentences involved being sentence to what is described as “hard labour”. There are relatively few criminal offences in the 21st century, but there are some including driving whilst disqualified and driving with a prescribed concentration of alcohol in the blood. But many of these offences are over 20 years old. Nonetheless, the offender’s antecedents disentitle him to leniency.

31. In terms of subjective material, the offender’s subjective material was limited to two reports prepared by Dr Sally McSwiggan a neuropsychologist, the first dated 24 November 2023 and the second dated 16 January 2024. There was also a more recent report tendered from Dr Thea Gumbert dated 30 January 2025. The offender did not give evidence on sentence and there is no evidence from him either by way of letter or affidavit expressing his remorse. Submissions were made to me explaining why that was the case. I note that the absence of any remorse from the offender does not aggravate the sentence.

32. The reports prepared by Dr McSwiggan were prepared in the context of Mr Gall making an application that he was not fit to be tried. The reports state that he does not present with any symptoms consistent with a major mental illness. Dr McSwiggan’s first report sets out some background information. It states that he is an indigenous man who lives alone in Warren and had worked most of his adult life in occupations such as being a drover and a farmhand and a driver of heavy machinery. He is one of 12 children. He left school in year 8 and struggles with literacy.

33. Dr McSwiggan’s report refers to him as someone who has tried to minimise his use of alcohol, at least in terms of his perception of how much he drinks. By way of contract, Dr McSwiggan also spoke with a friend of Mr Gall’s who described the offender as a severe alcoholic for the entire 40 years that he has known him and describes periods where Mr Gall would go on weeklong benders. He describes the offender as often inebriated four days without break, drinking on waking, sleeping in a chair and not eating.

34. Dr McSwiggan describes the offender as having a mildly reduced attention span with what is termed a “disruption of working memory”. This pattern of cognitive loss combined with his sustained alcohol use leads Dr McSwiggan to conclude that he suffers alcohol related dementia. Although Dr McSwiggan does note that she has reached this diagnosis without the benefit of a CT brain scan or medical investigation. Both Dr McSwiggan and Dr Gumbert ultimately conclude that he suffers from a persistent alcohol induced minor neurocognitive disorder and alcohol use disorder.

35. I note Dr McSwiggan’s second report states that she confronted the offender with the evidence setting out his blood alcohol concentration at the time of the collision and the offender simply rejected the results describing them as wrong. He maintained that he had not drunk to excess prior to the collision and that the only alcoholic drinks which may have reflected his blood alcohol reading were consumed post-accident.

36. With respect to the more recent report of Dr Gumbert, she refers to Dr McSwiggan’s reports as well as one that had not been provided to the Court dated 11 June 2024. In that report, Dr McSwiggan describes the offender has having grossly impaired insight and an inability to accept or believe the evidence concerning his blood alcohol concentration. It is that conclusion that Mr Broadbent SC who appears on behalf of the offender drew the Court’s attention by way of an explanation as to why his client has never expressed remorse.

37. Dr Gumbert repeated the history of the offender’s upbringing, noting he had an overall positive relationship with his siblings and he denied any history of abuse or neglect within his family, although he did recall a grandfather who drank excessive quantities of alcohol. The offender told Dr Gumbert that he is preoccupied with his thoughts about this incident and thinks about it many times a day, often when he is occupied with other activities, that he starts feeling an obligation from time to time to think about Mr Kelly and what happened. Dr Gumbert, consistently with Dr McSwiggan’s observation, also found the offender sought to minimise his alcohol intake prior to the offence. He stated to her that he did not mean to run over Mr Kelly.

30. Dr Gumbert concluded that within his family and peer group there was a normalisation of alcohol abuse and that drinking alcohol gave him a way to fit in socially. Dr Gumbert stated that there was a notable lack of family and social support, and that he had been reluctant to engage with therapeutic help outside of custody. I will just pause there to observe that this is relied upon as one of the bases to seek special circumstances for how the sentence is structured.

31. Dr Gumbert agreed with Dr McSwiggan’s diagnosis of a persistent alcohol induced minor neurocognitive disorder and alcohol abuse disorder. She also opined that there may be post-traumatic stress disorder and a major depressive disorder, two issues which were touched upon by Dr Pulman when she examined the offender. Dr Gumbert states that the prolonged incarceration may maintain or cause his mental health issues to become exacerbated. She sets out several rehabilitation programs and interventions which could assist him. I will ensure that her report is forwarded to Corrective Services.

32. In terms of mitigating factors under s 21A(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, I will obviously take into account the fact that he has pleaded guilty and he has demonstrated a willingness to facilitate the course of justice in doing so. I can only be guarded with his prospects of rehabilitation as there appears to be no evidence of any insight, quite the contrary, and he appears to have done nothing to address his alcohol abuse since being in custody. Although, I note that this may be reflecting where he is currently being housed since he commenced his sentence in July last year. There is no evidence of remorse, which I have already dealt with.

33. In terms of moral culpability, mental health and childhood depravation are key considerations. Because the offender did not give any evidence, I am relying purely on the material set out in the reports. No issue was taken with the matters raised in the three psychologists reports and not submission advanced that the details contained in the reports should be approached with caution or should be rejected. Accordingly, I accept the history outlined and the diagnosis.

34. Where a person’s mental health contributes to the commission of an offence in a material way, the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced. Consequently, the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a reduction in the sentence. It may also have the consequences that an offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence, resulting in a reduction in sentence which would otherwise have been imposed.

35. It may mean that a custodial sentence weighs more heavily on that person. It may reduce or eliminate the significance of specific deterrence. Conversely, it may be that because of a person’s mental illness or condition, they present more of a danger to the community, and in those circumstances consideration of specific deterrence may result in an increased sentence. It will be observed that none of these principles is stated as an absolute. What is recognised is the potential effect in any given case of a mental health disability.

36. Too often the mere fact of a mental illness is advanced to this Court as necessarily calling for a more lenient sentence. However, there is no such presumption. It remains necessary for the sentencing court examine the relevant facts in order to determine whether, in the specific case, the mental condition or impairment has the consequences contended for. I note the neurological condition is relevant in that it will make, in this case, the offender’s time in custody more onerous and I take it into account that way. I also take it into account as part of his broad subjective case, as it goes some way to explaining his conduct. However, I do not accept that it makes him a less suitable vehicle for general deterrence.

37. It is submitted on the offender’s behalf that his moral culpability is reduced because of his neurological condition which arises out of his chronic alcohol abuse. Senior Counsel for the offender acknowledges that there is a clear tension between this submission and the expressed prohibition on the Court using intoxication as a mitigating factor at 21A(5AA) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. It was submitted that the Court should view the offender’s decision to drive while intoxicated as reflecting a series of poor decisions made as a result of his cognitive impairment and decline, and not self-induced intoxication.

38. I raised with the parties during sentencing submissions this morning Adamson J’s statement in Fisher v R; R v Fisher [2021] NSWCCA 91 at 225 and Fullerton J’s comments at paras 73 to 75 which is to the effect that an offender’s self-induced intoxication cannot be considered by the sentencing judge to explain his behaviour where such explanation had the effect of minimising moral culpability. This position is consistent with cases such as Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Burton [2020] NSWCCA 54 and Pender v Rex [2023] NSWCCA 291.

39. The Court must disregard the offender’s intoxication entirely when enquiring into the respondent’s state of mind, awareness or perception at the time of the offending, for the purposes of assessing the objective seriousness of the offending. Senior Counsel for the offender’s submission is more nuanced. In effect, the offender is not asking the Court to reduce his moral culpability because of the intoxication, acknowledging that that would clearly fall foul of prohibition at s 21A(5AA), but that the reduction is moral culpability is not because of the alcohol use at the time, but rather the alcohol use and neurocognitive disorders which led to his decision to drive while intoxicated in the first place.

40. It is submitted that there is a link between his impairment and his decision making. I accept that submission at a very general level, in that the offender clearly lacks insight and did not appreciate the dangerousness of his conduct because of his condition. For that reason, it does moderate moral culpability to a small degree in that context, but pulling in the other direction, I also accept the Crown’s submission that this is a case where the person’s mental illness or condition is such that he presents as more of a danger to the community. The offender simply fails to see the connection between his conduct and the dangers that he poses to the community, a position that appears to be maintained to some degree in the psychological reports. Considerations of specific deterrence are of increased importance in the sentence as well as protection of the community.

41. The offender’s neurocognitive decline clearly impairs his ability to make rational decisions and the community must be protected from him. In other words, as part of the instinctive synthesis, I accept one aspect of his subjective case which reduces moral culpability as put forward by the offender, but another aspect of his antecedents which are relied upon by the Crown increases it. The tension between these two issues is difficult to reconcile. But in my view, both matters are of considerable importance, albeit that they pull in different directions.

42. Dealing now with issues of childhood depravation. The Crown accepts that there are childhood deprivation considerations that are relevant here. Wherever profound a childhood depravation arises and what form it takes, it is important not only as part of the subjective case for an offender, but it can also have a role to play in my assessment of the appropriate sentence to be imposed. The effect upon the actual sentence may not be significant, but to not consider childhood disadvantage because there is no causal connection with the offence is to ignore the subtleties and nuances of the considerations set out in the plurality in the High Court case of Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37.

43. I accept that there has been relative relevant disadvantage, and it does lessen his moral culpability to a small degree, particularly the normalisation of alcohol abuse which appears to be a large part of the offender’s background.

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS

52. There were six very powerful victim impact statements read to the Court. Each victim impact statement has been considered by me. Without exception, these statements powerfully express the grief and the torment family members have experienced since the death of Mr Kelly. I express my gratitude to all those who prepared those statements and read them in Court. I can assure you they have been taken into account. They provided me with a clear impression of both Mr Kelly and the enormity of the loss that his family suffers. I have had regard to them as I am required to do.

PURPOSES OF SENTENCING

53. I have had regard to the various purposes of sentencing set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, each of which is incredibly important, but particularly in this matter, the protection of the community and the need to rehabilitate the offender, as well as making him accountable for his actions.

SENTENCE COMMENCEMENT DATE

54. The offender has spent 88 days in custody before being granted bail, then he returned to custody upon entering his plea of guilty on 10 October 2024. The effect of this is that he has already spent seven months in gaol for this offence. His sentence can be backdated until 14 July 2024.

55. Having considered all of the possible alternatives, I am satisfied that the s 5 threshold has been crossed and that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate. Senior Counsel for the offender did not submit to the contrary.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

56. It was submitted that I make a finding of special circumstances relying on the identification factors of the appellant’s age, his alcohol dependency issues, his need for lengthy support within the community given is lack of family and other community supports, his need for long-term monitoring for alcohol rehabilitation and the cognitive and neuro declines I have discussed, and help perhaps with a post-traumatic stress disorder.

57. I accept the submission made by Senior Counsel for the offender that special circumstances should be found, and I will set the non-parole period at about two-thirds of the head sentence. I will now make the final orders.

ORDERS

58. Mr Gall, these are the orders I am going to make in relation to your matter.

1. You are convicted of this offence.

2. I impose the automatic period of disqualification of five years for your driver’s licence.

3. You are sentenced to a period of custody of six years to commence on 14 July 2024 and to conclude on 13 July 2030.

4. You are sentenced to a non-parole period of four years, which will also commence on 14 July 2024 and will expire on 13 July 2028.

59. That is a head sentence of six years and a non-parole period of four years. Whether you are released to parole is not a matter for this Court. Instead, it is a matter for the parole authority. Whether you obtain parole will no doubt depend on how you conduct yourself whilst in custody in determining the appropriate release date.

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Amendments

24 June 2025 - Minor amendment

Decision last updated: 24 June 2025