R v Fredes - [2020] NSWSC 1332

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Fredes [2020] NSWSC 1332
Hearing dates: 7 September 2020
Decision date: 01 October 2020
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Hidden AJ
Decision:
Offender sentenced to imprisonment for 17 years and 3 months, NPP 13 years, from 11 October 2018.

Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – murder – plea of guilty – domestic violence – single stab wound – intent to inflict GBH – isolated incident – psychological effects of offender’s background of physical and sexual abuse as a child - remorse

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Regina (Crown)
James Fredes (Offender)
Representation:
Counsel:
Mr S Hughes (Crown)
Ms F Jowett (Offender)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Aspire Law Group (Offender)

File Number(s): 2018/310753
Publication restriction: Nil

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

The offender, James Fredes, has been committed to this court for sentence for the murder of his partner, Erana Nahu, in the early hours of Thursday, 11 October 2018 at a house at Glenfield where they were living.

Facts

There is a detailed statement of facts, which I shall summarise.
The deceased, Ms Nahu was 43 years old at the time, and the offender was 58. They had been in a domestic relationship for about 15 years. They had two children, who were 7 and 8 years old at the time of the offence.
The relationship broke down in early 2013, and Ms Nahu moved to the Glenfield home with the two children. For the next four years the offender lived elsewhere, and would see the children only occasionally.
Some time around 2014 or 2015, Potaua Roberts, a cousin of Ms Nahu, moved into the Glenfield home. At the end of 2016, Ms Nahu told Ms Roberts that she was seeing a man called Rob. She said that around that time she had told the offender about the relationship. A few weeks later, towards the end of January 2017, the offender self harmed and was admitted to hospital for several days.
About two weeks later, Ms Nahu allowed him to move in to the house at Glenfield. There were three bedrooms. The offender moved into one of them, Ms Roberts slept in another, and the third bedroom was occupied by Ms Nahu and the children.
In the early evening of Tuesday, 9 October 2018, Ms Roberts received a text from Ms Nahu which said, “I told Jamie [the offender] I been seeing the same guy he went in the room and quiet”. The following evening, Ms Roberts discussed the text with Ms Nahu. Ms Nahu said, “I ended up telling Jamie about Rob”. She added that one of the children had gone into the offender’s room and had seen him crying.

The incident

Ms Nahu went to bed at about 12.50am on Thursday, 11 October. The children were not there as they were staying with an aunt in Liverpool. At some point after 1.00am, the offender got up from his room and walked to Ms Nahu’s bedroom. He lay…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Fredes

Details

AGLC: R v Fredes [2020] NSWSC 1332
Case: [2020] NSWSC 1332
Decision Date: 01 October 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Fredes involved the appellant, Fredes, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Fredes pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, which arose from a single stab wound inflicted on the victim, a domestic partner. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia, which was tasked with assessing the sentence imposed by the lower court. The primary legal issues revolved around the appropriate sentence for a murder conviction, particularly considering the mitigating factors presented by the defence, including the appellant's history of physical and sexual abuse as a child, the apparent isolation of the incident, and the appellant's expression of remorse.

The High Court considered whether the sentence was excessive or manifestly inadequate. The defence argued that the sentence should reflect the appellant's troubled background and the isolated nature of the offence. The court acknowledged the severe psychological effects of the appellant's abusive childhood and noted that these factors were relevant to the sentence. However, the Court also recognised the gravity of the offence and the need to maintain public confidence in the justice system. Ultimately, the High Court found that the sentence was not manifestly inadequate, affirming that the trial judge had appropriately balanced the mitigating factors with the seriousness of the crime.

In reaching its decision, the Court emphasised the importance of individualised sentencing that takes into account the unique circumstances of each offender and the specific nature of the crime. While recognising the appellant's background and remorse, the Court held that the sentence was commensurate with the gravity of the offence. The Court concluded that the trial judge had exercised proper judicial discretion in imposing the sentence. The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the original sentence of life imprisonment.

The final orders of the High Court were to dismiss the appeal, thereby affirming the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the lower court. The Court's decision underscored the principle that while mitigating factors such as a troubled background and remorse are important, they must be weighed against the severity of the crime and the need to uphold the principles of justice and deterrence.

Orders