R v Farrugia (Sentence) - [2010] VSC 606

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Unrestricted

AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 0069 of 2010

THE QUEEN

MICHAEL SAM FARRUGIA

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JUDGE:	Lasry J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	9 December 2010
DATE OF SENTENCE:	17 December 2010
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Farrugia (Sentence)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2010] VSC 606

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentencing – Accused plea of guilty and subsequent evidence given to assist authorities – Relevance of personal circumstances – Sentencing discounts.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mrs C Quin	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr R van de Wiel QC with Mr M Regan	Victoria Legal Aid

HIS HONOUR:

Michael Sam Farrugia, on 26 November 2010 you pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter. The maximum penalty for manslaughter is 20 years’ imprisonment. That offence arises from your involvement in the death of Desmond Herbert Moran on Monday 15 June 2009 when he was shot dead in a delicatessen in Ascot Vale. You were originally indicted together with Geoffrey Armour, Suzanne Kane and Judith Moran. The three remaining co-accused will be tried in January 2011, including for murder and related offences.

Circumstances of Offending

I will briefly summarise the manner in which the prosecution allege that you committed this offence and with which you agree. At about 11:59 am on Monday 15 June 2009, Desmond Moran was shot dead at a café at 191 Union Road Ascot Vale. The Crown case is that he was shot by the accused man Geoffrey Armour and the post mortem evidence indicates that Mr Moran was wounded by seven gunshots.

You were present when this occurred and that was because you earlier had agreed to assist Armour for the purpose, as you understood it, of enforcing a debt that Desmond Moran was said to owe to Judith Moran, although as I understand it, you were not then aware of his identity. You have told police that you were told by Armour earlier that day that he was doing some debt collecting for the accused woman Judith Moran and that the person who was ultimately shot by Armour owed her money and had, in some way, abused her.

On 16 November 2010 and 22 November 2010 you made statements to police about the circumstances of the offence. In those statements, on which the Crown propose to rely in the trial of your alleged accomplices, you begin by describing in detail your relationship with Armour dating back to 2004. Contact was maintained between you thereafter and then, from April and May of 2009, the contact between you became more frequent. You had three days off work around the time of the killing of Desmond Moran, due to a close-down at your employer’s business. You spent some of that time with Armour including on shooting trips and you were also introduced to Judith Moran.

On the Sunday night before the killing, at Armour’s invitation, you visited Judith Moran’s premises for dinner. By arrangement, you…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Farrugia (Sentence)

Details

AGLC: R v Farrugia (Sentence) [2010] VSC 606
Case: [2010] VSC 606
Decision Date: 17 December 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Farrugia involved the defendant, Farrugia, who had pleaded guilty to criminal charges. The nature of the dispute pertained to the sentencing of Farrugia, where the defence sought to present personal circumstances to mitigate the sentence. The matter was heard in the relevant Australian court. The primary legal issue before the court was determining the appropriate sentence for Farrugia, considering his guilty plea and the evidence provided by the defence about his personal circumstances.

The court had to weigh the principles of sentencing, including the defendant's guilty plea, which typically attracts a discount, and the relevance of personal circumstances to the sentencing decision. The court also had to consider the evidence provided by Farrugia to assist authorities, which could potentially warrant a further reduction in sentence. The court examined the statutory guidelines and case law to ensure the sentence was proportionate to the crime committed, while also taking into account the mitigating factors presented.

In delivering its judgment, the court acknowledged Farrugia's guilty plea and the assistance he provided to the authorities. The court considered the personal circumstances presented by the defence, which included factors such as his background, character, and potential for rehabilitation. After a thorough assessment, the court determined that the mitigating factors warranted a reduction in sentence, balancing the need for punishment with the principles of justice. The court concluded that the appropriate sentence would reflect both the seriousness of the offence and the mitigating evidence provided.

The final orders of the court included a specific sentence for Farrugia, taking into account the discounts for his guilty plea and the mitigating personal circumstances. The exact terms of the sentence were outlined in the judgment, ensuring that it was legally sound and justified by the evidence presented. The court's decision provided clarity on how personal circumstances and evidence of cooperation with authorities could influence the sentencing process in similar cases.

Orders