R v Farrell

[2003] NSWSC 300

CITATION:	R v Farrell [2003] NSWSC 300
HEARING DATE(S):	11 April 2003
JUDGMENT DATE:	15 April 2003
JURISDICTION:	Common Law
JUDGMENT OF:	Sperling J at 1
DECISION:	See paragraph 5 of the judgment.
CATCHWORDS:	Criminal Law - special hearing - murder - defence of mental illness - no question of principle
LEGISLATION CITED:	Evidence Act 1995, s191 Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, s14, s19, s21A, s38, s39
CASES CITED:	Hawkins (1994) 179 CLR 500 Re M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 CL & F 200
PARTIES :	Regina Stephen Patrick Farrell
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 70103/02
COUNSEL:	Mr M Barr for the Crown Mr T Game SC for the Accused
SOLICITORS:	Mr SE O'Connor for the Director of Public Prosecutions Giddy & Crittenden for the Accused

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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
Criminal

Sperling J

Tuesday, 15 April 2003

70103/02 Regina v Stephen Patrick Farrell

Judgment

1 His Honour: This was a special hearing pursuant to s19 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (hereafter “the Act”).

2 On 11 April 2003, Stephen Patrick Farrell was arraigned before me and charged with the offence that on 1 June 2001 at Sydney in the state of New South Wales he did murder Bernadette Farrell. The accused did not enter a plea and was accordingly deemed to have pleaded not guilty. His counsel, Mr Game of senior counsel, stated that the accused’s case was that he was not guilty on the ground of mental illness.

3 At an earlier time, on 30 August 2002, I found, pursuant to s14 of the Act, that the accused was unfit to be tried for the offence.

4 At the commencement of the special hearing, the Crown tendered an election for trial by a judge alone, signed by the accused and on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions pursuant to s21A(1) of the Act. I was satisfied that the accused, before making the election, sought and received advice in relation to the election from his solicitor.

5 At the conclusion of the special hearing, I found that the accused was not guilty of the offence charged by reason of mental illness. I directed the entry of a verdict to that effect. I made an order, as required, pursuant to s39 of the Act. What follows are my reasons for the determination.

6 A statement of agreed facts was tendered by the Crown by consent. I took this to be a statement of agreed facts by a party with the concurrence of the accused and, accordingly, granted leave pursuant to s191(3)(b) of the Evidence Act 1995. The agreed statement of facts was as follows.

Antecedents
The defendant was residing with his parents brothers and sisters.
He has been receiving treatment for schizophrenia. Inquiries are currently being made in relation to this treatment and prescribed medication.
He is currently employed and worked on the evening on 31st May 2001 in a hotel.
Full Facts
About 5.15am on Friday 1st June 2001 the mother of the Defendant and victim was awoken by the defendant.
He said, “Dad, Bernadette’s in big trouble”. He then left and walked to his own room. The mother then walked to the defendant’s room and asked him what was wrong. He said, “She’s in big trouble”.
The mother then walked to victim’s room and saw the victim laying on her back on the bed with an amount of blood on the sheets. The victim was pale but still conscious. The victim said, “I’ve rung an ambulance”. The victim then made gasping noises. The mother then returned to the defendant’s room. he looked at his mother and said, “I’m sorry”.
During this time the father, Allan FARRELL entered the victims bedroom and saw her on the bed. He said, “What happened?”. The victim replied Stephen stabbed me”.
Alan FARRELL then turned his daughter over and saw a large wound to the right side of her back that was bleeding freely. Both parents then commenced CPR on the victim. The parents saw a kitchen knife of the bed near the victim.
Police arrived a short time later and the defendant was arrested. Ambulance personnel also arrived and commenced treating the victim.
Police asked the defendant where the knife was and he stated, “It is still in the room”.
The defendant was conveyed to Hornsby Police station and entered into custody. The victim was pronounced life extinct at Hornsby Hospital at 6.35am. The treating doctor estimated that the victim had lost 2.5 litres of blood as a result of her injury.
The defendant refused to be interviewed on the advice of his solicitor. An order was issued in relation to Forensic Procedures to be carried out upon the defendant. These procedures were carried out at Hornsby Police station.

7 Witness statements by the following persons were tendered by the Crown: Dr A J Farrell (the accused’s father), Ms S Farrell (the accused’s sister), Mr M P Harris (a friend of the accused), Mr S R A Brown (a friend of the accused and of the deceased) and Mr M J Paterson (the licensee of the Great Northern Hotel, Chatswood, where the accused was employed). A certificate by Dr M J Sterrett and a post mortem report by Dr D Little confirmed the cause of death. The agreed statement of facts accurately and adequately summarised that evidence.

8 I was satisfied, on this evidence, that, on 1 June 2001, the accused killed the deceased as alleged.

9 That was sufficient to establish the element of action in the offence charged. As to the element of specific intent, where a defence of mental illness arises for consideration, the defence falls for determination before the issue of intent. It is only if the defence of mental illness is rejected that the issue of intent is to be addressed: see Hawkins (1994) 179 CLR 500. I read that case as relating to a situation where the only basis on which specific intent could be negated would be on the ground of mental illness. That was the situation in this case.

10 Sections 38 and 39 of the Act are as follows:

38. If, in an indictment or information, an act or omission is charged against a person as an offence and it is given in evidence on the trial of the person for the offence that the person was mentally ill, so as not to be responsible, according to law, for his or her action at the time when the act was done or omission made, then, if it appears to the jury before which the person is tried that the person did the act or made the omission charged, but was mentally ill at the time when the person did or made the same, the jury must return a special verdict that the accused person is not guilty by reason of mental illness.
39. If, on the trial of a person charged with an offence, the jury returns a special verdict that the accused person is not guilty by reason of mental illness, the Court must order that the person be detained in strict custody in such place and in such manner as the Court thinks fit until released by due process of law.

11 In s38, “mentally ill” means, on authority, mentally ill in the sense of the M’Naghten Rules: see Re M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 CL & F 200, relevantly (at 210):

[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.

12 The accused had a history of psychotic illness involving paranoid delusions.

13 The evidence before me included reports by Dr B Westmore, forensic psychiatrist, Dr Y Skinner, forensic psychiatrist, and Dr A Samuels, consultant psychiatrist. Dr Westmore and Dr Skinner were retained by the Crown. Dr Samuels was retained on behalf of the accused.

14 The following is an extract from Dr Westmore’s report of 12 December 2001:

Your client is a twenty-three year old man who suffers a psychotic illness which was first identified, probably in 1998. His illness is characterized by a paranoid delusional thought content, the belief that others can read his mind and in some way control or influence his thought or behaviours. He receives messages from the radio and had believed he was in a movie as were other family members.
My provisional diagnosis is that he suffers a chronic paranoid schizophrenic illness which has in the past been aggravated by his polysubstance abuse.
On the history he provides I believe he was psychotic, that is, mentally ill at the time he allegedly stabbed his sister, Bernadette. I believe he had delusional beliefs regarding his sister and he acted towards her due to those delusional beliefs.
He has available to him the defence of mental illness. He suffers from a disease of the mind, specifically, a paranoid schizophrenic illness, this illness would have totally deprived him of his capacity to consider his behaviour with a modicum of calmness and rationality. While he may have understood that his behaviour was wrong in a legal sense, he would not have understood his behaviour was wrong in the more subtle moral sense. He was delusionally driven in my view.

15 The following is an extract from Dr Skinner’s report of 19 March 2002:

Stephen Farrell suffers from Chronic Paranoid Schizophrenia. It has been suggested that he might have suffered a drug-induced psychosis. However, he has been in the prison hospital where he is presumably unable to access drugs and alcohol, and he continues to suffer severe psychotic symptoms characteristic of a schizophrenic illness. He has no insight into the fact that he suffers from a mental illness or that his beliefs are delusional.
I consider that he was suffering from severe mental illness at the time that he allegedly stabbed his sister. I consider that he had delusional beliefs about his sister and acted on those beliefs at the time.

16 The following is an extract from Dr Samuels’ report of 30 January 2002:

Mental state at the time of the offence
In my view, Stephen was suffering from an exacerbation of his psychotic illness. There is a clear history of his non-compliance with his prescribed medication for some months prior to the offence taking only half the recommended dose. There is also evidence that he either completely stopped taking his medication or at least significantly reduced the dose in the weeks leading up to the offence. I believe he suffered an “Abnormality of mind” as specified under Section 23A.1 of the Crimes Act.
He would have in my opinion fulfilled the Insanity criteria laid down by the M’Naughten Rules on the night of the offence. There seems little doubt that he was suffering a severe paranoid psychosis on the night of the offence with prominent delusional beliefs in relation to his deceased sister, Bernadette. He describes what amounts to “an irresistible impulse” in that he felt he had no option but to act in the way he did in order to release himself from the situation in which he felt he was “trapped”. This sense of being “trapped” was of course a product of his mind. Whether or not he knew “right from wrong” is harder to ascertain but given his belief that this was all “a movie” it seems that he had a sense in this context that his actions would not have the same impact on his sister as they would have “in real life”. He remains firm in his belief that she is still alive.

17 Having regard to this evidence, I was satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused was acting under such a defect of reason from a disease of the mind as neither to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing nor, if he did know it, that he was doing what was wrong. The defence of mental illness under the M’Naghten Rules was accordingly made out.

18 It was common ground at the bar table that, if I was so satisfied, there was no occasion to consider the question of specific intent as an element in the crime of murder, nor the question of diminished responsibility. I would add the observation, however, that, but for the defence of mental illness, the accused could only have been convicted of manslaughter rather than murder by reason of diminished responsibility.

-oOo-

Last Modified: 04/28/2003