R v Farr and Ors, Re; Re Farr

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1994] QCA 266

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

No. 130 of 1994

Brisbane

[R. v. Farr]

IN THE MATTER of the Supreme Court Act 1991

AND:

IN THE MATTER of THE QUEEN v. GLENN PATRICK FARR AND OTHERS

AND:

IN THE MATTER of an application by GLENN PATRICK FARR

Davies JA
McPherson JA

Williams J

Judgment delivered 19/07/1994
Separate reasons for judgment of Davies JA, McPherson JA and

Williams J all agreeing with the order.

MOTION DISMISSED

CATCHWORDS:CRIMINAL LAW - trial - special security arrangements - trial Judge's administrative jurisdiction - question of prejudice to accused considered - special dock - handcuffs and body belt - jurors to be anonymous.

Counsel:  S Herbert QC for the appellant, Farr
M Griffin for the respondent, Alexanderson

J Dick for the respondents, Garrett, MacQueen,

Nixon and Barlow

B Butler for the respondent, Attorney-General

Solicitors:  Peter Russo Solicitors for the appellant

Miss Gabriel Rudey & Garrett for the respondent,

Alexanderson

Legal Aid Office for the respondents, Garrett,

MacQueen, Nixon and Barlow

Director of Prosecutions for the respondent,

Attorney-General

Hearing date: 11 July 1994

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DAVIES J.A.

J udgment delivered 19/07/1994

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of each of McPherson J.A. and Williams J. I agree with them that the application should be refused. I also agree with Williams J. that the affidavit of Theodore Lucas should not be admitted for the reason which he gives.

The facts giving rise to this application are fully set out in the reasons of McPherson J.A. and Williams J. I shall not repeat them here.

The main contention for the applicant was that the totality of the precautions which his Honour ordered to be taken was more obvious than necessary, in consequence of which the applicant and his co-accused will not have a fair trial. It was submitted that an adequate but less obvious precaution would have been to attach each accused by a leg-iron to a rail fixed inside an ordinary dock. They could be secured in this way, it was said, before the jury entered court in the morning and taken out only after the jury had left at the end of the day. If that were done, it was submitted, it would not be obvious that the accused persons were secured in any way. It was further submitted that during the course of the hearing any disruption caused by an accused could be dealt with by his removal: Criminal Code, s. It was contended by the Attorney-General, who was a respondent to the application, that this Court had no jurisdiction to grant the declaration sought. However, for the reasons which I am about to give, I do not think it necessary to decide that question.

The applicant objected both to the manner in which each accused was to be secured, that is by handcuffs affixed to a body-belt, and to the presence of the perspex dock in which the…

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Case
[1994] QCA 266
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Farr and Ors, Re; Re Farr, the respondents, who were charged with the murder of Bart Hans Vosmaer, sought a declaration that the orders made by de Jersey J. with respect to security arrangements during the trial were beyond his jurisdiction, unnecessary, inappropriate, and inconsistent with their right to a fair trial. The respondents also sought an order that the trial be stayed until the orders were vacated. The case involved six respondents, each with extensive criminal histories involving violent offences, and a history of violent and disruptive behaviour in court. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the trial judge had the discretion to determine the security measures necessary to ensure a fair trial and the safety of those present in the courtroom. The Court held that the measures ordered by the trial judge, including the use of a transparent perspex dock, handcuffs, and body belts, were reasonable and not obviously distinctive. The Court emphasised the importance of allowing the trial judge to exercise their discretion in determining the appropriate security measures, and the need to balance the right to a fair trial with the safety of those in the courtroom. The Court also noted that the impact of the security measures on the fairness of the trial would ultimately be determined on appeal following conviction, if necessary.

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