R v Farr and Ors, Re; Re Farr

[1994] QCA 266

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1994] QCA 266

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

No. 130 of 1994

Brisbane

[R. v. Farr]

IN THE MATTER of the Supreme Court Act 1991

AND:

IN THE MATTER of THE QUEEN v. GLENN PATRICK FARR AND OTHERS

AND:

IN THE MATTER of an application by GLENN PATRICK FARR

Davies JA
McPherson JA

Williams J

Judgment delivered 19/07/1994
Separate reasons for judgment of Davies JA, McPherson JA and

Williams J all agreeing with the order.

MOTION DISMISSED

CATCHWORDS:CRIMINAL LAW - trial - special security arrangements - trial Judge's administrative jurisdiction - question of prejudice to accused considered - special dock - handcuffs and body belt - jurors to be anonymous.

Counsel:	S Herbert QC for the appellant, Farr
M Griffin for the respondent, Alexanderson

J Dick for the respondents, Garrett, MacQueen,

Nixon and Barlow

B Butler for the respondent, Attorney-General

Solicitors:  Peter Russo Solicitors for the appellant

Miss Gabriel Rudey & Garrett for the respondent,

Alexanderson

Legal Aid Office for the respondents, Garrett,

MacQueen, Nixon and Barlow

Director of Prosecutions for the respondent,

Attorney-General

Hearing date: 11 July 1994

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DAVIES J.A.

J udgment delivered 19/07/1994

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of each of McPherson J.A. and Williams J. I agree with them that the application should be refused. I also agree with Williams J. that the affidavit of Theodore Lucas should not be admitted for the reason which he gives.

The facts giving rise to this application are fully set out in the reasons of McPherson J.A. and Williams J. I shall not repeat them here.

The main contention for the applicant was that the totality of the precautions which his Honour ordered to be taken was more obvious than necessary, in consequence of which the applicant and his co-accused will not have a fair trial. It was submitted that an adequate but less obvious precaution would have been to attach each accused by a leg-iron to a rail fixed inside an ordinary dock. They could be secured in this way, it was said, before the jury entered court in the morning and taken out only after the jury had left at the end of the day. If that were done, it was submitted, it would not be obvious that the accused persons were secured in any way. It was further submitted that during the course of the hearing any disruption caused by an accused could be dealt with by his removal: Criminal Code, s. It was contended by the Attorney-General, who was a respondent to the application, that this Court had no jurisdiction to grant the declaration sought. However, for the reasons which I am about to give, I do not think it necessary to decide that question.

The applicant objected both to the manner in which each accused was to be secured, that is by handcuffs affixed to a body-belt, and to the presence of the perspex dock in which the accused persons would be seated. As to the first of these, his Honour also ordered that such of the prosecution witnesses as were also prisoners should be similarly restrained by handcuffs attached to body-belts whilst in the courtroom. This was, his Honour said, in order to avoid jurors drawing unfavourable contrasts. I think it unlikely that they will. It will be obvious from the evidence that all the accused and those witnesses were prisoners in a maximum security part of the jail. It should not be surprising that security measures such as this need to be taken in respect of such offenders.

It is possible that the perspex dock will be obviously different from the dock which jurors might otherwise expect to see. However, we were told that the ordinary dock will be removed from the court and that a jury will be empanelled specially for this trial. These measures will reduce the risk of any prejudice being caused by this measure.

The criminal record of each of the accused shows each to be a man of violent disposition and the quite frightening incident which occurred in the Magistrates Court, recorded on film, is recent proof of the serious risk of injury to innocent persons caused by the presence of these men.

A trial judge faced with this risk has the extremely difficult task of balancing the necessity of a fair trial for these men against the risk of serious injury or even death to innocent persons. I would be most reluctant to interfere with the exercise of a trial judge's discretion as to the security measures necessary to achieve that balance in her or his courtroom. Whilst I would not be prepared to say that this Court should never interfere with directions such as these, I could not be satisfied that the measures which his Honour directed went beyond what was reasonable to achieve that balance.

As to the argument that the jurors on the panel be given numbers instead of names, I agree with the conclusion and reasons of McPherson J.A.

I would therefore refuse the application.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

No. 30 of 1994

Brisbane

Before Davies J.A.
McPherson J.A.
Williams J.

[R. v. Farr]
IN THE MATTER of the Supreme

Court Act 1991

- and -

IN THE MATTER of THE QUEEN v. GLENN PATRICK FARR AND OTHERS

- and -

IN THE MATTER of an

application by GLENN PATRICK

FARR

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON J.A.
Judgment delivered the Nineteenth day of July 1994

On 25 July 1994 de Jersey J. is due to begin the trial by jury of six persons charged with murdering Bart Vosmaer on 24 March 1993. They were and are prisoners serving lengthy sentences, and the alleged murder itself took place in the prison of which they were all inmates. de Jersey J. has recently given directions the effect of which is that at the trial the accused will be seated in a specially constructed transparent perspex dock; they will each be handcuffed to a body belt; and the members of the jury will be identified at the proceedings by numbers, and not by means of their names, occupations or addresses.

The applicant is Glenn Patrick Farr, who is one of the accused persons. His application is supported by the others, who appeared before us by various counsel. Essentially what the applicant and those supporting him are seeking is a declaration that compliance with the directions given by his Honour will have the effect of denying them a fair trial. While acknowledging that the case is one in which some security measures may be justified, the submission made to this Court is that the restraints envisaged by the directions are excessive. Problems involved in conducting the trial of these persons can, and it is said should be, solved by adopting other equally practicable measures that would avoid needlessly creating in the minds of the jurors an impression that will be prejudicial to the accused at their trial.

There is no doubt that, where special security precautions are needed, it is incumbent on the judge who presides at the trial to ensure that they are "no more obvious than is necessary, and that all possible steps are taken to avoid or mitigate the prejudicial effect which such precautions may have on the mind of the jury" : see Smith v. The Queen (1985) 159 C.L.R. 532, 534. Gibbs C.J. was referring there to sequestering the jury from improper communications, but earlier, in what appears to be the same case, Street C.J., speaking on behalf of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales had said that the authority of the judge in respect of security within the court room extends to matters affecting witnesses, counsel and solicitors involved in the trial, as well as members of the public : R. v. E.J. Smith [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 608, 617. The learned Chief Justice also said there was no obligation at all upon a presiding judge to advise the parties to the proceedings of the special security measures being introduced, although the judge might on occasions do so "as a matter of courtesy". From what is said there it is also clear that there is no obligation on the presiding judge to invite submissions, or to permit the adduction or testing of evidence or advice on the subject. For that reason among others I would not be prepared to admit the affidavit of Theodore Lucas that was tendered to us concerning security arrangements capable of being made. To the extent that remarks of W.B. Campbell J. in R. v. Stuart and Finch [1974] Qd.R. 297, 344, suggest a contrary view from that expressed in R. v. E.L. Smith, they should in my opinion not be considered authoritative.

The underlying reason for this attitude toward matters of security is that a judge presiding at a trial has a power, which is not judicial but administrative, of regulating and controlling the conduct of his own court. See Re Andrew Dunn and the Morning Bulletin [1932] St.R.Qd. 1, 15, 16, 17. In relation to security matters within the courtroom itself, the authority of the presiding judge was described in R. v. E.J. Smith [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 608, 616, as "absolute". Directions given in exercise of that authority are consequently not susceptible to the ordinary processes of appeal: Re Andrew Dunn.

Henchman J. in Re Andrew Dunn, at 16, was careful to confine his remarks to directions not affecting an individual's proprietary rights, status or person; but even if some such qualification is added, it is not immediately obvious how directions like those in question here can be effectively challenged. Judges of superior courts are, as was acknowledged in argument before us, not subject to prerogative relief in the form of certiorari or mandamus : cf. R. v. Griffin (No. 2) (1868) 1 Q.S.C.R. 182, 184, 185. The question being one of justiciability, rather than of procedure or remedy, it is not in my view possible to circumvent limitations on the power to review such directions by the expedient used here of moving this Court at an interlocutory stage for declarations designed to persuade the judge to abandon or modify the security arrangements he has made. Apart from other considerations telling against such a procedure, it is obviously open to the judge to vary such arrangements from time to time as he sees fit.

Without, however, finally holding that persons likely to be affected by administrative directions are always entirely without remedy, it is obviously proper to approach the question raised here with a powerful predisposition in favour of the correctness of the directions given by the judge who is to preside at the trial. It is, after all, not the safety of members of this Court that is at stake, but that of the presiding judge and others who will be involved in or attending the trial. We ought therefore not to be minutely critical of measures adopted to reduce the danger. Prima facie the decisive say over the precautions to be taken must be left with the person who carries the responsibility and bears the risk. It is not for us to be unduly courageous about risks that do not threaten us personally.

The applicant and those supporting him will, in any event, not be left remediless if the trial miscarries. If the security measures are, as the accused suggest here, excessive, their impact on the fairness of the trial will in the end fall to be determined on the appeal which, it is suggested by experience, will almost as a matter of course follow conviction at the trial. See R. v. E.J. Smith [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 608, 617. For reasons of cost and otherwise there is an obvious desire to ensure that, before it starts, the trial is not doomed to be re- run. However, even if it is open to us at this stage to review the arrangements intended by the trial judge here, I would not be disposed to interfere with them.

My reasons for saying so are these. First, as to the proposals designed to maintain the anonymity of the jury, the applicant's written outlines of argument state that no objection is made to those measures. The directions do not deny the applicant or any of the other accused, or their legal advisers or representatives, access to the jury list when the jury is being empanelled and the accuseds' rights of challenge are being exercised. It is consequently not easy to identify any perceptible disadvantage that will result if, after the jury has been chosen, the accused no longer have access to the jury list; if and when an occasion arises, application will no doubt then be made to the judge for it to be allowed. The suggestion that, because they will be identified by number rather than by name, the jury will gain an impression that there is something fundamentally different about this trial is in my opinion not sustainable. Jurors are already assigned numbers which at trials in the Supreme Court are, on the rare occasions that it is necessary, sometimes used to identify them. The particular panel being assembled for this trial is one that is special, in the sense at least that its members will not have been or be used for the purpose of other trials proceeding in Court at the time.

There is therefore no substance in this matter of complaint, which Mr Herbert Q.C. for the applicant candidly conceded was not his client's most impressive objection. Having regard to what was said in Smith v. The Queen, it is only the other precautions that are proposed which invite any serious attention.

The first of the physical precautions envisaged is that the accused will be handcuffed and that the handcuffs will be attached to a body belt. The effect of the latter device will be to restrict upward and sideways movement of the hands of the accused. A degree of discomfort will inevitably result. However much this may be regretted, it is a measure that is plainly necessary or justified in the present case. We have, like de Jersey J., viewed a video recording of an event that took place on 6 September 1993. The accused were then in court awaiting a mention in connection with the committal proceedings when a physical struggle ensued in which most of them appear to have participated. The most memorable incident in the video recording is the use which at least one of the accused made of his manacled hands to bring down repeated heavy blows upon his human target or targets. The indelible impression created is that it would be possible for an accused person using that method to inflict serious injury or even death upon persons within his reach. Taking a hostage by this means is another possibility that may have to be borne in mind.

The direction that the accused be handcuffed to or with a body belt is in the circumstances therefore not excessive. That such a spectacle will make an impression on the jury can scarcely be doubted; but from the beginning they will also be or quickly become aware that all the accused are prisoners in a high security risk section of the gaol, as indeed are also many of the 70 or more witnesses who will be called to give evidence in the prosecution case. As it is intended that those witnesses will also be manacled in a similar fashion, the jury are not likely to be led to think that the accused are in some way special in this respect or that they are, more so than the prisoner witnesses, to be considered as specially dangerous.

The judge's direction that the accused be handcuffed in the manner described is therefore not fairly open to the complaint that it is excessive or obviously distinctive. The arrangement for provision of a perspex enclosed dock stands on a somewhat different plane. It is obviously unusual and may perhaps be identified by those who will see it as specially constructed for the occasion. It was, however, not sought to argue that the accused should be left free to escape, or even move from the dock at will. In the end the submission before us was really reduced to saying that shackling the feet of the accused to the floor was the preferable course as being less obtrusive. His Honour considered such an alternative but rejected it on the ground that it appeared "barbarous". Many would, I imagine, consider any disadvantage of being in an enclosed perspex dock as more than outweighed by the advantage of retaining free movement of one's unshackled feet. The question is, however, very largely one of opinion on which individual views may reasonably differ. It is not such as to justify intervention by this Court in favour of a method other than that chosen by the judge.

Using a specially constructed perspex dock to house the accused does, in any event, not involve a simple choice between two equally effective alternatives. A particular advantage of the perspex dock is that the accused will be able to be led into it directly from the door through which they will enter the court. That will almost certainly diminish the security risk at that point, as well as reducing the time that would be taken and the risk created by the process of shackling and unshackling the accused whenever it became necessary for one of them to be moved. In addition, the enclosure in which the accused will be seated at the trial will have the advantage of ensuring that no attempt can be made to injure or seize passers-by, or to engage in other unusual unexpected actions at moments when, as is inevitable in the course of time, close attention to matters of security tends to lapse. The trial, it must be remembered, is expected to occupy some seven weeks of sitting time, so that, if adequate precautions are not taken, the opportunity available to the accused for preparing plans and putting them into effect will not be slight. That there is a realistic possibility of some such attempt being made appears from the criminal records of the accused. All of them have extensive histories of convictions involving offences of violence. In the case of some of them there is evidence of repeated efforts to escape from lawful custody. Their behaviour on the occasion on 6 September 1993 attests to their continuing willingness to engage in violent conduct even in the court room itself. The accused Alexanderson must be excluded from the generality of this observation. Although present on the occasion in September last year, it is not suggested that he took an active part in the violence that occurred. However, for reasons that may be self- evident, he does not insist on being treated differently from his co-accused.

For all these reasons the motion should in my opinion be dismissed. I should add that I would be disposed to agree with the reasons of my colleagues concerning the affidavit of Theodore Lucas.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

No. 130 of 1994

Brisbane

Before Davies JA

McPherson JA
Williams J

[R. v. Farr]
IN THE MATTER of the Supreme Court Act 1991
AND:
IN THE MATTER of THE QUEEN v. GLENN PATRICK FARR AND OTHERS
AND:

IN THE MATTER of an application by GLENN PATRICK FARR

JUDGMENT - G N WILLIAMS J

Judgment delivered 19/07/1994

The applicant, Glenn Patrick Farr, and others, being the respondents, Alexanderson, Garrett, MacQueen, Nixon and Barlow, have been indicted in the Supreme Court for the murder of Bart Hans Vosmaer on 24 March 1993. The trial is due to commence on 25 July 1994, and it has been assigned to de Jersey J. On 14 and 21 June 1994 his Honour made certain orders or directions with respect to security arrangements which were to apply during the trial. The applicant seeks from this Court a declaration that such orders are:

"i) Beyond the jurisdiction of his Honour;
ii) Are unnecessary for the proper conduct of the trial;
iii) Inappropriate for the conduct of a fair trial;
iv) Inconsistent with the applicant's right to a fair trial."
He also seeks an order that the trial be stayed until such
orders are vacated. The respondents who are charged along with
the applicant supported the applicant's submissions. The
Attorney-General for Queensland is also named as a respondent,
and counsel on his behalf opposed the granting of the

declaration and orders sought.
Vosmaer died as a result of injuries inflicted on him
whilst he was an inmate of the Sir David Longlands Correctional
Centre. Each of the persons accused of murder were also
prisoners in that institution. In addition, a number of
important prosecution witnesses were also prisoners in that
institution at the relevant time.
Each of the accused persons has an extensive criminal
history, and details thereof were known to his Honour at the
time he gave consideration to making the orders under review.
It is sufficient to note that one finds throughout the criminal
histories frequent convictions for crimes of violence, for
assaults on police officers and correctional officers, and for
escaping or attempting to escape from custody. In addition, an
incident occurred on 6 September 1993 in a Magistrates courtroom
where there was to be a mention of the committal proceedings.
Before the presiding Magistrate entered the courtroom, most of
the accused persons were involved in an extremely violent
altercation with correctional officers and/or police. The whole
incident was recorded on video, and that was played to his
Honour and this Court.
It is anticipated that the trial will last seven weeks, and
for a variety of reasons it has been said that the trial will be
of some "complexity".
Against that background and after hearing submissions, his
Honour gave the following orders or directions on 14 and 21 June
1994:
1.That a floor to ceiling transparent perspex type dock be

erected immediately adjacent to the door from the cells to the courtroom so that the accused persons will enter and leave the courtroom in secure circumstances;

2.That each accused be handcuffed whilst in the dock and that

such handcuffs be attached to body belts;

3.That the jurors on the panel be assigned a distinctive number
so that names need not be called in the courtroom or in its
precincts during the process of empanelment and afterwards.
It should also be noted that on 21 June 1994 the applicant
was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. In consequence

it can be said that the various orders and directions in

question were made after his trial had commenced. making of orders resulting in the taking of special security precautions at a criminal trial in Smith v. The Queen (1985) 159

The applicant, and the accused-respondents, each contend
that he will be severely prejudiced at the trial by the security
measures ordered to be taken. The contention is that the jury
would reasonably infer from the obvious security precautions
taken that each of the accused persons was of violent
disposition and that each constituted some threat or danger to
persons in the courtroom.
The defence of each accused is being financed by the Legal
Aid Office (Queensland) and it is anticipated that the cost of
the trial to the Office will be well in excess of $200,000.
With that amount of public money at stake it is said that it
would be unfortunate if there was a re-trial in consequence of a
finding by an appellate court that the security measures in
question meant that some or all of the accused persons were
deprived of a fair trial.
Counsel for the Attorney-General contended that this Court
had no jurisdiction to make the declarations sought either
because it had no general jurisdiction to grant declaratory
relief or because declaratory relief was not available in the
particular circumstances. There is no need to consider the
first submission in any detail. There is no doubt that at least
in certain circumstances this Court would have power to grant
relief by way of declaration.
What is of more significance is the question whether or not
the Court should, in the particular circumstances of this case,
grant declaratory relief. The applicant is, under the guise of
seeking declaratory relief, seeking to appeal against the orders
and directions made.

C.L.R. 532. The relevant passage appears at 534:

"When it is necessary for a trial judge to take special precautions for the security of the jury (a situation which one would expect to be exceptional) the judge should take special care to ensure that the precautions are no more obvious than is necessary, and that all possible steps are taken to avoid or mitigate the prejudicial effect which such precautions may have on the mind of the jury. It may in some cases be desirable for the judge to advise the accused of the nature of the precautions or to warn the jury that they should not be influenced by the fact that the precautions were taken. But whether that will be so must depend on the circumstances of the case."

Section 617 of The Criminal Code provides that where an accused person "so conducts himself as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his presence impracticable" the Court may order him to be removed from the courtroom and that the trial proceed in his absence. The meaning and effect of that provision was considered at some length by the trial Judge and the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Stuart [1973] Qd.R. 460 and [1974] Qd.R. 297. There is no doubt that in a variety of circumstances the trial Judge may order that the trial continue in the absence of the accused. Senior counsel for the applicant submitted that s. 617 provided the appropriate remedy in all cases where there was concern on proper grounds that the presence of an accused person in the courtroom might create a security threat. But that is clearly not so. The trial Judge has an overriding administrative jurisdiction with respect to the conduct of proceedings in his courtroom and he has the power to give such directions as he sees fit with respect to the conduct of all persons, including members of the public, within the precincts of that courtroom. Ultimately it may be successfully argued that a direction so given has resulted in the accused not having a fair trial, but that is something which can only be determined at the end of the trial in the light of all that occurred during the trial, and in the light of all the circumstances which it was proper for the Judge to take into account in deciding to so act. The decision of the Full Court in Re Dunn and The Morning Bulletin Ltd [1932] St.R.Qd. 1 provides authority, if such be needed, that a Judge has the power of regulating and controlling the conduct of his own Court, including giving directions as to the position which members of the public and others may occupy within the Court. What is perhaps of greater significance for present purposes is that the Court there held that such a direction was administrative and not part of the Judge's judicial functions such as would permit of an appeal against the ruling. That would appear to be correct, but again it would not prevent an appellate court from subsequently quashing a conviction on the ground that the directions so given resulted in an accused not having a fair trial.

All of that makes it clear that this Court could only exercise its jurisdiction to interfere at this stage in the most exceptional of circumstances. The orders made and directions given involved the learned Judge giving effect to his discretionary control over proceedings in his courtroom. He is the person who has to preside at the trial, and in this case that means preside over a trial which is said to last for seven weeks and which involves, having within the courtroom, persons who can reasonably be said, given their past convictions and patterns of behaviour, to constitute a threat to the safety of other persons within the courtroom. The trial Judge is clearly in the best position to gauge the extent of security precautions which are necessary in the circumstances.

Here the learned trial Judge took into account the large number of accused persons, the anticipated length of the trial, the prior history of violent behaviour by each of the accused, the evidence of violent and disruptive behaviour by some or all of the accused during the course of proceedings in the Magistrates Court against them, and his own assessment of the situation given the content of the depositions and his own experience as a trial Judge over a number of years.

Indeed, by the end of the day senior counsel for the applicant conceded that some security precautions were reasonably required in all of the circumstances. The proposition which ran through many of his submissions was that it was the combination of the perspex dock and the handcuffing which made the orders objectionable. In the end, he submitted that he could not object to handcuffs, body belt, and leg irons, but he did object to those in combination with a "perspex cage".

Once that concession is made it is difficult to see how the applicant can succeed on the application at this stage. The use of handcuffs, body belt, and leg irons could not be hidden from the jury, and it is difficult to hold at this point of time that a jury would be more significantly affected by the presence of the enclosed dock coupled with the other visible restraints, than they would be by the mere presence of those visible restraints. That is particularly so when one considers the additional protection afforded by an enclosed dock. Particularly when a trial is likely to last for as long as this one there is always the risk that a person lawfully and properly moving around the court may move close enough to an open dock to be grabbed and held hostage. Given all the relevant evidence before his Honour that is not a fanciful proposition.

It must be remembered that his Honour has also intimated that all prisoners who give evidence for the prosecution must be physically restrained to the same extent as the accused persons so that there will be no visible disparity between them and the accused, save they will not be in the enclosed dock.

I have taken into account the undertakings which each of the accused persons has proffered, but his Honour was entitled to place more weight on the past conduct of the accused persons than on such statements obviously provided after consultation with legal representatives.
Though the security measures ordered by his Honour could properly be described as extreme no proper basis has been made out for this Court interfering with those directions at this point of time. Such directions are not immutable, and can be reviewed from time to time in the light of changes in circumstances. The learned trial Judge is no doubt aware of that, and one must assume at this point of time that wherever and whenever necessary modifications or variations would be made to the rulings in order to ensure each accused gets a fair trial. Ultimately the question of whether or not each accused received a fair trial can only be determined in the light of all that happened during the course of the trial, given all relevant background circumstances.

The learned trial Judge could have received evidence, if he required it, as to the type of security measures available to meet the situation as he saw it. But the Court is not obliged to receive such material either from the prosecution or the defence side (cf. R. v. E J Smith (1982) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 608 at 617). In this case the question of what security measures should be employed were debated before his Honour on two separate days; counsel had the opportunity of placing written submissions before his Honour. No attempt was then made to rely on evidence from any person allegedly experienced in providing security measures in places such as a courtroom. Counsel for the applicant in this Court sought to file and read an affidavit of Theodore Lucas, a director of Brisbane Security Services. The affidavit deals with certain security measures which may be taken in a courtroom, and comments on the suitability of some of the directions given by the learned trial Judge. The affidavit does not raise any issue which was not debated in the course of submissions before his Honour. Most of the points raised therein could be said to be matters of common sense. The affidavit is in the circumstances not materially relevant to the issues before this Court, and leave to file and read it should be refused.

The Sheriff informed the learned trial Judge that a separate jury panel would be summoned for this trial; it will of course be a very large panel to accommodate the number of possible standbys and challenges. The only submission which in the end was advanced by counsel on behalf of the accused with respect to the last of his Honour's directions was that if a member of the panel had prior jury service that person would wonder at the difference in procedure, namely the use of a number rather than the name. But in the final result, such a consideration could not be said, particularly at this point of time, to necessarily result in prejudice to an accused.

As each accused will have the opportunity of perusing a jury list in order to give instructions with respect to challenges, it can be said that there is little point in using numbers rather than names at the empanelling stage. But again that is a matter within the control of the trial Judge, and it cannot be said that he was clearly wrong in giving the direction which he did.

Counsel for Alexanderson initially sought to place his client in a more favourable position than the others, but he finally conceded that if the orders were justified with respect to some accused persons they had to apply to all if there was a joint trial.

For all of those reasons the motion should be dismissed.