R v Eustace - [2019] VSC 189

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S CR 2018 0227

THE QUEEN
v
DOUGLAS DERICK EUSTACE	Accused

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JUDGE:	TAYLOR J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	12 December 2018
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	26 March 2019
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Eustace
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2019] VSC 189

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Murder – Family Violence – Stabbing – Twelve separate wounds – Guilty plea – Remorse – General deterrence and denunciation – Just punishment – Good prospects for rehabilitation – Deportation at expiry of sentence – Sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 20 years.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Ms K Churchill	John Cain, Solicitor to the OPP
For the Accused	Dr T Alexander	Paul Vale Solicitors

HER HONOUR:

Douglas Eustace Derick Eustace, you have pleaded guilty to murder.

The maximum penalty for murder is life imprisonment.

Summary of Offending

You met Mary Freeman on 14 July 2017, while you were visiting Australia from India. Three months later you married. A further three months later, on 27 January 2018, you killed her in a frenzied knife attack in the bedroom of your shared home.

Ms Freeman suffered 12 sharp force wounds to her chest, abdomen, arm and leg. Your conduct in inflicting those wounds was sustained, purposeful and ruthlessly determined. Even after you had been restrained in a head lock and dragged from the bedroom by another occupant of the house, you broke free, returned to the room and stabbed Ms Freeman twice more saying ‘let me go, I want to kill this bitch’.

Ms Freeman’s life ended in physical pain and terror, the magnitude of which is difficult to imagine. The reason why you ended her life in such a manner is unfathomable. But, there is no doubt that your actions were brutal and utterly senseless. You committed the ultimate act of family violence. I denounce your behaviour in the strongest possible terms.

Background

Your marriage to Mary Freeman was, perhaps, of convenience. You were in Australia on a visitor visa when you met at a party. Your first, unsuccessful marriage proposal was made that same day. Two days later you returned to India. From there you and Ms Freeman communicated via social media. You renewed your offer of marriage, which was then accepted. As a result, you returned to Melbourne on 25 August 2017, again on a visitor visa.

Ms Freeman was then living in a share house in Hallam with a married couple, Nilushi and Palinda, and another man, Rushan. You moved in, initially into a separate bedroom. On 7 October 2017 you and Ms Freeman married, at which point you moved into her bedroom in the share house. The arrangement was not successful. There were arguments, and you began to sleep in separate beds. You had, by then, been granted a bridging visa pending the determination of your application for a partner visa. Ms Freeman told Nilushi that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Eustace

Details

AGLC: R v Eustace [2019] VSC 189
Case: [2019] VSC 189
Decision Date: 26 March 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Eustace, the respondent was charged with the murder of his partner, which occurred as a result of a violent attack that included twelve separate stab wounds. The case was heard in a higher court where the sentencing phase followed a guilty plea by the respondent. The central issues before the court involved determining an appropriate sentence, taking into account the severity of the crime, the respondent's level of remorse, his prospects for rehabilitation, and the principles of general deterrence and denunciation.

The court recognised the heinous nature of the crime, characterised by a brutal attack on a vulnerable person, resulting in multiple stab wounds. The respondent's plea of guilt was noted, along with the absence of any prior criminal history, and the possibility of deportation upon the completion of the sentence. The court also considered the respondent's remorse, though it was observed that this was not overtly expressed. In weighing these factors, the court concluded that the sentence must adequately reflect the community's demand for justice and the need to protect the public, while also considering the potential for rehabilitation.

After balancing these considerations, the court determined that a sentence of 25 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years was appropriate. This sentence was intended to ensure that the respondent would serve a significant period in custody, providing both a punitive response and an opportunity for rehabilitation. The court emphasised that the sentence was designed to achieve just punishment, provide general deterrence, and denounce the conduct of the respondent. The court also noted that deportation would follow at the conclusion of the sentence, further serving the interests of public safety.

The final orders of the court mandated that the respondent be imprisoned for a total of 25 years, with a non-parole period of 20 years. This decision reflected the gravity of the crime, the need to uphold the principles of justice, and the potential for the respondent to be rehabilitated and subsequently deported.

Orders