SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v ESCALANTE
[2023] SASC 138
Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Kimber
29 September 2023
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - CUSTODIAL ORDERS - LIFE SENTENCE - REDETERMINATION OR SETTING OF MINIMUM TERM OR NON-PAROLE PERIOD
This is an application to fix a non‑parole period pursuant to s 47(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA).
On 20 December 2001, following pleas of guilty to murder and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for life with a non‑parole period of 12 years, one month. Having been released on parole, the applicant was taken into custody on 15 July 2022 after returning positive results to drug screening tests. On 16 August 2022, in finding the applicant to have breached the ‘no drugs’ parole condition, the Parole Board cancelled the applicant’s parole.
Held:
1. The application to fix a non‑parole period is granted.
2. A non‑parole period of 15 months is fixed, backdated to 15 July 2022.
Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 47, referred to.
R v Bakewell [2022] SASC 39, applied.
R v Fricker [2017] SASC 107; R v Roberts [2016] SASC 41; R v Marshal (Supreme Court of South Australia, David J, 07 November 2008) ; R v Early [2014] SASC 202; R v Brady [2015] SASC 115, discussed.
R v ESCALANTE
[2023] SASC 138Criminal: Application to fix a non-parole period
KIMBER J:
Introduction
This is an application by Carlos Escalante to fix a non‑parole period in respect of a sentence of life imprisonment under s 47(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). On 20 December 2001, Mr Escalante was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 12 years and one month after pleading guilty to offences of murder and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. He was released on parole on 12 December 2016.
On 15 July 2022, Mr Escalante was remanded on a Parole Board warrant due to breaches of the ‘no drugs’ condition of his parole. On 16 August 2022, the Parole Board determined to cancel his parole.
For the reasons that follow, I fix a non‑parole period of 15 months backdated to 15 July 2022.
Background
On 11 December 1999, Mr Escalante, along with two others, murdered Matthew Bourne and wounded Colin Hillman. The offending occurred as part of a random attack on the victims by the three accused for the purpose of stealing Mr Hillman’s phone. All three were armed with a weapon and Mr Escalante was armed with a knife. It was the stab wound inflicted by Mr Escalante that caused the death of Matthew Bourne and a stab wound inflicted by him that caused serious injury to Colin Hillman. Mr Escalante was found to have a greater share of culpability for the offending than the other two. At the time of the offending, he was 17 years of age.
Mr Escalante’s behaviour in prison was…
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- R v Escalante [2023] SASC 138
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- [2023] SASC 138
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In acknowledging that this application is about whether a non‑parole period should be set, and if so, its duration, the co‑victims have requested that their views be taken into account in determining the application. They are of the view that Mr Escalante requires special engagement in resocialisation and should be required to participate in such a program for between 24 – 48 months prior to being eligible for release on parole. Due to their concerns for the safety of the community, they believe this treatment should occur while Mr Escalante remains in custody. Consideration I commence by observing the legal principles which apply. Section 47 of the Sentencing Act 2017 provides as follows: 47—Duty of court to fix or extend non‑parole periods…(3)If a prisoner is serving a sentence of imprisonment but is not subject to an existing non‑parole period, the sentencing court may, subject to subsection (5), fix a non‑parole period, on application by the prisoner or the presiding member of the Parole Board.…(5)The above provisions are subject to the following qualifications:(a) a non‑parole period may not be fixed—(i)in respect of a person who is liable to serve a total period of imprisonment (or detention and imprisonment) of less than 12 months; or(ii)in respect of a person who is liable to serve a sentence in the community while subject to an intensive correction order;(b) if fixing a non‑parole period in respect of a person sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence of murder, the mandatory minimum non‑parole period prescribed in respect of the offence is 20 years;(c) if a person who is subject to a sentence of life imprisonment is further sentenced to imprisonment by the Magistrates Court or the Youth Court, the question of whether a non‑parole period should be fixed or extended must be referred to the court by which the sentence of life imprisonment was imposed;(d) if fixing a non‑parole period in respect of a person sentenced to imprisonment for a serious offence against the person, the mandatory minimum non‑parole period prescribed in respect of the offence is four‑fifths the length of the sentence;(e) a court may, by order, decline to fix a non‑parole period in respect of a person sentenced to imprisonment if the court is of the opinion that it would be inappropriate to fix such a period because of—(i)the gravity of the offence or the circumstances surrounding the offence; or(ii)the criminal record of the person; or(iii)the behaviour of the person during any previous period of release on parole or conditional release; or(iv)any other circumstance. The principles governing the discretion to fix a non‑parole period where a person is serving a sentence of imprisonment but is not subject to a non‑parole period are well settled. Considerations relevant to determining an application for the fixing of a non‑parole period were set out by Peek J in the case of R v Fricker.[1] These include: ·The prospects of rehabilitation on parole; ·The gravity of the offences on which the offender was imprisoned and then paroled; ·The gravity of the breaching offences on which the offender was imprisoned or the breach of the designated condition; ·The need to deter the offender and others from commission of offences of the type with respect to which he was on parole and offences of the type that breached that parole;·The need to deter the offender and others from breaching parole.[2][1] [2017] SASC 107.[2] Ibid at [20] quoting R v Roberts [2016] SASC 41 and applied in R v Bakewell [2022] SASC 39, [48].