R v England (No 2) No. DCCRM-99-619 - [2000] SADC 149

R v ENGLAND (No. 2)
[2000] SADC 149
Judge Bishop
Criminal
Reasons (ex tempore) for ruling

In the Elizabeth Magistrates’ Court on 30 June 1999, the accused, Mark Anthony England, was committed to this court for trial upon an information which alleged his commission of 14 offences. Upon his arraignment before Judge Herriman on 2 August 1999, the accused pleaded not guilty to each of 15 counts of the information upon which he was then presented; that is, seven counts of burglary, five counts of rape, one court of robbery, one count of indecent assault and one count of robbery with violence. He was remanded for a directions hearing.
Directions hearings were subsequently held on 1 September 1999, 14 October 1999, 4 November 1999 and 11 November 1999. On 11 November 1999, the Director of Public Prosecutions filed two fresh informations, one alleging 11 offences and the other alleging four offences, thereby splitting the 15 offences alleged in the original information, which had been filed on 2 August 1999.
On 10 January 2000, the accused was presented for trial upon the information of 11 November 1999, which alleged his commission of 11 offences; that is, four counts of burglary, one count of robbery, five counts of digital rape and one count of procuring an act of gross indecency, those offences having allegedly been committed by the accused in five separate incidents at Salisbury and Salisbury Downs, during about eight weeks in November and December 1998.
Upon his arraignment upon that information before me on 10 January 2000, the accused pleaded not guilty to each of the 11 alleged offences. Through his then counsel, Mr Michael Ward, the accused made application for separate trials of those offences alleged in each of the five incidents. He also applied for the exclusion, at those trials, of evidence concerning an incident which occurred in October 1992 at Torrensville. Those applications, which were opposed by Mr McEwen, counsel for the Crown, were then heard, that is, on 10 January 2000. In published reasons for rulings delivered on 27 January 2000, I that day ruled that joint trial be held in relation to counts 1 to 10 (inclusive) of that information, that separate trial be held in relation to count 11 and that evidence concerning the 1992 incident not be adduced in either trial.
On 17 January 2000, Mr Jensen, counsel for the Crown, confirmed that a trial date had been fixed for 8 May 2000. Liberty was granted to counsel to attend before me in chambers in relation to any further pre-trial matters. On 6 March 2000, I vacated the trial date of 13 April 2000, which had been fixed by Judge Allan on 2 February 2000, in relation to count 11 of the information.
When the matter was next before me on 3 May 2000, Mr Millsteed QC and Ms Woithe appeared for the Crown and Mr Boylan for the accused. Mr Millsteed indicated that, on trial of the accused upon counts 1 to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2000] SADC 149
Decision Date: 8 December 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v England (No 2) No. DCCRM-99-619 was heard in the Elizabeth Magistrates' Court, where Mark Anthony England faced trial on multiple serious charges, including burglary, rape, robbery, and indecent assault. The accused had initially pleaded not guilty to all charges but later changed his plea to guilty on 8 May 2000. This change followed discussions with his father, who advised him to plead guilty, influenced by the Crown's indication that several charges would be dropped and that credit would be given for the guilty pleas. Subsequently, the Director of Public Prosecutions filed an application under section 23 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, seeking to remand England for sentencing before the Supreme Court. This application raised concerns, as it involved an inquiry into England's capability to control his sexual instincts, potentially leading to indefinite detention instead of imprisonment. In response, England filed an application to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that his pleas were influenced by his father's advice and the pressure of time, and that he was unaware of the Director's application at the time he entered his pleas.

The central legal issues revolved around the validity of England's guilty pleas and the appropriateness of allowing him to withdraw those pleas. The court needed to determine whether the pleas were informed and deliberate, considering the advice from his father and the lack of knowledge about the Director's application. Additionally, the court had to consider whether permitting England to withdraw his pleas would cause a miscarriage of justice or if it was in the interests of justice to allow such withdrawal. The court also had to address the Director's application, considering the potential implications of allowing it to proceed before the trials were completed.

In resolving these issues, the court found that England's decision to plead guilty was influenced by his father's advice and the limited time available to make a decision. The court held that England's pleas were not informed as he was unaware of the Director's application at the time. It was concluded that England's decision to plead guilty was not deliberate and considered in the full context of the potential consequences. The court emphasised that an informed and deliberate plea of guilty should generally be regarded as final, but exceptions could be made if a miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the plea or if it was in the interests of justice to permit withdrawal. In this case, the court found sufficient reason to allow England to withdraw his pleas. The Director's application was temporarily stayed to prevent any abuse of judicial process, pending the completion of the trials for all relevant offences.

The court's decision allowed England to withdraw his guilty pleas, ensuring that his plea was informed and voluntary. The temporary stay on the Director's application prevented potential injustice by ensuring that all relevant evidence and legal considerations were fully explored during the trials. This ruling underscored the importance of informed and deliberate pleas and the court's discretion to prevent miscarriages of justice.

Orders