R v Dupas (Ruling No. 2)

Case

[2004] VSC 283

22 July 2004


Do Not Send for Reporting
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1503 of 2003

THE QUEEN
v
PETER NORRIS DUPAS

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JUDGE:

KAYE J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

19 July 2004

DATE OF RULING:

22 July 2004

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

R v Dupas (Ruling No. 2)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2004] VSC 283

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr C. Hillman S.C. with
Ms M. Williams
Ms Kay Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr J. Montgomery with
Ms C. Gwynn
Mr Domenico Conidi, Victoria Legal Aid

HIS HONOUR:

  1. I have come to the conclusion that the evidence as to the name "Jolanta's" on the computer part found near the body of the deceased woman in this case is inadmissible.

  1. The prosecution relies on that as what it correctly concedes to be a weak link to the accused person based on the similarity but not identical nature of that word to the first name of the lady with whom the accused man was in a relationship at that time.

  1. There is no other evidence linking the computer part with the accused man, with Ms Cruz or with anyone else related to the accused man or indeed to the victim.  There was no DNA evidence or fingerprint evidence making such a link.

  1. A statement apparently will be read from Ms Cruz, but that statement does not contain any evidence from her expressing such a link.

  1. If the evidence is admitted, as I have stated, it goes to the issue of the identification.  For reasons I have outlined it seems to me to be extremely weak and if relevant only barely so.  It invites speculation and particularly would do so in an area, that is identification, in respect of which the jury will receive two other pieces of evidence, the similar fact evidence and the DNA evidence, which will be the subject of particular direction which they must follow. 

  1. For those reasons, I am of the opinion that the 31 evidence is irrelevant and, if relevant, it would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused man.  If I were called upon to do so, I would exercise my discretion to exclude it, but I exclude it primarily on the basis that it is irrelevant.  I so rule.

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