R v Dupas (Ruling No. 2)

Do Not Send for Reporting
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA		Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1503 of 2003

THE QUEEN

PETER NORRIS DUPAS

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JUDGE:	KAYE J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	19 July 2004
DATE OF RULING:	22 July 2004
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Dupas (Ruling No. 2)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2004] VSC 283

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Mr C. Hillman S.C. with Ms M. Williams	Ms Kay Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr J. Montgomery with Ms C. Gwynn	Mr Domenico Conidi, Victoria Legal Aid

HIS HONOUR:

I have come to the conclusion that the evidence as to the name "Jolanta's" on the computer part found near the body of the deceased woman in this case is inadmissible.

The prosecution relies on that as what it correctly concedes to be a weak link to the accused person based on the similarity but not identical nature of that word to the first name of the lady with whom the accused man was in a relationship at that time.

There is no other evidence linking the computer part with the accused man, with Ms Cruz or with anyone else related to the accused man or indeed to the victim. There was no DNA evidence or fingerprint evidence making such a link.

A statement apparently will be read from Ms Cruz, but that statement does not contain any evidence from her expressing such a link.

If the evidence is admitted, as I have stated, it goes to the issue of the identification. For reasons I have outlined it seems to me to be extremely weak and if relevant only barely so. It invites speculation and particularly would do so in an area, that is identification, in respect of which the jury will receive two other pieces of evidence, the similar fact evidence and the DNA evidence, which will be the subject of particular direction which they must follow.

For those reasons, I am of the opinion that the 31 evidence is irrelevant and, if relevant, it would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused man. If I were called upon to do so, I would exercise my discretion to exclude it, but I exclude it primarily on the basis that it is irrelevant. I so rule.

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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Dupas (Ruling No. 2) arose from a criminal prosecution where the accused, Peter Norris Dupas, was charged with an offence. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria's Criminal Division. The central issue before the court was the admissibility of evidence found on a computer part, which contained the name "Jolanta's," and whether this evidence was relevant and should be admitted in the trial against Dupas. The prosecution argued that the name, although not an exact match to the victim's name, could serve as a weak link to the accused.

The court had to determine whether the evidence was relevant and, if so, whether its admission would be unfair to the accused. Justice Kaye carefully considered the nature of the evidence and its potential to prejudice the jury. The judge noted that the evidence was tenuous and could lead to speculation, especially since there was no other direct link between the accused and the computer part or the victim. Furthermore, the judge highlighted that the evidence could unfairly prejudice Dupas, given the presence of other evidence, such as similar fact evidence and DNA evidence, which the jury would need to carefully consider.

After thorough deliberation, Justice Kaye concluded that the evidence of the computer part was irrelevant and would be unfairly prejudicial if admitted. The judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible on the grounds of its irrelevance. This ruling was made to ensure that the trial proceeded fairly, without undue influence from potentially speculative and prejudicial evidence. The judge's ruling effectively precluded the evidence from being presented to the jury during the trial.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established