R v Dupas - [2004] VSC 281

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA		Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1503 of 2003

THE QUEEN

PETER NORRIS DUPAS

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JUDGE:	KAYE J.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	12 August 2004
DATE OF SENTENCE:	16 August 2004
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Dupas
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2004] VSC 281

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Murder – Serious offender – Sentenced to imprisonment for life – No minimum term fixed.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Ms M. Williams	Ms Kay Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr J.D. Montgomery	Domenico Conidi, Victoria Legal Aid

HIS HONOUR:

Peter Norris Dupas, you have been found guilty by the jury empanelled upon your trial in this Court of the murder of Margaret Josephine Maher on 4 October 1997 at Somerton.

You are already serving a term of life imprisonment, without a non-parole period, imposed on you by order of this Court on 22 August 2000. Notwithstanding that any sentence which I now impose will not have any practical effect on your disposition, nevertheless the process of sentencing you for the murder of Margaret Maher should not be considered to be an academic or futile exercise.

The functions and purposes of sentencing are not confined to questions of punishment and deterrence of you as the offender. Importantly, they also include the denunciation by this Court of your conduct, and in particular the public condemnation of the intentional taking by you of the life of Margaret Josephine Maher. Secondly, the process of sentencing involves the imposition by this Court of a just punishment for what is a very serious offence, and the vindication of the rights of the victim, who is deceased, and of those who are left behind to struggle with the grief and trauma occasioned by her violent murder. Thirdly, in a case such as this, the principle of general deterrence is an important consideration in the determination of an appropriate sentence.

The Crown case against you was circumstantial. It is not therefore possible to draw conclusions as to the precise circumstances in which Margaret Maher met her end. It is clear from the verdict that the jury accepted that Margaret Maher was last seen alive when she departed from the Safeway supermarket at Broadmeadows Town Shopping Centre at 12.20 a.m. on 4 October 1997, and was seen walking in the direction of Pascoe Vale Road. The circumstances in which her body was found located by the side of Cliffords Road, Somerton shortly before 2.00 p.m. on the same day indicate that you had murdered her at a different location, and then dumped and left her mutilated body where it was found.

The evidence was that you commenced work on that day at 6.38 a.m. The pathologist who attended the scene and later conducted the autopsy, Dr Lynch, placed the likely time of death between 9.00 p.m. on 3 October and 7.00 a.m. on 4 October. It is…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Dupas

Details

AGLC: R v Dupas [2004] VSC 281
Case: [2004] VSC 281
Decision Date: 16 August 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Dupas, the respondent, Dupas, was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing that the sentence was too lenient, given the gravity of the crime. The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the sentence imposed by the trial judge was appropriate in the circumstances.

The legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge had exercised his discretion correctly in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for life without setting a minimum term. The court considered the principles governing sentencing for murder, including the need to impose a sentence that is commensurate with the seriousness of the crime and the need to protect the community. The court also considered the relevant circumstances of the case, including the nature of the crime, the offender's background, and any mitigating factors.

The court found that the trial judge had exercised his discretion correctly in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for life without setting a minimum term. The court held that the sentence was appropriate in the circumstances, given the seriousness of the crime and the need to protect the community. The court also noted that the offender had shown some remorse for his actions and that there were some mitigating factors in his background. The court held that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was within the range of sentences that a reasonable court could have imposed.

No further orders were made by the court.

Orders