R v Drummond (No 2)

Case [2015] SASCFC 82


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v DRUMMOND (NO 2)

[2015] SASCFC 82

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Blue)

5 June 2015

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - GENERALLY

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - FRESH EVIDENCE - AVAILABILITY AT TRIAL, MATERIALITY AND COGENCY - GENERALLY

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - POWERS OF COURT ON APPEAL - POWER TO ORDER NEW TRIAL OR QUASH CONVICTION AND DIRECT ENTRY OF VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL

Second appeal against conviction.

The applicant was convicted by a jury of attempted kidnapping.  The complainant was walking on the footpath of Prospect Road when she noticed a white station wagon drive slowly past her.  She recorded its registration number because she considered that the driver was acting suspiciously.  She saw a man alight from a white station wagon which she believed was the same vehicle.  A stranger approached her from behind, grabbed the top of her arm and told her to get in the car.  There was a tussle, in the course of which the stranger pulled the complainant backwards, the complainant pushed him backwards by the chest and arm and punched him two or three times.  The man returned to his car. 

The major issue at trial was the identity of the assailant but it was not conceded that the alleged events had occurred.  The complainant was unable to identify the applicant as her assailant, choosing a different person in a photopak identification procedure.  She described the clothes that her assailant was wearing, which did not match the clothes that the defendant was wearing.  The defendant gave evidence at trial that he was driving along Prospect Road at about the time of the incident but he did not stop, and he was not the assailant.

The police recovered the tops that the complainant and defendant were wearing at the relevant time and they were tested for DNA. The prosecution called a forensic scientist, Ms Mitchell, to give evidence concerning the DNA results. She gave evidence that sample swabs from the applicant’s clothing indicated that two persons had contributed to the DNA result with the complainant being positively excluded as being one of those contributors; she also gave evidence that sample swabs from the complainant’s clothing indicated that at least three persons had contributed to the DNA result with the applicant being positively excluded as being one of those contributors.

Ms Mitchell gave evidence that DNA was not always found after contact had occurred.  She said that studies at Forensic Science SA had shown that only 10 per cent of samples provided any useful information or usable DNA.  This evidence was the subject of cross-examination.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury and his first appeal to the Full Court was dismissed. An application for special leave was refused.

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AGLC
R v Drummond (No 2) [2015] SASCFC 82
Case
[2015] SASCFC 82
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Gray, Peek, and Blue JJ, considered an appeal by the applicant, R, against a conviction. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility and impact of new evidence presented on appeal, and whether its exclusion or the circumstances surrounding its availability constituted a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The court was required to determine whether the new evidence was "fresh and compelling" and if its consideration was "in the interests of justice." Subsequently, the court had to assess whether it was reasonably arguable that a substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred, justifying the grant of permission to appeal, and if such a miscarriage had indeed occurred, warranting the allowance of the appeal. The court also considered the definition of a "substantial miscarriage of justice" in the context of irregularities in or connected with a trial, including the wrongful admission or rejection of evidence, or misleading evidence.

The court reasoned that the very reasons for the new evidence being fresh and compelling rendered it in the interests of justice to consider it, thereby satisfying the initial threshold criteria under subsection 353A(1). The court then applied the principles established in cases such as *R v Keogh (No 2)* and *Baini v The Queen*, which define a substantial miscarriage of justice. This can occur when there has been an irregularity in the trial, such as the wrongful admission or rejection of evidence, or misleading evidence, which alters the state of evidence presented to the jury. The court indicated that such an error ordinarily leads to a substantial miscarriage of justice unless the conviction was inevitable regardless of the error.

The court concluded that the criteria specified in subsection 353A(1) were satisfied, and it was appropriate to proceed to consider whether a substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. The court found that the new evidence was fresh and compelling and that it was in the interests of justice to consider it. The court then determined that it was reasonably arguable that there had been a substantial miscarriage of justice, justifying the grant of permission to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At about the same time, police attended at the home of the complainant and obtained her statement. The complainant removed the clothes she had been wearing at the time of the incident. The police took possession of those clothes the following day. No medical examination of the complainant was conducted. No swabs for contact DNA were taken from her arms or hands at that time. Some days later, hand swabs and fingernail scrapings were taken. Evidence Concerning Identification The complainant described her attacker in evidence in chief as follows:Q. And, in terms of describing the man who grabbed you, what colour hair did he have.A. Brown.Q. What type of hair did he have.A. Sorry, what do you mean?Q. Like straight or not straight.A. It was sort of wavy.Q. How long was it.A. It was about collar length.Q. Was it parted at all.A. It possibly had a centre part but I don't remember.Q. Was it a full head of hair.A. Yes.Q. Did you notice what colour his eyes were.A. Brown.Q. Did you see him smile at all.A. Yes.Q. When.A. I saw him smile as he drove towards me.Q. Is there anything that you can assist the ladies and gentlemen of the jury about his smile.A. As he drove towards me and he got closer I noticed that he had yellow stained teeth and that - I'm not really sure how to describe it but his smile was really creepy. Q. What build was he.A. He was, like, thin to medium, not very muscly.Q. Did he have any accent that you noticed.A. No.No evidence was given about the man’s age, height or weight. The complainant described her assailant during evidence in chief as wearing a T-shirt, “it wasn’t like a bright white, it was more like a dim white and, with the fading in the collar, it was, like, darker – I don’t know light brown around some parts, like dirty.” In cross-examination, she was shown the T-shirt that the defendant was wearing on 24 November 2010, which was brown and carried the distinctive wording “Dulux Protective Coatings”. She agreed that this was not the T-shirt she had described. The complainant described her assailant during evidence in chief as wearing “blue track pants”. In cross-examination, she agreed that the faded black jeans the police had seized from the defendant were not the sort of pants she had described. The complaint’s evidence in chief concerning her assailant’s clothing was as follows:Q. What was he wearing.A. There was a white, like, a dim white top that was really faded around the neck. It was dirty and stained, it looked like brown marks on it.Q. Do you know what he was - what sort of pants he was wearing.A. They were just blue track pants. I didn't really get a good look at them.Q. Did you pay any attention to what he had on his feet.A. No. In cross-examination on this topic, the complainant said:Q. This isn't the white T-shirt with the staining around the collar that you described, is it.A. No.Q. The man who attacked you didn't have that on, did he.A. No.Q. He didn't have a T-shirt which clearly said 'Dulux Protective Coatings' on it.A. No.Q. You told us that the man who attacked you had blue tracksuit pants on.A. Yes.Q. These weren't the sort of pants that he had on, were they.A. No.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
In this case, the very reasons why the New Evidence is fresh and compelling summarised at [310] to [318] and [345] to [357] above render it in the interests of justice to consider it.Conclusion in respect of the subsection threshold The criteria specified in subsection 353A(1) are satisfied. It is appropriate to proceed to the next stage of considering whether it is reasonably arguable that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice (justifying the grant of permission to appeal) and that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice (justifying allowing the appeal).Substantial miscarriage of justice Subsections 353A(3) and (4) provide: (3) The Full Court may allow an appeal under this section if it thinks that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice.(4) If an appeal against conviction is allowed under this section, the Court may quash the conviction and either direct a judgment and verdict of acquittal to be entered or direct a new trial. A substantial miscarriage of justice may be found when there has been an irregularity in or in connection with the trial.[95] Irregularities include but are not limited to wrongful admission of evidence,[96] wrongful rejection of evidence[97] and misleading evidence.[98][95] R v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307 at [128] per Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ.[96] R v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307 at [121], [127] and [128] per Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ.[97] Baini v The Queen[2012] HCA 59, (2012) 246 CLR 469 at [32] per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ cited in connection with section 353A in R v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307 at [127] per Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ.[98] R v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307 at [128] per Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ; Davies & Cody v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 180 per Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ cited in connection with section 353A in R v Keogh (No 2) at [121] per Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ. When there has been wrongful admission or rejection of evidence or misleading evidence such that the state of the evidence given by a prosecution witness before the jury would have been different, there will ordinarily be a substantial miscarriage of justice unless the Court thinks that a conviction was inevitable regardless of the error concerning the evidence.[99][99] Baini v The Queen[2012] HCA 59 (2012) 246 CLR 469 at [32]-[33] per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ cited in connection with section 353A in R v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307 at [127] per Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ. In Davies and Cody v The Queen,[100] in the context of a first appeal in which the ultimate criterion was a miscarriage of justice, Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ said:From the beginning, [the English Court of Appeal] has acted upon no narrow view of the cases covered by its duty to quash a conviction when it thinks that on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice, a duty also imposed upon the Supreme Court of Victoria. It has consistently regarded that duty as covering not only cases where there is affirmative reason to suppose that the appellant is innocent, but also cases of quite another description. For it will set aside a conviction whenever it appears unjust or unsafe to allow the verdict to stand because some failure has occurred in observing the conditions which, in the court’s view, are essential to a satisfactory trial, or because there is some feature of the case raising a substantial possibility that, either in the conclusion itself, or in the manner in which it has been reached, the jury may have been mistaken or misled.[101] [100] (1937) 57 CLR 170.[101] At 180. (Legislative reference omitted)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

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