R v Domokos, Virag & Mica (No 1) No. DCCRM-02-125

Case [2003] SADC 27


R v DOMOKOS, VIRAG & MICA (No 1)
[2003] SADC 27

Judge Anderson
Criminal

  1. By a further Rule 9 Notice, each Accused has sought to have Warrants for the Interception of Communication, issued correctly pursuant to the provisions of Section 45 of the Telecommunication (Interception) Act 1979 (“the Act”), dated 9 October 2000 re: service number 08 8541 3008, 12 October 2000 re: service 0410 739 660 and 12 October 2000 re: service 0407 609 232 set aside with the consequence that any evidence gathered pursuant thereto be declared inadmissible.

  2. Mr White made submissions on behalf of counsel for all Accused.

  3. Because there is no submission that the procedure for, or the obtaining of, the warrants was flawed, it is not necessary to re‑trace the facilitating legislative scheme.  Upon the coming into existence of each warrant, certain certifying steps, as required by the legislation, were undertaken.  To use Mr White’s expression, the doing of all of this was “uncontroversial”.

  4. Thereafter, a letter was sent in relation to each warrant to satisfy the terms of Section 60(1) of the Act.  The letter relating to warrant A2444/00/00 is dated 9 October 2000 and is in these terms:

    “The Managing Director

    Telstra Corporation Limited
    37th Floor
    242 Exhibition Street
    MELBOURNE VIC 3000

    Attention: Mr David Tomlinson

    ORIGINAL ISSUE OF WARRANT

    Warrant A.2444/00/00 is forwarded to you for necessary action.  Please arrange for the intercepted material to be processed as follows:

    This warrant relates to Service Number 08 8541 3008

    Audio product directed to dial up number ISDN (22) 62339122

    Could you please direct the data to “DATA MOD AFP”.

    Please advise TID on 06 2870528 when the connection has been made.

    D E Baker
    Federal Agent
    A/Co-ordinator

    Telecommunications Interception Division”

  5. A letter sent in relation to the other two warrants is in like terms.

  6. Section 47 of the Act is in these terms:

    “A Part VI warrant does not authorise communications to be intercepted while they are passing over a telecommunications system operated by a carrier unless:

    (a)notification of the issue of the warrant has been received by or on behalf of the Managing Director of the carrier under subsection 60(1); and

    (b)the interception takes place as a result of action taken by an employee of the carrier, and by the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, a Deputy Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, an AFP employee or a special member of the Australian Federal Police, for the purpose of enabling the warrant to be executed.”

  7. Mr White has submitted that the letter of 9 October 2000 is a request to execute the warrant outside of its terms.  He said that there is a difference between forwarding the warrant for “necessary action” and making a request pursuant to Section 47(b) “for the purpose of enabling the warrant to be executed”.

  8. There is no doubt that this letter complies with the requirements of Section 60(1).  That is not to say that it cannot also comply with Section 47(b).  In my opinion, there is no real difference, in this context, between the words “for necessary action” in the letter of 9 October 2000 and the words “for the purpose of enabling the warrant to be executed” in Section 47(b).

  9. Whilst it may be preferable, so as to forestall any such argument, to specifically refer to, and request action pursuant to, Section 47(b), that it has not been done is not, in itself, fatal to the admissibility of any material obtained pursuant to the permitted interception.

  10. This is not a matter of protecting the rights of individuals as is referred to in the series of “warrant cases”[1] to which I have been referred.  But rather it is a case of looking in a sensible fashion at the import of the words used so as to seek to give effect to the intent of Parliament.  This intent is not to be frustrated by a strained interpretation under the guise of protecting individual rights.

    [1] George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 @ 110; Swanvelder v Holmes (1990) 52 SASR 549 @ 555-556; Tran Nominees v Scheffler (1996) 42 SASR 361

  11. In my opinion, the same conclusion applies to each of the three warrants.  Consequently, I am not of the opinion that there has been any breach of Section 7(1) of the Act.  Thus, Section 75 thereof has no application.

  12. The application of each Accused in relation to each warrant is refused.

  13. Warrant number A.2451/00/00 for service no 0407 609 232 has an error on its face in the first recital.  It is alleged that that service is connected in the name of “Magdalena MACA of 42 Cardigan Street, Angle Park”.  Further reading of the document indicates a satisfaction by the “nominated AAT member” that a particular person, “Magdalena Mica” of the same address is likely to use the service.  There is no issue but that the service is that of the Accused, Mica, who then resided at that address.

  14. This is not a sufficient error on the face of the warrant to invalidate it.  It is a spelling error amidst other information which clearly identifies the service user.

  15. There is no basis to conclude, as a consequence of this spelling error, that the warrant is defective.


Details
AGLC
R v Domokos, Virag & Mica (No 1) No. DCCRM-02-125 [2003] SADC 27
Case
[2003] SADC 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Domokos, Virag & Mica (No 1), the defendants sought to have warrants for the interception of communication declared invalid and the evidence gathered therefrom deemed inadmissible. The defendants argued that the warrants, issued under the Telecommunication (Interception) Act 1979, were not executed in compliance with the statutory requirements. The warrants in question related to three different service numbers and were issued on 9 October 2000 and 12 October 2000. The defendants' argument centred on the interpretation of the statutory language in the warrants and whether they conformed to the requirements of Section 47 of the Act, which stipulates the conditions for intercepting communications. The court had to determine whether the warrants were executed in a manner consistent with the legislative provisions.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the warrants, specifically the letter sent to the telecommunications carrier, complied with Section 47(b) of the Act, which mandates that the interception of communications must occur as a result of action taken by an employee of the carrier and by an authorised officer of the Australian Federal Police. The defendants argued that the letter requesting the interception was not in line with Section 47(b) because it did not explicitly request action to enable the warrant to be executed. The court considered whether the wording in the letter was sufficiently clear and whether there was any substantial difference between the letter's instructions and the statutory requirement. The court had to balance the need for strict compliance with the statutory language against the intent of the legislation and the practicalities of the interception process.

The court found that while the letter did not explicitly reference Section 47(b), the wording was sufficiently clear and did not differ substantially from the statutory requirement. The court emphasised the importance of interpreting the statutory language in a way that gives effect to the intent of Parliament, rather than adopting a strict interpretation that could potentially frustrate the legislative purpose. The court concluded that the warrants were executed in accordance with the Act and that there was no breach of Section 7(1) of the Act, which pertains to the rights of individuals. Consequently, the court rejected the defendants' application to declare the warrants invalid and the evidence obtained from them admissible. The court also noted a minor error in the warrant for service number 0407 609 232, but found it did not invalidate the warrant as it did not affect the identification of the service user.

The court ordered that the application of each accused in relation to each warrant be refused, thereby upholding the validity of the warrants and the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the interceptions.

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Background

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