R v Dickinson

[2021] SASCFC 23

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal: Leave to Appeal)

R v DICKINSON

[2021] SASCFC 23

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice Kelly, the Honourable Justice Blue and the Honourable Justice Doyle)

19 April 2021

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - APPEALS BY CROWN - EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-PAROLE PERIOD OR MINIMUM TERM - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - GENERALLY

Application by Crown for permission to appeal against sentence.

The respondent had in 2018 been sentenced by a District Court Judge to imprisonment for three years seven months and seven days, with a non-parole period of two years, for armed robbery committed in September 2017.

In March 2020, while on parole for the earlier offending, the respondent committed a robbery by stealing $830 from the till at a tavern, in the course of which he grabbed a tavern employee by the left arm, told her to get the money and pushed her back towards the till.

The respondent was sentenced by a District Court Judge for the 2020 offending to imprisonment for two years four months and 25 days, reduced from a starting point of four years on account of his early guilty plea.  That sentence was made cumulative on the balance, being one year one month and one day as at 12 March 2020, of the sentence imposed in 2018. This resulted in a total of the head sentences to be served of three years five months and 26 days. A non-parole period of two years (commencing on 12 March 2020) was fixed.

The Crown seeks permission to appeal on the ground that the head sentence and non-parole period are manifestly inadequate.

Held by the Court (granting permission to appeal and allowing the appeal):

1.The Judge erred in fixing the non-parole period of two years (at [36]-[39]).

2.The non-parole period was manifestly inadequate (at [40]).

3.Permission to appeal is required to be granted to correct the error and maintain public confidence in sentencing (at [41]-[42]).

4.Appeal allowed. Appellant resentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months, to commence on the expiry of the sentence imposed by the District Court on 27 February 2018, with a non-parole period fixed in respect of the old and new sentences of two years and seven months commencing on 12 March 2020 (at [45]).

R v Buttigieg [2020] SASCFC 38; R v Brant [2018] SASCFC 72; R v Bahrami [2020] SASCFC 111; R v Culley (2019) 134 SASR 92; Da Silva v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 66; R v Palmer [2016] SASCFC 34; R v McIntyre [2020] SASCFC 101, considered.

R v DICKINSON
[2021] SASCFC 23

Court of Criminal Appeal: Kelly, Blue and Doyle JJ

1. THE COURT:  This is an application by the Crown for permission to appeal against sentence.

2. The respondent, Robert Richard Peter Dickinson, was sentenced by a District Court Judge to imprisonment for two years, four months and 25 days for a robbery committed on 11 March 2020.[1]  That sentence was made cumulative on the balance, being one year, one month and one day as at 12 March 2020, of an earlier sentence in respect of which the respondent was on parole when he committed the offence and which parole had been cancelled by the Parole Board. This resulted in a total of the head sentences to be served of three years, five months and 26 days. A non-parole period of two years (commencing on 12 March 2020) was fixed.

   [1]     Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 section 137(1).

3. The Crown seeks permission to appeal on the ground that the head sentence and non-parole period are manifestly inadequate.

   Background

4. On 27 February 2018 the respondent was sentenced (the 2018 sentence) in the District Court to imprisonment for three years, seven months and seven days, with a non-parole period of two years, for armed robbery committed on 7 September 2017 (the 2017 offending).[2]  The head sentence and non-parole period were backdated to commence on 7 September 2017, being the day on which the respondent was taken into custody.

   [2]     Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 section 137(1).

5. On 6 January 2020 respondent was released on parole.

6. On 11 March 2020 at about 10.00 pm the respondent was gambling on poker machines at a tavern in Mount Gambier, having used methylamphetamine and consumed alcohol. When he ran out of money and was about to leave, he decided spontaneously to go behind the bar in the front bar and steal money from the till in order to continue gambling. He pulled his hood over his head and his T-shirt up over his nose. A tavern employee approached him to push him back out from behind the bar area. The respondent grabbed her by the left arm, said “Get the money” and pushed her back towards the till. She opened the till and the respondent took $830 and left the tavern.

7. The respondent went to another hotel in Mount Gambier, where he lost the stolen money gambling. He was arrested in the early hours of 12 March 2020. He admitted the offending and told the police that he would plead guilty. The robbery was captured on the tavern’s closed circuit television system. The tavern employee later picked out the respondent in a photographic identification procedure.

8. The respondent pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court within four weeks of his first appearance and thereby became entitled to a discount of up to 40 per cent pursuant to section 40(3)(a) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) as it then was (the Act).[3]

   [3]     That provision has since been amended to reduce the maximum discount to 35 per cent generally and 25 per cent for a serious indictable offence (which does not include robbery). However, those amendments do not apply to the sentencing of the respondent.

9. The respondent was born in 1975. He completed high school to year 10 and left school when he was 16 years old. He was subjected to physical and emotional abuse by his father, who was a heavy drinker.

10. At the age of 15 the respondent began drinking alcohol and using marijuana and became a heavy drinker and marijuana user. He worked as a bricklayer’s labourer until the age of 21 (1996). At the age of 19 he commenced using methylamphetamine and became a heavy user.

11. In 1996, at the age of 21, the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and five months, with a non-parole period of six months, in respect of several offences including three counts of larceny.

12. In 1997 the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for one year, one month and 26 days, with a non-parole period of nine months, in respect of driving offences. In 2000 he was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and three months, with a non-parole period of seven months, in respect of several offences including seven counts of larceny.

13. In 2000 the respondent was admitted to Glenside Hospital and diagnosed with bipolar disorder.

14. In 2002 the respondent was sentenced in the New South Wales District Court to imprisonment for 13 years, with a non-parole period of nine years, in respect of one count of robbery with violence and three counts of robbery with wounding by a knife.

15. In 2013 the respondent was sentenced in the New South Wales District Court to imprisonment for two and a half years, with a non-parole period of 16 months, in respect of assault with intent to rob.

16. At the age of 40, the respondent started gambling and became a heavy gambler.

17. In 2017 the respondent was sentenced to three months imprisonment for theft. In February 2018 he was sentenced for the 2017 offending.

18. As at 12 March 2020, when the respondent was arrested, his head sentence in respect of his 2017 offending was due to expire on 12 April 2021. He had one year, one month and one day remaining to serve of that sentence. Subsequently, on 8 September 2020, the Parole Board cancelled his parole in respect of his 2018 sentence back-dated to 12 March 2020.

19. In August 2020 the respondent was interviewed by a psychologist, Dr Jack White, who prepared a psychological report in September 2020. Dr White expressed the opinion that the respondent satisfied the diagnoses for Polysubstance Use Disorder, Substance Induced Psychotic Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety & Depressed Mood, Bipolar Disorder, Schizophrenia, Mixed Personality Disorder and Gambling Disorder. Dr White recommended that the respondent be referred for mental health treatment, substance use rehabilitation, gambling rehabilitation, anger management and the Changing to a Non-Criminal Lifestyle Program.

20. In October 2020 the respondent was sentenced by the Judge for the 2020 offending. It was common ground on the sentencing submissions that the maximum available discount for the respondent’s guilty plea was 40 per cent and the Director made no submission that this would be so disproportionate that it may affect public confidence in the administration of justice. The Judge observed that the maximum penalty was 15 years imprisonment, the respondent was entitled to a discount of up to 40 per cent on account of his guilty plea and the respondent was to be sentenced as a serious repeat offender. The Judge referred to the circumstances of the offence, the respondent’s antecedents and Dr White’s report.

21. The Judge adopted a starting point of imprisonment for four years and reduced it by 40 per cent on account of the respondent’s early guilty plea to give a head sentence of two years, four months and 25 days to be served cumulatively on the balance of his 2018 sentence comprising one year, one month and one day as from 12 March 2020. The Judge observed that this gave a total of sentences to be served of three years, five months and 26 days. The Judge fixed a non-parole period of two years also commencing on 12 March 2020.

    Relevant principles

22. In R v Buttigieg[4] Lovell J (with whom Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreed) said:

    It is well established that leave should only be granted with respect to Crown appeals against sentence in cases that are ‘rare and exceptional’. As Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said in Everett v The Queen:

    An appeal by the Crown against sentence has long been accepted in this country as cutting across the time-honoured concepts of criminal administration by putting in jeopardy for the second time the freedom beyond the sentence imposed.

    A Crown appeal against the adequacy of a sentence should be approached with great care, and the “rare and exceptional” test should be rigorously applied. However, the Crown will be granted permission to appeal if it is necessary to enable the Court to establish and maintain adequate standards of punishment for crime; to enable idiosyncratic views of individual judges as to particular crimes or types of crime to be corrected; or if a sentence is so far below the appropriate range of sentences that the sentence reflects an error of principle or would “shock the public conscience”. Both error and strong reasons of public policy are required to justify appellate intervention in a sentence said to be manifestly inadequate. The Crown must persuade the Court that such strong reasons of public policy exist which demand permission to appeal be granted despite the public interest in not twice vexing the respondent.  

    As with any appeal against sentence, error must be identified before an appellate court may interfere. A specific error may be identified if a sentencing judge has acted upon a wrong principle, mistaken the facts, failed to take into account a material consideration, or allowed irrelevant matters to impact the decision. Alternatively, a specific error may not be identifiable yet the sentence imposed is so manifestly excessive or inadequate that the only inference to be drawn is that there was a failure to properly exercise the sentencing discretion.

    Manifest inadequacy is a conclusion. In determining if a sentence is or is not plainly inadequate, an appellate court must essentially repeat the sentencing task undertaken by the sentencing judge and in doing so, determine whether the sentence imposed fell outside the permissible range such that it must be plainly inadequate. A sentence will not be disturbed on appeal merely because the appellate court would itself have reached a different result.

    On a Crown appeal, the Court must first deal with the question of permission to appeal before determining whether the appeal should be allowed. The question of permission to appeal involves issues ranging beyond those involved in the merits of the appeal. This Court has determined on numerous occasions that the common law principle of double jeopardy continues to apply in respect of an application by the South Australian Director of Public Prosecutions for permission to appeal against sentence. This is particularly so when the original sentence has been suspended as the offender has been in the community and may have taken significant steps towards rehabilitation. To suddenly reverse the decision and impose a custodial sentence may produce an injustice.  A court can exercise its discretion and refuse permission to prevent a person being twice vexed by the repeated exercise of the coercive power of the State.[5]

    [4] [2020] SASCFC 38; (2020) FLR 170. (Footnotes omitted)

    [5]     At [38]-[42].

    Contentions on appeal

23. The Director contends that the starting point of four years imprisonment is manifestly inadequate. The Director refers to this Court’s decision in R v Brant[6] which concluded that “the starting point for robberies from retail premises, or from individuals, either without violence or with some violence, but not involving a weapon, was generally four years”. The Director contends that a starting point of four years imprisonment in the present case is manifestly inadequate given the circumstance of aggravation that the offence was committed while on parole and the respondent’s poor prospects of rehabilitation given his history. The respondent takes issue with this contention, points out that the level of violence was very low and the robbery was not premeditated and contends that in any event the criteria for permission to appeal are not satisfied.

    [6] [2018] SASCFC 72 at [30] per Kourakis CJ (with whom Kelly and Blue JJ agreed).

24. The Director contends that the Judge erred by allowing the maximum available discount of 40 per cent. The Director contends that, in the words of section 40(5)(a) of the Act, “the reduction of the defendant's sentence by the percentage contemplated would be so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence, or so inappropriate in the case of that particular defendant, that it would, or may, affect public confidence in the administration of justice”. The Director refers to the recent decision of this Court in R v Bahrami[7] in which this Court applied section 40(5)(a) of the Act and reduced the discount of 40 per cent allowed by the sentencing Judge to a discount of 30 per cent. The respondent takes issue with the Director’s contention, points out that this Court’s decision in Bahrami post-dated the sentencing of the respondent and contends that in any event the criteria for permission to appeal are not satisfied.

    [7] [2020] SASCFC 111 at [139] per Livesey J (with whom Bleby J agreed).

25. The Director contends that the non-parole period of two years was manifestly inadequate. The Director points to the fact that it was common ground during sentencing submissions that the respondent was to be sentenced as a serious repeat offender and, by virtue of section 54(1)(b) of the Act, the non-parole period was required to be at least 80 per cent of the head sentence imposed in respect of the 2020 offending. Although the non-parole period of two years comprised approximately 90 per cent of the head sentence for the 2020 offending (two years, four months and 25 days), this does not take account of the balance of the sentence for the 2017 offending, being one year, one month and one day, in respect of which the respondent’s parole had been cancelled by the Parole Board. The respondent takes issue with the Director’s contention and points out that there was strict compliance with section 54(1)(b) of the Act.

    Non-parole period

26. It is convenient to address first the adequacy of the non-parole period.

27. Section 54 of the Act provides:

    54—Sentencing of serious repeat offenders

    (1)The following provisions apply in relation to the sentencing of a person who is a serious repeat offender for an offence (including an offence that resulted in the person being a serious repeat offender):

    (a)     the court sentencing the person is not bound to ensure that the sentence it imposes for the offence is proportional to the offence;

    (b)     any non‑parole period fixed in relation to the sentence must be at least four‑fifths the length of the sentence.

    (2)However, a court that is sentencing a person who is a serious repeat offender for an offence may declare that subsection (1) does not apply if the person satisfies the court, by evidence given on oath, that—

    (a)     the person's personal circumstances are so exceptional as to outweigh the paramount consideration of protecting the safety of the community (whether as individuals or in general) and personal and general deterrence; and

    (b)     it is, in all the circumstances, not appropriate that the person be sentenced as a serious repeat offender.

28. There was no suggestion before the sentencing Judge that subsection 54(2) applied.

29. In R v Culley[8] Culley had earlier been sentenced to imprisonment for three years, 10 months and 17 days (with a non-parole period of two years) commencing on 20 December 2016. As a result of the offending the subject of the Director’s application for permission to appeal, he became a serious repeat offender. He was sentenced for that offending to imprisonment for four years and 19 days (the “actual sentence”), backdated to commence on 20 December 2017, so as to result in a substantial degree of concurrency, such that the total of the two head sentences exceeded the previous head sentence by only one year, two months and two days (the “effective sentence”). The total of the two head sentences was five years and 19 days. The Judge extended the original non-parole period by 11 months and one week, being 80 per cent of the “effective sentence”.

    [8] [2019] SASCFC 143, (2019) 134 SASR 92.

30. This Court held that the Judge erred by having regard to the “effective sentence” (one year, two months and two days) rather than the “actual sentence” (four years and 19 days) when calculating the minimum 80 per cent non-parole period mandated by section 54(1)(b). However, this Court rejected a contention by the Director that the Judge was required to have regard to the total of the head sentences (five years and 19 days) when calculating the minimum 80 per cent non-parole period. Kourakis CJ, Peek and Hughes JJ said:

    For the purpose of s 54(1)(b) a non-parole period is fixed both when sentencing a defendant who is not then serving a non-parole period, and when extending the non-parole period being served by a defendant who is sentenced for other offending.... The sentence to which s 54(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2017 refers is the sentence, or contemporaneously imposed sentences, which enliven the obligation to fix (including to extend) a non-parole period.

    …

    Clearly, in the context of s 54(1)(b), both occurrences of the word “sentence” only make grammatical and contextual sense if each is taken to mean the imposition of a penalty. The penalty imposed in this instance was four years and 19 days. The respondent does not resist this conclusion.

    …

    However, it remains to be considered how the four-fifths rule operates where partial concurrency is employed. Section 47 of the Sentencing Act 2017 required the earlier non-parole period to be reviewed and extended. The non-parole period, once extended, must therefore not be less than four-fifths of the sentence the imposition of which invokes s 47 of the Sentencing Act 2017. That sentence is the sentence of four years and 19 days. Whether it is imposed concurrently or cumulatively, we acknowledge that it follows that in the sentencing of a serious repeat offender who is subject to an existing non-parole period, the four-fifths requirement will be easily satisfied. The consequence is that a sentencing judge will retain a wider discretion when extending a non-parole period than when fixing one for a serious repeat offender who is not then subject to an existing non-parole period.

    It may well be that Parliament thought s 54(1)(b) would operate differently and that an existing non-parole period would be extended by four-fifths of the subsequently imposed sentence or by four-fifths of the effective increase in the total period of imprisonment. It may be that Parliament did not turn its mind to the problem at all. The failure to expressly deal or even mention extensions suggests the latter. Be that as it may, the text itself does not support any construction other than the one we would adopt. This is not a case in which the ambiguity can be removed by contracting the breadth of the meaning of the words of the section. To reach a different outcome would require the Court to read text into the section. There is insufficient justification to do so and to thereby limit the discretion of sentencing courts. Sentencing courts will of course exercise their discretion having regard to Parliament’s concern that the community be protected from serious repeat offenders.[9]

    [9]     At [54], [56] and [58]-[59].

1. In Da Silva v The Queen[10] Da Silva had earlier been sentenced to imprisonment for seven years, cumulative on the balance of an existing sentence of four months and 23 days (with a revised non-parole period of four years and 9 months) commencing on 14 September 2016. As a result of the offending the subject of Da Silva’s application for permission to appeal, he became a serious repeat offender. He was sentenced for that offending to imprisonment for five years, four months and 24 days, cumulative on the earlier sentences such that the total of the head sentences was 12 years, nine months and 18 days. The Judge extended the original non-parole period to 10 years and two months, calculated as 80 per cent of the total of the head sentences of 12 years, nine months and 18 days.

   [10] [2020] SASCFC 66.

2. This Court, following the decision in Culley, held that the Judge erred in calculating the minimum 80 per cent non-parole period by reference to the total of the head sentences instead of by reference to the new head sentence of five years, four months and 24 days. The Court remitted the matter to the District Court for resentencing. Livesey J (with whom Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreed) said:

   Having determined to impose a head sentence of five years, four months and 24 days (this being a reduction from a starting point of six years for the late guilty pleas), it was to that head sentence that the s 54 “four-fifths rule” applied, requiring that the non-parole period be at least four years, three months and 26 days.[11]

   [11] At [49].

3. In the present case, as a result of the respondent’s breach of his parole conditions, the Parole Board cancelled his parole and he became liable to serve the balance of his 2018 sentence until 12 April 2021.

4. Subsections 47(1) to (3) of the Act relevantly provide:

   47—Duty of court to fix or extend non‑parole periods

   (1)Subject to this section, when a court, on convicting a person of an offence, sentences the person to imprisonment, the court must—

   (a)     if the person is not subject to an existing non‑parole period—fix a non‑parole period; or

   (b)     if the person is subject to an existing non‑parole period—review the non‑parole period and extend it by such period as the court thinks fit (but not so that the period of extension exceeds the period of imprisonment that the person becomes liable to serve by virtue of the sentence, or sentences, imposed by the court); or

   ...

   (2)If the sentence of imprisonment is imposed for an offence committed during a period of release on parole or conditional release from a previous sentence of imprisonment or detention, the court, in fixing a non‑parole period under subsection (1)(a), must have regard to the total period of imprisonment (or detention and imprisonment) that the person is, by virtue of the new sentence and the balance of the previous sentence, liable to serve.

   (3)If a prisoner is serving a sentence of imprisonment but is not subject to an existing non‑parole period, the sentencing court may, subject to subsection (5), fix a non‑parole period, on application by the prisoner or the presiding member of the Parole Board.

5. But for the fact that section 47(1) and (2) required the Judge sentencing the respondent for the 2020 offending to fix a combined non-parole period for the 2017 and 2020 offending, subsection 47(3) would have empowered the District Court to fix a new non-parole period in respect of the 2018 sentence due to expire on 12 April 2021. If the Court had been asked to fix a new non-parole period in respect of the 2018 sentence under subsection 47(3), it could not have been an appropriate exercise of the discretion to fix a period less than six months being approximately 50 per cent of the balance of the sentence to be served (one year, one month and one day) and entailing a total non-parole period of approximately 70 per cent of the original head sentence of three years, seven months and seven days.

6. The combined non-parole period fixed by the Judge of two years might be considered in two ways. If the bare statutory minimum of 80 per cent is allocated to the sentence for the 2020 offending (one year and 11 months), this leaves only one month’s non-parole period allocated to the balance of the 2018 sentence (one year, one month and one day as at 12 March 2020). Section 54 of the Sentencing Act, as explained in Culley, imposed a minimum requirement that the combined non-parole period represent at least 80 per cent of the 2020 head sentence and it follows that the sentence complied with the requirement of the text of section 54. However, the imposition of such a low non-parole failed to take into account the purpose of section 54 of protecting the community against serious repeat offenders.

7. Conversely, if the two years non-parole period is considered as a proportion of the total of the head sentences to be served of three years, five months and 26 days, it is only 57 per cent of that total. In R v Palmer,[12] in a passage subsequently cited with approval by this Court in R v McIntyre,[13] Kourakis CJ said of the discretion exercised in fixing a non-parole period:

   … the discretion demands a balancing of the competing sentencing objectives. A judge’s prediction about an offender’s future behaviour is not the determinative criterion. Indeed judges neither have a crystal ball nor any special intelligence with which to make such predictions. The need for punishment and protection will generally result in non-parole periods of between one half and three quarters of the head sentence. Where in that range, or in special cases where outside that range, the non-parole period is fixed will depend on a realistic balancing of positive and negative indications of the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation. That balancing does not necessarily entail the making of a prediction. This is a fraught area. There is a real risk of heuristic error by judges who, for one reason or another, believe they have gained an intuitive understanding of the psychology of the defendants they are sentencing. The safer course is to fix a lower or higher proportion by reference to the usual range depending on whether the offender has relatively poor or good indications for rehabilitation. That assessment must be based largely on factors like the offender’s antecedents, previous responses to community corrections orders, degree of contrition and demonstrated willingness and capacity to overcome criminogenic factors.[14]

   [12] [2016] SASCFC 34.

   [13] [2020] SASCFC 101 at [84] per Doyle J (with whom Stanley and Hughes J agreed).

   [14] At [4].

8. Given the respondent’s antecedents, lack of expressed contrition and lack of any demonstrated willingness and capacity to overcome criminogenic factors, a proportion of only 57 per cent, near the bottom of the range of 50 to 75 per cent referred to by the Chief Justice, was manifestly inadequate.

9. The Judge made a serious error of principle in calculating the non-parole period. The Judge effectively failed to take into account the fact that the respondent had breached the conditions of his parole and, subject to the exercise of discretion under subsection 47(3), was otherwise obliged to serve the whole of the balance of the 2018 sentence in custody.

10. As a result of this error by the Judge, the non-parole period fixed by the Judge was manifestly inadequate.

11. The nature and extent of the Judge’s error of approach renders this one of those rare and exceptional cases in which it necessary for this Court to grant permission to appeal to correct the error and maintain public confidence in sentencing.

12. As a result, it is necessary for this Court to resentence the respondent.[15].

    [15]   Da Silva v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 66 at [56] per Livesey J (with whom Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreed).

    Resentencing

13. In determining an appropriate starting point for the head sentence, the level of violence displayed by the respondent was at the very low end of the range of robberies in which violence is applied. In a sense, it was a theft accompanied by minimal and incidental force. On the other hand, the offence was committed while the respondent was on parole. An appropriate starting point is imprisonment for four years.

14. The maximum discount under section 40(3)(a) of the Act is 40 per cent. In the circumstances, we discount the starting point to two years and six months, being a discount of slightly less than the maximum of 40 per cent to reflect the strength of the prosecution case and the lack of expression of remorse. Given the very low level of violence displayed, the resultant head sentence is not such as to adversely affect public confidence in the administration of justice. This head sentence is to be served cumulatively on the expiry of the 2018 sentence. The total of the balance of the 2018 sentence and the new sentence as at 12 March 2020 is three years, seven months and one day. We fix a non-parole period of two years and seven months backdated to commence on 12 March 2020.

    Orders

15. We make the following orders:

    1.Appeal allowed.

    2.Sentence imposed by the Judge set aside.

    3.The respondent is sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months, to commence on the expiry of the sentence imposed by the District Court on 27 February 2018.

    4.A non-parole period is fixed in respect of the old and new sentences of two years and seven months commencing on 12 March 2020.