R v Dawson
[2000] VSC 146
•19 April 2000
| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA CRIMINAL DIVISION |
No. 1618 of 1998
| THE QUEEN |
| v. |
| RAYMOND LESLIE DAWSON |
---
JUDGE: | Hampel J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 19 October 1999 – 29 October 1999, 18 April 2000 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 19 April 2000 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2000] VSC 146 | First Revision – 22 May 2000 |
---
Criminal law – Manslaughter – Husband killed wife – Pretended wife disappeared – False Trail - Denial – 51 years of age – Categorisation of offence – Effect of post offence conduct – Whether aggravating feature of offence - Limited mitigatory factors
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
For the Prosecution | A. J. Moore | Office of Public Prosecutions |
For the Accused | B. Kent QC (trial) J.A.O. Kemp (plea) | Kemp (Jonathan) & Associates |
HIS HONOUR:
Raymond Leslie Dawson, in October of last year you were tried for the murder of your wife, Pamela Jane Dawson. The jury acquitted you of murder, but convicted you of manslaughter.
Your wife was not seen after an argument which you had with her on 18 January 1994 outside the factory at which you worked. A month after her disappearance, you filed a missing persons’ report. You created and perpetuated a false story that you had no knowledge of her disappearance. You actively created a false trail by telephone calls, letters and removal of the clothing from her wardrobe, all designed to suggest that she was still alive. You actively encouraged the belief that she was in Sydney by persuading John Cardona to drive her car to Sydney and leaving it near her friend's house.
Nearly four years ago, on 24 April 1998, you were arrested and charged with murder. You denied your involvement and did not give evidence at your trial. You maintained your denial to the psychologist, Mr Cummins, who examined you after your conviction. At the trial, there was evidence of a heated argument between you and your wife. Cardona, who I sentenced for assisting you and attempting to pervert the course of justice, gave evidence of the admissions and of the arrangement you made to have him take the car to Sydney. You told him that you struck your wife and she did not regain consciousness. Roselin Ficheroux said that you told her that you lost control and hit your wife on the head and made a strangulation gesture. You also asked Ficheroux to provide you with an alibi.
You are now 51 years of age and have a good work record as a spray painter. For about five years prior to your arrest, you had been working for Nuveau Kitchens as a subcontractor. You had been married to the deceased for about 20 years. She had a son, Reece, before she married you. You had one daughter together, who is about 18 now, and has just completed her schooling. Before her death, your wife had been working at Vision Express, and in early 1993 she went to New South Wales to work. You suspected her of having been involved with other men. She returned to live with you after a five month separation, but there were still marital problems. You had a close relationship with Reece, who had psychiatric problems for a long time.
Tragically, he committed suicide soon after the conclusion of your trial. Understandably, this has been a tragic and traumatic event for you.
At the end of 1991, you suffered a subarachnoid haemorrhage and were operated upon. After some initial difficulties, your condition improved and you were able to resume normal work, although you suffer some residual loss of memory.
Between 1969 and 1984 you accumulated a number of convictions, which were mainly for offences of dishonesty, and resulted in some terms of imprisonment. However, you have no relevant convictions for violence and no convictions since 1984.
Mr Kemp submitted on your behalf that your offence should be characterised as being in the lower range of manslaughter offences. It was manslaughter, he argued, by an unlawful and dangerous act during a heated argument by striking of the deceased. There is no evidence about how the death was caused except for what you said and demonstrated to others, and no evidence of what then happened to the body. There is, of course, the clear inference that you disposed of the body.
Mr Moore, for the Director of Public Prosecutions, submitted that the offence should not be treated as one at the lower end of the scale because of your subsequent action of disposing of the body and then creating the myth that your wife had disappeared, that she might still be alive, and creating a false trail. This, Mr Moore submitted, has caused additional anguish to the deceased's family and should be seen as an aggravating feature of the offence. Mr Moore relied on cases such as R v. Darren Deans and R v. Brett Woodman[1] and also the Director of Public Prosecutions v. England.[2] In Deans and Woodman, the Crown submitted that the manslaughter should be seen as being in the middle range and not the lower range of manslaughters. Smith, J. held that this was placing the culpability of Deans too high for sentencing purposes because there was no evidence of premeditation and the blow was struck on the spur of the moment. His Honour did, however, go on to say that Deans significantly aggravated what he did by the way he dealt with the body and by concealing what he had done, which had a profound effect on the deceased's family.
[1][1999] VSC 299.
[2][1999] VSCA 95.
Looking at His Honour's judgment as a whole, I do not take what His Honour called aggravation as placing the offence itself in a different category. The features His Honour described as aggravating, after concluding that the offence was in fact in the lower range of manslaughters, amounted to conduct which reduced the amount of leniency which could be extended in the sentence as a whole. In England's case, there was sexual interference and burning of the body following the death. The court observed that it would be artificial to draw the line, in those circumstances, at the point of death when viewing the criminal conduct of the offender. I think that is a different situation from that which I have to consider and that which Smith, J. had to consider.
I agree with Mr Kemp's submissions that, on the evidence available, this crime is within the lower range of crimes of manslaughter, although no precise division into such categories can really sensibly be drawn. There is no evidence of premeditation or previous violence generally by you to others or to the deceased. That is not to say that your conduct afterwards should not be considered in the sentencing process as a whole. It certainly has the effect of depriving you of the benefit of the leniency which can be extended for contrition and remorse, for co-operation, and the extension of mercy to you generally. It also does not speak well of your prospects of rehabilitation.
All this means that there are not many mitigatory factors left so far as the sentence to be imposed on you is concerned. I do, however, take into account your age, and the fact that since you were charged in April of 1998, you have been in custody with a charge of murder hanging over your head.
I have read the victim impact statements of the deceased's two sisters. They speak loudly of the tragedy which you caused and, indeed, the additional anguish which you caused by your deceitful conduct.
In all those circumstances, you are sentenced to be imprisoned for six years. I fix a period of four years before which you will not be eligible for parole. I declare that 727 days have been served pursuant to this sentence, and that this declaration be entered into the records of the court. I have made the order for an intimate sample under s.464ZF of the Act.
---
0
0
0