R v Dawood No. Sccrm-02-62, Sccrm-02-94

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R v DAWOOD
[2002] SASC 346

Court of Criminal Appeal:  Perry, Williams and Gray JJ

  1. PERRY J.               I have had the benefit of perusing the draft reasons for judgment of Gray J. I am indebted to him for his exposition of the circumstances surrounding the road accident which has given rise to the charge against the appellant. I will enlarge on his summary of the relevant facts only to the extent necessary to make these reasons intelligible.

  2. The Crown called two witnesses who were said to have made observations of the vehicle driven by the appellant shortly before the accident. (I exclude for this purpose a third witness, Gregory Dunn, who saw only a puff of dust before coming on the wrecked car which had been driven by the appellant.)

  3. The first of these was John Richardson, who lived on the eastern side of Mt Pleasant Road, which is the road upon which the accident occurred. A few minutes before the accident, he was standing outside of his home in a position from which he had a view of part of the roadway, a strip of about 600 metres. He heard the sound of a vehicle travelling south on the roadway. When it came into view, although he did not see it for long, he estimated that it was travelling in excess of the speed limit, or at least the limit set by a speed advisory sign which was 95 kilometres per hour. He thought that it was exceeding that speed by a “considerable amount”. He thought that the vehicle was a dark colour, either very dark blue or black, and that it was either a Ford sedan or a Holden Commodore.

  4. Mr Richardson was a member of the local Country Fire Service. Shortly after he saw the vehicle, his wife passed on a phone call asking him to attend a road accident which turned out to be the accident in question. When he arrived at the accident scene, which was “a couple of minutes” drive from his house, he saw the damaged car which had been driven by the appellant. He identified it as the car which had passed him shortly beforehand, in the sense that it answered the general description of that car, and he thought that it was the same vehicle.

  5. The other witness who was said to have observed the appellant’s vehicle shortly before the accident was Peter Gaston, who lived between Angaston and Eden Valley. On the afternoon in question, he dropped his partner off at work in the township of Eden Valley. In driving there, he passed along the Mt Pleasant Road, during the course of which he saw a vehicle parked on Mt Pleasant Road. He recognised it as a Holden Commodore, black in colour, and that it appeared new. He saw at that stage that a male person was sitting in the driver’ seat.

  6. When he returned, driving in the opposite direction after having dropped his partner off at her work, he…

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Details
Case
[2002] SASC 346
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Dawood, the appellant, Hassan Mohammad Dawood, was convicted for causing death by dangerous driving. The appeal against his conviction and sentence was heard by the South Australian Supreme Court. The primary issues in the appeal were the admissibility of certain evidence, the conduct of the trial judge in handling cross-examination regarding the appellant's engagement of an expert witness, and the adequacy of the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding causation. The court examined whether the trial judge's handling of the evidence and the jury instructions met legal standards and whether any errors led to a miscarriage of justice.

The court found that the trial judge properly handled the admissibility of evidence from witnesses Gaston and Richardson, providing adequate warnings to the jury about the reliability of their testimony. Regarding the cross-examination about the appellant's engagement of an expert witness, the court held that the trial judge's conduct did not prejudice the appellant. The court also addressed the argument that the trial judge's direction on causation was flawed, finding it to be correct and sufficient in light of the evidence and circumstances of the case. The court concluded that no error of principle or law was made by the trial judge, and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

Ultimately, the appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed. The court confirmed that the sentence imposed was within the judge’s discretion and found no grounds for overturning the conviction. The judgment affirmed the integrity of the trial process and upheld the appellant's conviction and sentence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is convenient at this stage to deal with the grounds of appeal. I will deal with them in the order in which they are set out in the notice of appeal.(A) treatment of evidence of the witnesses gaston and richardson The appellant pleads in this ground that the learned trial judge erred in refusing to exclude the evidence of these two witnesses. This relates to the refusal by the learned trial judge to accede to arguments which were put on a voir dire hearing ahead of the trial that the evidence was inadmissible. On the hearing of the appeal, Mr Barrett QC, who appeared for the appellant, did not pursue that argument. Rather, he submitted that a “... more effective caution should have been given to the jury” about their evidence. With respect to Mr Barrett QC, there is nothing in this criticism. The learned trial judge reminded the jury with respect to Mr Richardson’s evidence “... you will bear in mind the paucity of time for which he saw the vehicle and the difficulties of estimating speed in those circumstances”. As for Mr Gaston’s evidence, the learned trial judge reminded the jury of the criticisms made of his evidence by counsel for the appellant which related to the discrepancy between the appellant’s evidence that he did not stop his car, and Mr Gaston’s evidence that he saw it while it was stopped and before it drove off again, and the uncertainties attendant upon identification of it. In my opinion, the jury was given adequate assistance by the learned trial judge in approaching the evidence of these two witnesses.(b) Cross-examination of the appellant as to his engagement of an expert witness, Mr Hall, who was not called There are four grounds of appeal relating to this topic. They are as follows:“2.The learned trial judge erred in allowing counsel for the prosecution to cross-examine the accused as to instructions to his legal advisers to have an engineer review the work of the Crown witness England.3.The learned trial judge erred in refusing to allow a mistrial having subsequently concluded that the cross-examination referred to in Ground 2 was impermissible.4.The learned trial judge erred in directing the jury to ignore the cross-examination referred to in Ground 2 hereof in the light of counsel for the accused requesting that no such direction be given.5.His Honour erred in the manner in which he directed the jury in respect of the evidence on the subject of Ground 2 in that the directions highlighted the fact that another expert had apparently validated England’s work and, further, gave the impression to the jury that it was permissible for counsel for the prosecution to cross-examine in the manner in which he did.” These grounds of appeal arise out of a passage in the cross-examination of the appellant which is as follows:“Q.You’ve been aware, for some time, of the estimate of speed based upon the computer simulation given by Mr England, have you not.A.Sorry, say that again?Q.You’ve been aware, for many, many months, of the estimate of speed based upon the computer simulation that Mr England has told us about in court.A.That’s correct, yes.Q.Have you instructed anyone, on your behalf -OBJECTION: MR BOUCAUT OBJECTSQUESTION ALLOWEDQ.Have you instructed anyone, on your behalf, to review the work Mr England has done on the computer simulation.A.Yes.Q.Whom is it that you have instructed to review that.OBJECTION: MR BOUCAUT OBJECTSQUESTION ALLOWEDA.It was my solicitor.Q.Is it your understanding your solicitor has contacted an expert, other than Mr England, with a view to looking at the work Mr England had done in the computer simulation.A.Yes.Q.Do you know the name of the person that your solicitor contacted for the purpose of that review.OBJECTION: MR BOUCAUT OBJECTSMR BOUCAUT: Your Honour will assume this is a running objection?HIS HONOUR: I’m taking it question by question.MR BOUCAUT: My objection applies across the board. I don’t want to keep getting up and saying ‘I object’, because that would be tiresome.HIS HONOUR: I’m conscious of the Jones and Dunkel direction we’re getting at, I suppose, or whatever.XXNQ.Do you know the name of the person you instructed to have your solicitors to have review the material.A.Yes. I’m not sure of the name, I think it’s Mr Hall or something.Q.Mr Hall.A.That’s right.Q. You understand him to be an expert in collision reconstruction.A.I don’t know what his expertise are.Q.Is it your understanding he’s reviewed the computer simulation work that Mr England has done.A.That’s right.Q.Have you also instructed your solicitors to have anyone review the manual calculations that Mr England has told us about in this court.A.I believe that’s been done, yes.Q.Again, by Mr Hall.A.I believe so.Q.The same person who reviewed the computer simulation material.A.That’s right.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRY J WILLIAMS J (dissent)
No error of principle has been identified. No relevant consideration was overlooked. No irrelevant matters were taken into account. No error of fact has been identified. The sentence imposed was within the judge’s discretion. The judge did not err. The appeal against sentence should be dismissed.JUDGMENT CITATIONSLISTED IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE IN THE JUDGMENT1. (1959) 101 CLR 298.2. See Cornish (1988) 48 SASR 520, Mayne (1975) 11 SASR 583 and Leaf-Milham (1987) 47 SASR 499.3. “ Statement of OffenceCausing Death by Dangerous Driving. (Section 19A(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935).Particulars of OffenceHassan Mohammad Dawood on the 27th day of November, 1999 at Eden Valley, drove a motor vehicle in a manner and at a speed which was dangerous to the public and thereby caused the death of Colleen Judith Levy.”4. (1991) 172 CLR 3785. Royall (supra) at 389-3906. Royall (supra) at 398, 3997. Royall (supra) 412, 4138. Royall (supra) 424, 4259. Royall (supra) at 441, 450, 45110. The proviso appears in section 353(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) which provides:“The Full Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if it thinks that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment of the court before which the appellant was convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on any question of law, or that on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal; but the Full Court may, notwithstanding that it is of the opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.” See Driscoll v The Queen (1976-1977) 137 CLR 517 at 524-5; Mraz v The Queen (1954-56) 93 CLR 493 at 514; Domican v The Queen (1991-1992) 173 CLR 555 at 565-567; Festa v The Queen (2001) 76 ALJR 291 at 326; Ugle v The Queen [2002] HCA 25.11. (2000) 202 CLR 32 at 324-512. (1987) 45 SASR 270 at 27213. SASC CCA unreported 11 December 1990 Judgment No 268214. [2001] SASC 258; 34 MVR 244 at [22] and [29]. See also R v Walden (1993) 19 MVR 193

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRY J,

Counsel for the appellant further complained that the direction with respect to causation was flawed. As earlier observed the judge correctly directed the jury that they may conclude that there was at least a reasonable possibility that Ms Levy had applied the handbrake. However it was said that once this circumstance was a reasonable possibility the judge was required to give a further direction to assist the jury evaluate the significance of Ms Levy’s conduct. It was contended that in Royall v The Queen[4] the High Court concluded that a special direction was necessary in cases like the present. It was acknowledged that there were differences as to the nature of the warning required but it was said that the court was unanimous about the need for a special warning or direction.[4] (1991) 172 CLR 378Consideration of the Issue In Royall the victim died in an apparent fall from a sixth floor flat where she and the accused had been living for several months in a de facto relationship. In the days immediately preceding the incident neighbours had overheard the victim and the accused arguing. When the victim’s naked body was discovered on the street her hair was wet. An examination of the flat revealed that there had been forced entry into the bathroom and signs of a struggle. The victim’s blood was found in the bathroom and throughout the flat. The Crown advanced a number of explanations for the death. One was that the accused had pushed or forced the victim out of the window. Another was that the accused had attacked the victim in the bathroom causing her to fall and him to retreat and the third was that the victim had jumped from the window as a means of escape from a well founded fear that she would be subject to life threatening violence if she remained in the bathroom. The accused made an unsworn statement in which he said that the victim was an amphetamine user who also suffered from epilepsy. He explained that she was having a shower in the bathroom when he heard a sudden thump on the wall. He became concerned for her safety and forcibly entered the bathroom. At that time the victim was already jumping out of the window. In Royall the trial judge gave a specific direction concerning the victim’s conduct:“The third allegation is that [the victim] at the time immediately before her fall from the window, had a well-founded and reasonable apprehension that if she remained in the bathroom she would be subjected to such further violence as would endanger her life and if in those circumstances she sought to escape by jumping out the window thinking that by so doing she had a better chance of saving her life than by staying inside, and was killed in that fall, the causal link between the acts of the accused and the death are established.” The accused was convicted of murder. An appeal to the High Court challenged the adequacy of the direction concerning causation. The members of the court differed in their views. The question of the appropriate direction to be given in cases of escape or self preservation was addressed.