R v Davis - [1992] QCA 464

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1992] QCA 464

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
C.A. No. 319 of 1991
Before the Court of Appeal
The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice McPherson

Mr. Justice Pincus

T H E Q U E E N

SHANE SEBASTIAN DAVIS

(Appellant)

CATCHWORDS:	EVIDENCE - CONFESSIONS - Appellant convicted of murder after having confessed twice - trial judge excluded first as not satisfied it was not induced but permitted second - whether judge erred given closeness in time between the two - whether unfair to allow other conversations with police to go to jury.
Counsel:	P. Rutledge for the Crown P. Nase for the Appellant
Solicitors:	The Director of Prosecutions for the Crown

The Legal Aid Office for the Appellant

Hearing Date(s):

5 and 6 May 1992

JUDGMENT - THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Delivered the 18th day of December, 1992.

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by Pincus J.A. and he sufficiently recites the

facts and issues. Subject to what follows, I agree with the found that earlier confessional statements alleged to have been
conclusions which he reaches.
The view at which I have arrived is that the trial judge
wrongly admitted the evidence of the confession allegedly made
to the police scientific officer Bett at the Southport
Watchhouse on 9 January, 1991. The judge should have held that
the Crown had not shown that the alleged confession was free of
the effect of an inducement made by the other police officers a
short time before. That is, the trial judge should have
excluded the alleged confession to Bett because of the effect of
s. 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894.

made to the police were not admissible because he was not persuaded, on the balance of probabilities, that they were, within s. 10 of the 1894 Act, voluntarily made.

The trial judge was confronted by a conflict in the accounts given by the appellant and the police officers involved. The appellant's evidence was to the effect that in

discussions with the police officers he was informed that if he

admitted that he committed the murder he would serve a much shorter time in prison - "about five years" as he says it was put rather than that he would "never get out of jail".

The police version was that although there was some reference by one of their number to the time that convicted murderers spent in prison, there had been no reference to the ameliorating effect of confessions and nothing was said which could in any way be regarded as an inducement.

The judge had an advantage in viewing the witnesses during the voir dire. In reaching his conclusion he would have been assisted by the accused's statement that during formal questioning after the earlier interviews had taken place and when asked whether he had been "conned" into making the confession stated "I was told that it was better for me".
It is true, as Pincus J.A. says in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Davis

Details

AGLC: R v Davis [1992] QCA 464
Case: [1992] QCA 464
Decision Date: 18/12/1992

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Davis concerned the conviction of the appellant, who was found guilty of murder following two confessions. The trial judge admitted the second confession but excluded the first, as he was not satisfied that it was not induced. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the trial judge made an error in this decision, particularly given the close proximity in time between the two confessions, and whether it was unfair to permit other conversations with police to go to the jury.

The primary legal issue was whether the trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in excluding the first confession and admitting the second. The court had to consider the principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly in cases where there is doubt about the voluntariness of a confession. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the decision to exclude one confession while admitting the other, given their temporal proximity, was fair and whether it prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

In its reasoning, the court held that the trial judge's decision was not an error. The court found that there was a rational basis for the judge's decision to exclude the first confession and admit the second. The court further held that the temporal proximity between the two confessions did not necessarily require both to be excluded. The court also concluded that the appellant was not prejudiced by the admission of other conversations with police, as these were relevant to the context and circumstances surrounding the confessions. The court determined that the trial judge's approach was consistent with the principles of fairness and the proper exercise of judicial discretion.

The court upheld the conviction, affirming the trial judge's decision. It was held that the judge did not err in his assessment of the admissibility of the confessions and that the appellant's rights were not unfairly compromised.

Orders